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Abstract 
Alzheimer’s disease is the leading cause of dementia worldwide, affecting more than 
30 million people. FDA-approved drugs only provide temporary relief to memory problems, 
and no disease-modifying therapies are currently available. As such, different therapeutic 
modalities are being investigated to address the biological and/or cognitive manifestations of 
the disease. A number of these therapies are highly invasive and require stereotactic surgery, 
potentially posing a greater risk of harms to a vulnerable population with cognitive deficits 
that limit their ability to provide fully informed consent. Using an interdisciplinary and 
pragmatic approach to bioethical inquiry, this dissertation examines studies on deep brain 
stimulation in people with Alzheimer’s disease, reviewing clinical trials and relevant animal 
studies to highlight pressing ethical concerns that ongoing and forthcoming trials need to 
address. By having three major publications during the course of the PhD as the main chapters, 
this thesis aims to enumerate ethical issues that encompass the genetic, neurobiological, 
cognitive, individual, and societal dimensions of deep brain stimulation for Alzheimer’s 
disease. These ethical considerations can then be extended into other forms of novel 
neurosurgical trials such as cell implantation and gene therapy. Finally, this thesis 
incorporates other publications during the PhD to illustrate further conundrums on the use 
of deep brain stimulation and highlight directions for future bioethics research on the use of 
invasive neurotechnologies for dementia in terms of the importance of genetic underpinnings, 
clinical translation issues, communication of research objectives, media portrayal, and 
implications on criminal responsibility. 
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Chapter One. Introduction: Neuroethical Considerations for 
Emerging Neurotechnologies  
Neuroethics, a discipline encompassing both the ethics of neuroscience and 
neuroscience of ethics (Roskies 2002), has gained prominence in the past decade and a half, 
as evidenced by an increase in publications and research efforts and by the establishment of 
dedicated journals and academic societies (Racine et al. 2017; The Lancet Neurology 2018). 
Among the key concerns of neuroethics is the investigation of ethical issues associated with 
novel technologies for people with neurologic or psychiatric conditions. Although ethical 
concerns on bio- and neurotechnologies  (Twiss 1976; Siegfried, Lazorthes & Sedan 1980; 
Kletzel, Morgan & Frader 1998; Ryan 2000) and on on-going practices and research involving 
the management and treatment of psychiatric and neurologic disorders (Redlich & Mollica 
1976; Dickens 1981; The American Academy of Neurology Ethics and Humanities 
Subcommittee 1996; The Ethics and Humanities Subcommittee of the American Academy of 
Neurology 1998) have been raised before the formalization of neuroethics as a discipline and 
the establishment of dedicated societies and journals (Buniak, Darragh & Giordano 2014), the 
creation of a more formal field of inquiry has led to more unified, better funded, and 
interdisciplinary research efforts and to a stronger push to integrate ethical inquiry into 
neuroscience research and neurotechnology development (Martin et al. 2016; Becker et al. 
2017), especially for those targeting vulnerable populations (Singh 2013; Stevenson et al. 
2013; Fins 2016). 
This thesis draws upon the interdisciplinary nature of neuroethical inquiry to dissect a 
broad range of ethical issues associated with clinical trials on invasive neurotechnologies for 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD). By focusing on deep brain stimulation (DBS) trials, this thesis 
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highlights concerns starting from the translational value of pre-clinical studies in different 
animal models (Viaña et al. 2017) to the design of clinical trials to account for population-
specific characteristics that might influence disease progression and intervention response 
(Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017). This thesis also aims to underscore the importance of 
acknowledging that trial participants are persons with a selfhood that has already been 
influenced by the disease, and as such, the impact of an invasive intervention such as DBS on 
their identity, self-image, self-appraisal, and relationality must be given importance equal to 
that of cognitive and neurologic outcomes (Viaña & Gilbert 2018). By taking an 
interdisciplinary approach, as reflected in the three major papers that comprise this thesis 
(Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017; Viaña & Gilbert 2018; Viaña et al. 2017), this study aims to 
highlight that both AD and DBS have effects not only on the brain (cognition and behaviour), 
but also on the person as an embodied whole and as a relational being in a society and a 
particular culture that also has its views on an AD diagnosis and on recipients of a particular 
intervention such as DBS. 
In addition to taking an interdisciplinary lens, this thesis also utilises an empirical, 
applied, and pragmatic bioethical approach (Fins, Miller & Bacchetta 1997, 1998; Racine 
2008a, 2008b). Pragmatism, a philosophical tradition that originated from the USA around 
1870 and initially forwarded by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, 
emphasises the clarification of the contents of hypotheses by tracing their practical 
consequences or implications for what we will or should do (Hookway 2016). The version of 
pragmatism in bioethics that is applied in this work draws upon from the moderate natural 
pragmatism forwarded by Eric Racine (2008b, 2013) and the clinical pragmatism method 
proposed by Joseph Fins, Matthew D. Bacchetta, and Franklin G. Miller (1997, 1998), both of 
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which were mainly or partly inspired by John Dewey’s formulation of pragmatism, which 
emphasises that moral problem solving should be based on the experimental method of 
inquiry (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997). Dewey’s naturalistic metaethics of value judgements, 
grounded in developmental and social psychology, argues the use of reflective intelligence in 
revising our judgements in light of the consequences brought about by acting on them, 
allowing redirection of conduct when habits fail. Through an experimental method of inquiry, 
value judgements are tested by putting them into practice and assessing whether the results 
are satisfactory in the way they solve problems while limiting side effects to an acceptable 
level, enable successful outcomes to new problems, and provide satisfactory results when 
compared to alternative value judgements. Dewey’s ethics distinguishes itself by focusing on 
human conduct as warrant for value judgements, rather than on a fixed reference point such 
as Platonic Forms, God’s command, nature, or pure reason (Anderson 2018). 
 
 Racine’s (2013) reading of Dewey’s (1922) pragmatism highlights his view of 
pragmatism as an approach that stresses how ethical behaviour and thinking are contextual.  
Racine compares it with Beauchamp’s and Childress’s principlism (2009), and emphasises how 
pragmatism reflects more on aspects of social justice, empirical research’s transformative role, 
and institutional and macro-level changes on health policy due to the influence of democracy 
and deliberation in the construction of shared common goods (Racine 2013). Furthermore, 
his perspective on pragmatism emphasises the positive contribution of science to debates on 
ethics and policy but also challenges various forms of foundationalism in philosophy and 
science. In addition to Dewey’s (1922) pragmatism, Racine (2008b) has also drawn upon the 
work of various philosophers such as Van Rensselaer Potter on bioethics being the bridge 
between science and the humanities; Anne Fagot-Largeault on the auto-regulation process 
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that is based on social adaptation in bioethics; and Jonathan Moreno on pragmatism’s 
rejection of fundamental ethical principles that rely on a priory inquiry. By using ideas from 
various pragmatists, Racine (2008b) then proposes that a moderate pragmatic naturalism 
best describes the state bioethics has taken in order to respond to new healthcare situations 
and scientific advances. The theoretical commitments of Racine’s (2008b) moderate 
pragmatic naturalism are: 
“1) Distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ granted with qualifications; 2) Ethical 
predicates are properties that cannot be reduced to natural properties but are best 
understood within a fact-value continuum; 3) Empirical knowledge does not bring 
ethical justification of ethical norms but ethical knowledge must take into account 
human capacities. ‘Is’ does not imply ‘ought’ but ‘ought’ implies ‘can’; 4) Ethical norms 
are not natural laws but norms and rules proper to human social life. There are no 
natural moral laws but moral rules can be better understood from a factual point of 
view that takes into consideration constraints to moral agency; 5) Ethical norms do 
not simply follow from reason or experience but from their interaction, e.g. reflexive 
equilibrium; 6) Bioethics is neither autonomous nor heteronomous but best described 
as an interdisciplinary field with practical goals such as creating new forms of wisdom 
in the delivery of healthcare and the pursuit of health; 7) Normative ethics is 
normative. Metaethics is both empirical and conceptual.” (p. 98, Racine 2008b) 
Racine (2008b) forwards that moderate natural pragmatism “expresses some of the 
commitments required for the flourishing of new forms of wisdom for the delivery of 
healthcare and the pursuit of health” (p. 100, Racine 2008b). Through the lens of pragmatist 
bioethics, Racine has advocated for the acknowledgement of pluralism in neuroethics and for 
more active involvement of physicians, allied healthcare personnel, and stakeholders in 
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improving healthcare (Racine 2008a). He has also used this framework to investigate the 
effect of media depictions of disorders of consciousness on public perceptions on disorder 
prognosis; the differing opinions of physicians, and the contextual and personal factors 
influencing such, on the prognosis of people with disorders of consciousness (Racine 2008b); 
and the reason for ongoing controversies on death determination and why lay and 
foundational expert views need to co-evolve in order to reconstruct the meaning of death 
considering its practical importance (Racine 2015). 
Another perspective greatly inspired by Dewey’s (1922) pragmatism is that of Fins, 
Bacchetta, and Miller (1997, 1998), who proposed clinical pragmatism as a method of 
problem solving. The goal of clinical pragmatism is to reach consensus on good outcomes in 
real clinical cases posing moral problems. This is achieved by a thorough process of inquiry, 
discussion, negotiation, and reflective evaluation, treating moral rules and principles as 
hypothetical guides for conduct rather than as fixed and absolute moral laws (Fins, Bacchetta 
& Miller 1997). In clinical pragmatism, health practitioners engage in a collaborative process 
of problem solving when they 
 “(1) assess the patient’s medical condition; (2) determine and clarify the clinical 
diagnosis; (3) assess the patient’s decision-making capacity, beliefs, values, 
preferences, and needs; (4) consider family dynamics and the impact of care on family 
members and others intimately concerned with the patient’s well-being; (5) consider 
institutional arrangements and broader social norms that may influence patient care; 
(6) identify the range of moral considerations relevant to the case in a manner
analogous to the clinical process of differential diagnosis; (7) suggest provisional goals 
of care and offer a  plan of action including plausible treatment and care options; (8) 
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negotiate an ethically acceptable plan of action; (9) implement the agreed upon plan; 
(10) evaluate the results of the intervention; and (11) undertake periodic review and
modify the course of action as the case evolves” (p. 131, Fins, Bacchetta & Miller) 
Ultimately, clinical pragmatism focuses on the interpersonal process of moral problem solving, 
and as such, it requires being able to take others’ perspectives, engage in deliberative 
dialogue, and negotiate questions of meaning and the goals of care to reach an informed and 
inclusive consensus (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997, 1998). Using the case of a person with 
Parkinson’s disease who became non-arousable due to a yeast infection, has poor prognosis, 
and who has a wife who wanted him to receive all aggressive measures including 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, Fins, Bacchetta, and Miller (1997) illustrated how clinical 
pragmatism can be used by the physician to undertake authentic communication with the 
wife and achieve consensual decision on the appropriate therapeutic course at the end of life, 
taking into account situational, relational, institutional, social, religious, and cultural factors 
influencing decision making (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997). Clinical pragmatism has also been 
used by Fins (2005) to identify challenges in the care of patients with severe brain injury and 
on ways in which a proper plan of palliative care can be negotiated with surrogates, 
considering medical facts and the values of the patient and surrogates while ensuring balance 
between burdens and benefits. 
Although pragmatism in bioethics focuses more on a deliberative and dynamic 
approach to decision-making rather than on the direct top-down application of bioethical 
principles and moral laws (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b), certain moral rules, 
principles, and guidelines can still be used as hypotheses or as available frameworks for 
analysing moral situations (Arras 2002) and determining the most appropriate ethical course 
7
of action in a particular context. In this thesis, principles from various guidelines such as the 
Nuremberg Code, Declaration of Helsinki, Belmont Report, and the International Ethical 
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects are used to evaluate clinical 
trials on their social or scientific value, scientific validity, subject selection, risk-benefit ratio, 
study design, informed consent procedure, communication of research results, and treatment 
of participants (Emanuel, Wendler & Grady 2000; Li et al. 2016). Although not explicitly stated 
all the time, the ethical considerations forwarded throughout this dissertation are also guided 
by the four key principles in medical ethics, which are respect for autonomy, beneficence, 
non-maleficence, and justice (Beauchamp & Childress 2013). The application of a pragmatic 
approach (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b) means that no principle takes 
precedence or priority over the others; rather, these principles are just used as guides to 
determine the most appropriate course of action to protect and promote the welfare of 
research participants and other stakeholders, taking into account scientific and medical 
knowledge, relational and social dimensions of living with AD and/or receiving an invasive 
intervention such as DBS, and the context in which the trial is performed and where decisions 
are made. By utilising a pragmatic approach (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b) 
guided by cornerstone ethical guidelines and medical ethics principles to evaluate different 
aspects of a clinical trial (Emanuel, Wendler & Grady 2000; Li et al. 2016), this dissertation 
and the publications in it emulate the clinical and research ethics-grounded analysis 
performed by Issa and Keyserlingk (2000), Karlawish and Casarett (2001), Karlawish and Clark 
(2002), Beattie (2007), and Fisk (2007) to dissect ethical issues in research involving people 
with dementia and by Cabrera, Evans, and Hamilton (2014), Clausen (2010), and Racine, Bell, 
and Zizzo (2014) to determine ethical considerations on the expanding use of DBS. 
8
It is important to acknowledge that the experimental method championed by 
pragmatism also has its challenges, particularly in determining whether the tested principles 
provide the necessary guidance to a situation and lead to desired consequences. Although, 
consensus can be viewed as a potential way of determining the success of a tested principle, 
the influence of inequalities in power, wealth, and information should not be disregarded 
(Arras 2002) as this could easily degenerate pragmatism into clinical manipulation and 
become a way for the physician to reassert paternalism (Tong 1997). Nonetheless, 
considering pragmatism’s (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b) dynamism, self-
reflexivity, and fluidity and its commitment to modest fallibilism (Arras 2002), this approach 
provides adequate opportunity for self-correction (Brown 2008) should initial consensus 
prove to exacerbate rather than ameliorate paternalistic attitudes and undermine patient 
autonomy. Furthermore, even though consensus cannot be achieved, an open and honest 
discussion and deliberation could still result to the goods of mutual respect and trust between 
participants and health professionals (Tong 1997). Pragmatism’s acknowledgement of 
fallibilism in a sense that knowledge is not absolute and in the restriction of cognitive claims 
in a fluxative world (Brown 2008) could also provide opportunity for speculation, provided 
that speculations follow from a thorough review of scientific, clinical, narrative, and 
contextual information relevant to the case (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Fins 2005). By 
employing a rigorous method in reaching an ethics differential diagnosis or speculations on 
relevant moral considerations, a better negotiated and workable consensus on care plans 
with the patient and family could be achieved (Fins 2005), in addition to tempering assertions 
and preventing ideological distortions (Fins 2008) in bioethical reflections concerning clinical 
and/or research scenarios. 
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Through the principle-guided pragmatic approach (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; 
Emanuel, Wendler & Grady 2000; Racine 2008b; Li et al. 2016) described in the preceding 
paragraphs, this dissertation critically examines the protocols of animal research and in-
human trials of DBS for AD, determines aspects of these studies that necessitate ethical 
reflection, and provides recommendations that directly address ethical concerns arising from 
the recruitment, design, and conduct of these studies. Considering the emphasis placed by 
pragmatism on the contribution of scientific and clinical knowledge derived from empirical 
investigations to ethical debates (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b), ethical 
reflection was based on the set-up and results of clinical trials and/or animal studies testing 
the effect of DBS on animal models or on people with AD. For the three publications that are 
the main focus of this dissertation (Viaña et al. 2017; Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017; Viaña 
& Gilbert 2018), past and ongoing trials of DBS in people with AD were determined using a 
PubMed and clinicaltrials.gov search of the keywords “DBS Alzheimer’s disease” while 
completed animal studies that employed DBS of the fornix were identified using the keywords 
“DBS fornix” on PubMed. For the paper examining potential effects of DBS on the selfhood of 
people with AD (Viaña & Gilbert 2018), references were obtained through a search on 
PubMed, Scopus, and Google Scholar using the keywords “Alzheimer’s disease”, “dementia”, 
“deep brain stimulation”, “selfhood”, “social constructionist”, and “identity” and their 
corresponding permutations and combinations. Primary studies and case reports that 
explored the impact of AD on the social constructionist framework’s three aspects of the self 
were identified and highlighted in this review. There were no studies that investigated the 
impact of DBS on selfhood using the social constructionist framework, so relevant studies that 
discussed its effects on self recognition and perception, psychological and psychiatric profiles, 
identity, and social adjustment were referenced instead. For the research involved in all three 
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publications (Viaña et al. 2017; Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017; Viaña & Gilbert 2018), the 
references of highly relevant articles were also examined to expand the search coverage and 
identify other articles related to the initial keywords used. No specific period was set during 
the searches, and only articles that are fully in or with abstracts in English were included as 
references for the three publications. 
 
For the three main publications (Viaña et al. 2017; Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017; 
Viaña & Gilbert 2018), the pragmatic analytical framework (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; 
Racine 2008b) was employed to provide recommendations that acknowledge and address 
ethical concerns specifically arising from evaluating the safety and efficacy of DBS in people 
with AD. After obtaining relevant literature through methods detailed in the preceding 
paragraph, scientific papers describing the clinical trials of DBS for people with AD were 
carefully and critically read and details on different aspects of the trial such as inclusion and 
exclusion criteria, consent procedure, characteristics of the population enrolled, study design, 
and measured outcomes and results were placed in a Microsoft Excel matrix to facilitate 
better comparison among different trials. By using information on the pathophysiology, 
diagnosis, and prognosis (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997) of AD and the mechanisms of action 
and possible risks of DBS, better assessment of the suitability of the enrolled participants and 
the design of the clinical trials could be made.  With the focus of clinical pragmatism on 
patient’s decision-making capacity and family dynamics (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997), the 
way the informed consent was obtained for the trials and how the opinions of family 
members and caregivers were taken into account in the consent procedure, in addition to 
how AD could affect decision-making capacity, were also examined. In the identification of 
ethical considerations in the three major publications, institutional arrangements and 
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broader social norms (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997) were considered in identifying DBS 
access issues and in determining how social factors such as malignant positioning of people 
with dementia (Sabat & Collins 1999) and therapeutic misconception of invasive 
neurotechnological trial participation (Fisher et al. 2012) could affect the lived experience of 
a person with dementia who is receiving DBS. Furthermore, relevant moral considerations are 
also identified (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997), highlighting potential tensions between the 
need to properly and systematically investigate an intervention that might be beneficial to 
people with AD and the obligation to ensure that vulnerable people with impaired-decision 
making are not taken advantage of and are not subjected to risky interventions with minimal 
possibility of benefit.  With the focus of pragmatic ethics on suggesting goals of care (Fins, 
Bacchetta & Miller 1997)  and on drawing from various disciplines to create new forms of 
wisdom in the pursuit of health (Racine 2008b), the ultimate aim of the three main 
publications in this dissertation (Viaña et al. 2017; Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017; Viaña & 
Gilbert 2018) is to suggest plans of action that would minimise harm and ensure the welfare 
of clinical trial participants, ensuring that adequate care and respect are provided in the 
context of a clinical trial. Finally, clinical pragmatism advocates for periodic review and 
modification of course of action as the case evolves (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997). As such, 
results from previous clinical trials of DBS for AD are also assessed to see how they can inform 
the design of ongoing and planned trials, ensuring that the participants enrolled and that the 
set-up of the clinical trials would lead to the greatest prospect of benefit and the least 
possibility of undue medical and social harms. 
 
At this point, it is also important to stress what this dissertation does not try to achieve. 
First, although pragmatic ethics focuses on the role of deliberation and negotiation (Fins, 
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Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b), research for this dissertation does not include direct 
engagement with people participating in DBS for AD clinical trials, their family members 
and/or caregivers, and researchers and clinicians having an active role in the conduct of these 
trials, given that none of the trials are performed in Australia. As such, this dissertation 
employs a relatively limited pragmatic approach. Nevertheless, by drawing directly from 
information on how the trials are set-up and recruited, in addition to previous studies on 
clinical trials of DBS for other indications and on how Alzheimer’s disease could affect 
selfhood and decision-making, this thesis embraces the pragmatic framework, at least to the 
extent in which it uses an interdisciplinary approach that acknowledges the contributions of 
medicine, social science, and philosophy to providing practical recommendations that would 
help guide the ethical conduct of ongoing and prospective DBS for AD trials. The three main 
publications in this thesis (Viaña et al. 2017; Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017; Viaña & Gilbert 
2018) could also serve as groundwork for future ethics research that employ a fuller 
pragmatic approach (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b) – directly engaging with 
participants and researchers in DBS for AD trials, determining how the recommendations 
forwarded in the publications help improve the conduct of these trials, and gauging additional 
concerns of multiple stakeholders that warrant further moral reflection. 
 
Second, though some philosophical viewpoints are raised, particularly in Chapters 3 
and 6, the primary goal of this thesis is neither to extensively review and/or engage with these 
discussions nor to provide an in-depth philosophical and conceptual analysis on how DBS 
and/or AD impact philosophical conceptions of mind, personhood, selfhood, and identity. 
Instead, this work aims to directly engage with researchers, clinicians, and people attending 
to those with AD, via the three main publications highlighted in this dissertation, which were 
13
also published in journals ranked by Scimago Lab to be in the first quartile of their respective 
subjects (Scimago Lab 2017).  To better achieve the practical goals of this thesis, it is urgent 
that ethical recommendations directly addressing the trials are forwarded, formulated and 
published in medically-oriented journals, especially ones that focus on dementia, to best 
attract the attention of clinicians, researchers, and promote the interests of people with AD 
who are already participating or who are planning to participate in trials of DBS or other 
invasive neurotechnologies.  
 
The next paragraphs in this Introduction section provide brief descriptions of the 
remaining sections in this dissertation to give readers an idea of the overall flow of the thesis 
and how the three main publications (Viaña et al. 2017; Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017; Viaña 
& Gilbert 2018) and other publications during my PhD are integrated into the overall narrative.  
 
 To facilitate a more fluid discussion of ideas and to attract a wider readership before 
the presentation of the three main peer-reviewed publications (Viaña et al. 2017; Viaña, 
Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017; Viaña & Gilbert 2018) as three separate chapters, following the 
Introduction section are descriptive introductory chapters on AD (Chapter 2) and DBS 
(Chapter 3). Similar to introductory sections in scientific and social science publications, the 
main aim of Chapters 2 and 3 is to provide readers of the three main publications in Chapters 
4, 5, and 6 sufficient background information on the science behind DBS and AD and a brief 
overview on some of the sociological, psychological, and philosophical discussions on their 
implications on selfhood and identity. These two chapters neither aim to appraise the 
positions or conclusions of the literature presented nor argue for or against them, for they 
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are engaged with in the incorporated (for Chapter 3) and ensuing publications (Chapters 4, 5, 
and 6). 
 
Following this chapter (Chapter 1: Introduction), Part 1 of Chapter 2 provides a 
succinct overview on the biology of AD; while Part 2 briefly introduces how the disease can 
affect the selfhood of people with AD, providing a concise introduction of different 
perspectives and approaches used to investigate AD-associated changes in selfhood and 
identity. Initial information provided in Part 2 of Chapter 2 serves as a prelude to the main 
discussion in Chapter 6 on the possible effects of DBS on the selfhood of people with AD.  
 
Chapter 3 then introduces DBS, providing a brief history and information on its 
possible modes of action. This chapter also includes three publications that this dissertation’s 
author has contributed to, two of which highlight the ethical dimensions of this technology 
and concerns that extend beyond its neurobiological mechanism and intended effects on a 
particular disorder (such as motor improvement for people with Parkinson’s disease). The first 
paper entitled “I miss being me: phenomenological effects of deep brain stimulation”, 
published in the American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience, illustrates the perspectives of 
people with PD who received DBS, focusing on how the intervention led to self-estrangement 
and to whether such estrangement was deteriorative or restorative in nature (Gilbert et al. 
2017). The second study entitled “A personal narrative on living and dealing with psychiatric 
symptoms after DBS surgery”, published in Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics, provides a more in-
depth and long-term investigation on one of the people with PD in the study of Gilbert et al. 
(2017) to illustrate the challenges that a DBS  recipient may face as a result of DBS-associated 
psychological and psychiatric sequelae and to demonstrate how someone copes with and 
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integrates them into his/her self-image (Gilbert & Viaña 2018). These papers would bring into 
the spotlight ethical concerns regarding an invasive and risky intervention such as DBS that 
extend beyond its “initial” safety and clinical efficacy, most of which will also be touched on 
in the discussions on possible long-term, relational, and social effects of DBS in people with 
AD in Chapters 4 to 7. This chapter also introduces several philosophical reflections on the 
possible effects of DBS on selfhood and identity, a number of which will be drawn upon in 
Chapter 6. This chapter is concluded by a paper on “'Deflating the “DBS causes personality 
changes” bubble”, published in Neuroethics, that cautions against ethics hype and 
encourages philosophical reflections to be grounded in clinical realities (Gilbert, Viaña & 
Ineichen 2018). 
 
As mentioned earlier, this dissertation focuses on three main papers discussing 
different ethical issues on DBS for AD. Chapter 4 presents the paper entitled “Currents of 
memory: recent progress, translational challenges, and ethical considerations in fornix deep 
brain stimulation trials for Alzheimer's disease”, published in Neurobiology of Aging, which 
summarizes different trials and animal studies on fornix DBS for AD and highlights associated 
translational, medical, and ethical issues (Viaña et al. 2017). Building on the discussion in 
Chapter 4, Chapter 5 narrows down the focus to a specific sub-population of people with AD 
who exhibit cognitive dysfunction earlier, have a more aggressive disease course, and 
interestingly, had a different response, when taken as a group, to fornix DBS in one of the 
clinical trials. This chapter, which is comprised of the paper entitled “Ethical considerations 
for deep brain stimulation trials in patients with early-onset Alzheimer’s disease” published 
in the Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease, underscores the importance of acknowledging that 
additional ethical issues might arise in specific participant sub-populations and details 
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additional ethical concerns that are raised by including participants with a particular genotype 
in DBS for AD studies (Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017). Finally, Chapter 6 extends the 
discussion to the social psychology domain and uses this as a platform to frame the ethical 
discussion. The paper “Deep brain stimulation for people with Alzheimer’s disease: 
anticipating potential effects on the tripartite self”, which was published in Dementia, builds 
on Rom Harre’s and Steve Sabat’s tripartite model of selfhood to anticipate how DBS for AD 
might affect the selfhood of participants and what ethical considerations should be made to 
account for and address these effects, some of which could be unintended and potentially 
detrimental to the person with AD (Viaña & Gilbert 2018). 
 
Chapter 7 brings together the ideas raised in the three main papers on DBS for AD and 
also integrates key points raised by the three papers in Chapter 3 on the ethics of DBS for PD. 
It synthesizes the main points in these publications and proposes a way to go forward for 
existing and future trials on DBS for AD. By including a poster presentation entitled “Ethical 
Considerations for Cell Implantation in Alzheimer’s Disease” and an open peer commentary 
entitled “Of Meatballs and Invasive Neurotechnological Trials: Additional Considerations for 
Complex Clinical Decisions”, indexed and published in the American Journal of Bioethics 
Neuroscience, this chapter also illustrates how the framework used to extract, explore, and 
elaborate on the ethical issues on DBS for AD can be extended to other neurotechnologies 
such as cell implantation and gene therapy, both of which have been and are also currently 
being tested in people with AD. Although there are key differences among the three 
technologies, a number of the ethical issues are partially or fully translatable, and insights 
from the three main publications on DBS for AD can be used to further dissect ethical concerns 
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for cell implantation, gene therapy, and other invasive neurotechnologies being explored for 
and tested in people with AD. 
 
Throughout my doctoral research, I have also contributed to and have written several 
open peer commentaries and full articles on a wide range of bio- and neuroethical topics. 
These OPCs and papers were published in AJOB Neuroscience and Bioethics. A number of the 
frameworks and methodologies used and arguments raised in these commentaries and 
papers can be used for further inquiry on the ethics of DBS and other invasive 
neurotechnologies for AD. As such, these papers are incorporated into Chapter 7 as directions 
for future research. In particular, this chapter includes articles on the value of findings from 
genome-wide association studies (Viaña, Bueno & Gilbert 2017), the portrayal of 3D 
bioprinting in the media  (Gilbert et al. 2018), portrayal of the goals of the Human Brain 
Project (Viaña & Gilbert 2016), the influence of neurological findings on criminal culpability 
(Gilbert, Vranic & Viaña 2016), and ethical  issues in the clinical translation of decoded 
neurofeedback (Viaña et al. 2016). The last part of Chapter 7 highlights key ideas, concepts, 
arguments, and/or research approaches in these studies and commentaries, and it also 
illustrates how they can be translated and applied to future neuroethical investigations on 
ethical conundrums on emerging neurotechnologies for people with AD. 
 
Finally, Chapter 8 synthesizes information presented in the preceding chapters and 
summarises the key ideas presented in the publications included in this paper. It also 
reiterates the main objectives of the PhD project and concisely demonstrates how the three 
main publications in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 meet these objectives and how ideas raised and 
methods used in the remaining publications can be used as a platform to investigate 
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additional ethical concerns raised by other neurotechnologies and clinical trials for people 
with dementia. This chapter also includes a discussion of the major limitations of the research 
performed during the PhD and provides suggestions for future work to address and overcome 
these limitations.  
 
Overall, this thesis aims to extend the discussion on ethical issues involved in the 
management and care of and research involving people with dementia (Strech et al. 2013; 
Pierce 2014; Johnson & Karlawish 2015; Ovadia & Bottini 2015; Forlini 2017; Robillard & Feng 
2017; Siegel, Barrett & Bhati 2017; Robillard et al. 2018) and in the development and 
translation of emerging neurotechnologies. By focusing on DBS clinical trials for people with 
AD, it emphasizes the need to develop specific ethical recommendations for newly-developed 
technologies or when extending the applications of or introducing modifications to existing 
ones. Although this thesis acknowledges the usefulness of existing ethical publications (Pierce 
2014; Ovadia & Bottini 2015; Siegel, Barrett & Bhati 2017; Bittlinger & Müller 2018) and even 
recommends extending the ethical frameworks and ideas raised in them to other 
technologies for dementia, it also aims to underscore the importance of accounting for 
nuances in medical details and social context, and adapting, reconciling, and/or reframing 
ethical discussions and recommendations to accommodate these specificities and differences, 
as in the case of DBS for people with early-onset AD. In no way this study exhausts all the 
ethical issues on DBS for AD; surely, new findings from forthcoming clinical trials or 
modifications to the technology would necessitate additional ethical reflection. Hopefully, 
this study could serve as a stepping stone to guide and encourage further ethical exploration 
on this topic. 
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Truly, rapid progress in neuroscience has encouraged the firm and formal 
establishment of neuroethics as a research discipline. It is expected that with the further 
development of new neurotechnologies and the exploration of new indications for existing 
ones, neuroethics will play a pivotal role in ensuring the ethical, humane, and just evaluation 
and translation of these technologies to the populations who need them the most. With 
different scholars from a wide range of backgrounds and academic disciplines contributing to 
the neuroethical discussion, neuroethics is poised to demonstrate how a collaborative and 
multi-faceted research endeavour would benefit the medical and research enterprise while 
ensuring that the most important stakeholders, recipients of the developed technologies, are 
put on the pedestal. Hopefully, this thesis illustrates the result of an interdisciplinary mode of 
inquiry in the way that it viewed the ethics of DBS for AD from neuroscientific, medical, 
psychological, sociological, and philosophical vantage points. It also demonstrates how this 
interdisciplinary and pragmatic approach (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b) could 
facilitate an ethical discussion that acknowledges the scientific and medical dimensions of a 
disorder and an intervention while putting equal importance to the lived experience and 






































Chapter Two. The Brain and the Self in Alzheimer’s Disease 
 
Chapter 2 is divided into two parts, with the first part reviewing the neuroscience of 
AD and the second part reviewing discussions on how AD could affect selfhood and identity. 
Specifically, Part 1 of Chapter 2 reviews literature on the prevalence, diagnosis, genetics, 
pathophysiology, and pharmacologic management of AD and therapeutic modalities that are 
being explored to address its symptoms. Its main goal is to familiarise readers with the 
neurobiology of AD, which would be useful in understanding scientific, medical, and ethical 
points raised in Chapters 4 (Viaña et al. 2017), 5 (Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017), and 6 (Viaña 
& Gilbert 2018). Part 2 of Chapter 2 then provides a descriptive overview of different 
frameworks used to investigate AD-associated changes in selfhood and identity and of results 
from empirical studies utilising these frameworks. This overview would help readers better 
follow the arguments forwarded in Chapter 6 (Viaña & Gilbert 2018), which hypothesises 
possible effects of DBS on the selfhood of people with AD and their implications on informed 
consent, study design, and treatment of study participants. 
 
 
Part 1: Alzheimer’s Disease: A Neurobiological Overview 
 
I. Prevalence and Cost of Dementia and Alzheimer’s Disease 
 
Dementia affects an estimated 50 million people worldwide, with nearly 10 million 
new cases recorded each year (World Health Organization 2017). It also has a total estimated 
worldwide cost of US$ 818 billion (Prince et al. 2015). In Australia, 425,416 people live with 
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dementia, which was estimated to cost the country more than 15 billion AUD in 2018 
(Dementia Australia 2018). 
 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is the most common form of dementia, accounting for 
approximately 69.9% of all dementia cases (Plassman et al. 2007) or almost 5.3 million people 
in the USA alone (Alzheimer's Association 2015), with 5.1 million of patients aged 65 and 
above (Hebert et al. 2013). Considering the number of people in Australia with dementia, it is 
estimated that around 297,366 Australians have AD (Plassman et al. 2007; Dementia Australia 
2018).  
 
The burden of dementia on individuals, their family, and society raises salient concerns 
on the allocation of limited health resources and in the setting of priorities for medical 
research and treatment development. Should more priority be given to dementia, a condition 
that primarily affects older individuals, over conditions that affect children or people in mid-
age (Clark 1985)? Would it be justifiable to allocate limited resources to curing or reversing a 
disease and prolonging life in a population that in general, is expected to experience hardship 
due to other health problems and potential rejection or stigmatisation by younger individuals 
(Mahendra 1984)? Finally, is it appropriate to utilise costly high-tech applications to meet the 
care demands and reduce disease burden of older populations (Clark 1985)? Although this 
thesis does not aim to extensively reflect on the issue of justice with regards to funding 
allocation for research and healthcare of geriatric populations, especially of those with 
dementia, the paper in Chapter 4 (Viaña et al. 2017) provides an overview of societal issues 
arising in the development and application of fornix DBS in people with AD. 
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II. Clinical Diagnosis of Alzheimer’s Disease 
 
The proper diagnosis of AD is crucial in disease management and in the development 
and testing of new interventions, particularly those aimed at addressing the core symptoms 
and neuropathology of AD. Misdiagnosis is linked to many ethical issues. Misdiagnosis could 
lead to the prescription of unnecessary medications (Gaugler et al. 2013) and exposure to 
their potential adverse side effects (Kerchner, Tartaglia & Boxer 2011). Furthermore, 
misdiagnosis in people who are subsequently recruited into a clinical trial could lead to 
iatrogenic harms in the absence of a foreseeable benefit, especially for trials targeting 
pathologies specific to Alzheimer’s disease and/or requiring an invasive procedure. Finally, 
false positives could create unnecessary distress to the individual and to his or her family 
while false negatives could create a false sense of security and delay the initiation of therapies 
that could delay the onset of cognitive symptoms and improve quality of life (Howe 2006). 
 
Full diagnosis of AD is established by neuropathologic findings of amyloid beta (Aβ) 
plaques and neurofibrillary tangles, whereas its clinical diagnosis is mainly based on slowly 
progressive dementia and gross cerebral cortical atrophy observed through neuroimaging 
(Bird 1998). Conventionally, clinical diagnosis of AD is based on criteria set by the National 
Institute of Neurological and Communicative Disorders (NINCDS) and the Alzheimer’s Disease 
and Related Disorders Association (ARDRA) (McKhann et al. 1984); however, in 2011, the 
National Institute on Aging (NIA) and the Alzheimer Association published three reports that 
suggested criteria for the asymptomatic preclinical, pre-dementia, and dementia phases of 




Figure 1. Different phases of Alzheimer’s disease (figure from Forlenza, Diniz & Gattaz 2010; 
available via CC BY 4.0 license, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). It is important 
to note that not all people with MCI (mild cognitive impairment) will progress to clinically-
defined AD dementia (Frolich et al. 2017).   
 
Although mainly intended for research purposes, the pre-clinical phase of AD 
proposed by Sperling et al. (2011) is characterised by people starting to exhibit amyloidosis 
and neurodegeneration as observed from PET and fMRI scans and from CSF measurements 
of low Aβ142 levels and high tau/p-tau ratio. Subtle changes in baseline cognition and poor 
performance on more challenging tests, which are not substantial for Mild Cognitive 
Impairment (MCI) diagnosis, are also observed.  
 
The pre-dementia phase of AD is clinically defined by reports from the person or 
clinician regarding declining cognition and impairment in one or more cognitive domains, 
indicated by scores on cognitive tests 1 to 1.5 standard deviations below the mean for their 
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age and education-matched peers. These people still preserve independence in functional 
abilities and are not significantly impaired in social or cognitive functioning. Ruling out other 
sources of cognitive decline, providing evidence of longitudinal decline in condition, and 
having history consistent with AD-associated genetic factors further provide evidence for 
diagnosing MCI consistent with AD pathophysiology. Moreover, biomarkers of Aβ deposition, 
neuronal injury, inflammation, oxidative stress, synaptic damage, and neurodegeneration 
could provide support that the observed cognitive impairment is due to AD pathology; 
however, their use at this stage is mainly limited to research and clinical trial settings (Albert 
et al. 2011).  
 
Lastly, the dementia phase of AD is defined as having cognitive or behavioural 
impairment in two or more domains, which includes memory, reasoning and executive 
function, visuospatial abilities, language functions, and personality, that significantly 
interferes with ability to function at work or at usual activities (McKhann et al. 2011). Aside 
from such impairments, people with AD dementia could also exhibit confusion, agitation, 
withdrawal, and hallucinations, and some could also occasionally experience seizures, 
Parkinsonian features, mutism, myoclonus, increased muscle tone, and incontinence. Death 
from people with AD dementia usually result from general inanition, malnutrition, and 
pneumonia (Bird 1998). 
 
AD dementia can be clinically classified as either probable or possible AD dementia. 
Probable AD dementia is mainly characterized by an insidious onset evident from a clear-cut 
history of cognitive worsening and is not due to cerebrovascular disease or other forms of 
dementia. On the other hand, possible AD dementia has an atypical course with sudden onset 
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of cognitive impairment and has an etiologically mixed presentation involving a 
cerebrovascular disease or other types of dementia. As with pre-clinical AD and MCI, 
biomarkers such as low CSF Aβ142; positive PET amyloid imaging; elevated CSF tau; and 
disproportionate atrophy of medial, basal, and lateral temporal lobes, and medial parietal 
cortex observed through MRI imaging could provide further support for the diagnosis of 
dementia due to AD pathology; however, their use for diagnostic purposes is not yet 
advocated (McKhann et al. 2011). Although FDG-PET ([18F] fluorodeoxyglucose positron 
emission tomography) is already used in clinical practice to differentiate AD from other types 
of dementia, preventing the prescription of inappropriate medications for those with 
frontotemporal dementia or dementia with Lewy Bodies, the hasty and inappropriate use of 
amyloid imaging for AD diagnosis is cautioned against. A negative result on an amyloid PET 
scan indicates reduced likelihood of AD as the underlying cause of cognitive impairment; 
however, a positive result does not establish differential diagnosis between AD and other 
amyloid-beta disorders such as dementia with Lewy bodies or cerebral amyloid angiopathy 
(Marcus, Mena & Subramaniam 2014).  Furthermore, a positive result may be incidental since 
cognitively-normal adults could also exhibit age-related increase in cerebral amyloid (Atri 
2016). As such, when using amyloid PET imaging to aid in AD diagnosis, it is important that 
other clinical information are considered, standardized protocols are followed, and the 
procedure and scan interpretation are performed by staff and clinicians with expertise in 
neurodegenerative disorders (Marcus, Mena & Subramaniam 2014). Though cognitive and 
behavioural tests and in the future, biomarkers can be used in diagnosing dementia or 
cognitive impairment due to AD pathology, neuropathologic examination to determine Aβ 
deposition, abnormal tau accumulation, and neuritic plaques (Hyman et al. 2012) is still the 
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definite method for determining whether an individual’s cognitive impairments are due to 
underlying AD pathology. 
 
III. Pathophysiology of Alzheimer’s Disease 
 
Considering that Aβ deposition, abnormal tau accumulation, and neuritic plaques 
(Hyman et al. 2012) mainly characterize AD pathology, progression of the disease can be 
relatively related to pathophysiological changes associated with these biological hallmarks. In 
addition, a number of these pathophysiological changes can be used as biomarkers for early 
detection and confirmation of AD diagnosis (Niemantsverdriet et al. 2017). Although there 
are ethical issues that arise from the development and clinical application of biomarkers, a 
number of which are extensively discussed elsewhere (Porteri et al. 2017; Vanderschaeghe, 
Dierickx & Vandenberghe 2018), their relevance to this thesis is in their use in DBS clinical 
trials for AD. As will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the use of biomarkers would ensure 
that DBS trials for AD really include individuals who have pathophysiological hallmarks 
associated with the disease. Under the principles of non-maleficence and justice (Beauchamp 
& Childress 2013), including people who do not have AD-associated pathologies in trials 
involving technologies that target AD-associated neurobiological changes and are highly 
invasive in nature could expose individuals that have a lesser prospect of benefit to a great 
amount of risk and unnecessary harms. 
 
Prior to the clinical diagnosis of AD, AD pathology could have started to occur ten or 
more years before. It is postulated that AD starts with a long asymptomatic phase wherein 
AD-associated pathological processes progress, and biomarkers of these processes could 
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indicate risk of progression to MCI and even to dementia. AD pathology is proposed to begin 
with Aβ peptide accumulation either through abnormal processing or clearance; however, 
other factors such as cytoskeletal, inflammatory, metabolic, mitochondrial, synaptic, 
neuronal, and other age-related changes could also play key roles in AD pathology onset. 
Following these initial processes, synaptic depletion, accumulation of intracellular 
hyperphosphorylated tau forms, neuronal loss and atrophy, glial activation, and neural 
dysfunction could then follow (Sperling et al. 2011). Deposition of Aβ dimers, trimers, and 
oligomers may act intracellularly and extracellularly and engage both lipids and proteins, 
causing changes in the distribution or activity of neurotransmitter receptors and associated 
signalling molecules, disruption of intracellular calcium homeostasis, and impairments of 
axonal transport and mitochondrial functions (Huang & Mucke 2012). Aβ deposition starts as 
small groups of diffuse plaques in the neocortex then spreads through allocortical regions and 
eventually to diencephalic nuclei, the striatum, and cholinergic nuclei of the basal forebrain. 
After which, it further spreads to several brain stem nuclei and lastly to cerebellar regions 
(Thal et al. 2002). 
 
Another hallmark of AD is the formation of neurofibrillary tangles, made up of 
hyperphosphorylated and acetylated tau that causes the inhibition and disassembly of 
microtubules, which then leads to interference of neurotransmission (Huang & Mucke 2012; 
Raskin et al. 2015). Spread of neurofibrillary tangles starts at projection cells in the 
transentorhinal region, then extends into the entorhinal region proper, and eventually 
proceeds into both the hippocampus and the temporal proneocortex. After which, they 
further spread into the association areas of the adjoining neocortex proceeding 
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superolaterally and finally extending into the primary areas of the neocortex (Braak & Braak 
1997). 
 
Taken together, the deposition of Aβ plaques, neurofibrillary tangles, and the 
neuronal and glial reactions to them result to loss of neurons in regions such as the entorhinal 
cortex and hippocampus and loss of neuronal processes (Huang & Mucke 2012). Loss of 
neurons and thus regional atrophy usually start years before dementia onset and in projection 
neurons of the medial temporal lobe (MTL), resulting to early memory deficits. Following 
damage to MTL-originating inputs, neocortical regions receiving inputs from the MTL exhibit 
reduced activity and decreased metabolism and blood flow. Eventually, these lead to the 
disintegration of axons connecting these neocortical regions to other cortical regions, 
potentially resulting to atrophy of the corpus callosum (Smith 2002). Overall, the atrophy 
observed in the MTL, cortex, and in the corpus callosum results to an aberrant network 
activity in the brain that interferes with intricate processes underlying memory, learning, and 
other cognitive functions (Huang & Mucke 2012).  Such aberrant network activity is well 
reflected by electrophysiological changes in brain activity, starting even from pre-clinical 
stages of the disease. For instance, increased θ activity is associated with impaired cognition 
during early stages of AD, and as the disease progresses, δ activity increases and α activity 
decreases. These changes correlate not only with cognitive decline but also with 
hallucinations, behavioural disturbances, declining functioning, and incontinence. These 
electrophysiological changes also correspond with metabolic and neuropathologic changes in 




IV. Genetics of Alzheimer’s Disease 
 
Given that Aβ deposition, abnormal tau accumulation, and neuritic plaques (Hyman 
et al. 2012) mainly characterize AD pathology, genetic factors associated with their 
development could give clues on individual predisposition to AD. As explored and elaborated 
in Chapter 5, the identification of individuals with strong genetic predispositions to AD could 
be critical in the design of clinical trials. Considering that individuals who possess autosomal-
dominant AD-associated mutations could also have an earlier and more aggressive disease 
course (Rademakers, Cruts & Van Broeckhoven 2003), it is important to identify associated 
ethical issues that arise from their inclusion and potential modifications that have to be made 
in the design of clinical trials to ensure that these individuals are not unjustly harmed by trial 
participation.  
 
Genetic studies have established rare autosomal dominant forms of AD in people with 
mutations in their APP, PSEN1, or PSEN2 genes, which play roles in amyloid beta production, 
and those with Down syndrome who may have a third copy of the APP gene. People having 
these mutations may develop AD before they reach 60 and even as young as in their mid-20’s 
(Chouraki & Seshadri 2014; Ringman et al. 2014). People with AD pathology who develop 
dementia before 65 are referred to as people with early-onset AD (EOAD). Although the 65-
year-old cut-off point has no biological significance and is mainly an indicative of social divide 
in terms of employment and retirement age (Rossor et al. 2010), it has been reported that 
people with EOAD usually have a more rapid disease progression and also have more 
pronounced brain pathology compared to those who develop AD symptoms after 65 
(Rademakers, Cruts & Van Broeckhoven 2003). In addition, they have a much shorter survival 
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time; much more prevalent language disturbance (Seltzer & Sherwin 1983); exhibit other 
atypical symptoms such as visual agnosia, apraxia, dyscalculia and executive dysfunction (van 
der Flier et al. 2011); have a higher prevalence of additional non-cognitive neurological 
symptoms (Wu et al. 2012); and exhibit more severe temporoparietal junction atrophy 
(Frisoni et al. 2005). 
 
At least 62% of people with EOAD have a history of AD in the family (Campion et al. 
1999), with mutations in APP, PSEN1, or PSEN2 ascribed as the most common cause of early-
onset familial AD (EOFAD). The PSEN1 gene is the most frequently mutated and accounts for 
most EOAD cases, making up 30 to 70% of familial EOAD (EOFAD); followed by APP that 
accounts for 10 – 15% of EOFAD cases; and lastly, by PSEN2 that accounts for less than 5% of 
all EOFAD (Bird 1993; Cacace, Sleegers & Van Broeckhoven 2016). Mutations in APP result to 
its aberrant processing and increased Aβ42 secretion, whereas mutations in PSEN1 or PSEN2 
lead to aberrant cleavage of APP by γ-secretase, resulting in an overproduction of Aβ42 
(Rademakers, Cruts & Van Broeckhoven 2003). Overall, this leads to the biological cascade 
causing the observed cognitive defects in AD. Interestingly, disease onset and disease 
progression also differ depending on the mutated gene and the region of mutation. For 
instance, the age of AD onset in PSEN1 mutation carriers is between 30 and 50 years old, 40 
to 70 years in PSEN2, and 45 to 60 years in those having a mutation in APP. Moreover, atypical 
presentations such as language impairment and behavioral symptoms such as delusion, 
hallucinations, and apathy have been observed in those with PSEN1 or PSEN2 mutations 
(Cacace, Sleegers & Van Broeckhoven 2016). Certain APP mutations have also been linked to 
cases of congophilic angiopathy (Bird 1993), which can lead to leukoencephalopathy, stroke-
like episodes, haemorrhage, and cortical calcification (Wu et al. 2012).  
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Although mutations in these genes have been attributed to AD onset, people having 
an autosomal dominant mutation in these genes account for only less than 1% of those 
affected with AD (Schindler & Fagan 2015).  Most AD cases occur later in life and are 
multifactorial. Although these late-onset cases are not due to specific mutations on a single 
gene, they also have a strong genetic component, albeit more complex and heterogeneous. 
APOE, which plays a role in the clearance of soluble Aβ and Aβ aggregations, has been 
associated with late-onset AD, particularly in people with a copy of the APOE ε4 allele, which 
is believed to be less effective in Aβ clearance. Having an APOE ε4 allele could also reduce the 
age of onset of AD by roughly 10 years (van der Flier et al. 2011), and even make its onset 
earlier for people who have AD-associated mutations in APP, PSEN1, or PSEN2 (Bird 1993; 
Wijsman et al. 2005). 
 
Genome-wide association studies (GWAS) together with functional variant and 
pathway identification have also been utilized to identify other genes involved in AD. 
Although none of the risk loci were found to have an effect on AD risk similar in extent to that 
of APOE ε4, several promising genes have been identified including Clusterin (CLU), Sortilin-
related receptor 1 (SORL1), ATP-binding cassette subfamily A member 7 (ABCA7), Bridging 
integrator 1 (BIN1), Complement component (3b/4b) receptor (CR1), CD33 (Van 
Cauwenberghe, Van Broeckhoven & Sleegers 2015), PICALM, BIN1, MS4A, EPHA1, CD2AP, and 
ABCA7 (Chouraki & Seshadri 2014). In addition to identifying genetic mutations associated 
with AD, current studies are also starting to explore gene expression changes, gene-
environment interactions, and epigenomic modifications including DNA methylation and 
hydroxymethylation and microRNA deregulation (Chouraki & Seshadri 2014; Song et al. 2015). 
Ultimately, elucidating the genetic and epigenetic underpinnings of AD would provide insights 
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on its diagnosis and would also help predict response to different forms of treatment 
(Ringman et al. 2014). 
 
V. Pharmacologic Management of Alzheimer’s Disease 
 
 Although AD was first reported over 110 years ago (Dahm 2006), there are still no 
approved disease-modifying treatments available. Currently, only six drugs have been FDA-
approved for the management of AD; however, none of them stops disease progression 
(Alzheimer's Association 2015) or treats the underlying pathology. Moreover, the benefits of 
these drugs extend only for an average of six to 24 months (Broadstock, Ballard & Corbett 
2014). With the failure of several drug trials (Cummings, Morstorf & Zhong 2014; Amanatkar, 
Papagiannopoulos & Grossberg 2017) and the retreat of big pharmaceutical companies from 
dementia research (Rinaldi 2018), only a few approved substances are available to address 
the cognitive dysfunction of people with AD. This underscores an ethical need for 
governments and other institutions to review their strategies and funding towards dementia 
research, particularly in the development and translation of new drugs (Rinaldi 2018) and 
other forms of therapy.  
 
Given that early loss of basal forebrain cholinergic neurons occur in AD (Mangialasche 
et al. 2010), four of the approved drugs (tacrine, donepezil, rivastigmine, and galantamine) 
are acetylcholinesterase inhibitors, which act through enhancing cholinergic 
neurotransmission by decreasing acetylcholine breakdown (Anand, Gill & Mahdi 2014), and 
are mainly prescribed for mild to moderate AD (Broadstock, Ballard & Corbett 2014) with the 
exception of donepezil, which is prescribed for all AD stages in the USA (Mangialasche et al. 
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2010). Donepezil, rivastigmine, and galantamine might also have a potential neuroprotective 
activity by influencing APP processing and decreasing Aβ production, influencing the 
expression of AChE isoforms, and increasing the expression of nicotinic receptors (Nordberg 
2006). Monotherapy with these drugs has been shown to improve cognitive function, slow 
the pace of cognitive decline, and reduce behavioural symptoms (Anand, Gill & Mahdi 2014) 
in people with mild to moderate AD (Tsoi et al. 2019).  
 
The other FDA-approved drug, memantine, is an uncompetitive NMDA antagonist that 
blocks persistent and pathologic NMDA activation in AD and is prescribed for moderate to 
severe AD (Anand, Gill & Mahdi 2014). Memantine might also have neuroprotective effects 
by decreasing Aβ toxicity, preventing tau hyperphosphorylation, decreasing microglia-
associated inflammation, and increasing astroglia-released neurotrophic factors 
(Mangialasche et al. 2010). The last drug, which has only been approved in 2014 (Alzheimer's 
Association 2015), is NamzaricTM, which is a combination of extended-release memantine and 
donepezil and is a potentially more convenient once-daily regimen for patients with moderate 
to severe AD (Greig 2015). 
 
VI. Therapeutic Modalities Being Investigated for AD 
 
 Since there are currently no approved disease-modifying or -stopping therapies for AD, 
there is a pressing ethical need to explore several treatment modalities to reduce the health 
and economic burden brought by AD to affected individuals and to society. Drugs and 
biologics that target amyloid beta and hyperphosphorylated tau production and 
accumulation; modulate neurotransmitter release; target mitochondrial dysfunction and 
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oxidative stress; counter inflammation; lower cholesterol; provide neuroprotection; 
encourage neurogenesis; inhibit apoptosis; modulate nitric oxide synthase; and alter 
epigenetic changes such as DNA methylation, histone acetylation, and noncoding RNA 
production are currently being tested, with several already undergoing clinical trials (Adwan 
& Zawia 2013; Kumar, Singh & Ekavali 2015). Moreover, other non-drug approaches such as 
cognitive rehabilitation, cognitive training, cognitive stimulation therapy, and physical 
exercise are being actively investigated for improving cognition in people with MCI and/ or 
dementia (Corbett & Ballard 2012).   The potential of cell-based therapies by transplantation 
of autologous progenitor cells or neurons derived from cell reprogramming for 
neuroprotection or neuronal and glial replacement is also being explored (Felsenstein et al. 
2014; Kazmerova et al. 2013). In vivo viral- or liposome-mediated delivery of genes to 
promote growth factor expression or to facilitate siRNA-mediated knockdown of proteins 
involved in the amyloid beta pathway are also being done in animal models and in a few 
clinical trials (Nilsson et al. 2010). Lastly, given the aberrant network function in AD, 
neuromodulation with non-invasive techniques such as transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) (Cantone et al. 2014) and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) (Cotelli et al. 
2014; Hsu et al. 2015) and with invasive methods such as vagus nerve stimulation (VNS) and 
deep brain stimulation (DBS) (Laxton, Stone & Lozano 2014) are being explored as well.  
 
Although the focus of this thesis is on invasive treatment modalities that primarily aim 
to improve the cognition of people with AD, it is important not to discount the importance of 
social and environmental interventions that provide additional support and help improve the 
quality of life and well-being of people with AD and their caregivers (Quinn et al. 2016; 
Vandepitte et al. 2016; Whitlatch & Orsulic-Jeras 2018). In addition, evaluating the value of 
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interventions, regardless of their nature and invasiveness, should always take into account 
effects that extend beyond the biology of the person with AD, acknowledging how they could 
also influence daily function and living, relationality, and sociocultural integration.   
 
In this dissertation, Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the ethical issues associated with clinical 
trials of DBS for people with AD. These chapters critically examine the scientific validity, 
recruitment criteria, informed consent procedure, study design, measured outcomes, and 
communication of results of these trials using the four key principles of bioethics (Beauchamp 
& Childress 2013) and literature on ethical issues on clinical trials involving people with AD 
and on the use of DBS for Parkinson’s disease and the extension of its application to other 
conditions. This framework, which utilises an applied and pragmatic approach (Fins, 
Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b) to evaluate different clinical trial aspects, can then 
be extended to evaluate ethical issues arising from other biotechnological interventions such 
as cell implantation and gene therapy, as demonstrated in publications incorporated in 
Chapter 7. 
 
Part II: Beyond Neurobiology: Alzheimer’s Disease and Selfhood 
 
 Alzheimer’s disease significantly impacts both semantic and episodic memory, not 
only affecting verbal fluency and naming but also causing loss of memories (Gold & Budson 
2008; Jahn 2013), especially those that occurred before or shortly after disease onset (Sagar 
et al. 1988). Episodic memory deficits could lead to loss of autobiographical information 
containing memories for specific personal experiences at a particular time and place (El Haj 
et al. 2015). These autobiographical memories contribute to self-narratives and self-
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knowledge, allowing integration of past and present selves that enables a sense of identity 
continuity (Addis & Tippett 2004) and a coherent sense of self. As such, AD could threaten a 
person’s sense of self when a person with AD is unable to reconcile past experiences that he 
or she still remembers with her most recent experiences. This in turn could result to a 
petrified and outdated sense of self in which people with AD mainly have the identity of their 
former selves prior to dementia (Mograbi, Brown & Morris 2009). In addition, the inability of 
people with AD to reliably retrieve skills and memories constituent of their categorical self 
could impair the continuous creation of self-narratives, memories, and a self-defining identity 
(Ronch 1996). Awareness of memory and cognitive deficits, which could also lead to reduced 
social interaction, ultimately causes distress not just to the person with AD but also to 
caregivers (Maki et al. 2012). 
 
The concept of selfhood is important in determining ethical issues associated with DBS 
trials for AD as the potential loss of a person’s sense of self has profound implications on his 
or her ability to provide consent and on how he/she perceives intended and side effects of an 
intervention (Viaña & Gilbert 2018). How AD could affect a person’s sense of self, and the 
ethical issues associated with these effects on his or her capacity to consent to an invasive 
neurotechnological trial and ability to make eventual trial-related decisions, are explored in 
Chapter 6. The main purpose of this section is to provide readers a more extensive 
introduction and overview of the literature on effects of AD on the self that are presented in 
the paper comprising Chapter 6 (Viaña & Gilbert 2018). As this is a mainly descriptive section, 
no ethical arguments are forwarded in this section. These arguments, which incorporate 
findings from empirical studies that are reviewed in this section, are presented in Chapter 6. 
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 Several qualitative and quantitative studies have been performed to determine the 
effect of AD on a person’s sense of self. Different studies have used a range of models of the 
self to investigate how AD affects people’s selfhood and identity. These models include the 
social constructionist theory, an interactionist perspective, embodied selfhood, self as a 
narrative, autobiographical memory in selfhood, role identity, self-recognition, and self-
knowledge (Caddell & Clare 2010). 
 
 The framework that has been most widely used in studies is the social constructionist 
model, which states the importance of language in the creation of a social reality that is a 
product of cooperative and active enterprise of people in relationships (Gergen 1985; Caddell 
& Clare 2010). Applying this model in selfhood studies, three aspects of the self can be derived 
and investigated through interactions of people with AD with other individuals or with the 
interviewer. Self 1 is the experience of singularity or psychological continuity over time and 
can be determined by a person’s use of personal pronouns such as “I”, “me”, “my”, and “mine” 
and/or gestures such as pointing to one’s self that index a person’s unique and singular 
position in time and space. Self 2 refers to the self in terms of past and present physical and 
psychological attributes, beliefs, and judgment of these attributes. Self 3 consists of the 
persona that an individual displays socially, along with the attributes associated with that 
particular role, as a result of co-creation with one or more individuals (Harré 1991; Sabat & 
Harré 1992; Sabat & Collins 1999).  
 
An illustration of how these three aspects of selfhood are investigated in a person with 
AD is in the case study performed by Sabat and Collins (1999) on a 63-year-old woman with 
probable AD (Mrs. F). In her responses to interview questions, Mrs. F still demonstrated an 
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intact Self 1 through regular use of first-person pronouns that indicated her opinions as being 
hers. Her Self 2 was also relatively preserved as she clearly took pride in past attributes such 
as her musical background, education, and talents; and of her sense of independence. Mrs. F 
was also cognizant of new attributes she has acquired due to AD, which include “memory and 
linguistic problems, problems organizing sequences of movement, and difficulty taking care 
of aspects of family life that had been her domain in earlier, healthier days” (p. 16, Sabat & 
Collins 1999). She also demonstrated awareness of differences in her past and present 
abilities and expressed frustration on her disease-related attributes. With regards to her Self 
3, she presented herself as a teacher with a degree in music rather than as an AD sufferer. 
Sabat and Collins (1999) noted that Mrs. F preferred to be seen as someone with positive 
attributes through her past profession as a teacher rather than as someone with AD in an 
adult day care program. 
 
 The study of Sabat and Collins (1999) demonstrated that several aspects of the three 
senses of self could remain intact in a person with AD. This has also been the observation in 
most other studies that investigated selfhood using Harre’s social constructionist theory 
(Caddell & Clare 2010). For instance, a later study done by Sabat (2002) involving a different 
woman with probable AD demonstrated all three aspects of the self to still be mostly intact. 
The woman still used first person pronouns, indicative of an intact Self 1. She also was able to 
refer to her previous ability to find the exact words for her thoughts, being a former academic, 
and shared her frustrations from not being able to use the most appropriate words as a result 
of AD (Self 2). In connection with her acknowledgement of linguistic difficulties, her 
expression of her Self 3 as a former academic and social worker has been limited. Although 
Dr. M’s training as an academic and social worker could enable her to identify organizational 
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problems in the support group she was attending, she was hesitant to point them out due to 
fear of embarrassment from her difficulties in finding the correct words. After Sabat (2002) 
engaged and positioned her as an insightful person, seeing her as someone with two 
advanced degrees rather than as an AD patient, she enjoyed subsequent conversations 
discussing how the support group sessions went, allowing her to express her social persona 
as a social worker. Sabat (2002) noted that the initial hesitation of Dr. M to express herself as 
an academic and a social worker can indicate a potential loss of Self 3; however, this was not 
due to the pathology itself but rather could be a result of the attitudes of healthy others to 
limit the social persona of a person with AD to that of a ‘burdensome, dysfunctional patient’ 
by focusing on his or her diminished attributes due to the disease. Given that Sabat (2002) 
encouraged Dr. M to share her insights, such loss of Self 3 was averted, allowing Dr. M to 
express her former social persona as an academic, colleague, and mentor in subsequent 
interviews. 
 
 Although Self 1, Self 2, and Self 3 were not really lost in Dr. M and Mrs. F in the studies 
of Sabat (2002) and Sabat and Collins (1999), respectively, other studies have pointed out to 
a possible loss of different aspects of the Self. For instance, Small et al. (1998) have 
demonstrated a possible deterioration in or loss of Self 1 based on the reduced capacity or 
inability to refer to one’s self in conversations. They reported that more than half of people 
with dementia in their study, in a sample with mostly people with AD, did not use first 
pronouns when interacting with other people. However, they noted that these people were 
still able to defend their rights in conflicts and call staff by their names, which Small et al. 
(1998) interpreted as demonstrations of the integrity of the self via non-verbal behaviours 
and manners of addressing people. Fazio and Mitchell (2009) also reported a decrease in the 
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usage of personal pronouns with increasing cognitive impairment; however, calculations on 
the rate of pronoun and attribute word usage indicated similar rates of usage among those 
with no, mild, and moderate cognitive impairment. This suggests that decreased personal 
pronoun use is mainly a result of cognitive and linguistic production deficits, but not of 
inability to refer to one’s self. With regards to a possible loss of Self 2, there were reports of 
a person with AD mixing past and present events, and several individuals who did not 
recognize or even markedly deny their memory deficits (Sevush & Leve 1993; Skaalvik et al. 
2016). Finally, as already suggested by Sabat (2002) in the case of Dr. M.,  the expression of 
certain Selves 3 or social selves by people with AD might be limited due to healthy others 
constraining the social persona of a person with AD to that of a ‘burdensome, dysfunctional 
patient (Sabat 2002; Sabat 2003) and to malignant positioning of healthy behaviours as 
dysfunctional and certainly due to the diagnosis (Sabat & Harré 1992; Sabat & Collins 1999; 
Sabat, Napolitano & Fath 2004; Sabat 2005; Sabat & Gladstone 2010). 
 
Since Harre’s social constructionist theory will act as the base of an extended tripartite 
model of the self that will be used in exploring how DBS for AD could impact selfhood in 
Chapter 6, the remaining models used in other qualitative and quantitative studies will only 
be briefly described. Another commonly used framework in qualitative studies is the 
interactionist perspective, which posits that the self is based on social constructs that are 
rooted in interactions with other people through conversations and non-verbal behaviour 
(Caddell & Clare 2010). An interesting study that used this approach is that of Fontana and 
Smith (1989) where people with AD in a senior day-care centre were observed for a year, 
taking note of their daily activities and interactions with staff and other people with AD. 
Fontana and Smith (1989) noted that in certain people with AD, the self is deteriorated to a 
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point that only internalized social norms and customs, basic emotional needs such as love and 
affection, and manifestations of selfishness and egocentrism remain in the patient. They have 
mentioned instances when people with AD would answer the phone when it rang but then 
would not be able to identify what they are holding; conversations between people with AD 
where one is just singing nursery rhymes while the other person is mumbling nonsense; and 
interactions where people with AD express emotions suggesting of engagement in a dialogue, 
only to eventually utter non-sensical statements (Fontana & Smith 1989). 
 
Other qualitative studies employed the concept of embodied selfhood, which sees the 
self as reflected in bodily actions such as appearance, social etiquette, response to music, 
caring, politeness, and culture- and class-specific gestural communication and behaviour 
(Kontos 2004, 2005). Using such framework of selfhood still suggested that people with AD 
have manifestations of selfhood through maintenance of their appearance, awareness of 
their surroundings, interaction with other people, and construction of an autobiographical 
memory-based narrative, albeit to varying degrees. For instance, by observing residents 
suffering from dementia in an Orthodox Jewish long-term care facility, Kontos (2004) found 
that people with AD still manage to maintain their appearance by applying lipstick or wiping 
food on face with a bib; exercise social etiquette by expressing gratitude or covering one’s 
mouth when yawning; show care for others by comforting them when they show signs of 
distress; dance when Yiddish songs are being played spontaneously in the hallway; and use 
gestures such as gazing to express interest or disinterest in communicating with other 
residents. In addition to evaluating selfhood based on corporeal awareness through social 
interaction, bodily action, and spatial navigation (Kontos 2004), other qualitative studies 
investigated the ability of participants to share personal narratives. Although people with AD 
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could still manage to access and share personal accounts of their life and use them to maintain 
a self-schema (Usita, Hyman Jr & Herman 1998), such narratives could be compromised either 
through chronological fragmentation or omission, and they might not be as cohesive and 
comprehensive as of those who do not have AD (Caddell & Clare 2010). 
 
Quantitative approaches have also been utilized, using scales to evaluate strength and 
valence of identity in people with AD; role identities from the person’s and family members’ 
perspectives; self-recognition using mirrors, photographs, and videotapes; and knowledge of 
one’s name, job, and personality traits, which are compared with ratings from family 
members. Overall, results from these quantitative studies show people with AD to have a 
vaguer and weaker sense of identity; to forget or place less significance in role identities, 
especially occupational roles; to less likely be able to recognize themselves in the mirror, 
videotapes, and recent photographs; and potentially, to less accurately rate present 
attributes and personality traits, especially for those with severe AD (Caddell & Clare 2010).  
  
Overall, results from quantitative and qualitative psychological and sociological 
studies on people with AD suggest that although selfhood is not completely lost in these 
individuals, several aspects of it can be affected by the disease, with varying severities 
depending on disease stage and on interaction with other people. Of special note is how the 
framework used in a number of these studies can be utilised to investigate how a particular 
intervention could further affect the selfhood of someone with Alzheimer’s disease. 
Considering that Sabat and Harre’s tripartite model of selfhood has been one of the most 
commonly-used qualitative frames, this model could be extended for use in the reflection of 
possible changes in the selfhood of people with AD, due to the AD pathology and its cognitive 
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effects and also due to both the intended and unintended effects of a particular intervention 
such as DBS. Chapter 6 (Viaña and Gilbert 2018) builds on Sabat and Harre’s tripartite model 
of selfhood, incorporating frameworks from other qualitative and quantitative studies on the 
effect of AD on selfhood and discussions on the plausible effects of DBS on the selfhood and 
identity of individuals receiving this therapy, to explore possible DBS-associated changes in 




















Chapter Three. Deep Brain Stimulation: Effects on the Brain and 
Implications on the Self 
 
The first six sections of Chapter 3 review the history, medical procedure, modes of 
action, and risks and possible side effects of deep brain stimulation, which will be useful in 
understanding scientific, medical, and ethical points raised in Chapters 4 (Viaña et al. 2017), 
5 (Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017), and 6 (Viaña & Gilbert 2018). The last section (Section VII) 
provides a descriptive overview of philosophical reflections on the possible effects of DBS on 
selfhood and identity. This information would help readers better follow the arguments 
forwarded in Chapter 6 (Viaña & Gilbert 2018), which hypothesises possible effects of DBS on 
the selfhood of people with AD and their ethical implications for the informed consent 
procedure and the design of DBS for AD clinical trials. This chapter also includes three 
publications that I co-authored. These publications report on feelings of self-estrangement of 
people with Parkinson’s disease post-DBS (Gilbert et al. 2017); reflect on the lived experience 
of someone with PD who experiences unintended psychiatric sequelae (Gilbert & Viaña 2018); 
and caution against hype in neuroethical discussions on the effects of DBS on personality, 
identity, agency, authenticity, autonomy, and self (Gilbert, Viaña & Ineichen 2018). 
 
I. History of and Recent Progress on DBS 
 
 From 46 A.D. until the 1700’s, electricity had been used for treating disorders such as 
headaches, epilepsy, haemorrhoids, and gout (Gionfriddo et al. 2013). One of the very early 
demonstrations was made by the first-century Roman physician Scribonius Largus wherein an 
electric ray (Torpedo torpedo) is placed on the spot which is in pain (Wu 1984). However, it 
was only in 1802 when electrical stimulation of the brain was shown to stimulate facial 
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muscular contraction in cadavers and only in 1874 when experiments on a patient showed 
that electrical stimulations of the brain result to a variety of muscular contractions and 
eventually seizures (Gionfriddo et al. 2013). The first therapeutic application of instrument-
induced electrical stimulation of the brain was reported in 1936 and in 1937 when it was used 
to localize the firing point for epilepsy (Penfield 1936) and in mapping cortical somatic motor 
and sensory representation (Penfield, Wilder & Boldrey 1937), respectively. On the other 
hand, the use of chronic electrical stimulation of subcortical targets as therapy was first 
performed in the 1950s to treat psychiatric illness and pain and for behavioural modification, 
and subsequently for epilepsy and movement disorders such as Parkinson’s disease (Hariz, 
Blomstedt & Zrinzo 2010; Hariz 2012). Although DBS for psychiatric and neurologic disorders 
was first performed in the 1950s, the modern DBS that is employed now was heralded in 1987 
when high frequency stimulation (HFS) of the thalamic nucleus ventralis intermedius was 
systematically tested on patients with drug-resistant bilateral extrapyramidal tremor 
(Benabid et al. 1987). 
 
 Since the first systematic test of modern DBS on patients with tremor (Benabid et al. 
1987), DBS has received regulatory approval for a number of conditions. In the USA, it has 
received pre-marketing approval from the FDA for unilateral thalamic stimulation for tremor 
in the upper extremity for patients with essential and Parkinsonian tremor in 1997 (Alpert 
1997), and for bilateral stimulation of the internal globus pallidus (GPi) or subthalamic nucleus 
(STN) for advanced, levodopa-responsive Parkinson’s disease in 2002 (Schultz 2002). 
Moreover, it has received a Humanitarian Device Exemption from the FDA for unilateral or 
bilateral stimulation of the GPi or STN to aid in the management of chronic, drug-refractory 
dystonia in 2003 (Schultz 2003), and for bilateral stimulation of the anterior limb of the 
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internal capsule (AIC) for chronic, severe, treatment-resistant obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(OCD) in 2009 (Tillman 2009). In Europe, various DBS manufacturers have also received 
Conformité Européenne (CE) marks for the treatment of various disorders such as essential 
tremor, symptoms of Parkinson’s disease, dystonia, OCD, and epilepsy (Sarem-Aslani & 
Mullett 2011).  
 
As of 2017, more than 150,000 people worldwide have received Medtronic-
manufactured DBS implants for the treatment of movement disorders (Medtronic 2018). 
Currently, DBS is tested for a wide range of conditions including headache disorders (Altinay, 
Estemalik & Malone 2015); psychiatric conditions such as depression, anorexia nervosa, 
addiction and substance abuse disorder, aggressive behaviour, and post-traumatic stress 
disorder (Cleary et al. 2015); and dementia-causing disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease 
(Hescham et al. 2013). In addition, registered trials on movement disorders are continuously 
being performed to provide further evidence for efficacy, determine the benefit of early 
surgery, identify novel brain targets (Kalia, Sankar & Lozano 2013), and determine other 
movement disorders such as Huntington’s disease, Tourette syndrome, and ataxia in tremor 
patients (Fasano & Lozano 2015) where DBS could be applicable. The expansion of the 
populations for which DBS is offered to and the testing of DBS for other neurologic and 
psychiatric indications raise a wide range of ethical concerns, which have been explored and 
raised in numerous bioethical discourses. These concerns range from the assessment of 
decisional capacity and therapeutic misconception of prospective participants (Fisher et al. 
2012) to the proper selection of potential recipients and the design of clinical trials (Grant et 
al. 2014). In addition to concerns that directly address aspects of the trial, there have also 
been discussions on the implications of both intended and side effects of DBS on the selfhood, 
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agency, and personal identity of people with neurologic or psychiatric disorders (Mathews 
2011; Nyholm & O’Neill 2016). This thesis focuses on the ethics of DBS in people with AD, with 
Chapters 4 (Viaña et al. 2017) and 5 (Viaña, Bittlinger, & Gilbert 2017) directly addressing the 
ethical issues raised by the design and conduct of the clinical trials and Chapter 6 (Viaña & 
Gilbert 2018) broadening the discussion to how DBS could potentially impact the selfhood of 
people with AD and the accompanying implications of these possible effects on consent for 
participation and care provided throughout a clinical trial.  
 
II. Deep Brain Stimulation Surgery 
 
 In a typical DBS procedure, initial targeting of the brain region of interest, which is 
guided by neuroimaging that is then co-registered with stereotactic frame-based markers, is 
performed prior to surgery (De Jesus et al. 2015). During surgery, microelectrode recording is 
used to verify trajectory to the target and confirm targeting of the desired region. Upon 
confirmation, the microelectrode is withdrawn, and one or more quadripolar leads, which 
currently have band-shaped structures 1.5 mm long and spaced either 0.5 mm or 1.5 mm 
apart, are implanted in the target structure and secured to the skull. The leads will then be 
connected to an externally programmable implanted pulse generator (IPG), which will deliver 
continuous electrical stimulation (Okun 2012; Gionfriddo et al. 2013; De Jesus et al. 2015). 
Constant voltage stimulation is provided in a monopolar or bipolar configuration, which 
activates a spherical volume of tissue surrounding the lead. Post-implantation and once the 
patient has recovered from surgery, DBS stimulation parameters can be programmed by 
clinicians to determine the optimal settings for each patient to maximize relief from disease 
symptoms while minimizing unwanted stimulation-induced side effects. The voltage, 
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frequency, and pulse width in specified electrodes can be programmed in current DBS devices, 
and the stimulation is generally delivered in a regular pattern (De Jesus et al. 2015). As soon 
as optimal stimulation parameters are set, stimulation is continuous; however, the 
stimulation parameters can be adjusted as needed and the device might be turned off 
overnight to preserve battery life (Fitzgerald & Segrave 2015). Overall, total hospital charges 
for a DBS surgery costs $62,077 for FDA-approved indications and $88,173 for Humanitarian 
Device Exemptions (HDE) and other emerging indications (Youngerman et al. 2016). The 
invasiveness and complexity of DBS raise several issues on the acceptable risk-benefit ratio 
and scientific validity of clinical trials for novel indications, which are further elaborated using 
the case of DBS for AD in Chapters 4 (Viaña et al. 2017) and 5 (Viaña, Bittlinger, & Gilbert 
2017). Furthermore, the high cost of the procedure and the requirement for a multi-
disciplinary team imply access issues for certain populations and implementation difficulties 
in resource-limited settings, issues that are also touched upon in Chapter 4 (Viaña et al. 2017). 
 
III. Possible Modes of Action of DBS 
 
 There are a number of mechanisms by which DBS could exert its therapeutic action on 
symptoms of movement and psychiatric disorders (Figure 2). At the synaptic level, high 
frequency stimulation (HFS) from DBS is hypothesized to primarily activate axons resulting to 
antidromic spikes that collide with naturally-occurring movement-related spikes and 
orthodromic spikes that will propagate to synaptic terminations resulting to either excitatory 
postsynaptic potentials (EPSPs) or inhibitory postsynaptic potentials (iPSPs), which would 
then affect the activity of target neurons and nuclei (Hammond et al. 2008; Cheney, Griffin & 
Van Acker 2013). In addition, neuronal activity changes resulting from HFS DBS could lead to 
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increased extracellular potassium and inactivation of sodium currents, which may hinder 
action potential development through a periodic depolarization block, or to an eventual 
leakage of glutamate from terminals resulting to excitation of postsynaptic elements (Zheng 
et al. 2011; Florence et al. 2015; Herrington, Cheng & Eskandar 2016). The observed 
antidromic and orthodromic spikes from DBS, together with the changes in extracellular 
potassium and the physiologic changes that follow, could then regularize cell firing or 
generate a new regular activity locked to the stimulation and overall result to an interruption 
of pathological oscillatory rhythms while preserving the transmission of cortical information 
(Hammond et al. 2008; Florence et al. 2015).  
 
 At a systems and network level, axonal activation brought about by DBS could lead to 
numerous widespread and heterogeneous effects. These include changes in neurotransmitter 
release and neuronal excitability in structures directly and indirectly connected to the 
stimulation nucleus; modification of a network’s oscillatory properties and introduction of a 
regular activity in several nodal points of a network, which ultimately prevents the generation 
and propagation of pathological synchronized oscillations (Hammond et al. 2008; Deniau et 
al. 2010); creation of an informational lesion through the stimulated nucleus preventing the 
transmission of pathological neural signals (Herrington, Cheng & Eskandar 2016); and 
activation of en passant fibres and afferent terminals that could influence activity not only in 
subcortical structures but of the cortex as well, breaking the phase relationship among 
neurons and releasing it from a pathological rhythm (Li et al. 2014). 
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 Figure 2. Mechanisms of action of high frequency deep brain stimulation. Inactivation of the 
target brain region results from (A) release of the inhibitory neurotransmitter GABA and (B) a 
depolarization block that decreases activity in neuronal soma. In addition, DBS could also lead 
to (C) stimulation of axons resulting in a tonic, artificial pattern of action potential firing and 
(D) changes in the firing pattern and firing rate in neurons of connected brain structures, 
which can be associated with (E) release of neurotransmitters, (F) altered metabolism, and 
(G) long-term potentiation (figure from Hamani & Temel 2012; © 2012, AAAS). 
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 The described therapeutic effects of DBS based on its physiologic actions at the 
synaptic and network levels is well illustrated by the effect of subthalamic nucleus (STN) 
stimulation on Parkinsonian symptoms. During HFS of the STN, pathological activity that gives 
rise to motor symptoms are suppressed (Rosenbaum et al. 2014) and are potentially replaced 
by a new HFS-driven pattern that can influence target structures in the basal ganglia network 
(Garcia et al. 2005). Particularly, STN HFS possibly activates pallido-nigral neurons via the 
glutamatergic subthalamo-pallidal projections releasing GABA to the substantia nigra pars 
reticulata (SNR), leading to its inactivation and eventual relief from akinesia in people with 
PD. In addition, STN HFS generates inhibitory synaptic effects in external globus pallidus (GPe) 
neurons via antidromic activation of the pallido-subthalamic axons and a local axon reflex. 
Moreover, given the massive inputs that the STN receives from the pedunculopontine nucleus, 
HFS of the STN could also give rise to antidromic spikes that could affect neuronal excitability 
and processing in regions beyond the first-order connections of the STN such as the thalamus, 
tectum, and brainstem (Deniau et al. 2010). Aside from subcortical structures, DBS could also 
affect incoming fibres from the cortex, antidromically targeting it in a retrograde manner and 
releasing it from a pathological rhythm. These DBS actions could overall then lead to 
suppression and disruption of local beta band oscillations and LFP-spike coherence in several 
brain regions, which leads to relief from bradykinesia and rigidity experienced by people with 
PD (Li et al. 2014; Rosenbaum et al. 2014; Herrington, Cheng & Eskandar 2016). Although 
these effects might also be applicable to DBS in psychiatric disorders, it has been proposed 
that targeting the STN in PD disrupts a synchronized circuit thereby creating an informational 
lesion, whereas targeting structures not part of a synchronized circuit such as the medial 
hypothalamus could have a stimulatory effect (Murrow 2014). As such, therapeutic effects 
observed in HFS DBS for psychiatric disorders might have a different underlying mechanism 
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depending on the target structure, the neural networks involved, and the behavioural or 
cognitive symptom being addressed. 
 
 Although HFS DBS has been mainly proposed to affect neural firing patterns (Okun & 
Oyama 2013) and regulate network activity, other mechanisms could also potentially 
contribute to its therapeutic effects. DBS might lead to synaptic plasticity-related changes in 
the neural network such as short-term potentiation (STP), long-term potentiation (LTP) and 
long-term depression (LTD). It could also have neuroprotective effects by increasing cell 
survival through reduction of glutamate excitotoxicity, inducing neuroprotective growth 
factors such as the brain derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF), increasing neuronal precursor 
cell proliferation, and inducing hippocampal neurogenesis (Herrington, Cheng & Eskandar 
2016). Lastly, electrical stimulation from DBS could also trigger astrocytes, leading to altered 
cerebral blood flow and release of ATP and glutamate, which are neuromodulators that could 
regulate neuronal synaptic networks.  Aside from stimulation during DBS, insertion of the 
stimulating electrode itself could trigger ATP and glutamate release in addition to producing 
hypermorphic reactive astrocytes, which can deplete GABA and hyper-excite regions where 
they are present (Vedam-Mai et al. 2012). Chapter 4 (Viaña et al. 2017) reviews the results of 
animal studies and clinical trials of fornix DBS, reflecting on how they can be used to improve 
participant selection and the study design of ongoing and future clinical trials on DBS for AD.  
 
IV. DBS-Associated Medical Risks and Side Effects 
 
 DBS is not a risk-free procedure, and a number of adverse side effects have been 
observed in- and post- surgery and during stimulation. During operation, several patients 
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(5.1%) experienced adverse events related to electrode placement such as intracranial 
haemorrhage, subdural haemorrhage, air embolus, and seizure. In the immediate 
postoperative period, seizure, spinal fluid leak, mental status change, and pneumonia have 
been reported in 6.1% of patients. A number of patients (4.9%) could also have hardware-
related complications such as hematoma or seroma, lead fracture, skin erosion, and infection. 
Lastly, stimulation-related adverse events including speech disturbance, ballism, eyelid 
apraxia, and corticospinal effects have also been reported in some patients (5.7%) (Patel et 
al. 2015). A number of studies and reviews have also reported other adverse events such as 
delirium, depression, mania, cognitive decline, psychosis, suicidality, anxiety, disinhibition, 
hypersexuality, weight gain, and emotional change (Appleby et al. 2007; Pinsker et al. 2013). 
It is important to emphasize though that adverse effects could vary depending on the targeted 
brain region and condition being treated. For instance, DBS side events occur more frequently 
when subthalamic rather than pallidal or ventral intermediate thalamic stimulation is 
performed (Guehl et al. 2003). Overall, adverse events are relatively infrequent in DBS and 
neurohistopathological findings likewise support the safety of chronic DBS neuromodulation 
therapy (DiLorenzo et al. 2014); however, it is important to highlight that certain adverse 
events such as infection and lead failures are serious complications, and intracranial 
haemorrhage and suicidal ideation and its execution are life threatening (Appleby et al. 2007). 
 
Given the possible complications and adverse side effects that may arise in patients 
undergoing DBS, novel stimulation protocols via hardware and software innovations are 
currently being developed to minimize side effects and maximize derived benefits. These 
protocols include constant current stimulation; interleaving different stimulation parameters 
to target different symptoms; ability to vary temporal pattern of stimulation; customized field 
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shaping and current steering for directional stimulation; and non-continuous, scheduled, or 
adaptive stimulation (Hariz 2014; De Jesus et al. 2015). In addition, advances in structural 
imaging with fMRI and connectivity visualization with diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) and 
tractography aim to improve targeting and discrimination of brain structures of interest (Hariz 
2014). 
 
In Chapters 4 to 6, the possibility of these side effects occurring are taken into 
consideration in the discussion of the risks associated with DBS for AD trial participation, while 
equally emphasizing that differences in the brain region targeted, pathophysiology of the 
condition, and pharmacologic management among different conditions could influence the 
adverse events that would occur as a result of DBS surgery and long-term stimulation. 
Specifically, these chapters review the protocols of different DBS for AD clinical trials to assess 
whether they have accounted for the possibility of these adverse events occurring and what 
strategies have been devised to adequately inform the research participants of these risks 
and minimise harm should any of the mentioned clinical adverse events arise, in line with the 
ethical principle of non-maleficence (Beauchamp & Childress 2013). 
 
V. Beyond the Clinical: Potential Effects of DBS on Personality, Selfhood, and Socialization 
 
One of the first studies reporting putative the effects of DBS on behaviour, personality, 
selfhood, and relationships was that of Houeto et al. (2002). This study analysed 24 
Parkinsonian patients who were successfully treated by subthalamic nucleus DBS for the 
presence of behavioural disorders including adjustment disorders, psychiatric disorders, and 
personality changes. Overall, although motor disability was improved and levodopa dosage 
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was decreased in at least 60% of the patients, social adjustment was impaired in more than 
half of the patients. Interestingly, late disease onset was associated with poor postoperative 
global social adjustment. Furthermore, amplification or decompensation of previously 
existing psychiatric disorders, such as depressive episodes, generalized anxiety, and 
behavioural disorders with drug dependence, that have previously passed unnoticed was 
observed. In addition, more than half of the patients had episodes of mild to moderate 
emotional hyperactivity. Finally, personality traits were aggravated in a third of the patients. 
In particular, there was an increase in irritability, lack of initiative, perseveration, 
lability/moodiness, lack of persistence, lack of planning, inflexibility, poor judgement, 
insensitivity, impatience, indecisiveness, apathy, and vulnerability to pressure.  
 
Houeto et al. (2002) also provided extensive case reports on five patients in the study. 
The first patient reported lack of energy, wanted his wife to stay at home the whole day to 
look after him, and had mood swings with aggression, irritability, and depression. Sexual 
behaviour with exhibitionism and gambling were also reported. Upon further investigation, 
the patient had a period of alcohol misuse and hypomania ten years before PD onset, 
indicating potential worsening of an affective disorder with addictive behaviour.  
 
The second case report is that of a patient whose marriage deteriorated four months 
post-stimulation, which eventually led to a divorce. His wife reported behavioural disorders 
with sexual deviancy, heightened libido, and exhibitionism (Houeto et al. 2002). In addition, 
“the patient showed an interest in games of chance and travelled to foreign countries where 
he was suspected of leisure tourism” (p. 702, Houeto et al. 2002). It was hypothesized that 
DBS-induced improvements in the patient’s conditions led to expression of his novelty-
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seeking and sexually deviant behaviour, which reached the point of his wife being afraid for 
children in the neighbourhood (Houeto et al. 2002).  
 
The third case illustrates that of a patient who had “reappearance of a severe anxious-
depressive state during the stimulation therapy and the exacerbation of familial conflicts” (p. 
702, Houeto et al. 2002). This patient had two episodes of severe depression years prior to 
surgery. Weeks after DBS implantation, he had conflicts with his daughter, complained of 
sexual dysfunction, and had difficulties in communicating with his wife. Six months post-
implantation, the patient had several episodes of depression with sleep disorders and loss of 
appetite, interest, and inertia. The fourth patient had mild reduction in verbal fluency after 
surgery and presented emotional hyperreactivity. Specifically, the patient had difficulty 
controlling the magnitude and range of his emotions, suggesting that he is being overtaken 
by feelings that he cannot control (Houeto et al. 2002).  
 
The fifth patient had no history of psychiatric disorders, but developed affective 
blunting and hyperreactivity post-DBS. Four months post-surgery, he complained of loss of 
initiative, fatigue, and loss of interest in seeing his friends. He highlighted that “Before 
stimulation, I wanted to be like everybody else. I fought against my disease. Now, I have lost 
my motivation, I no longer want to do anything, I miss the period when I was fighting” (p. 702, 
Houeto et al. 2002). His wife also reported a decrease in libido (Houeto et al. 2002). 
 
Overall, Houeto et al. (2002) divided the observed abnormalities post-DBS into five 
categories. The first one, social maladjustment, can be attributed to communication problems 
between patients and their spouses as a result of a sudden change in roles, and by difficulties 
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in integrating into a new socio-familial environment after being disabled for several years. 
Second, depression was observed, especially in patients with a history of depression, with one 
patient developing melancholia with major delusions and feelings of guilt in the context of 
marked anxiety and eventually committing suicide. Third, there was a high prevalence of 
anxiety in patients. Fourth, a quarter of the patients experienced emotional hyperreactivity, 
having disabling difficulties in controlling their emotions. Fifth, two patients who had periods 
of drug dependence in the past and became addicted to levodopa therapy exhibited 
behavioural disorders such as sexually deviant behaviours. 
 
Other extensive reports on the effects of DBS on the self are that of Agid et al. (2006) 
and Schupbach et al. (2006) where 29 people with Parkinson’s disease were evaluated and 
interviewed before and after DBS to determine the effect of the intervention on recipients’ 
psycho-social condition. Interestingly, although there was a general improvement in motor 
and mental function, there was no significant improvement in the patients’ Social Adjustment 
Scale (SAS) scores (Paykel et al. 1971).  In addition, the work and marital relations sub-
dimensions of SAS also tended to be worse two years after DBS surgery, with 65% of 
previously-married patients experiencing a conjugal crisis and 64% of those who were 
working wanting to stop their professional activity.  
 
Psychological interviews in the studies of Agid et al. (2006) and Schupbach et al. (2006) 
then revealed potential effects of the neurosurgery on the patient’s self, spouse and family, 
and socio-professional life, which help explained the lack of sufficient improvement in social 
integration following DBS. On potential effects of the surgery on the “self”, some patients 
experienced strangeness from the absence of motor symptoms; loss of aim in life from no 
59
longer dealing with motor impairments; difficulties in dealing with consequences of the 
disease on their social and professional lives; loss of vital force; persistence of anticipatory 
thoughts on potential eventual motor problems; and an impression of a dehumanised and 
device-dependent body due to the leads in their brain. In terms of marital relations, some 
patients rejected their spouses due to recovery of their autonomy and feelings of being 
“cured”, leading to spouses experiencing difficulties in giving up their role as a caregiver. On 
the other hand, some patients might be rejected by their spouses who expect them to return 
to a normal life post-stimulation. Finally, effects on socio-professional affairs include giving 
secondary importance to work after stimulation and wanting to be socially recognized for 
their disease. These observations reflect potential changes in the identity in which patients 
see themselves after DBS surgery, which could be a result of difficulties in re-integrating into 
their professional and familial environments (Agid et al. 2006). 
 
 In addition to the accounts presented by Houeto et al. (2002), Agid et al. (2006), and 
Schupbach et al. (2006), there have been other cases reported that demonstrated a significant 
change in personality post-DBS. Mathews, Bok and Rabins (2009) presented a case of a 
formerly-shy engineer who became extremely outgoing and gregarious, changed his political 
affiliation, and became an ardent environmentalist post-DBS. Kraemer (2013) referred to a 
Dutch patient undergoing DBS treatment who developed a permanent manic state, which led 
him to have excessive debts, altercations with the police, and eventually, psychiatric 
hospitalization. Interestingly, when the stimulation was turned off, the patient had an 
accountable and rational state of mind and was capable of making decisions; however, he 
was physically disabled and bedridden due to PD (Leentjens et al. 2004). Another patient has 
also developed manic psychosis following subthalamic nucleus stimulation for PD. The patient 
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lost normal social inhibitions, tried to kiss and embrace people, fell in love with neurologists, 
engaged in unrestrained shopping for clothes, and felt her sons were conspiring against her. 
The patient had little insight into her disorder and exhibited impaired judgement (Herzog et 
al. 2003). This was also observed in a 60-year old man with DBS for PD who was described by 
his wife as becoming like a spontaneous and difficult teenager post-surgery, wanting to cross 
an international border without a passport (Bell et al. 2011). Aside from changes in personality, 
changes in preferences could also occur. Mantione, Figee and Denys (2014) reported a patient 
who received DBS for obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) who developed a sudden and 
distinct preference for Johnny Cash songs, along with an increase in confidence. 
 
 On the more extreme end of the spectrum of potentially DBS-associated changes in 
behaviour, Goethals and colleagues (2008) reported a 43-year old male patient suffering from 
Tourette syndrome who received DBS and developed a dissociative response 12 months 
postoperatively when the stimulation amplitude was increased. Increasing right thalamic 
stimulation amplitude from 1.5 to 2.4 V resulted to him “anxiously crouching in a corner, 
covering his face with his hands. He spoke with a childish high-pitched voice and repeatedly 
insisted that he was not to blame. Sentences were brief and grammatically incorrect. If 
approached by one of us, he fiercely kicked his feet because he feared being thrown in the 
basement” (p. 545, Goethals et al. 2008). Interestingly, when the stimulation amplitude was 
lowered again, the patient returned to normal behaviour but “could not tell what had 
happened and reported to have been overwhelmed by bad childhood memories” (p. 545, 
Goethals et al. 2008). 
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 In evaluating the risks associated with clinical trials of DBS for a novel neurologic or 
psychiatric indication, it is important to consider the possible effects of DBS on behaviour, 
personality, relationships, and societal integration, in addition to its effect on the brain and 
on symptoms of the condition in which it is being tested for. Accounts from case studies and 
systematic empirical investigations that are enumerated in this section are used in Chapter 6 
(Viaña & Gilbert 2018) to hypothesise on the possible impact of fornix or NBM DBS on people 
with AD as a result of both intended and side effects of the intervention. It is essential to 
consider how these effects could influence a participant’s sense of self. This information can 
then be used to improve the way consent is obtained and the manner in which participants 
are treated all throughout the trial, in line with the ethical principles of respect for autonomy, 
beneficence, and non-maleficence (Beauchamp & Childress 2013). 
  
VI. Co-authored publications on DBS-associated changes in selfhood and identity 
   
 In addition to possible changes in behaviour and personality observed in studies 
reviewed in the previous section, postoperative DBS self-estrangement has been substantially 
reported by Gilbert et al. (2017). Since I have contributed to this project, a copy of the 
manuscript is included in this section and can be found in pages 68 to 82. In this qualitative 
study, we demonstrated that there are different kinds of self-estrangement experiences. We 
found that 47% of the people implanted with DBS for PD (8/17 interviewees) reported either 
a single segment, intermittent episodes, or a persistent state of self-perceived changes 
following implantation, even in cases of substantial motor improvements. We noted that the 
way patients perceive themselves through the pathology will likely influence the way they will 
experience potential DBS-induced self-estrangement, with those feeling more estranged by 
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PD also experiencing the greatest degree of self-estrangement post-DBS. In addition, the 
notion of self-estrangement appears to exist in association with loss of control and distorted 
perception of capacities. “Loss of control”, commonly manifested in inability to properly 
control emotions or a change in character as described by other people, is mostly associated 
with a deteriorative sense of the self. On the other hand, a “distorted perception of capacities” 
is largely related to a restorative one as evidenced by increase in self-confidence, feelings of 
self-rejuvenation, and heightened sense of strength and physical capabilities (Gilbert et al. 
2017).  
 
Results from our study (Gilbert et al. 2017) could be used to inform prospective 
participants of DBS trials on associated risks, particularly those that extend beyond the effects 
of DBS surgery and stimulation to the body and to the symptoms of the condition. These 
results could also be used to inform future researchers on what outcomes should be included 
in assessing DBS trials and on how the possibility of self-estrangement occurring (particularly 
those that are perceived negatively by the participant and his/her family) should be utilised 
to design strategies that would minimise harms from feelings of restorative or deteriorative 
estrangement. 
 
 One of the participants in our study (Gilbert et al. 2017) has been followed up further, 
and narratives on how she integrated the changes in her personality, preferences, and 
psychological state into her self-concept are described in the paper of Gilbert and Viaña 
(2018). This paper is also included in this section and can be found in pages 83 to 94 Mainly, 
we present the case of a 46-year old woman with PD who received DBS and experienced 
depression, mania, impulsivity, and hypersexuality afterwards. Eventually, her therapeutic 
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relationship with her neurologist and surgical team broke down. She also divorced her 
husband, moved to another Australian state, and attempted suicide. Later on, she started 
coping with the psychologic and psychiatric changes, indicating that she worries less; and she 
even started using her perceived improvement in sensory capacities (particularly, visual and 
auditory) to create coloured paintings expressing her emotions. What is quite striking in this 
account is that the patient emphasized that she was not adequately informed by the medical 
team of potential DBS-associated psychosocial effects (Gilbert & Viaña 2018). Our study 
emphasizes the importance of acknowledging patient perspectives in terms of assessing DBS-
associated psychologic and psychiatric sequelae, with these perspectives potentially shedding 
light on socio-environmental factors that could trigger psychiatric events and ways in which a 
person experiencing these unintended effects copes with them. The statements of the patient 
regarding the informed consent process for DBS therapy also underscores the importance of 
adequately informing patients not just of medical risks of a particular procedure, but also of 
the possible psycho-social risks, especially if information on those is available in the literature. 
It is also vital to have a bi-directional discussion with patients to determine what risks they 
are most worried about in order to devise in advance coping strategies should any of these 
unintended sequelae arise. 
 
 Overall, sections V and VI of Chapter 3 present a number of cases wherein changes in 
character, behaviour, personality, preferences, and/or self-perception post-DBS have led to 
personal, relational, and/or social adjustment difficulties and issues. These sections do not 
aim to review all the literature on DBS-related psychiatric and psychological changes; rather, 
by providing a sample of reported DBS-associated changes, they aim to provide frames of 
reference on what could arise in people with AD participating in DBS clinical trials.  The ethical 
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implications of these effects on the informed consent procedure and general conduct of DBS 
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I Miss Being Me: Phenomenological
Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation
Frederic Gilbert , University of Tasmania and University of Washington
Eliza Goddard , University of Tasmania
John Noel M. Via~na , University of Tasmania
Adrian Carter,Monash University
Malcolm Horne, University of Melbourne
The phenomenological effects of deep brain stimulation (DBS) on the self of the patient remains poorly understood and under
described in the literature, despite growing evidence that a significant number of patients experience postoperative
neuropsychiatric changes. To address this lack of phenomenological evidence, we conducted in-depth, semistructured
interviews with 17 patients with Parkinson’s disease who had undergone DBS. Exploring the subjective character specific to
patients’ experience of being implanted gives empirical and conceptual understanding of the potential phenomenon of DBS-
induced self-estrangement. Our study concluded that (1) the more patients preoperatively felt alienated by their illness, the
more they experienced postoperative self-estrangement, and (2) the notion of self-estrangement seems to exist in association
with certain common qualitative characters, namely, loss of control, which reflects a deteriorative estrangement, and distorted
perception of capacities, which reveals a restorative estrangement. These findings indicate that subjective self-reports help us to
understand some aspects of the potential phenomenon of DBS-induced self-estrangement.
Keywords: alienation, deep brain stimulation, distorted perception, loss of control, Parkinson’s disease, self, side effects, self-
estrangement
Despite growing evidence that a significant number
of patients experience postoperative neuropsychiatric
changes (Volkmann, Daniels, and Witt 2010; Muller and
Christen 2011, Clausen 2010), including reports of irrevers-
ible alteration following removal of implants (Gilbert
2013a), the phenomenological effects of deep brain stimu-
lation (DBS) on the patient’s self remain poorly understood
and underdescribed in the literature. Most postoperative
reports emerging from clinical studies measure standard
cognitive, psychometric, and functional scales (Smeding
et al. 2011; Lewis et al. 2015; Pham et al. 2015; Schoenberg
et al. 2015). Most discussion of the postoperative changes
following the implantation of brain devices such as DBS
focuses on abnormal side effects caused by the interven-
tion (e.g., hypersexuality, hypomania). By contrast, rela-
tively little attention is paid to the idea that successfully
“treated” individuals might experience difficulties in
adjusting to becoming “symptom free”: a phenomenon
that is known as the “burden of normality” and that can
lead to postoperative iatrogenic harms (Gilbert 2012; Wil-
son, Bladin, and Saling 2007). The risk of postoperative iat-
rogenic harms can be extremely serious; in a statistically
significant number of clinical trials, implanted patients
have attempted or died by suicide (neurological condition:
Temel et al. 2009; psychiatric condition: Gilbert 2013a;
Gilbert 2013b). Given the failure of studies to faithfully
capture patients’ experience of a “new” postoperative self,
potential DBS-induced phenomenological effects on
patients’ self remain largely unexplored. DBS’s nontarget
effects and their impact on patients’ self are particularly
concerning, given the number of patients being implanted
for approved therapy (more‘ than 100,000) and the increas-
ing number enrolled in experimental trials (Medtronic
2013).
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To our knowledge, only a small number of studies in
the literature have specifically addressed the phenomenol-
ogy of the self through a patient’s subjective experience
with DBS (de Haan et al. 2015; de Haan et al. 2013, Hariz
et al. 2011, Sch€upbach et al. 2006). A small number of case
reports provide further insight into some of these postop-
erative changes to the self. With so few phenomenological
investigations into the experience of self, the philosophical
debates about potential postoperative effects of DBS on the
self are mostly based on anecdotal cases that may not be
representative, but are used to serve authors’ arguments. It
is essential to supplement the current literature with more
rigorous empirical studies exploring the phenomeno-
logical effects of DBS on the self. Studying patient’s
first-personal experience of DBS through the unique phe-
nomenological lens to explore patient’s self-perception
will shed light on current philosophical disputes, but most
importantly, will guide prospective patients through deci-
sion-making processes leading to implantation.
To address this lack of phenomenological evidence,
we conducted in-depth, semistructured interviews using
open-ended questions with 17 patients with Parkinson’s
disease (PD) implanted with DBS in Australia, from the
states of Victoria, Tasmania, and Queensland.1 The aver-
age duration of the interviews was 45 minutes. This
qualitative approach allowed us to capture first-personal
perspectives that are not identified by standardized
questionnaires and scales. Three independent research-
ers conducted the interviews and transcribed the con-
tent. All interviews were conducted in English.
Interviews were analyzed by grouping patients’ self-
experience into four main phenomenological clusters of
experience: (1) degrees of alienation caused by PD or
benefit caused by PD; (2) postoperative feelings of ena-
blement or powerlessness; (3) postoperative feelings of
embodiment or disembodiment; and (4) reports of post-
operative changes by partner/family members. These
clusters were then divided by subthemes, which were
populated by patients’ key answers and quotes. Table 1
reports patients’ details, and Appendix 1 is the semi-
structured questionnaire used to guide our interviews.
Our aim was to explore perceptions of self-change by
patients implanted with DBS. As this is a qualitative
study based on first-personal narratives involving more
than 765 minutes of interviews, the results are
highlighted and given in excerpt format.
This article (1) reports our general findings; (2) reports
and discusses findings related to deteriorative and restor-
ative self-estrangement; (3) discusses embodiment through
patients’ accounts of experiencing DBS implants as being
part of them; (4) summarizes the notion of self-estrange-
ment; (5) advocates that DBS alone does not directly causes
potential self-estrangement; (6) indicates some limits of
our research; and (7) provides general conclusions from
our collected data.
PATIENT SUBJECTIVE ACCOUNTS: EXPERIENCING
SELF-ESTRANGEMENT
Before reporting our results, we need to define some termi-
nology. Exploring the phenomenon of DBS postoperative
self-estrangement involves an examination of whether
experiencing self-estrangement involves certain qualitative
experiences as phenomenally characterized by implanted
patients. From a phenomenological perspective, if we
define the self as, broadly construed, the subject of one’s
phenomenological experience of X (e.g., X being an emo-
tion, perception, thought, etc.), then we understand that
the very existence of some particular phenomenological
experiences can qualitatively reflect the self. By experience,
as Strawson formulated it, we understand experiential
“what-it’s-likeness” (Strawson 2011).2 The existence of a
self qualitatively experiencing X is given with the existence
of experiencing X. In other words, experiencing DBS likely
entails specific or common qualitative experiences; we
aimed to explore these specific or common DBS-related
experiences, especially any experiences of estrangement.
By looking at the subjective character specific to patients’
experience of being implanted, especially through phe-
nomenological experience of first-personal or subjective
change, we believe we can gain better empirical and con-
ceptual understanding of the phenomenology of potential
DBS-induced self-estrangement.
Our study reveals that there is a strong correlation
between postoperative estrangement and how patients
preoperatively perceive themselves with respect to their
illness. In other words, 100% of patients who perceived PD
as not intruding on their life did not experience feelings of
estrangement (n D 4). For instance, Patient 08 and Patient
12 clearly articulated this correlation:
Patient 08: “The disease is part of me. You can’t separate from
the disease” and “I don’t think [DBS] changed me, it hasn’t
changed my personality or who I am, or how I feel about
myself.”
Patient 12: “[Parkinson’s] is not a painful experience . . . I was
able to do things and contribute to society in ways I would
otherwise have been unable to do” and later pointed out that
“[DBS] has not changed who I am, it’s improved.”
1. This study was conducted in accordance with the Tasmanian
Human Research Ethics Committee regulations. Patient Consent
and Minimal Risk Ethics Application Approval, entitled
“H0014820 Deep Brain Stimulation and Postoperative Self-Adjust-
ment Phenomenon,” are also in compliance with the Tasmanian
Human Research Ethics Committee regulations. Ethical approval
was obtained in May 2015.
2. We draw on Strawson’s account here in order to justify looking
at the subjective experience of DBS implantation. We do recognize,
however, that this is a “thin” account of the self and that
Strawson’s conception of phenomenology can be contrasted with
a ”thick” account, which takes agency and embodiment as defin-
ing of the phenomenological standpoint.
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In parallel with this strong correlation between pre-
operative perception of oneself through disease and a
sense of estrangement, we observed that patients (61%)
who felt alienated by their illness were likely to experi-
ence, to various degrees and intermittently, some post-
operative feelings of self-estrangement (n D 8). For
example:
Patient 16: “[Parkinson’s disease] really takes over. . . . I
couldn’t work which was a big part of my identity. . . . If I
didn’t have the device I’d probably be dead right now”
and later states “I think that [DBS] does change you as a
person.”
Our findings indicate that the more patients preop-
eratively felt alienated by their illness, the more they
experienced postoperative self-estrangement. The ques-
tion that needs to be addressed in the next section is
how experiencing DBS self-estrangement correlates
with some specific qualitative character common to
some implanted patients.3
EXPERIENCING DETERIORATIVE AND RESTORATIVE
SELF-ESTRANGEMENT
Our study found that postoperative self-estrangement
could be phenomenally experienced as deteriorative or
restorative by implanted patients. Deteriorative or restor-
ative self-estrangement involves experiencing an involun-
tary shift in the qualitative character. For instance:
Patient 04: “I can’t be the real me anymore—I can’t pretend . . .
I think that I felt that the person that I have been [since the
intervention] was somehow observing somebody else, but it
wasn’t me. . . . I feel like I am who I am now. But it’s not the
me that went into the surgery that time. . . .My family say they
grieve for the old [me] . . ..
Interviewer 2: “What have your children said to you about the
difference that they’ve seen before and after?”
Patient 04: “Yes, they said they don’t recognize me.”
Interviewer 2: “And in what way don’t they recognize you?”
Patient 04: “That I am so impulsive and seem to change my
mind all the time.”
What characterizes Patient 04’s postoperative feelings
of estrangement, as in other cases, can be understood by
way of the deteriorative effects on the patient’s self. We
believe Patient 04 mostly experienced deteriorative conse-
quences because Patient 04’s feelings of estrangement
largely appear to be correlated with a radical and ongoing
sense of loss of control over her previous self, which
reflects an involuntary and unintentional shift in her quali-
tative character. For instance, Patient 04 reported develop-
ing postoperative ongoing mania (medically diagnosed),
Table 1. Patients’ general information.
Patient Age (surgery) Gender
Time span between
surgery and interview
Time span between PD
diagnostic and surgery
P01 64 years old F 1 year 6 months 10 years
P02 68 years old F 1 year 20 years
P03 68 years old M 2 years 2 months 12 years
P04 52 years old* F 1 year 2 months 6 years
P05 82 years old F 3 years 12 years
P06 63 years old M 1 year 8 years
P07 53 years old F 4 years 9 years
P08 50 years old M 6 years 9 years
P09 54 years old* F 5 years 16 years
P10 58 years old M 1 year 11 years
P11 50 years old M 6 years 10 years
P12 66 years old M 1 year 11 years
P13 66 years old M 2 years 6 years
P14 40 years old M 4 years 7 years
P15 69 years old M 4 years 19 years
P16 ** F 3 years 6 months **
P17 52 years old M 5 years 8 years
*Patients had two surgeries. Patients’ ages during the second surgery.
**Was not provided.
3. In our study all patients (4 out of 4; 100%) reporting that PD
enhanced their life also reported a general feeling of postoperative
self-continuity. Some patients clearly experienced the opposite (8
out of 13; 61%): namely, they self-reported how PD devastated
their existence, and simultaneously reported how they experi-
enced postoperatively various degrees, intermittences, and inten-
sities of estrangement. For the five remaining patients (5 out of 13;
38%), their reports are too unclear to be classified. They experi-
enced PD as intruding in their life, but didn’t clearly report signifi-
cant postoperative estrangement. Thus, they couldn’t fit in our
classification of restorative or deteriorative estrangement.
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leading to a suicide attempt, as well as a substantial
increase in impulsivity. Patient 04 said, “I cannot control
the impulse to go off if I’m angry.” As such, these findings
appear to further corroborate the hypothesis that deterio-
rative self-experiences seem to qualitatively characterize
the notion of powerlessness (Gilbert 2013a, 2015a), often
manifested through involuntary self-harming actions/
behaviors and/or loss of control.
It is a common mistake to think that postoperative feel-
ings of self-estrangement are qualitatively deteriorative.
Our study exposes that although DBS diminishes symp-
toms and restores patients’ control over their lives, more
patients experienced feelings of restorative estrangement
rather than deteriorative estrangement. For instance:
Patient 13: “[DBS] has allowed me to return almost to the per-
son I was before . . . It’s allowed me to be what I am, rather
than change what I am,” but while discussing this sudden
restorative feeling, Patient 13 confessed that DBS adversely
resulted in intermittent uncontrollable emotional sensitivity,
to the extent of experiencing “a state of hysterics . . . I felt like I
had lost my true self, it [is] way behind me.”
Patient 13’s experiences of restorative estrangement
seem to separate an old self (practically understood), “DBS
has partly restored my autonomy,” and a postoperative
qualitative character of this patient’s selfhood, “I had lost
my true self” as a result of the disease. Patient 13’s com-
ments illustrate that restorative estrangement can come in
degrees. In this respect, a patient might experience self-
rejuvenation while observing an involuntary shift in some
aspects of her qualitative character. Similarly:
Patient 11 first claimed: “it wasn’t so much that it changed
who you are, it rather restored who you are,” but he later
confessed that this novel restorative empowerment origi-
nated an uncontrollable phenomenon from which he disso-
ciated his self and does not recognize himself: “There’s
nothing that I can do [to stop this] ‘emotional incon-
tinence’4 as I call it. . . . If I had a choice I would say, ‘Look
see what you can do . . . to stop me from doing that.’
Because it does get embarrassing.”
Patient 11’s postoperative feelings of restorative
estrangement appear to increase some restorative capacities
that the patient seems to identify with as essential for his
preoperative and predisease self while admitting losing con-
trol of other aspects of his postoperative self. Aligning with
these feelings of postoperative restorative estrangement:
Patient 09 stated: “I felt I was 15 years younger after the oper-
ation . . . I felt so strong and confident . . . I could do anything
. . . I felt so good I tried to move the pool table and I ruptured
the disc in my back . . . I blame DBS for that because I felt so
good, I did something that I couldn’t have done when I was
21 and I don’t know why I thought I could do it when I was
54 . . . I was in a wheel chair for 2 months.”
Patient 09 “blames” the device for her ruptured disc
(i.e., she accepts it was her fault, but she attributes her
unreasonable confidence to the success of the device). We
observed that sometimes the device provided such levels
of heightened and uncharacteristic confidence that this
resulted in other unforseen difficulties. For example,
Patient 06 observed that he was bold in his activities, had
difficulties in refraining from engaging in numerous com-
mitments, and that he was in conflict with his wife: “I think
I have been causing a bit of problems in my relationships
by being just so full on. . . . I have to slow down that activ-
ity and make it more manageable for myself and my wife.”
In a similar way, Patient 09 was so confident in her new-
found strength and physical capabilities that she was
nearly permanently disabled when she attempted to lift
and move a large pool table. In this way, DBS may be con-
strued as so effective in relieving symptoms that it actually
causes people to have a distorted view of their own capa-
bilities. These distorted perceptions appear to induce the
belief that patients have (some) enhanced capacities far in
excess of their actual abilities. These distorted views of
their capacities are often described in the language of sud-
den unexpected strength.
For instance, Patient 07 described her feelings after
suddenly acting out of character during calibration. She
reported starting walking and wanting to reach her
husband’s location (i.e., by foot), which would have taken
her days. She explained her decision later by saying:
“Oh God, I wasn’t me, and I knew I wasn’t me and there was
nothing I could do about it . . . I knew what it was! I knew
[DBS] had been turned up that day. Unlike the drugs which
creep up on you, and you don’t know what’s happening.
With [DBS] I knew what it was, so I knew it was fixable.”
Here again, the device is similarly “blamed” for the
sudden restorative strength. The device is responsible, “I
knew what it was! I knew [DBS] had been turned up that
day,” for the distorted interpretation of her own capacities,
“I knew I wasn’t [my capacities].”
In parallel, while describing a sense of loss of control,
Patient 04 also recognized DBS had given her increased
feelings of strength (despite having mostly suffered from
deteriorative estrangement):
”I never had felt this lack of power or this giving of power—
until I had deep brain stimulation . . . It’s like the psychologist
said [to me]: for a woman who had a very invasive brain sur-
gery nine days ago and you’ve just walked 10 kilometres [to
get to your appointment]. And on the way I stopped and
bought a very uncharacteristic dress, backless—completely
different to what I usually do.”
Here, Patient 04’s “lack of power” in some aspects of her
character seems to be replaced by a “giving of power” with
respect to other novel qualitative features of character—that
4. DBS has turned Patient 11 into a SNAG (patient words), a phe-
nomenon beyond his control and putting him in discomfort. A
SNAG is an acronym for “Sensitive New Age Guy.”
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is, a loss of control leading to a disinhibition that is character-
ized by some incommensurable feelings of strength.
The collected restorative narratives seem to indicate
that DBS can distort patients’ feelings of who they are or
make them feel like they aren’t themselves in some ways,
capable of reaching unwanted limits beyond the preopera-
tive self, for instance, as well as inducing unintended
estrangement experiences of being in the world.
Given the preceding discussion, our study shows that
the notion of self-estrangement seems to exist in associa-
tion with certain common qualitative characters: namely,
loss of control, which reflects a deteriorative estrangement,
and distorted perception of capacities, which reveals a
restorative estrangement.
EMBODIMENT: HAVING A BRAIN IMPLANT VERSUS
BEING A BRAIN IMPLANT
Another way to understand how DBS might induce feelings
of estrangement is to examine whether DBS has an effect in
terms of being understood as a foreign intrusion; that is,
whether the patients viewed the device as being a part of, or
not a part of, themselves. For instance, for Patient 08, “It’s just
become part of me. It’s more the other way around. It’s more
the DBS becomes a part of who you are rather than changing
you.” In this case the patient identifies with or sees him- or
herself as continuous with his or her stimulated self. In con-
trast, when the device is seen as other or an outside force, it
could contribute to feelings of self-estrangement.
However, our study found that the hypothesis—that if
patients incorporate the DBS device into their self-image/
body schema, then they will suffer less from self-estrange-
ment—is not as robust as it sounds. In general, the patients
interviewed did not notice the device in their body while it
was doing its job in the background, despite having experi-
enced some degrees and intermittent episodes of self-
estrangement. Many noted that the device had a minimal
presence in their body and that they did not typically notice
that it was there. For example, Patient 13 declared, “I charged
myself up this morning”; Patient 12 asserted, “I just don’t
know it’s there. I don’t feel invaded.” Patient 06 affirmed,
“It’s part of me.” Patient 05 indicated, “More a part of my
body.” Such responses appear to illustrate that patients use a
language that seemingly incorporates the DBS device into
their self or body image. Patient 13 clearly uses such meta-
phorical language; he does not say “I charged the devices up
this morning” but rather “I charged myself up.” Such lan-
guage could indicate an embodied acceptance of the implant,
of patients feeling like being one with the implant.
Nonetheless, we did find a correlative example
between the device felt as an alien entity and a patient
experiencing self-estrangement. Patient 04, who experi-
enced the most severe and harmful effects of estrangement
in our study, declared the following in response to the
interviewer’s question:
Interviewer 1: “The implant, do you feel that it is part of you?”
Patient 04: “ No!”
Interviewer 1: “You feel that it is alien?”
Patient 04: “I hate it. I wish I could pull it out!”
Aside from this obvious case with Patient 04, who
clearly experienced having a foreign device rather than it
being part of her (i.e., language of being the device), most
patients incorporated the devices. A few complained that it
hampered, or had hampered, physical activity in the past.
Patient 08 said, “I used to be able to feel the electricity going
through my body but I don’t feel it now . . . I forget about it
most of the time, but I am aware because there is a hard lit-
tle thing on your chest.” Others had (perhaps unwarranted)
fears about others interfering with the device accidentally
(one research participant instructed hairdressers not to use
clippers on her neck in case it damaged the wires). But in
general, patients seemed to regard the device as something
that had been integrated into their body. Most did not view
it as a foreign entity that existed separately from their own
self. The fact that patients tend to forget about the DBS
implant might be construed as a positive thing because, in
the end, they may focus less on their disease. This percep-
tion prevents DBS from having a felt intrusive quality. An
interesting general point is that patients with non-recharge-
able devices seemed not to notice the device as much, and it
didn’t have as much presence to them. Some patients with
rechargeable devices noticed it a lot more, sometimes
obsessing over its charge.5
In addition to exploring whether and how the implant
altered patients’ relationship to their body, we can explore
the relationship to changed capacities of the body. Patients’
measure of restoration often correlated with their physical
abilities, and they declared being more independent (e.g.,
patients 16 and 17). However, as also noted in the preced-
ing, some patients overestimated their capacities, in some
cases beyond what they were capable of prior to the stimu-
lation and the onset of PD. These experiences were often
connected with a feeling of a loss or lack of control.
SUMMARIZING DBS POSTOPERATIVE SELF-
ESTRANGEMENT
Our study demonstrates that there are various qualita-
tively different kinds of self-estrangement experiences.
To speak of a postoperative estrangement implies that
5. There were some fears concerning what would happen if the
device was not charged correctly (i.e., for those with rechargeable
batteries). Some research participants took a very conservative
attitude toward the battery charge and constantly monitored and
topped up the battery. Others were very casual and let the battery
run down a lot. The people who were concerned about monitoring
the charge level were also people who seemed to have some anxi-
eties about the implications of what would happen if the device
ran out of power. Those who were more casual seemed to not har-
bor those sorts of fears. One person accidentally turned off his
device at one point and only noticed a few hours later when he
had trouble typing. But it was easily remedied and the event did
not bother him or give him any further anxieties.
































the relevant patient experience of deteriorative or
restorative estrangement has an irreducibly subjective
character specific to the implanted individual (Atkins
2000). The postoperative feelings of estrangement con-
stitute a patient’s first-personal point of view of a quali-
tatively deteriorative or restorative experience.
Experiencing deteriorative or restorative self-estrange-
ment does not mean a subject is experiencing X differ-
ently (e.g., X being an emotion, perception, thought,
etc.), but rather that the experience of being the subject
of X is qualitatively different. Experiencing X differ-
ently is not the same as experiencing oneself as qualita-
tively different. In other words, in some cases, the
experience of X can feel different while the experiencer
remains identical. Accordingly, an experiencer can feel
estranged while the experience of X feels identical in
some cases. In that respect, being self-estranged cannot
be reduced to experiencing X differently; it rather
involves an irreducibly novel experience of being the
subjective character of X (experiencer is necessarily
qualitatively different, but not necessarily X). Being a
subject of X does not involve estrangement when the
subjective experience is identical.
DBS ALONE DOES NOT DIRECTLY CAUSE POTENTIAL
SELF-ESTRANGEMENT
There is a lack of consensus about how to adequately
characterize the self vis-a-vis DBS treatment within the
neuroethical literature. The current state of the debate
is eclectic. Table 2 shows the numerous theoretical
models of the self motivated to explain the effects of
DBS on the self, including, but not limited to, the self
as characterized by “self-representational capacities”
(Synofizik and Schlaepfer 2008); as a “foundational-
functional model” (Witt et al. 2013); as narrative self-
constitution (Schechtman 2010) or relational narrative
constitution (Baylis 2013); as an “enactive, affordance-
based model” (De Haan et al. 2013); and as a “pattern
theory of self” (Dings and de Bruin 2015). In addition
to various models of the self, there is disagreement
about the central concept affected by DBS, autonomy,
and/or identity, and how to characterize these effects—
for example, autonomy in terms of patient autonomy or
competence, loss of control, and identity in terms of
changes to personality or psychological continuity, to
name a few. The conceptual understanding of agency
also varies in these accounts. Most philosophical discus-
sions concerned with potential DBS-induced effects on
the self are not based on firsthand studies (see
Table 2).6 Also, when examining the firsthand studies
from which the philosophical debate is inspired, we
quickly observe that these studies describe a wide
range of anatomical targets, as well as a diversity of
unwanted personality changes associated with postop-
erative DBS intervention.
Further, there is a potential to claim that DBS directly
causes these changes. It is often inferred in the nonscien-
tific literature that DBS intervention poses a postoperative
threat to personal identity, or induces some unwanted per-
sonality changes or has an unintended effect on the self.
For instance, some have written, “The risk of becoming
another person following surgery is alarming” (Witt et al.
2013) and “personality changes represent a threat to per-
sonal identity and agency” (Schechtman 2010). We catego-
rize these positions as a “post hoc ergo propter hoc”-
related assumption. Many neuroethical and philosophical
documents7 are guilty of perpetuating this assumption
with little examination or scrutiny.
What do subjective self-reports from PD patients with
DBS show us about the potential for self-estrangement?
Our study found that 8 patients among 17 (47%) experi-
enced some degrees of, and intermittent episodes, of self-
estrangement. These results align with clinical reports,
which indicate that the phenomenon of “becoming a dif-
ferent person” after DBS intervention may not be solely
attributed to the electrical stimulation itself but could be
caused by treatment adjustments post surgery or by dis-
ease progression (Volkmann, Daniels, and Witt 2010). As
such, the prevalence and incidence of self-estrangement
might not be exclusively correlated with a specific DBS tar-
get and/or stimulation parameter but rather should be
seen as a result of the interaction between the neural and
glial effects of electrode insertion during surgery (Vedam-
Mai et al. 2012) and electrical stimulation, adjustments in
medication, and natural progression of the disease (Volk-
mann, Daniels, and Witt 2010), especially when DBS is
used in patients with neurodegenerative disorders where
changes to personality and identity are inevitable regard-
less of treatment course and choices. Although DBS affects
spiking activity and neurotransmitter release in local
(Hammond et al. 2008; Cheney et al. 2013) and distant cir-
cuits (Li et al. 2014), turning off stimulation won’t conclu-
sively allow dissociation of personal identity changes as a
result of electrical stimulation from DBS and as a result of
associated treatment modifications and disease prognosis.
This is further complicated by the potential of DBS to
induce long-term synaptic changes in the brain (Herring-
ton, Cheng, and Eskandar 2015). However, some case
reports do seem to suggest that turning off the stimulation
ends, for instance, an episode of mania or impulsivity
(Tsai et al. 2010), and if longer term synaptic changes are
made, then we might not expect the personality changes to
disappear with the removal of stimulation (Gilbert 2013b).
Overall, changes in identity, personality, and self-aware-
ness during DBS not only should be attributed to the DBS
target structure, surgical trajectory, and stimulation
6. We do not have enough space to adequately characterize the
accounts in Table 2 concerning the potential DBS-induced effects
on the self. Rather, we aim to examine a patient’s postoperative
phenomenological experience of first-personal or subjective
change, especially responses, or feelings of, self-estrangement. 7. Though not necessarily all those listed in Table 2.
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parameter, but also should account for patient history, dis-
ease attributes, and other forms of treatment adaptations
such as medication adjustments and psychotherapy.
At this point in time, it is relatively difficult to isolate
the cause of these postoperative changes, though they
have been associated with DBS. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no neurobiological studies claim that postoperative
personality changes can be predicted solely on the basis of
DBS itself or an exclusive neurobiological cause. Even in a
tragic case where a patient implanted with DBS died by
suicide, an indirect causal explanation was used in the
legal case to argue that postoperative changes are “more
likely than not to have been due in significant but unquan-
tifiable measure to the DBS” (Dillon 2014).
A similar relationship is seen in Parkinson’s disease
patients who develop compulsive behaviors or impulse
control disorders (ICD) (e.g., compulsive gambling,
shopping, and eating) associated with dopamine
replacement therapy. As seen during our interviews,
many patients reported self-changes due to medication.
This correlates with other findings that show that almost
17% of individuals with PD who are treated with dopa-
mine agonists (DA) will develop an ICD (Ambermoon
et al. 2011). There is strong evidence that DA plays an
important causal role: These behaviors tend to emerge
soon after commencing the medication or increasing
doses, and they often resolve when the medication is
stopped, as some of our patients reported. There is also
a plausible explanation for how dopaminergic medica-
tions would lead to compulsive behaviors. The medica-
tion only plays a partial causal role: the overwhelming
majority of individuals do not develop these disorders.
There are also predictable individual differences that
identify the likelihood of developing a compulsive
behavior, such as having a personal or family history of
addictive or impulsive behavior. The sorts of behaviors
that emerge appear to be heavily influenced by social
factors: Women tend to engage in compulsive shopping
and eating, while men are more likely to develop patho-
logical gambling or hypersexuality.
In short, this work does not advocate that DBS alone
directly causes potential personality changes.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
There are a number of limitations in this study. It is
important to clarify what the study was, and was not,
doing. There is concern with the lack of data concerning
first-personal phenomenological reports or assessments
of neural implants, which this article in some sense
seeks to address. Connected to this point is the concern
that no generalizable conclusions can be drawn from
such limited data. While looking at the phenomenology
of DBS might be a useful tool for describing the lived
experiences of implanted patients, it remains severely
impoverished as a theory for explaining it (Sholl 2015).
However, we are not attempting to draw generalizable
conclusions on the basis of numbers, but rather, we aim
to examine phenomenological first-personal reports to
inform understandings of the impacts of DBS on
patients’ self, with a focus on self-estrangement.
First, it should be recognized that drawing on subjec-
tive or first-personal phenomenological accounts of how a
person feels about or experiences their implant does not
provide us with enough context to assess the (objective)
accuracy of these accounts. Estrangement is not necessarily
self-perceived. As other studies have demonstrated, rela-
tives are often more sensitive to alterations in self than the
patients themselves (Pham et al. 2015). In addition to what
we discussed in the previous section, Patient 03 reported,
“I don’t feel different at all. Some people said to me that I
am a bit different.” Correspondingly, Patient 06 reported,
“I think I have been causing a bit of problems in my
relationships.” Also, the epistemic role of the first-personal
perspective may be limited, particularly in the case of
induced mania. We are not questioning the what-it’s-like-
ness but rather the consistency of the narration. As family
members pointed out to Patient 04, “They said they don’t
recognize me . . . I am so impulsive and seem to change my
mind all the time.” Here it is not the experiential-qualita-
tive character of being manic which is problematic, but
rather the consistency of the narrative account. Families
and social context are an essential measurement of how
patients are experiencing potential estrangement, even if
patients do not perceive it. An extended study would not
only involve interviewing the implanted patients, but also
their close relatives. In the current study, patients were
asked whether their relatives mentioned any postoperative
changes, but systematically interviewing patients’ relatives
would have likely generated more data.
Second, and more importantly, our study merely asked
patients to report on their perception of self-change. As
such, it provides a limited amount of information about
patients’ uptake and adaptation over time. As such, there
is insufficient evidence to draw conclusions about how the
implants affect autonomy and identity and consequently
to draw conclusions about the impacts on autonomy and
identity. An extended version of the study should also
include interviews made before the intervention, and at
least two follow-ups; this would add important insights
regarding the degree of “self-deception” of patients when
remembering their state prior to surgery. Further, the
study should include focus on the patient’s engagement
with the world and his or her implant, in addition to
reporting on perception of self-change.
Despite these identified limitations, we strongly
believe that we can draw some robust and common find-
ings from the patient postoperative narratives, as we have
done in the preceding, and on the basis of these findings
make some conclusions, as summarized in the following.
Further, exploring patient’s first-personal experience of
DBS can inform and guide patients through decision-mak-
ing processes leading to implantation, and can also answer
questions of patients currently experiencing self-estrange-
ment phenomenon.

































Subjective self-reports from PD patients with DBS help us
to understand some aspects of potential postoperative self-
estrangement. The way patients perceive themselves
through pathology will likely dictate the way they will
experience potential DBS-induced self-estrangement; self-
perception through pathology will likely dictate degrees of
whether patients self-perceive DBS as something that is
restorative. The notion of self-estrangement seems to exist
in association with certain common qualitative characters:
(1) loss of control and (2) distorted perception of capacities.
The first is mostly associated with a deteriorative sense of
the self, and the second is largely related to a restorative
one. Most implanted patients we interviewed experienced
a shift in their self-perception, mostly in a restorative
sense, especially during calibration. Some feelings of dete-
rioration were experienced in relation to powerlessness,
which resulted in severe harm in one case. This evidence
supports the hypothesis that postoperative feelings of
powerlessness play a crucial role in causing harm (Gilbert
2013a, 2015a). This study demonstrates that DBS, as a
whole, increases autonomous restorative power over one’s
self, rather than a deterioration of the self. This is anec-
dotally supported by our interviews with patients who
reported a sensation of empowerment. The explanation for
this may reside in the concept of embodiment, where the
device is felt to become part of the individual, rather than
as a foreign despot exerting control (Amadio and Boulis
2015).
It appears from these clusters that most patients expe-
rience a proportionally restorative sense of the self. This
evidence justifies the claim that, generally speaking, DBS
is not a threat to personal, but some patients might not
experience well any form of estrangement. Patients would
benefit from being informed ahead of any potential risks,
prior to consenting to being implanted, as in other types of
invasive brain intervention (Via~na, Vickers et al. 2017; Gil-
bert et al. 2014; Via~na, Bittlinger et al. 2017; Gilbert 2015b;
Bretzner et al. 2011; Gilbert, Vranic, and Hurst 2013; Gil-
bert 2014; Gilbert et al. 2015; Vranic & Gilbert 2014; Gilbert
& Cook 2015; Gilbert 2017; Gilbert & Dodds 2013; Gilbert
& Focquaert 2015; Gilbert & Vranic 2015).
This study highlights the importance of the first-per-
sonal perspective and subjective assessments when consid-
ering the impacts of implants and the need for more
assessments. More significantly, however, we argue that
further and more fuller phenomenological exploration of
how patients respond to their neural implants is needed in
order to draw conclusions about the impacts of DBS on
autonomy and identity. This would involve interrogating
patients’ agency over time so that we can make an assess-
ment of whether initial disruptions, feelings of self-
estrangement, and failures in decision making are short-
term or long-term phenomena. Furthermore, this would
involve assessing how patients live with their implants,
with a focus on whether the implant facilitates or hinders
their capacities to engage in the world.
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APPENDIX: SEMISTRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCRIPT
These are examples of generic questions. They are an indi-
cation of the structure to be followed during the inter-
views, rather than the actual questions to be asked to
patients. The choice of words, terminology, or languages
may change slightly for each patient.
1. Potential questions regarding postoperative sense of the
self.
i. What was it like to live without the deep brain stim-
ulation (DBS) device? Did you feel comfortable in
yourself with your medical condition? How did you
feel that your medical condition affected your life?
ii. What is it like to be implanted with DBS? Do you
feel any significant difference from before the
device compared to after it was implanted?
 Please provide some examples. Did you expect to
find differences or changes prior to the operation?
iii. Have others commented on any changes to you
(e.g., personality, habits, etc.) since being
implanted? If so, do you agree with them? Why or
why not?
iv. (Depending on previous answers) Do you think
you may change/change more in the future as a
result of this intervention?
2. Potential questions regarding the sense of control.
i. Prior to the implantation of DBS, how would you
describe your control over your life? (e.g., through
habits, daily activities, etc.)
ii. Do you feel the device has increased your auton-
omy (e.g., making you less dependent on others)?
For instance, has it improved your life, control on
symptoms? Has it given you back more control
over your life?
iii. Have others commented that you have better con-
trol over your life/symptoms/yourself? Do you
agree with them? If not, why not?
iv. (Depending on previous answers) If you experi-
enced the device as form of control, does it feel
authentic? From your own personal experience, do
you see it as a novel control?
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Introduction
Deep brain stimulation (DBS) has been regarded 
as an efficient and safe treatment for Parkinson’s 
disease (PD) for the last 25 years (Schultz, 2002). 
During this time, several thousands of people with 
PD have received DBS therapy. In terms of clinical 
ethics, it is worth asking whether the use of DBS 
may have unanticipated negative effects similar to 
those associated with other types of neurosurgery: 
in particular, how postoperative neuropsychiatric 
effects may impact upon a patient’s sense of self 
(Gilbert, Cook, O’Brien, & Illes, 2017; Gilbert, 
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Abstract. Although deep brain stimulation (DBS) may result in dramatic motor improvement in people with 
Parkinson’s disease (PD), it has been correlated with a number of postoperative psychiatric side effects. We 
report a case of a person with PD experiencing depression and hypomania following DBS surgery. We provide 
a detailed report of the patient’s personal experiences dealing with and managing these psychiatric side effects 
for three years. Providing a personal narrative focusing on detailed patient subjective experiences comple-
ments reports that give insight into the short- and long-term effects of DBS on established psychiatric measures 
and neurologic activity. But, most importantly, such a qualitative approach provides prospective patients and 
clinicians with a broader ethical picture of real-life challenges faced and coping strategies employed by PD 
patients treated with DBS who are experiencing psychiatric adverse events. This case study reinforces the ethi-
cal need to disclose the potential risk of harm to prospective patients as well as the importance of establishing 
a multidisciplinary postoperative supportive group.
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Goddard, Viaña, Carter, & Horne, 2017; Gilbert, 
Vranic, 2015; Gilbert, Harris, Kapsa, 2014). In some 
instances, symptoms are alleviated but patients 
do not cope well with their new “normal” life, a 
syndrome known as the “burden of normality” 
(Gilbert, 2012).
Potential adverse effects of DBS raise impor-
tant ethical concerns. Unlike the side effects of 
drugs that may simply require stoppage of intake 
or decrease of dosage to be controlled, DBS is an 
invasive procedure that necessitates risky interven-
tions for removal from the body. Most importantly, 
turning stimulation down may not actually allevi-
ate side effects; indeed, studies have shown that 
calibrating stimulation has induced worst adverse 
effects for some patients, including suicide attempts 
(Gilbert, 2013a; 2015a). As a result, DBS adverse 
events may increase the magnitude of harm to 
patients, especially if the intervention appears to 
be correlated with postoperative effects involving 
the core components of a patient’s personality: self 
and identity.
The phenomenological effects of DBS on 
patients’ postoperative existence remain poorly 
understood. Some researchers suggest that the 
impact of DBS on patient personality is character-
ized by self-perception through narrative identity 
(Focquaert & De Ridder, 2009); changes in thought 
and personality (Glannon, 2009); disruptions of 
psychological continuity influencing competence 
and responsibility (Klaming & Haselager, 2010); 
alteration of a patient’s core attitudes (Witt, Kuhn, 
Timmerman, Zurowski, & Woopen, 2013); variation 
in embodied, affective, intersubjective, cognitive, 
narrative, extended, and situated aspects of the self 
(Dings & de Bruin, 2016); or changes in relational 
autonomy competences (Brown et al., 2016). We do 
not have enough space to characterize all accounts 
adequately, but it appears that DBS may lead to 
some existential side effects that are ostensibly 
profound, as patients may experience shifts in 
identity in relationship to both themselves and 
their families.
Most studies on the psychiatric adverse events 
caused by DBS in PD patients focus on its effect 
on several established psychological tests and 
psychiatric measures in a number of individuals 
over time (Castrioto, Lhommée, Moro, & Krack, 
2014; Boel et al., 2016), with a few investigating the 
effect of stimulation on brain activity (Ulla et al., 
2011). Although some publications present case 
reports, providing brief descriptions of the pro-
gression of the experienced psychiatric symptoms 
with respect to adjustments in medication and 
stimulation parameters (Funkiewiez et al., 2004; 
Rodrigues et al., 2010; Ugurlu, Acar, Karadag, & 
Acar, 2014; Widge et al., 2013), or statements from 
patients and caregivers (Lewis et al., 2015), they do 
not really provide detailed long-term information 
on patients’ subjective experiences before symptom 
onset and potential socioenvironmental factors 
that could have triggered or exacerbated these 
symptoms, patient perspectives while experienc-
ing psychiatric conditions, and coping strategies 
that patients potentially employ in addition to 
medication and stimulation adjustments. This 
presents a gap in the literature on DBS-associated 
psychiatric adverse events from patients’ points 
of view, information that that would also be 
important in understanding how these events 
affect actual patient day-to-day experiences and 
perceptions of DBS therapy.
In this study, we report on the case of a patient 
with PD exhibiting depression and hypomania 
after DBS, despite improvement in motor symp-
toms. We detail the patient’s personal experi-
ences with these psychiatric adverse events and 
the ways in which she experienced them. These 
qualitative accounts provide a perspective beyond 
standard psychological tests, psychiatric evalua-
tions, and neurologic measurements on neuropsy-
chiatric issues in DBS for PD by highlighting a PD 
patient’s perception of life with these symptoms 
and providing prospective patients and clini-
cians a more detailed, relatable, and empathic 
understanding of these issues through the narra-
tion of our case subject’s experiences of struggle, 
acceptance, and recovery. This case illustrates an 
ethical concern, in that successful postoperative 
alleviation of motor symptoms did not necessarily 
result in an improvement in the patient’s overall 
well-being.
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Case Report
A 46-year-old female patient, with no history of 
mental health issues, underwent bilateral sub-
thalamic nucleus (STN) DBS in August 2013. She 
consented to DBS surgery 6 years after receiving 
a diagnosis of PD and being refractory to the most 
common drugs (dopamine agonists). Following 
DBS surgery, Parkinsonian tremor remained sub-
stantial, which required adjustment of stimulation 
parameters. Calibration resulted in significant 
diminution of motor symptoms; however, concomi-
tant psychiatric symptoms emerged, in particular 
depression and mania, for which Zoloft and Sero-
quel were prescribed. In the following months, 
the patient experienced a wide range of feelings, 
especially intense distress, which were articulated 
through various narratives. Subsequently, her thera-
peutic relationship with her neurologist and surgi-
cal team broke down. Successively, she divorced 
the father of her children, moved to another state, 
and ultimately attempted suicide in February 2014.
The patient was included in our multicentre 
qualitative postoperative study of DBS for PD. We 
used qualitative methodological tools to conduct 
continuous in-depth, semistructured interviews 
using open-ended questions in order to understand 
PD patients’ perception of self-changes following 
surgery (Gilbert, Goddard, Viaña, et al., 2017). This 
qualitative approach gave us access to first-person 
perspectives that are not captured by standardized 
questionnaires and scales.
The patient reported a persistent state of self-
perceived changes following implantation. More 
than one year after surgery, her narratives explicitly 
refer to a persistent perception of strangeness and 
alteration of her concept of self. For instance, she 
reported:
can’t be the real me anymore—I can’t pretend . . . 
I think that I felt that the person that I have been 
[since the intervention] was somehow observing 
somebody else, but it wasn’t me. . . . I feel like I 
am who I am now. But it’s not the me that went 
into the surgery that time. . . . My family say 
they grieve for the old [me]. . . .
In another occurrence, when discussing her divorce 
and the rupture in her familial structure, she 
reported how her children perceived her postop-
erative self:
Patient: My family say they grieve for the old 
[me] . . .
Interviewer: What have your children said to you 
about the difference that they’ve seen before 
and after?
Patient: Yes, they said they don’t recognize me.
Interviewer: And in what way don’t they recog-
nize you?
Patient: That I am so impulsive and seem to 
change my mind all the time. . . .
The patient also reported developing severe 
postoperative impulsivity: “I cannot control the 
impulse to go off if I’m angry.” In parallel, while 
describing a sense of loss of control over some 
impulsions, she has also recognized that DBS gave 
her increased feelings of strength: “I never had felt 
this lack of power or this giving of power—until 
I had deep brain stimulation.” Here, the patient’s 
“lack of power” in some aspects of her character 
seems to also result in a “giving of power” in other 
novel qualitative features of character; that is, a loss 
of control leading to a disinhibition has also given 
her some incommensurable feelings of strength. 
For instance, she experienced radically enhanced 
capacities, in the form of increased uncontrollable 
sexual urges:
I know this is a bit embarrassing. But I had 35 
staples in my head, and we made love in the 
hospital bathroom and that wasn’t just me. It 
was just I had felt more sexual with the surgery 
than without.
And greater physical energy:
I remember about a week after the surgery, I 
still had the 35 staples in my head and I was 
just starting to enter the cooler months of winter 
but my kids had got me winter clothes so I had 
nothing to wear to the follow up appointment 
and when I went back there of the morning, 
I thought “I can walk into the doctor’s” even 
though it was 5 kilometers into town. It’s like 
the psychologist said: “For a woman who had 
a very invasive brain surgery 9 days ago and 
you’ve just almost walked 10 kilometers.” And 
on the way, I stopped and bought a very unchar-
acteristic dress, backless—completely different 
to what I usually do.
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In the following interviews, the patient’s experi-
ence of being estranged from her previous self was 
different; in particular, when the treating psychia-
trist tried calibrating the DBS parameters:
I went to the psychiatrist, and he said, “Right, 
well, this is bordering on mania, you need to 
turn the settings right down to manage it.” I 
said to him, “Please don’t, this is not over the 
top—this is just joy.”
Eventually, the patient’s narrative started to 
indicate progressive coping with postoperative 
psychiatric changes:
Well, it was different to—I’ve always been a 
worrier for so many years. Now, I don’t seem 
to have that worry thing anymore . . . I feel that 
other [me] that was before the surgery would 
never have able to stand on her own two feet. . . . 
I wouldn’t [have] been able to cope if I was the 
old [me].”
To some extent, the patient started to use her new 
postoperative capacities. She started expressing her 
emotion through colored painting (Figure 1) and is 
currently selling some of her creations.
I don’t know, all the senses came alive. I wanted 
to listen to Paul Kelly and all of my favorite 
music really loud in the toilet. And you know, 
also everything was colourful. . . . Well, since 
brain surgery I can. I didn’t bother before. I 
can see the light . . . the light that is underlying 
Figure 1. A colored painting made by the patient.
87
 A Personal Narrative on Living and Dealing with Psychiatric Symptoms after DBS Surgery 71
every masterpiece in photography. . . . I’ve seen 
it like I’ve never seen it before . . . I am a totally 
different person. I like it that I love photography 
and music and colourful clothes, but where is 
the old me now?
The patient still faces challenges linked to her 
new self, but she has developed an attitude to 
embrace several aspects of it:
Interviewer: And over this subsequent 2 years, 
you’ve come to actually feel that rather than 
being self-estranged, you are actually truly 
who you are—is that correct?
Patient: Yes.
Interviewer: Would you go back to the old [you] 
if you could?
Patient: No. . . . I don’t have any regrets about 
who I am now. But I have regrets, and I’m not 
angry anymore—just concerned that I wasn’t 
given the opportunity to know what could 
possibly happen.
A surprising element we observed is that on many 
occasions, the patient mentioned and maintained 
that she was never informed by her initial medical 
team about potential unwanted psychosocial effects 
of the treatment.1
Discussion
There is an ongoing debate in the literature about 
the clinical and ethical implications of personality 
changes following DBS surgery. This debate dis-
cusses trade-offs between the motor benefits of DBS 
and the potential psychological harm caused by the 
intervention. The discussion often addresses the 
issues of how the medical team should account for 
personality changes (de Haan, Rietveld, Stokhof, & 
Denys, 2013), whether patients should be prescribed 
deactivation or explantation (Gilbert, 2015a), and 
what moral criteria could guide a patient’s deci-
sion to accept side effects while enjoying motor 
symptom alleviation (Glannon, 2009). Our case 
1 The patient has taken legal action against the lead neuro-
surgeon. Legal procedures were still in progress at the time 
this article was written. 
raises ethical difficulties because it illustrates how 
DBS treatment may result in unexpected outcomes 
for patients along with a diminution of targeted 
symptoms, even after many years of follow-up. 
As a result, the ethical question of benefits and 
risks associated with DBS treatment is raised. The 
potential psychosocial risks demonstrate that access 
to information with respect to potential unwanted 
DBS-induced effects is an ethical priority. Clinicians 
should prioritize appropriately informing prospec-
tive patients, their families, and their caregivers 
about treatment responses that might not be in line 
with the therapeutic goals of the DBS intervention. 
Access to information should also highlight the 
limits of the treatment and its potential long-term 
psychosocial effects, despite diminution of the ill-
ness’s core symptoms. It is fundamental to stress 
these details, as our patient reported never having 
received information on potential unwanted psy-
chosocial effects of the treatment from her initial 
medical team.
The observed psychiatric side effects in the case 
reported here are not the first of their kind and have 
also been observed in other PD patients who under-
went STN DBS. Depression (Anderson & Mullins, 
2003), mania (Ugurlu et al., 2014; Chopra et al., 
2012), aggression (Sensi et al., 2004), and impulsivity 
(Hälbig et al., 2009; Ballanger et al., 2009) have all 
been observed in a number of patients. Such effects 
can be due to the stimulation itself or accompany-
ing medication changes and can also be influenced 
by preoperative psychiatric history (Anderson & 
Mullins, 2003; Witt, Daniels, & Volkmann, 2012). 
Moreover, the postoperative development or pro-
gression of these psychiatric side effects varies, 
with some patients reporting improvement and 
others worsening (Castrioto et al., 2014; Anderson & 
Mullins, 2003; Couto, Monteiro, Oliveira, Lunet, & 
Massano, 2014). Following STN DBS, some patients 
become less depressed while others become more 
so (Funkiewiez et al., 2004; Couto et al., 2014), with 
some having suicidal ideations or even committing 
suicide despite motor improvements (Weintraub et 
al., 2013; Rodrigues et al., 2010). The reduction of 
dopaminergic drugs in PD patients receiving DBS 
might lead to dopamine withdrawal syndrome, 
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which could cause depression (Castrioto et al., 2014; 
Thobois et al., 2010). The ethical concern is how 
to balance motor improvement with these effects, 
especially if they seem irreversible.
Our patient experienced depression and even-
tually attempted suicide, which could have been 
precipitated by persistent feelings of distress and 
the breaking down of her relationships with her 
physicians and ex-husband. The severity of these 
side effects emphasizes the importance of long-term 
narrative studies in PD patients receiving DBS in 
determining how postoperative mood changes 
affect patients’ quality of life, understanding how 
depressed patients see treatment effects and might 
feel unsatisfied despite motor improvements, and 
identifying potential social and environmental fac-
tors that could affect postoperative depressive feel-
ings and precipitate suicidal ideations and attempts 
(Gilbert, 2012; 2013b).
The first-person narrative presented in this 
study aims to highlight experiences of mania and 
hypersexuality from a patient’s perspective rather 
than from an external observer’s evaluation and 
to demonstrate the patient’s thoughts and feelings 
when these tendencies and symptoms emerge. 
These subjective reports are ethically fundamental 
to making sense of drastic changes that may harm 
the patient: in particular, negatively affecting what 
constitutes first-person experiences. By explor-
ing the patient’s subjective experience of being 
implanted, we examine what makes a person who 
she is: the subject of her own experience—unique 
and distinct from that of any other subject (Gilbert, 
2017). The patient claimed that “I can’t be the real 
me anymore—I can’t pretend . . . I think that I felt 
that the person that I have been [since the inter-
vention] was somehow observing somebody else, 
but it wasn’t me,” and “I feel like I am who I am 
now. But it’s not the me that went into the surgery 
that time.” These feelings reflect a notion of self-
estrangement: in other terms, being the estranged 
subject of experiences; “estrangement of the self 
from itself” (Gilbert, 2017). The ethical issue with 
self-estrangement is that it can be associated with 
deteriorative aspects (e.g., depressive symptoms) 
and restorative aspects (e.g., distorted perception 
of capacities) (Gilbert, Goddard, Viaña et al., 2017). 
In either case, patients may not cope well with these 
newly acquired aspects.
The patient’s narratives of deteriorative es-
trangement appear to be compatible with previ-
ous literature reporting an increased number of 
patients perceiving themselves as having an altered 
or different personal identity following DBS, de-
spite motor improvements. Previous studies have 
reported patients experiencing feelings of strange-
ness, including narratives such as the following: 
“I don’t seem to recognize myself without the 
problems I had before” (Agid et al., 2006) and “I 
don’t recognize myself anymore; I haven’t found 
myself again after the operation” (Schüpbach et al., 
2006). Previous studies have highlighted the salient 
issue that patients suffering from deteriorative self-
estrangement were at greater risk of harm, includ-
ing from suicide attempts (Gilbert, 2015a; 2013a).
Exploring patients’ feelings of self-estrangement 
allows us to comprehend which cognitive, affective, 
and conative capacities may have been drastically 
affected, and, as a result, compromise their ability 
to freely act or make decisions. For instance, our 
patient reported feeling “more sexual with the 
surgery than without,” leading her to manifest 
degrees of hypersexuality.2 The general increase 
in her sexual arousal and activity, tangential with 
augmented impulsivity, may call into question 
whether she is ultimately responsible for some of 
her behaviors and actions: “I never had felt this 
lack of power or this giving of power—until I had 
deep brain stimulation.” These first-person expe-
riences have indicated how the patient is aware 
that her behavior is different from her pre–DBS 
self and that the hypersexual person post–DBS 
is questioning who she has become. This is very 
2 Although reports of increased sexuality immediately after 
DBS surgery and after initial stimulation (Romito & Alba-
nese, 2010) and of impulsive actions as a result of feelings of 
grandiosity and energy increase have been presented before 
(Ugurlu et al., 2014), they have not really highlighted a 
patient’s feelings during these episodes. 
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important, because it could assist the medical team 
in (re)evaluating the harmful outcomes that have 
occurred despite successfully addressing therapeu-
tic endpoints. For instance, when the psychiatrist 
recommended that “ . . . you need to turn the set-
tings right down to manage it,” the patient replied, 
“Please don’t, this is not over the top—this is just 
joy.” These dilemmas echo how a patient might 
prefer to keep a particular stimulation parameter 
because of feelings, such as joy, that DBS induces 
(Chattha, Greene, & Ramdhani, 2015; Krack et al., 
2001). However, practitioners’ responses to patient 
requests to operate stimulation at a certain level 
should always take into account the risk of harm.
As discussed, what characterizes the reported 
patient’s potential postoperative harmful experi-
ence, as in other cases (Gilbert, Goddard, Viaña 
et al., 2017; Agid et al., 2006; Schüpbach et al., 
2006), can be understood by way of deteriorative 
estranged effects. We believe that the patient sub-
stantially experienced deteriorative estrangement 
correlated with a radical and ongoing sense of loss 
of control over some important capacities, which 
reflects an involuntary and unintentional shift in 
her character: to some extent, a “radical disrup-
tive experience which redefines the patient’s life” 
(Gisquet, 2008). These capacities were implicated in 
her conception of herself as a rational agent, able to 
decide and freely choose what is in her best interest. 
Her struggles with postoperative estrangement, 
especially to reidentify with particular qualitative 
capacities, through activities, emotions, and aspira-
tions, illustrate a loss of control of some elements of 
herself. As such, the case report appears to further 
corroborate the hypothesis that postoperative self-
estrangement experiences seem to qualitatively 
characterize the notion of powerlessness (Gilbert, 
2013a), which is often manifested through invol-
untary self-harming actions or behaviors or loss 
of control.
The patient went through a spectrum of subjec-
tive experiences, articulated in various narratives, 
from intense distress (suicide attempt) to manifesta-
tions of stability (little regret for her previous self). 
Along the spectrum of feelings associated with self-
interpretation of strangeness, the patient reported 
subjective changes in her capacities. Some of the 
testimonials show that she initially experienced 
DBS-induced capacities as not representative or 
characteristic of herself. This experience of a gap in 
character has been felt in many cases as a malaise 
(Gilbert, 2017). In some instances, this malaise took 
the form of a dispossession of control of some capaci-
ties. In this case, such malaise appears to antagonize 
the patient’s ability to appropriate her new capaci-
ties. The existence of sudden and persistent capaci-
ties that are not embraced by the patient following 
stimulation is evidence that a different subjective 
experience of the self has emerged poststimulation. 
Self-estrangement reflects the idea that feelings of 
strangeness reach a critical proportion when DBS-
induced capacities overpower previous capacities 
and specific behaviors (Gilbert, 2017). Some aspects 
of this postoperative overtaking can be negative, as 
in cases where the patient becomes impulsive. How-
ever, not all situations would appear to be negative, 
as seen with the implanted patient in this case study 
who enjoyed new sexual capacities and developed 
artistic ways of expressing herself.
Eventually, the patient managed to come to 
terms with her newfound self and interests while 
still being aware that she was no longer her old 
self. These phenomenological accounts can help 
the medical team address some issues: in particular, 
by illustrating variance between the experiences 
of different subjects, such as affective valence and 
intensity (Bittlinger, 2017). This could help guide 
medical decisions to remove, deactivate, or main-
tain treatment. Understanding nontargeted effects 
of this therapeutic intervention will better prepare 
PD patients and physicians for potential side effects 
of a more interpersonal nature.
Overall, our case illustrates the lack of acknowl-
edgment by this patient’s initial medical team 
concerning the existential dimensions of her post-
operative experience. These dimensions translate 
into three main ethical issues: (1) A patient might 
prefer not to be implanted with DBS knowing that 
these changes could occur. However, should the risk 
be deemed acceptable, then (2) there may be a way 
to design a better shared decision-making process, 
involving the patient’s family, in order to prepare 
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everyone for possible identity and personality shifts. 
Should this process lead to fair negotiation between 
the patient and his or her family, then (3) all of them 
must consent to accepting the potential long-term 
unanticipated harmful consequences (patient: being 
symptom-free but potentially becoming an unex-
pected “new” person; family: living with a treated 
but perhaps unwelcome “new” person). The first 
issue appears to be a sole and ultimate decision 
made by the patient that aims to preserve patient 
sovereignty within his or her entourage. The second 
issue involves an acceptance of the potential risk, 
but includes preparatory phases to help the patient 
and his or her family manage possible unwanted 
outcomes.3 The third issue addresses the possibility 
of adverse outcomes experienced by the patient that 
are incompatible with her or his family values and 
expectations. These possible ethical issues reflect 
the need for patients and families to face existential 
adversities (including potential psychiatric side 
effects) that may accompany the alleviation of the 
patient’s motor symptoms.
Conclusions
In this report, we present the narrative of a patient 
who experienced depression, mania, impulsivity, 
hypersexuality, and self-estrangement after DBS. 
Such a narrative can provide support to patients 
experiencing these unexpected postoperative 
neuropsychiatric effects, prepare caregivers to deal 
with potential neuropsychiatric consequences, 
educate family members about potential sudden 
behavioral changes, and generate knowledge that 
could guide prospective patients and their families 
through the decision-making process leading to 
3 Patient postoperative socioenvironmental trajectory is 
compatible with previous studies reporting postoperative 
changes associated with family dynamics and restructuring. 
For instance, “64% of patients who were working before sur-
gery wanted to stop their professional activity, and 65% of 
those who were married (or lived with a partner) experienced 
a conjugal crisis after operation” (Agid et al., 2006, p. 410). 
implantation. For patients and families, knowing 
that postoperative neuropsychiatric changes are 
also experienced by several individuals undergo-
ing DBS treatment could help them understand 
and appreciate the difficulties caused by these side 
effects and potentially motivate them to establish or 
join patient support groups. Finally, this case study 
illustrates that the perspectives and narratives of 
patients facing postoperative neuropsychiatric 
changes and self-estrangement should also be 
given importance in devising management strate-
gies not only for the motor symptoms of Parkin-
son’s disease but also for the range of non-motor 
symptoms that are the adverse effects of medication 
and stimulation.
The narrative approach that we used in describ-
ing patient experiences post–DBS sheds an addi-
tional light on the procedure’s psychiatric effects, 
demonstrating the need to support patients’ 
postoperative trajectory with a multidisciplinary 
team. Narrative medicine, especially in psychiatry, 
facilitates better understanding of patients’ experi-
ences, encourages patient participation in illness 
reporting, and helps align scientific and medical 
knowledge with specific patient symptoms, needs, 
and preferences (Holmes, 2000; Schultz & Flasher, 
2011). In addition, patient narratives are important 
tools in informing the public about the disorder 
by revealing the human side of illnesses (Sachdev, 
2011). In this report, the use of a narrative approach 
sheds light on how feelings of self-estrangement 
initially caused distress to the patient but eventu-
ally led to acceptance and coping. It highlights the 
importance of not just resolving the motor condi-
tion of PD patients but also addressing non-motor 
symptoms that might arise from treatment. Finally, 
it makes descriptions of adverse side effects more 
relatable to future patients and caregivers and gives 
them a more personal insight on problems and 
issues, beyond the medical diagnosis of psychiatric 
conditions, that they might face post–DBS.
As novel implantable brain technologies are 
developing fast—for instance, in their control by 
artificial intelligence to target neurological and 
psychiatric conditions—new ethical issues will 
likely emerge (Gilbert, Cook, O’Brien, & Illes, 2017; 
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Reardon, 2017; Gilbert, 2015b; Gilbert, Cook, 2015; 
Gilbert, O’Brien, Cook, 2018). As our case study 
has demonstrated, keeping in mind the possibility 
that novel neurotechnologies may have profound 
existential side effects will be critical for ensuring 
patients’ wellness.
Ethics Approval
This study was conducted in accordance with 
Tasmanian Human Research Ethics Committee 
regulations. Patient consent and minimal risk eth-
ics application approval, entitled “H0014820 Deep 
Brain Stimulation Postoperative Suicidal Ideation 
within Treatment Resistant Depression: Why 
Removing the Devices is Not Enough,” conform 
to Tasmanian Human Research Ethics Committee 
regulations. Ethics approval was obtained in 2015. 
The patient provided consent to have her narratives 
included in publications on neuropsychiatric side 
effects of DBS for PD.
Discussion Questions
1. What obligations do DBS providers and research-
ers have to offer follow-up care aimed at addressing 
potential personality and behavior changes that can 
cause patients distress?
2. What are the trade-offs between the motor ben-
efits of DBS and the potential psychological harm 
induced by treatments?
Should decision aids be developed to help patients 
weigh the pros and cons? What would you put into 
such a decision aid? 
3. Should family members have a greater voice in 
DBS decision-making than in ordinary healthcare 
decision-making given the potential impact of DBS 
on personality and behavior?
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VII. Descriptive review of philosophical perspectives on DBS, selfhood, and identity 
 
 The literature presented in sections V and VI illustrate possible effects of DBS on 
preferences, behaviour, personality, self-concept, and socialisation. Some of these reports 
have been used in the philosophical reflection of how DBS could affect selfhood and identity, 
with several reflections cited in the publications included in section VI of this chapter (Gilbert 
et al. 2017; Gilbert & Viaña 2018). These philosophical viewpoints will also be utilised in the 
discussion on the possible effects of DBS on the selfhood of people with AD in Chapter 6 
(Viaña & Gilbert 2018). Considering the word limit for journal publications, the three 
publications (Gilbert et al. 2017; Gilbert & Viaña 2018; Viaña & Gilbert 2018) citing these 
philosophical perspectives did not have enough space for a more concrete and extensive 
description of the views included. As such, this section of Chapter 3 aims to provide readers 
of this thesis a representative overview of philosophical perspectives on how DBS could 
influence the selfhood and identity of its recipients. This section neither aims to critically 
engage with each viewpoint nor argue for a particular position on whether DBS changes 
identity or not. Rather, its main goal is to introduce to readers who might not have an 
extensive neurophilosophy background the philosophical discourse on the effects of DBS on 
selfhood and identity, which would also be used in Chapter 6 (Viaña & Gilbert 2018) to 
hypothesise how DBS for AD may affect selfhood and its implications on a clinical trial’s 
consent procedure and manner of treating research participants. 
 
 In 2009, Walter Glannon highlighted that DBS could alter mental states critical to 
personality, thought, and behaviour, which could then disrupt the continuity and integrity of 
psychological properties constituting the self and the experience of persisting through time 
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as the same person. He suggested that if psychiatric adverse events from DBS such as mania 
alters the general content, continuity, and integrity of a person’s desires, intentions, beliefs, 
and emotions, then turning on the stimulation seems to turn the PD patient to a different 
person. Glannon (2009) acknowledged though that for certain PD patients, this alteration in 
the self that leads to less suffering is preferable to a self with more suffering. In addition, 
although the manic state would appear to disrupt the thematic unity of the total set of a 
person’s mental states over time and disrupt his or her narrative identity, it does not entail a 
complete disruption of someone’s psychological continuity. There may be enough 
psychological continuity and narrative integrity for a person to retain a sufficient, albeit 
weaker, sense of identity to still be the same person that is aware of and can recall what it is 
like to lose motor control and regain it. Even if there is substantial change, the patient still 
benefits from the stimulation through relief from motor suffering. As such, potential changes 
or harms in a person’s identity cannot be separated from a comparison of the potential 
benefit to the patient. Possible psychological and/or psychiatric changes have to be 
contextualized by the procedure’s goal of relieving a patient’s suffering. 
 
 Schechtman (2010) also posited that DBS-induced psychological and personality 
changes represent a threat to personal identity and agency. She indicated that both rapid and 
dramatic relief from symptoms and long-term changes can be alarming or a cause of concern.  
She cited examples wherein patients and researchers felt terrified by sudden changes in mood 
caused by stimulation in depressed patients. This can be due to the global nature of the 
psychological change and to its immediate nature comparable to “flipping a switch”, which 
makes it difficult to attribute the changes as products of the patient’s will and effort. Although 
there is a positive outcome, patients might still see the effect as a threat to identity and 
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agency. Schechtman (2010) also indicated that long-term changes observed in Parkinson’s 
patients receiving DBS can be perceived as a threat to identity in a way that it leads to 
problems in patients with adjusting on how to go on with their lives once the motor symptoms 
of PD have been alleviated. In examining how these changes affect identity, she underscored 
the use of a narrative perspective, which states that “our selfhood is essentially tied not 
directly to defining traits, but to our ability to understand ourselves and others in narrative 
terms” (p. 136, Schechtman 2010). The main idea of this perspective is that as people develop, 
they see themselves as temporally extended subjects whose past affect their present states 
and whose current choices and circumstances will likely have implications for the future. 
Using this narrative perspective, DBS could disrupt a patient’s personal narrative through the 
manner and rapidity of the change, which could break off a current narrative and start a new 
one. For the long-term changes caused by DBS, disruptions in narrative can be due to the loss 
of the identity of a person with motor symptoms and difficulties adjusting to a life with 
relieved symptoms. Despite these potential threats to a person’s narrative, DBS can 
alternatively be seen as something enabling and as a segment of a continuous and self-
expressive life narrative when viewed beyond just the period of change and through a longer 
time bracket.  By having a long view of life that allows for instances of radical change to be 
integrated into an ongoing story, people could find a way to bring DBS into one’s narrative 
rather than to allow it to disrupt it. The threats posed by DBS to personal identity and agency 
highlight the importance of working with patients pre- and post-operatively to help them 
construct and maintain a sense of self and agency gracefully despite radical and long-term 
changes, preventing alienation and ensuring that therapeutic goals are met. 
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Jotterand and Giordano (2011), defining personal identity as the psychosocial and 
biological aspects of human development and experience through a body located in time and 
space, posited that neurostimulation affects certain aspects of personal identity. They 
highlighted three main issues that must be raised when determining the effect of DBS on 
personal identity – its effect on neural structures with unforeseeable consequences, the 
creation of a state of dependence that does not foster a patient’s autonomy, and its effect on 
a patient’s rationality or the ability to advance one’s ideas and beliefs. They highlighted the 
importance of evaluating the potential for DBS-induced personality changes, especially on its 
reversibility upon treatment termination or upon administration of secondary interventions. 
 
Mathews (2011) explored the effect of DBS on personal identity through its effects on 
a person’s sense of oneself as a continuous being over time, with memories and justifications 
for any changes.  Mathews (2011) highlighted the importance of the construct of personal 
identity in the sense that it influences our views of a person’s responsibilities and also our 
responsibilities towards that individual. She emphasized that DBS might be perceived 
differently from medication or psychotherapy due to its potential permanence, increased 
requirement for interaction and dependency on the medical system, and effects that are 
reversible, reproducible, and immediate, which could result to identity and sense of self 
changes immediately upon turning the stimulation on. She also raised important questions 
on the presence of narrative continuity in identity changes and if a patient’s and his or her 
caregiver’s views are congruent. She advocated further investigations on evaluating the 
impact of DBS on personal identity, integrating patients’ views of what counts as a risk and 
benefit. If these changes are evaluated as risks, then new measures and metrics should be 
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developed to assess them and provide better information on the risks to patients, especially 
during the stage when patients and their families have to provide informed consent. 
 
  Baylis (2013) argued that the claim that DBS threatens personal identity is either false, 
misdirected, or trivially true. Using a relational perspective on identity, Baylis (2013) posited 
that the identity of an individual is the negotiated space between how a person sees him or 
herself as and who other people will allow him to be. She argued that DBS is not and could 
never be a threat to personal identity since the self is continuously being constituted socially, 
culturally, and politically. What matters more is how an event or experience is integrated, 
consciously or unconsciously, into an identity-constituting narrative. She also highlighted the 
importance of autonomy for it enables people to contribute to the authoring of their lives in 
a way consistent with their commitments, interests, and values. As such, it is the 
discriminatory, stigmatizing, and alienating attitude of people towards those with disabilities, 
rather than DBS, that seriously threatens identity. Finally, she emphasized that if DBS poses 
as a threat to identity in a way that it limits the way a person views and understands himself, 
affecting the process of identity formation and subsequent self projection, then any life event 
or experience is then actually a threat to identity. As such, DBS should not be considered a 
threat, unless life events are also considered as threats. Although Baylis (2013) argued that 
DBS is primarily not a threat to identity, she acknowledged that it could potentially threaten 
agency, especially when brain manipulation results to actions that do not flow from a person’s 
own intentions and beliefs. In this situation, Baylis (2013) posited that DBS may then give rise 
to a threat to identity.  
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 Klaming and Haselager (2013) suggested that in some patients, DBS may influence 
mental states that are critical to personality, influencing a patient’s unique character traits 
that are reflected in his or her desires, thought, motivations, and behaviour. In turn, this could 
affect personal identity, which they defined as the experience of persisting through time as 
the same person or psychological continuity. By citing the case of a patient with Tourette 
syndrome who developed an alternate identity state upon increasing the stimulation’s 
amplitude, Klaming and Haselager (2013) presented that DBS can impinge on psychological 
continuity due to its profound effects on behaviour and memory and influence personal 
identity to an extent that an alternate personality state can be observed. This case also 
demonstrates that psychological disruptions induced by DBS can occur relatively quickly due 
to immediate behavioural changes after stimulation, which also disappear after decreasing 
the stimulation intensity. As such, DBS can lead to a discontinuity phenomenon regarding 
character traits, intentions, beliefs, goals, and desires. In addition, even though DBS does not 
often lead to an alternate identity, severe changes in personality such as having manic and 
psychotic symptoms could still result in disruptions of psychological continuity, which could 
also affect a person’s mental competence. Finally, they highlighted that although stimulation 
itself could cause unwanted changes, the sudden discontinuation of stimulation through 
battery failure could also result in a state prior to treatment that could also be damaging to 
the patient, such as the occurrence of suicidal thoughts in depressed patients. 
 
Lipsman and Glannon (2013) argued that although DBS is capable of altering 
fundamental attributes of identity, it is no more of a threat to numerical or narrative identity 
than any other brain-based process such as advanced dementia or intervention such as brain 
tumour removal. In this sense, they defined numerical identity as the continuous sense of a 
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biological self over time independent of experience, whereas narrative identity is made up of 
memories, details, and experiences that defines who a person is. However, they highlighted 
that two unique ways in which DBS could influence identity - its ability to be turned off 
allowing dissociation of the influence of the surgery, implant, and underlying disease process 
on identity; and in the discrepancy between reported identity change from the perspective 
of the patient and his or her family. Their second point emphasizes that although patients feel 
unchanged after the procedure, maintaining a sense of continuity in the experience of self 
and identity, family members might deem the patient unrecognizable as a result of perceived 
significant changes in identity. In addition, they highlighted the importance of the degree and 
consistency of change. A persistent minor negative change that is incongruent to one’s 
general disposition might have a more dramatic influence on one’s identity than a temporary 
major surgery-attributable negative change or than a major positive change that is congruent 
with the patient’s disposition and is a desired effect of the intervention.  
 
 Witt et al. (2013) explored the notion of individual identity changes as a result of DBS, 
which they defined as “deepest values and beliefs which “make someone the person she is” 
[and] thus involves certain elements or states figuring prominently in a person’s mental life” 
(p. 502, Witt et al. 2013). They presented different models to address whether DBS really 
leads to changes in identity. The first one is a core-periphery model, which posits that only 
changes in central attitudes, values, beliefs, ideologies, etc. constitute a substantial change in 
identity. Another model is the activity model that ascribes a processing of 
ordering/endorsement or rejection to certain attitudes for them to be central to an 
individual’s identity. Finally, they proposed and pushed for a Foundational Function model 
wherein certain beliefs are more foundational in which changes in them would entail changes 
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in countless other beliefs and would result to a discontinuity in the self prior to and after the 
change. On the other hand, other beliefs are more peripheral, changes in them do not really 
result to changes in other beliefs and would not have any direct consequences to the identity 
of a person. They then proposed to use dimensional assessments of personality in order to 
assess varying levels of changes to identity; however, they posited that current tests might 
not be adequate to capture changes in individual identity and do not fully cohere with the 
functional-foundation model that they proposed. 
 
 Nyholm and O'Neill (2016) argued that DBS does not exclusively threaten a person’s 
sense of self, and it could sometimes even lead to positive or rehabilitating effects on the 
patient’s self. They explored whether DBS helps bring out the true self, or if it only brings forth 
superficial aspects of people’s selves. They also emphasized the importance of recognizing 
varying degrees of the effect of DBS on the self. Although radical changes may occur post-
stimulation, these radical changes could allow a patient to manifest his or her true self. The 
effect of DBS on a person’s true self is affected by the values or norms that he or she accepts. 
If a trait that a particular person values is positively influenced by DBS, then that person might 
achieve a greater self authenticity as a result of DBS. In the context of anorexia nervosa, they 
argued that DBS might help patients remain in a mindset that fits better with his or her 
authentic self if the patient had an inclination at some point towards that mindset, even in 
the absence of DBS, and if the values held by the patient when in an anorexic mindset fall 
outside of widely-endorsed values by other people. 
 
 Overall, philosophical reflection on case reports has led to a wide range of viewpoints 
on the effect of DBS on selfhood and identity. Some ethicists suggest that it could have an 
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influence on identity (Klaming & Haselager 2013), leading to changes (Glannon 2009; 
Mathews 2011) or even posing a threat to it (Schechtman 2010). On the other hand, other 
neuroethics scholars posit that claims on DBS-associated identity changes are false, 
misdirected, or trivially true (Baylis 2013), and that any DBS-associated change is no more 
than a threat to identity than any brain-based process or intervention such as surgery 
(Lipsman & Glannon 2013). In addition to being cited in the publications (Gilbert et al. 2017; 
Gilbert & Viaña 2018) included in Section VI of this chapter, some of the points raised by the 
ethicists in this section will also be applied in examining ethical issues in clinical trials of DBS 
for AD in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Whenever these viewpoints are cited in publications 
incorporated in this thesis, readers could go back to this section to gain more information on 
the arguments forwarded by different neuroethicists, which hopefully would facilitate better 
understanding on how they are relevant to points raised in the publications I co-wrote. 
 
Although philosophical reflection is critical in forwarding the academic discourse on 
DBS-associated sequelae and their effects on selfhood and identity, it is important for 
philosophers to exercise responsibility in their interpretations of empirical data and always 
keep in mind the limitations of making conclusions or sweeping statements based on few 
cases, considering that hundreds of thousands of people have received DBS. To conclude this 
chapter, the article of Gilbert, Viaña and Ineichen (2018) will be presented to highlight the 
possibility that bioethical discussions could lead to an ethics bubble, which could have an 
effect on participant decisions. By illustrating that despite numerous neuroethical claims that 
DBS could affect personality, identity, agency, authenticity, autonomy, and self (PIAAAS), only 
few systematic empirical studies have been conducted to determine the actual effect of DBS 
in at least one of these domains. More so, most of the empirical studies did not directly 
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attribute social adjustment difficulties of patients to DBS, but rather to difficulties in re-
integrating to their familial and social environment. Overall, we emphasize that although 
philosophical dissection of DBS-associated phenomenon can contribute to the 
acknowledgement of its risks and effects on individuals and society, grounding it in medical 
realities would ensure the accuracy of the claims presented and properly inform prospective 
patients or trial participants of the potential risks and benefits of DBS. Given that I am a co-
author of this paper, it is included in this section and can be found in pages 110 to 126.  
 
Considering that exaggerated claims can result from the overinterpretation and non-
systematic analysis of cited empirical studies, it is important to acknowledge the limitations 
of qualitative empirical studies themselves that could also contribute to hyperinflated 
pronouncements. One of which is the possibility of bias in terms of the segment of the 
interview included in the paper, manifested as “cherry picking” of data presented in order to 
conform with a particular pre-established conceptual stance, hypothesis, or agenda of the 
researchers (Morse 2015; Galdas 2017). In addition, there could also be bias in the selection 
of the interviewees and in the formulation of questions, especially in the comparison of 
different interventions in samples that are likewise inherently non-equivalent. Though certain 
steps such as member checks and triangulation can be taken to lessen bias (Morse 2015), it is 
always important for qualitive researchers and those who cite their work to acknowledge 
inherent limitations of qualitative research in order to moderate the extent of any claims and 
conclusions.  
 
Our article on the potential ethics bubble on the effects of DBS on PIAAAS (Gilbert, 
Viaña & Ineichen 2018) has encouraged deeper reflection on how my and my collaborators’ 
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previous conceptual and empirical works could have likewise contributed to an ethics bubble, 
and on how future work conducting empirical research or drawing from results of qualitative 
studies could be improved so as not to create an impenetrable bubble that distorts accurate 
perception of actual risks and potential benefits of a certain technology or intervention. One 
evidence of such reflection is the citation of Frederic Gilbert’s (2013, 2015) previous works on 
how DBS in people with treatment-resistant depression could lead to self-estrangement. In 
the article of Gilbert, Viaña and Ineichen (2018), the papers of Gilbert (2013, 2015) were 
included in Table 2 as examples of philosophical explanations about the putative impact of 
DBS on PIAAAS. Including Gilbert’s (2013, 2015) papers as possible contributors to the PIAAAS 
bubble is evidence of growing self-awareness and an increase in critical perspective during 
research and publication, in line with pragmatism’s (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997) emphasis 
on periodic review and in modifying previously proposed courses of action as research evolves. 
The critical appraisal of one’s previous work is also a demonstration of commitment to 
moderate fallibilism and epistemological humility advocated by pragmatism (Arras 2002), 
acknowledging how one’s previous views could have contributed to an ethics bubble and how 
this could be corrected. The use of the term “we neuroethicists” or “we, the neuroethicists” 
in the paper also exemplifies that the goal of the article of Gilbert, Viaña and Ineichen (2018) 
is not to simply delegate blame to other ethicists for generating hype on the extended effects 
of DBS, but also to critically appraise one’s previous work and the way it has also contributed 
to the generation of a speculative bubble. Finally, in order to achieve a full pragmatic 
approach (Fins, Bacchetta & Miler 1997; Racine 2008b) in addressing the issue of ethics hype 
on the effects of DBS on PIAAAS, it is important to facilitate deliberation with patients, 
physicians, and ethicists on how they perceive philosophical reflections on DBS’s effects on 
PIAAAS could affect patient willingness to undergo DBS and physician decision to offer it as a 
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potential therapy. This deliberation would allow testing of the practical usefulness and 
applicability of the recommendations forwarded by Gilbert, Viaña, and Ineichen (2018) and 
also espouse mutual trust and respect among various stakeholders (Tong 1997) in the 
applications of DBS to movement disorders and in its expanding therapeutic applications. 
 
Although Gilbert, Viaña, and Ineichen (2018) caution against unwarranted and 
unsubstantiated speculation on the effects of DBS on PIAAAS, we do not aim to disregard the 
role and importance of speculation. Speculation in bioethics involves an attempt to predict 
scenarios and draw conclusions on their possible outcomes based on assumptions that cannot 
be verified by present empirical or scientific claims. We acknowledge that through this effort, 
major ethical challenges can be foreseen before a novel technology or a new application of 
an existing technology is introduced and disseminated (Racine et al. 2014), allowing adequate 
steps to be taken to avert or deal with these challenges (Roache 2008). Furthermore, we 
agree with Roache (2008) that properly grounded and knowledge-based speculation (Racine 
et al. 2014) encourages ethical evaluation at the start or early stages of a project, helping 
avoid unethical or ethically misguided scientific endeavours before a significant amount of 
money, time, and careers has been invested in them. Speculation, even of future scenarios 
with low probabilities of occurring, could also be instrumental in motivating the conduct of 
crucial ethical projects (Roache 2008) that address present issues.  
 
Pragmatism’s commitment to fallibilism (Arras 2002), acknowledging that knowledge 
is not absolute (Brown 2008), also signifies room for making speculations, as long as they 
follow a thorough review of empirical information (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Fins 2005) 
and discuss the limitations of various methods in obtaining such information, as indicated in 
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the paper of Gilbert, Viaña, and Ineichen (2018) and in one of the preceding paragraphs. With 
pragmatism’s emphasis on scenario and context-based ethical deliberation (Fins, Bacchetta 
& Miler 1997; Racine 2008b), it is important to critically appraise previous speculations and 
conclusions made to see how well they still fit within a particular context and the extent of 
the applicability of any claims made. For instance, the article of Gilbert, Viaña, and Ineichen 
(2018) highlighted that “the prevalence and incidence of effects on PIAAAS might not be 
exclusively correlated with a specific DBS target and/or stimulation parameter. It should 
rather be seen as a result of the interaction between electrical stimulation, adjustments in 
medication, and natural progression of the disease” (p. 10, Gilbert, Viaña & Ineichen 2018).  
This claim underscores the significance of context in translating ethical claims. In addition to 
taking into account biological details of a case, it is essential to factor in family dynamics, 
institutional arrangements, social norms (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997), cultural practices, 
and broader environmental factors that could affect the extent in which a person receiving 
DBS adjusts and adapts to DBS therapy. The applicability, importance, and relevance of any 
speculations made should be viewed from both techno-scientific and psycho-socio-
environmental vantage points, considering not just the perspectives of people receiving DBS 
but also of the attending medical professionals and of family and caregivers. Finally, fallibilism 
should be applied to both qualitative and quantitative claims. Potential biases due to conflicts 
of interest (Bebbington 2003) and/or limitations and challenges in gathering comprehensive 
quantitative information (Fairchild et al. 2018) should be acknowledged when presenting and 
drawing claims from quantitative data. For instance, the applicability to ethical claims of 
prevalence rates of various psychiatric symptoms in people with Parkinson’s disease indicated 
in the paper of Gilbert, Viaña, and Ineichen (2018) might be affected by location, time period, 
specific patient population, institutional capacities, and other socio-environmental factors 
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that influence the reporting and diagnosis of psychiatric symptoms (Woodall et al. 2010; Kohrt 
et al. 2014). 
 
In the three main publications presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, caution was exercised 
in the claims made to ensure that those that are hypothetical are clearly indicated as such. 
Although most of the ideas and concerns raised are based on empirical studies on DBS for AD 
or other indications, or in fornix DBS in animal models, it is important to acknowledge that 
there are currently no extensive qualitative studies on the effects of DBS on personality, 
identity, selfhood, and social adjustment in people with AD, similar to what Houeto et al. 
(2002), Agid et al. (2006), and Gilbert et al. (2017) performed. As such, the best that can be 
done to reflect on these possible effects is to review studies on DBS in other indications 
and/or for other brain regions, while emphasizing that these may or may not happen in DBS 
for AD given the difference in pathophysiology, brain regions targeted, social attitudes 
towards AD, and lived experiences of people with AD. Furthermore, in order to apply a 
complete pragmatic approach (Fins, Bacchetta & Miler 1997; Racine 2008b) to investigating 
and understanding the ethical concerns associated with DBS for AD, deliberation with patients, 
family members and caregivers, researchers, and medical staff should be made using 
recommendations in this paper’s three main publications (Viaña et al. 2017; Viaña, Bittlinger 
& Gilbert 2017; Viaña & Gilbert 2018) as guiding frameworks. This would ensure that ethical 
recommendations are actually enacted and evaluated, in addition to determining additional 
techno-scientific and psycho-socio-environmental factors, especially participant and 
caregiver actual lived experiences, that are crucial in developing more sound and adaptive 
recommendations for ongoing and future DBS for AD clinical trials. 
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The following paper has John Noel M. Viaña as a co-author and thus, is included in this 
doctoral dissertation: 
 
Pages 110 to 126: 
Gilbert, F, Viaña, JNM & Ineichen, C. Copyright 2018, 'Deflating the “DBS causes personality 
changes” bubble', Originally published in Neuroethics and reprinted by permission from 
Springer Nature B.V. (Netherlands). Article online, published first on June 19, 2018. doi: 
10.1007/s12152-018-9373-8. Available from: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007% 
2Fs12152-018-9373-8 
 
Note: On page 111, there is a period after “has the potential to alter essential features of a 
patient’s personhood, including mood, personality, and cognitive abilities [7]”. This was a 
typographical error, and the period should not have been there. “[7]., etc.” should be replaced 
with “[7], etc.” I would like to thank one of the examiners for pointing out this mistake. 
 
Permissions for inclusion of this article in this PhD dissertation has been obtained from and/or 
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Abstract The idea that deep brain stimulation (DBS)
induces changes to personality, identity, agency, authen-
ticity, autonomy and self (PIAAAS) is so deeply
entrenched within neuroethics discourses that it has be-
come an unchallenged narrative. In this article, we criti-
cally assess evidence about putative effects of DBS on
PIAAAS. We conducted a literature review of more than
1535 articles to investigate the prevalence of scientific
evidence regarding these potential DBS-induced changes.
While we observed an increase in the number of publica-
tions in theoretical neuroethics that mention putative
DBS-induced changes to patients’ postoperative
PIAAAS, we found a critical lack of primary empirical
studies corroborating these claims. Our findings strongly
suggest that the theoretical neuroethics debate on putative
effects of DBS relies on very limited empirical evidence
and is, instead, reliant on unsubstantiated speculative
assumptions probably in lieu of robust evidence. As such,
this may reflect the likelihood of a speculative neuroethics
bubble that may need to be deflated. Nevertheless, despite
the low number of first-hand primary studies and large
number of marginal and single case reports, potential
postoperative DBS changes experienced by patients re-
main a critical ethical concern. We recommend further
empirical research in order to enhance theoretical
neuroethics work in the area. In particular, we call for
the development of better instruments capable of captur-
ing potential postoperative variations of PIAAAS.
Keywords Adverse effects . Autonomy. Agency.
Assumption . Authenticity . Control group . Deep brain
stimulation . Evidence . Identity . Neuroethics .
Personality . Self
Introduction
In theoretical neuroethics, the idea that Bpersonality
changes and possible loss of personal identity can follow
from the introduction of foreign (biological or technical)
material into the brain^ [1] is pervasive and highly recur-
rent. In particular, deep brain stimulation (DBS) has been
commonly associated with such alleged changes, and
consequently, it has been a central concern in theoretical
neuroethics. Many publications suggest that when BDBS
is applied to enhancing or maintaining movement, the
specter of Phineas Gage, whose personality changed so
radically after his brain was pierced by a tamping iron,
haunts us. [DBS] may fundamentally alter selves^ [2].
Suggestions that DBSmay induce personality changes
are strongly established within theoretical neuroethics
narratives, and they are articulated in many ways. For
instance, Schechtman declares that Bpersonality changes
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and agency^ [3]. Witt and colleagues assert that Bthe risk
of becoming another person following [DBS] surgery is
alarming^ [4]. Others argue that DBS Bpose[s] manifold
medical, philosophical and ethical questions as regards
the personality, personal identity, individual responsibili-
ty, autonomy, authenticity and self-perception of the per-
son involved^ [5]; or that DBS Bmay alter a range of
mental states critical to thought, personality and behaviour
… disrupt[ing] the integrity and continuity of the psycho-
logical properties that constitute the self and one’s expe-
rience of persisting through time as the same person^ [6];
or that DBS Bhas the potential to alter essential features of
a patient’s personhood, including mood, personality, and
cognitive abilities^ [7]., etc. These examples are a fraction
of many claims frequently published in neuroethics arti-
cles about the alleged adverse effects of DBS. In fact,
since the publication of Schüpbach et al.’s seminal work
in [8], entitled BNeurosurgery in Parkinson’s disease: A
distressed mind in a repaired body?^ [8], there has been a
substantial increase in theoretical neuroethics articles ex-
ploring the putative impacts of DBS on personality, iden-
tity, agency, autonomy, authenticity, and self (PIAAAS).
The idea that DBS induces PIAAAS changes is so deeply
entrenched within neuroethics discourses that it has be-
come an unchallenged narrative. However, it comes with
some surprise that this narrative has not been rigorously
scrutinized. To our knowledge, few studies investigate the
occurrence and type of empirical evidence demonstrating
putative effects of DBS on PIAAAS.
The purpose of this study is to address this
issue. We critically examine and assess empirical
evidence about the putative effects of DBS on
patients’ PIAAAS. In particular, our main objec-
tive is to identify evidence within the neuroscien-
tific and medical literature substantiating the con-
clusion that DBS causes PIAAAS changes, which
appears to be persistently suggested in the theoret-
ical neuroethics narrative. Accordingly, this paper
targets substantial and consequential effects
impacting patients’ PIAAAS, primarily considering
deteriorative and estrangement-inducing adverse ef-
fects of DBS [9]. Our second objective is to ex-
amine the prevalence of articles discussing the
alleged effects of DBS on patients’ PIAAAS in
the theoretical neuroethics literature. Our third goal
is to assess our findings, especially, whether the
theoretical neuroethics literature is engaged in a
speculative bubble, which may need to be deflated
and rectified by grounding it in empirical evidence
as available through the scholarly neuroscientific
and medical literature.
Methods
To identify and examine the prevalence of articles
discussing putative effects of DBS on patients’ person-
ality, identity, agency, authenticity, autonomy, and self
(PIAAAS), we searched the archives of some leading 30
bioethics journals1 and AJOB Neuroscience, as well as
relevant articles indexed in ProjectMuse, JSTOR,
PhilPapers, and PhilIndex (limiting our search to aca-
demic journals). Furthermore, we examined the preva-
lence of empirical evidence supporting links between
DBS and PIAAAS explicitly. To this purpose, we
searched for relevant articles in the databases of
PubMed, Scopus, Embase, Web of Science,
PsycAarticles, Psychology & Behavioral Sciences Col-
lection (PBSC), PsycInfo (via Ovid), and Psychiatry
Online (excluding news articles). Articles until
May 2017 were considered.
Articles were retrieved using the search terms Bdeep
brain stimulation^ AND (personality OR identity OR
autonomy OR agency OR authenticity OR self). Dupli-
cate articles were removed manually with the help of
EndNote’s BFind duplicates^ function. To determine
whether articles were mainly discussing DBS, we used
the web browser’s (Google Chrome) or Adobe Reader’s
search function to get an overview of the extent to which
the term DBS appeared in each article under review.
Articles that did not mention DBS in the abstract or did
not dedicate at least half of the text to discussing DBS
were excluded. The remaining articles—those that in-
volved ‘substantial’ discussion of DBS—were then in-
dividually examined to determine the number of times
any element of PIAAAS was mentioned as determined
through a search for (personality OR identity OR auton-
omy OR agency OR authenticity OR self) using the
browser or Adobe Reader’s Search function. The num-
ber of mentions for each search component were then
tabulated in an Excel sheet. Articles that did not mention
at all any component of PIAAAS were automatically
excluded. The abstract and/or actual text of articles that
mentioned any of these terms were examined further to
see if they really explored the effect of DBS on PIAAAS
or if these terms were just mentioned in passing. In some
1 Please refer to Annex 1 to see the full list of journals.
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cases, bioethics articles might make over 100 mentions
of the terms PIAAAS (taken collectively), while scien-
tific articles might make as little as five (or fewer) of the
same mentions (taken collectively).
Articles reporting primary studies or case studies
were identified and examined manually. We defined
primary studies as new reports of clinical cases involv-
ing first-hand interviews or clinical studies involving
implanted patients. In other words, a first-hand primary
study is a new clinical report involving at least one
patient undergoing psychometric tests or being
consulted in a clinical setting or being interviewed for
the purpose of examining potential DBS-induced
PIAAAS. Our final inclusion and exclusion criteria
were based on the evaluation of the primary study’s core
text and explicit conclusion. Articles with primary data
were identified as first-hand literature; consequently,
articles that did not directly gather PIAAAS-relevant
data from patients were not considered as valid first-
hand evidence. Articles not reporting novel empirical
evidence but that still discuss already published primary
empirical studies in relation to PIAAAS were manually
identified as second-hand literature. Articles that discuss
PIAAAS but not referring to any primary research (of a
kind that reported new empirical evidence) were manu-
ally identified as third-hand literature.
Results
In General
A total of 1535 articles were assessed. We found 64
articles that qualified as first-hand studies (See Fig. 1
BPrimary Study Articles^2). However, after assessing
these articles one by one, we found that 67% (n = 43)
do not support direct links of DBS on PIAAAS. Anal-
ysis of the remaining 21 articles revealed that 13 articles
were marginal or single case studies.3 As a result, only 8
studies qualified as significant evidence (12.5% of 64
primary research), involving 168 patients in total (see
Table 1: First Hand Primary Research).4 It is crucial to
note that none of these 8 studies had control groups.
Generally, it can be more difficult to evaluate the out-
come and attribute the cause of the observed effect when
a control group is lacking. Prospective, randomized, and
sham-controlled trials, for example, represent particu-
larly neat study designs to investigate effects of DBS.
Strikingly, when a control group was included as part of
the experimental procedure, for example in Schüpbach
et al. [18], the control group, which did not receive
stimulation, experienced more severe adverse effects
related to PIAAAS than the actual group that received
stimulation.
We observed a contrast between the number of pub-
lications in theoretical neuroethics and the number of
published primary research articles (see Fig. 2). A sub-
stantial increase in publication in theoretical neuroethics
appears to occur starting in 2009.
In Particular
1) Conclusions of studies not matching neuroethics
claims
When assessing the strength of evidence referred to
in the theoretical neuroethics literature, we observed that
the most cited articles in Table 15 are three seminal
manuscripts published by Schüpbach et al. [8], Agid
et al. [11] and Houeto et al. [10]. Interestingly, the
articles by Schüpbach et al. [8] and Agid et al. [11] are
two distinct versions of the same French trial study,
based on the same interviews, involving the same 29
2 Primary study articles explicitly naming PIAAAS in their published
work.
3 By marginal reports, we understand case reports not well detailed.
Marginal reports mention some events in articles, nothing more. For
instance, most articles marginally report Bout of 27 patients implanted,
1 patient experienced hyper-sexuality following surgery^ without pro-
viding more details. From marginal reports, it is difficult to derive
causation, in particular also impossible to exclude co-variables. Hence,
by marginal reports we include anecdotal reports, single-patient case
reports.
4 Involving 168 patients in total, but not all 168 patients’ experiences
would qualify as evidence for a link between DBS and PIAAAS
changes. Even if marginal and case reports were included in our final
total, it would not significantly change the prevalence (see our Discus-
sion). To our knowledge, the most cited case report in neuroethics is the
one by Leentjens et al. [17]. Unfortunately, most marginal and case
reports in the literature are not like Leentjens et al. [17]. The report of
Leentjens et al. is a unique example where clinicians were turning off/
on the stimulation and were able to directly and instantaneously ob-
serve behavioral changes occurring (accordingly, they were capable of
excluding some variables as contributing to these changes). But if we
include the Leentjens et al.’s single case report in our final count, we
have to include all the marginal case reports. Most marginal reports
strictly mention events in articles, without providing much details or
excluding co-variables. Including marginal case reports would be
including occurrences where essential details about the cause of the
observed changes are missing.
5 As reported by Google Scholar citation metrics
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patients. Despite being referenced, cited, and discussed
in theoretical neuroethics as empirical evidence demon-
strating the effects of DBS on PIAAAS, both articles do
not support this conclusion. Agid et al. [11] concluded:
It seems more likely that the difficulty in social
integration experienced by our operated patients
resulted, not directly from a modification of the
patients’ personality, but rather indirectly from a
difficulty of reintegrating into the socio-familial
and professional environment [11].
At the same time, Schüpbach et al. [8] concluded:
it was shown that [DBS] led to an overall im-
provement in mood, anxiety, and quality of life.
Now, in spite of the excellent motor outcome, it is
clear that the operation can result in poor adjust-
ment of the patient to his or her personal, family,
and socio-professional life. Whether this is a pure-
ly reactive response to a new situation or whether
it is caused by an effect of STN stimulation on
behavior, or both, remains to be elucidated. [8]
An article published later by Schüpbach et al. [18]
that included a group of people with Parkinson’s disease
(PD) treated with DBS and a matched control group not
treated with DBS (both groups with a follow-up period
of 2 years), found that the control group experienced a
higher rate of psychiatric adverse effects related to
PIAAAS compared to the group treated with DBS.
On their side, Houeto et al. [10] reported 8 patients
(out of 24) who experienced changes related to PIAAAS
following DBS implantation, but they observed that
postoperative Bpsychiatric disorders consisted of ampli-
fication or decompensation of previously existing dis-
orders that had sometimes passed unnoticed^ before
implantation [10]. In other words, DBS did not initiate
the onset of postoperative psychiatric disorders; rather,
patients were already suffering from these disorders
prior to implantation. Put simply, Parkinson’s disease
symptoms may have ‘masked’ psychiatric symptoms;
DBS helped keep Parkinson’s disease symptoms under
control, with the decompensation and manifestation of
psychiatric symptoms as an unintended adverse effect.
2) Conceptual discussions based on few quotes.
Given the scarce evidence, as reported above, many
neuroethicists and philosophers selected specific quotes
from BSchüpbach et al. [8]^ or BAgid et al. [11]^ to
introduce, support, and illustrate their philosophical ap-
proach regarding the link of DBS to changes of im-
planted patients’ PIAAAS. One of the most fascinating
quotes used by conceptual neuroethicists is the reported
experience of an implanted female French patient who
declared after surgery: BI feel like an electric doll^ [8].
Surprisingly, we found that this specific quote was not
accurately translated in Agid et al. [11], where the
patients’ statement appeared as: BI’m an electric doll^
[11]. We would like to highlight the importance of these
semantic points because establishing a philosophical
theory on a few selective quotes, particularly when
words such as BI feel^ or BI am^ largely differ in their













Fig. 1 Number of primary
articles on the putative effects of
DBS on patient PIAAAS until
May 2017
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This highlight the importance of not just basing
theroetical arguments on some selective quotes. In
addition, one would think that such nuances do
make a differences in the theroetical discourse, even
though, the error for disseminating a wrong transla-
tion was not on the part of neuroethicists, in this
case. However, such a discrepancy in translation
suggests that we (neuroethicists) should look more
carefully from where these quotes are taken from
and how they are being used (purportedly) as evi-
dence within our work. Ontologically speaking, one
could strongly question and dispute a philosophical
conclusion based on the sentence BI feel like an
electric doll^, as it might not entail the same philo-
sophical view as the quote, BI’m an electric doll^
(while the latter quote may involve a psychotic
(delusional) episode, the former could simply repre-
sent a playful and moody remark). Importantly, this
also means that professional interviewers have a
duty to try identifying what the interviewees mean
when verbalizing such statements, and more impor-
tantly, translations should be identical across differ-
ent publications and should faithfully capture the
verbal expressions voiced by patients, along with
providing a description of the context in which these
expressions were made. As well, this highlights that
philosophers quoting these first-hand studies may
need to provide more than just fragments of the
quote, preferably include a longer tract of quoted
text that better reveals the patients intended mean-
ing, and mention the context as well, especially if
this was reported or described in the primary study.
3) Postoperative outcomes related to pathology rather
than technology
As indicated in Houeto et al.’s conclusion [10], a
neurodegenerative disease such a Parkinson’s disease
may entail psychiatric symptoms due to advancement
of the degenerative process, a phenomenon that does
not necessarily translate to other diseases, such as
dystonia. Based on (still scarce) qualitative research
outcomes, it could be suggested that postoperative
adverse effects on PIAAAS are more related to dis-
ease progression rather than to DBS itself. For in-
stance, interviews conducted by Hariz et al. [19],
capturing subjective experiences of 30 patients im-
planted with DBS for treating their dystonia, reveal
that, overall, patients felt they Bstill [were] the same
person inside, but with new abilities and another
physical appearance, [which] was difficult to compre-
hend and come to terms with^. 12 As an example,
Hariz et al. [19] quoted a patient reporting: BNow,
even though I have been given a new body I haven’t
been given a new mind. It’s like plastic surgery, you
might change your nose but how you feel about your-
self is still the same^ [19]. Elsewhere, de Haan et al.
[14], after interviewing 18 OCD patients implanted
with DBS, concluded that: BApart from the previously
documented improvement of mood, diminishment of
anxiety, and increase of impulsivity, we also found
changes such as an increase in trust, self-reliance, and
self-confidence, a more unreflective mode of engage-
ment, and a more careless stance on things^ [14]. Our
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Fig. 2 Theoretical neuroethics
and primary research articles on
the putative effects of DBS on
patients’ PIAAAS until
May 2017
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PIAAAS are raised by theoretical neuroethicists, most
authors do not distinguish diseases and stimulation
parameters —most generalize their conclusions
concerning the putative effects of DBS on PIAAAS
of patients being treated for Parkinson’s disease to
how they understand the effects of DBS on PIAAS
for patients with other conditions and potentially, with
leads implanted in other brain regions or with differ-
ent stimulation parameters. The presumption here is
that all patients suffering from different presenting
neurological conditions and stimulated in different
brain regions and with differing parameters would
react in the exact same way to treatment. For example,
Nyholm and O’Neill [20] in their conceptual study
about the effects of DBS on treatment-refractory an-
orexia nervosa individuals selected cases from differ-
ent patients implanted with DBS targeting distinct
pathologies: for instance, Parkinson’s and OCD. Our
findings show that there is no evidence pointing to-
ward an identical treatment reaction for DBS targeting
different neurological conditions. Although we do not
say that unintended effects of DBS can be excluded
per se, we aim to highlight that theoretical neuroethics
publications should always acknowledge that DBS is
not a monolithic technology and that the region and
parameters of stimulation interact with the pathophys-
iology of the disorder, all of which contribute to the
overall effect of the surgery and stimulation.
4) Assumptions
We discovered some commonly accepted as-
sumptions among conceptual neuroethicists and
philosophers, particularly in third-hand literature.
Assumptions include claims without any corrobo-
rating empirical evidence. In those cases, manu-
scripts discuss putative impacts of DBS on
PIAAAS without referring to first-hand primary
research. For instance, in order to support the hy-
pothesis that implantable devices are a philosophi-
cal and ethical problem, Schermer [21] quotes
Hasson’s view that brain implants may be a Breason
to reconsider our criteria for personal identity and
personality changes^ [1]. It is essential to note that
Hasson’s conceptual paper does not refer at all to
any first-hand primary research. Elsewhere,
Johansson et al. advance the claim that, B[p]otential
alterations of personality seem […] to be relevant
for most DBS indications^ [22]. It is important to
note that these same authors, in other important
works, refer to first-hand primary research [23,
24]. However, these examples of unsubstantiated
claims—i.e. claims lacking any reference to prima-
ry research—as appearing in third-hand literature
illustrate a trend across the theoretical neuroethics
literature where authors rely on rare empirical evi-
dence to argue their case, as statements based on
lack of evidence go unchallenged. It goes without
saying that purely theoretic work is warranted and
highly valuable. Neuroethicists have more than the
freedom to reflect on PIAAAS, but it is potentially
misleading if they either bring it in connection with
empirical findings that do not corroborate their
claims.
To the best of our knowledge, the assumption that
DBS alters PIAAAS first appears to have been ex-
plicitly articulated in a scholarly publication with the
work of Gisquet [12]. Gisquet, interviewing patients
implanted with DBS, declared that her study was
Bbased on the assumption that a treatment using
biotechnical techniques is a unique disruptive expe-
rience which redefines the patient’s life^ [12]. Inci-
dentally, from the moment the assumption was for-
mulated and published in the literature in 2009 (see
Fig. 2), across all publications in neuroethics, the
prevalence of theoretical manuscripts increased,
while studies reporting empirical evidence dimin-
ished overall. Although speculation in ethics can
be a very valuable tool [25], the lack of empirical
evidence showing that DBS induces PIAAAS
changes is concerning and reflects a potential spec-
ulative ethics bubble, which might need to be
deflated.
Discussion
In general, we found that the discussion about
putative effects of DBS on patients’ PIAAAS in
theoretical debates is supported by only a small
sample of empirical evidence, which strongly sug-
gests that this discussion relies on a limited
amount of facts rather than on substantial empiri-
cal evidence. Theoretical neuroethics in the context
of DBS-related discussions about PIAAAS is
mostly reliant upon second-hand and third-hand
literature.
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There is considerable diversity in the way putative
effects of DBS on patients’ postoperative life have been
described in the literature, particularly in theoretical
neuroethics (see Table 2: Sample of philosophical ex-
planations about putative impact of DBS on PIAAAS).
These descriptions seem to serve the authors’ philosoph-
ical accounts rather than reflect first-hand primary study
conclusions. For instance, according to Kraemer [33],
Bby employing the philosophical framework of authen-
ticity and alienation, we are led to call into question the
psychological assessment of the three case studies of
Parkinson patients who underwent changes in their per-
sonalities and preferences after successful treatment
with DBS^. To support her claims, she refers to
Schüpbach et al. [8]. However, as indicated above,
Schüpbach et al. [8] do not conclude that patients’
personalities were impacted by DBS.6 Elsewhere, Witt
et al. [4] assert Bwe will begin our discussion with a few
quotes from a case reported by Schüpbach et al. It will
give us an impression of what proponents of the
Change-of-Identify Thesis presumably have in mind
when ascertaining ‘alterations in the patient’s identity .^
Here too, there seems to be a misinterpretation of the
findings of Schüpbach et al., who do not conclude
anything about how DBS impacts patient identity.7 In
a very influential paper (citation count 90 with Google
Scholar at the time of writing), Baylis affirms:
BDBS is such a threat but only insofar as it is a
threat to agency—the ability to make informed
and rational choices—as when a person’s actions
do not flow from her intentions or beliefs but
rather are the result of direct brain manipulation.
Here it is worth noting that following DBS pa-
tients not only report BI don’t feel like myself
anymore,^ and BI haven’t foundmyself again after
the operation,^ they also report BI feel like a
robot,^ and BI feel like an electric doll ^.
To support this philosophical claim, she refers to
Schüpbach et al. [8]. However, Schüpbach et al.’s [8]
article explicitly states that these quotes: BI feel like a
robot,^ and BI feel like an electric doll^ are given in the
context of discussions of Baltered body image^, not
agency. For instance, Schüpbach et al.’s [8] manuscript
states: B1) Altered body image: Only 6 patients (20%)
thought about the implanted material in terms of body
image and formed a mental representation of the stimu-
lator and the electrodes.^ Schüpbach et al.’s [8] do not
suggest anything about how DBS might alter patients’
deliberation, decision-making or agency. Our goal here
is not to single out each relevant claim made in the
philosophical and theoretical neuroethics literature and
to check whether it is supported by empirical evidence.
After all, part of the important mission of philosophy
and theoretical neuroethics, as seen in the great concep-
tual work of Baylis and others cited above, is to specu-
late about concepts and to indulge in thoughtful enquiry,
not necessarily trying to ground them in empirical facts.
Instead, our goal is to stress that Table 2 represents a
sample of some of the philosophical speculations about
the putative impacts of DBS on PIAAAS, which appear
not to accurately reflect the conclusions made by the
first-hand primary studies.
Out of 64 first-hand primary studies, 43 did not cor-
roborate evidence that DBS leads to PIAAAS alteration.
Out of the remaining 21 articles, 13 were marginal or
single reports. By virtue of the fact that marginal or
single observations do not constitute robust data leading
to definitive scientific conclusions, our study indicates
that the theoretical neuroethics literature may rely on
unsubstantiated speculative assumptions in lieu of robust
evidence. Marginal or single findings are discounted
because they are mostly reported without any objective
measurement and may not include extensive medical
information, which make these studies difficult to repli-
cate and compare with other studies. In addition, they do
not provide the actual incidence of DBS-induced
PIAAAS in a particular cohort of individuals that re-
ceived DBS for a particular disorder in that institution.
In general, to establish cause-and-effect relationships,
study subjects, for example, can be divided into experi-
mental and control groups. Therefore, double blind ran-
domized controlled trials (RCT’s) are considered one
form of study design (besides e.g. longitudinal and time
series studies) for establishing such relationships [40]. In
RCT’s, differences in outcomes are attributable to differ-
ent treatments received in such between-group designs
because the distribution of confounders is balanced
across experimental conditions by design [41]. In com-
parison to control-group designs, case-studies are often
characterized by poor internal validity due to the fact that
there is nothing to compare the result to. As a final
addition, in principle, studies and reviews investigating
6 Not only Schüpbach et al. do not conclude this, they exclude person-
alities as an explanation in their Agid et al. [11] version. See our section
BConclusions of studies not matching neuroethics claims^.
7 In addition, the concept of identity is not alluded to nor is used once
in this published study.
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effects on PIAAAS should differentiate between active
and inactive control groups because there is a difference
in the kind of effect estimates that are obtained [42].8 It is
essential to stress that these observations do not lead to
the conclusion that case study designs are less valuable
than RCTs in all respects.
According to a Global Deep Brain Stimulation De-
vices Industry report, in 2018, 21 companies are
commercialising DBS worldwide9; Medtronic accounts
for 150,000 implanted patients alone [44]. As such,
accounting for the exact number of patients implanted
with all different commercialized DBS devices world-
wide is difficult to guess, but 150,000 is clearly an
underestimation. Given the high number of patients
8 This observation does not mean that for establishing causal relation-
ships, there has to be a control group installed; having control groups is
one example of good experimental design in order to compare effects.
However, with regard to interventional DBS studies on cognitive
changes, a recent review outlined that the majority of such studies is
actually under-powered thereby affecting the inferences that can be
drawn from such results (i.e. studies lacked statistical power even for
large effect sizes and therefore are associated with an increased type II
error risk [43]) Effect size refers to a standardized measure that quan-
tifies the size of the difference between two groups or the strength of
association between two variables (i.e. the magnitude of the effect). It
goes without saying that studies on the presumed effects of DBS on
PIAAAS should also be adequately powered. We are aware of the fact
that recruiting age-, medication- and disease-matched controls and
adherence to robust study designs are often practically difficult. A
more detailed discussion on study designs (including, for example,
interventional pre-post analyses), however, is beyond the scope of this
article
9 These companies include Boston Scientific Corp., Abbott Laborato-
ries, Aleva Neurotherapeutics SA, Deep Brain Innovations LLC, Bei-
jing Pins Medical Co. Ltd., etc. They are commercialising and
manufacturing their devices across US, Canada, Japan, Europe, Asia-
Paficic, Latin America. Please refer to https://www.prnewswire.
com/news-releases/global-deep-brain-stimulation-devices-industry-
300594349.html Last retrieved May 06 2018.
Table 2 Sample of philosophical explanation about DBS putative impact on PIAAAS
Discussed by DBS impacts characterised by
Gisquet [12] Changes in personality and loss of control over one’s life and illness
Synofzik & Schlaepfer [26] The ‘level’ and ‘extent’ of changes to naturalistic notion of personality
Focquaert & De Ridder [27] Changes in personality and self-perception
Glannon [6] Changes in thought and personality
Schechtman [3] Narrative identity and agency/disruption of the narrative flow
Klaming and Haselager [28] Disruptions of psychological continuity impact on patient competence
and responsibility
Johansson et al. [22] Personality changes and impacts on authenticity
Schermer [23] Balancing risks and benefits and respect for autonomy and responsibility
Baylis [29] Disruption of the balance between how a person sees and understands
herself with how others see and understand her
Nir & Walter [30] Personal identity and a sense of free agency (identification)
De Haan et al. [13] Patients experience a richer field of affordances and act more flexible on
these new affordances
Witt et al. [4] Patients’ core attitudes
Gilbert [31, 32] Self-estrangement, loss of control and powerlessness.
Kraemer [33] Felt-Authenticity and felt-Alienation
Mecacci & Haselager [34] Psychological maladaptations and conceptual schemes concerning the
relationship between mind and brain
Dings & de Bruin [35] Aspects of the self – embodied, experiential, affective, intersubjective,
psychological/cognitive, narrative, extended and situated
Maslen, Pugh & Savulescu [36] DBS can potentially affect authenticity of the patient’s choice.
Mackenzie & Walker [37] Autonomy, competence
Nyholm & O’Neill [38] DBS can bring about a patient’s Btrue self^: best version or the best part(s)
of a person as valued from the point of view of the patient or from the point
of view of a third party (e.g. the family).
Goddard [39] The impacts of DBS must pay account to the interrelation of identity or agency or autonomy
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implanted with DBS, the number of reported (putative)
DBS-induced PIAAAS changes appear to be extremely
low. Cumulatively, our study found that there were only
168 patients interviewed across the 8 first-hand primary
studies. Even if we were to include the 13 marginal and
case reports we found, it would not significantly change
the prevalence of evidence.10
The putative effects of DBS on patients’ PIAAAS has
probably been inflated in several ways. First, there is the
problem of scarce data given that a large proportion of the
published studies involve reports of only marginal or
singular cases, and it is not possible to derive conclusions
from this basis for explaining the phenomenology of
DBS. For instance, a scholar who has read reports of
marginal findings that some patients experience mood
changes following DBS implantation might extrapolate
that these mood changes are evidence of postoperative
PIAAAS changes, even though mood changes are not
sufficient to the ascription of DBS induced changes on
PIAAAS. Deriving conclusions from marginal cases
might lead to committing a post hoc ergo propter hoc-
related error [9]. The phenomenon of Bbecoming a differ-
ent person^ after DBS interventions could not be solely
attributed to the electrical stimulation itself but also to
post-operative treatment adjustments or to disease pro-
gression [47, 48]. As such, the prevalence and incidence
of effects on PIAAASmight not be exclusively correlated
with a specific DBS target and/or stimulation parameter. It
should rather be seen as a result of the interaction between
electrical stimulation, adjustments in medication, and nat-
ural progression of the disease [9 47–49], apart from
premorbid personality traits and e.g. the pre-operative
psychosocial status of the individual [47], especially when
DBS is used in patients with neurodegenerative disorders
where changes to PIAAAS are naturally inevitable re-
gardless of treatment course and choices. For instance,
although Parkinson’s disease is usually associated with
motor symptoms such as bradykinesia, rest tremor, mus-
cular rigidity, and postural instability, a large proportion of
affected individuals also exhibit cognitive impairment and
psychiatric symptoms [50]. Studies show that almost 25.2
to 40% of Parkinson’s disease patients suffer from depres-
sion, up to 43% have anxiety disturbances, 32 to 42%
exhibit apathy, 5.6 to 11.1% experience mania or hypo-
mania, 15% have symptoms of impulse control disorders
[51, 52], up to 75% complain of insomnia [53], 8 to 40%
experience psychosis [54], and asmany as 78.2% develop
dementia [55]. Some of these disorders such as depres-
sion, anxiety disorders, apathy, and cognitive impairment
might be due to the degeneration of brain structures
leading to complex brain signalling disturbances caused
by Parkinson’s disease itself [51, 56, 57], whereas others
such as mania/hypomania, impulse control disorders, and
psychosis might, to a greater degree, result from dopami-
nergic medication used to treat motor symptoms [52, 53].
Most of these disorders are associated with multiple risk
factors, and their onset and progression are determined by
a combined effect of genetic susceptibility, neural degen-
eration, neurotransmitter dysregulation, co-existing psy-
chiatric disorders, and medication dosage and regime [54,
58, 59]. Hence, changes in PIAAAS following DBS
should not only be attributed to the DBS target structure,
surgical trajectory, and stimulation parameter, but should
also take into account patient history, disease attributes,
and other forms of treatment adaptations such as
medication adjustments. At this point in time, it is
relatively difficult to isolate the cause of these post-
operative changes, though they have been associated
with DBS. Connected to this point is the concern
that no generalizable conclusions and recommenda-
tions should be drawn from such limited data.
Second, there is a fundamental problem with empir-
ically investigating effects of DBS on PIAAAS. As it
was outlined previously [47], there are currently only a
small number of scales that are trying to measure
personality-related changes (for studies investigating
Bagency^ [60, 61]). Unfortunately, a number of these
scales may generate biased and/or insufficient responses
because they often refer to self-report measurements.
Moreover, a majority of them are test-psychologically
inappropriately verified (regarding all necessary mea-
surement criteria, e.g. reliability & validity) and do not
consistently take up recent insights from psychological
research (i.e. they focus on explicit-deliberate process-
ing entirely). Finally, they rarely take up responses from
third parties (e.g. spouses, relatives) that could substan-
tially contribute to our understating of undesired chang-
es following DBS interventions. Consequently, there are
currently only vague objective markers of e.g. person-
ality (gathered via e.g. the big five personality test) and
10 With or without marginal case reports, our position would be sim-
ilar: empirical evidence suggesting a link between DBS and PIAAAS
is rare. This echoes Temel et al.’s [45] metareview where they report
Bpersonality changes, hypersexuality, apathy, anxiety, and aggressive-
ness were observed in less than 0.5%^ of DBS outcomes Band only
reported in case studies^. It is crucial to note that Temel et al. [46] do
not provide specific proportion of Bpersonality changes^ within the
0.5%.
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only few studies that have investigated on the topic
(thereby generating only few data). Similar to the diffi-
culties that arise when dealing with Bpersonality^ as a
rich psychological concept, Bidentity ,^ Bagency ,^
Bauthenticity ,^ Bautonomy^ and Bself^ constitute even
more difficult concepts from an empirical perspective.
Representing multifaceted and ambiguous constructs,
these terms are far from ideal for an empirical investi-
gation because operationalization is difficult. Whilst
there are numerous studies focusing on various subsets
of what could be termed Bpersonality ,^ such as cognitive
deterioration and changes in mood, to name a few, some
of the terms related to PIAAAS seem not particularly
suited for quantitative inquiries.11 Because it is a vital
prerequisite of empirical studies to generate concise
research questions on clearly identifiable markers to
meet common methodological quality criteria, it is like-
ly that concepts such as Bauthenticity^ and the Bself^
will probably remain for some time in the philosophical
rather than in the empirical domain. This is not to say
that with time, no better measures of PIAAAS will be
developed and that investigating subsets of the latter
relating to e.g. changes of affect can and will contribute
to our understanding of more qualitative concepts. Also,
this does not imply that ethical analysis only makes
sense when neuroscience gets in that stage of complete
operationalization of psychological concepts.
Neuroethicists do not have to wait for neuroscience to
be finished before they can contemplate on its ethical
implications [28]. We are also not trying to suggest that
neuroethicists can base their work only in response to
neuroscientific empirical work. However, it is currently
difficult to assess the degree of change to patients’
PIAAAS after DBS implantation given the scarcity of
instruments to objectively assess changes of PIAAAS.
Consistent with what has been said in the previous
paragraph, our third point regarding the inflation of
putative effects of DBS on patient PIAAAS takes up
methodological prerequisites (mostly stemming from
sociology) of qualitative research. Briefly, whilst single
quotes of patients can be illustrative, they need to be
treated with caution. Convergence of responses
representing saturation of the data should be in place
before generalizing the outcome(s). Needless to say,
qualitative studies should disclose the methodological
details to allow interested readers to understand them.
Finally, the concept of Bunderstanding^ in qualitative
research is a decisive issue that should be reviewed
during the process of interviewing, analysing, and writ-
ing. Patient experiences and narratives, which should
unquestionably be heard, bring fundamental knowledge
to our comprehension of postoperative changes in the
context of DBS. However, marginal or single case re-
ports, do not inform us of the actual incidence of DBS-
induced effects on the PIAAAS in a particular popula-
tion of patients treated with DBS. In some cases, mar-
ginal or single case reports could even bend the focus
in the second- and third-hand literature about chang-
es to patient PIAAAS that, although warranting im-
portant medical and ethical consideration, could in-
flate potential adverse effects, way beyond what
would be observed if a systematic study was con-
ducted. Although, subjective narratives may allow to
understand some aspects of the potential phenome-
non of DBS-induced PIAAAS [9, 63] and some
critical ethical issues, quantitative empirical studies
with strong research-designs constitute an appropri-
ate tool to investigate causal effects and to inform us
about the incidence of a given variable following a
certain treatment.
Finally, some have made the claim that the DBS
literature does not address or publish enough negative
outcomes [64–66]. If this is the case, then it would mean
that the limited amount of evidence of DBS effects on
patient PIAAAS may be due to lack of negative reports.
In that respect, it is important to consider whether most
studies have been designed to include all dimensions of
DBS’s potential side effects. Should study designs ne-
glect inclusion of subjective reports, then a lack of
evidence would not be evidence of a lack; it would
simply reflect that studies are not designed to capture
all aspects of a potential phenomenon. Concomitantly,
there is also a possibility that some patients do not report
their subjective experiences. Hariz and Hamberg have
observed that most implanted patients considered their
side effects to be the trade-off between getting treatment
and having control of the symptoms enabling them to be
more active in day-to-day life while incurring with post-
operative slurred speech or balance problems [67]. As
well, there are no objective means of deciding when a
treatment has to be considered a failure or a success
[68]. Although scales and measures that can assess
improvement or deterioration in certain symptoms of
11 Providing evidence for empirical (correlative or causal) relations
between DBS and PIAAAS might be beyond the ability of qualitative
research: BPhenomenological approach cannot establish statistical re-
lationships, because it is concerned with uniqueness and individuality,
rather than numbers and statistics^ [62].
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neurological and psychiatric disorders exist, it is to some
extent up to the patient and/or family members to decide
whether the treatment is a success or not, likely on how
benefits outweigh side-effects and whether they are in
line with the patient’s and family members’ needs and
expectations. It is also important to highlight that what
can be deemed successful from a patient’s perspective
might not necessarily be deemed successful by the fam-
ily. Although both the patient and family members
might see relief from motor symptoms, a patient might
not see potential treatment-associated hypomania as
much of a nuisance as his or her family members would.
This highlights that although PIAAAS changes might
occur, they should not necessarily be seen as a treatment
failure, automatically regarded as something completely
negative, or viewed as a trade-off that a patient should
not make.
Limitations of the study
A possible limitation of the study, even though simulta-
neously strengthening our primary claim, can be found
in the practice of selectively searching for PIAAAS in
the empirical literature. On the on hand, if instead of
only searching for DBS, we had searched (more broad-
ly) with terms such as neurotechnologies, brain im-
plants, neural devices, etc., then we would have found
a greater number of theoretical articles. On the other
hand, as outlined previously, PIAAAS are philosophical
concepts that are inherently non-scientific. Even though
empirical investigations using the concepts of
Bpersonality^ and Bagency^ do exist, they often do not
fully capture the philosophical essence of these terms.
For instance, autonomy is sometimes medically defined,
especially in the Parkinson’s literature, as the ability to
perform a particular set of actions associated with daily
living [69]; by comparison, the concept is portrayed
more broadly in the philosophical literature. In most
neuroethics and bioethics publications, the conditions
for autonomy include (1) intentions (volitions), (2) com-
petence (capacity to appreciate right and wrong and
determine oneself accordingly), (3) absence of external
controlling influences (freedom from external forces),
and (4) absence of internal controlling influences (free-
dom from internal coercive influences) [70, 71]. There-
fore, it is obvious that our sample of the empirical
literature on PIAAAS in a wider sense is too conserva-
tive. The search terminologies we used, which are main-
ly based on philosophical discourse, might not have
fully captured the extent of PIAAAS-associated key
words and terms as used in medical databases. Accord-
ingly, a large number of studies were lost due to the
rather narrowly defined search string. However, since
the vast majority of the theoretical neuroethics literature
refer to PIAAAS specifically—concepts that have weak
empirical grounding—corroborates our claim that
neuroethics is in danger of discussing PIAAAS-related
problems without a rigorous empirical foundation; as a
consequence, buying into speculative ethics. This does
not mean that we neuroethicists are not allowed to take
anecdotal findings in order to make a more general (thus
speculative) philosophical point. However, we should
accept that by not explicitly stating the weak empirical
grounding of our claims, we increase the risk of inflating
an empirically impenetrable speculative bubble and
even more pressingly, disseminating information that
might detrimentally affect the decision making of some
prospective patients and their relatives who would ben-
efit from treatment. Again, we are not advocating that
philosophers should restrain from engaging in philo-
sophically interesting theoretical reasoning stimulated
by an anecdotal incident or that potential postoperative
DBS changes experienced by patients are not critical
ethical concern despite the low number of first-hand
primary studies and large number of marginal and single
case reports. Whether and in which cases philosophy
should be based on empirical data, albeit an intriguing
question, is not within the scope of this work. Although
it is important to acknowledge the occurrence of these
potential DBS-induced PIAAAS changes and to devise
measures to adequately address them, they must also be
viewed in light of incidence rates in order to better
inform patients, family members, and caregivers of ac-
tual risk probabilities associated with this surgical inter-
vention. Unquestionably, the measurement problem of
complex changes such as PIAAAS makes the assess-
ment of incidence rates extremely difficult, and in some
cases, perhaps even impossible.
Conclusion
We have argued that there is a critical lack of primary
empirical studies corroborating potential DBS-induced
effects on patients’ postoperative PIAAAS. We have
observed a disproportionate relationship between what
is available in terms of supporting empirical evidence
and the number of theoretical interpretations and
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assumptions canvassed by neuroethicists despite the
thinness of any empirical backing of their claims
concerning the impact of DBS on patient PIAAAS. To
our view, this is reflective of a speculative neuroethics
bubble, which may need to be deflated. Occurences of
Bethics hype^ and Bspeculative ethics^ are also dis-
cusses in other domains of ELSI literatures [72–76].
While we support the view that theoretical
neuroethics is as an important field of research, we
question the robustness of building philosophical ac-
counts on limited empirical evidence (often only with
very selective quotes of patient self-reports). Given the
current state of the neuroethics literature as analysed in
this study, most claims by neuroethicists concerning the
effects of postoperative DBS PIAAAS-related changes
are made up of conclusions derived from first-hand
primary studies that do not include control groups, or
from anecdotal reports, thereby risking that the stories
seem to be ‘cherry picked’. Even if a large proportion of
the published theoretical neuroethics manuscript ap-
pears to be supported by scarce data from which it is
not possible to derive conclusions, potential postopera-
tive DBS changes experienced by patients remain a
critical ethical concern. Neuroethicists play a crucial
role in addressing concerns of stakeholders (including
patients and the general public) and improving philo-
sophical understanding of such concepts.
However, there is a pressing and urgent need to
examine the question of the effects of DBS on
PIAAAS with Bfresh^ evidence. Publishing more
first-hand primary studies can only enhance the re-
liability, robustness, and validity of the discipline.
Epistemological and methodological challenges can
be overcome by developing instruments to measure
potential changes in PIAAAS. Hence, we recom-
mend facilitating the development of instruments
that will become an international standard for cap-
turing postoperative variations in patient experience
of post operative changes to PIAAAS. Responsibil-
ity to study further this question should also be
taken by relevant stakeholders from the device in-
dustry, including device companies. To avoid risks
of conflicts of interest(s), the stakeholder should
provide necessary financial support to independent
institutions to develop study protocols that will in-
vestigate more extensively issues related to DBS-
associated impacts on patients’ PIAAAS.
Reading that Bthe risk of becoming another person
following surgery is alarming^ [4] and that Bpersonality
changes represent a threat to personal identity and
agency^ [3] is not without consequence; particularly
for prospective patients (and families) who could imme-
diately and directly benefit from the intervention. These
neuroethical assertions come with risks: they may per-
petuate and propagate misleading assumptions that lack
strong supportive scientific evidence. Ethics that pro-
pounds such unfounded speculation may seem to en-
courage the public, but most importantly prospective
patients, to adopt a reluctant approach to treatment [-
25]. However, despite the empirical limitations, we be-
lieve investigating further these issues help patients to
be informed about the potential risks of psychiatric
adverse events, possible changes in personality, and
other treatment-associated changes at hand. Neuroethics
has a fundamental responsibility to play in articulating
risks about the putative effects of DBS on PIAAAS,
hence more research and funding are needed. Nonethe-
less, we, the neuroethicists, should also keep inmind our
responsibility to properly inform our readers (potential-
ly, prospective patients) of actual risks, acknowledging
that our views are more than likely based on limited case
reports. We should also work to ensure that patients and
their family members are neither hyped up by overly
positive depictions of DBS (notably by media), nor
turned down by hyperinflated assumptions about the
involved associated risks. The media account for bigger
responsibilities in how the effects of DBS are portrayed
to the public. Neuroscientists should receive appropriate
media training so as to critically and effectively counter
stories involving hype, unrealistic and inflated sensa-
tionalistic portrayals of DBS [77].
A lack of evidence of putative effects of DBS on
PIAAAS is not evidence that there is no link; em-
pirical studies are most likely not designed to cap-
ture all aspects of potential DBS-induced PIAAAS
phenomena. What remains unclear is whether it is
all DBS-implanted patients who are at risk of post-
operative PIAAAS sequelae. Further neuroethical
research is needed more than ever, especially in a
context where novel generation of DBS systems
including closed-loop, artificially intelligent im-
plants, and brain-computer interfaces are being de-
veloped. [78–85] Whether or not these emerging
neurotechnologies will affect PIAAAS is still un-
charted territory.
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Annex 1: Search Methods Employed
I. We searched the top 30 bioethics journals (according
to a list provided by bioethics.net) and AJOB
Neuroscience.
Name of journals:
Am J Bioethics (The American Journal of Bioethics)
Dev World Bioeth (Developing World Bioethics)
Hastings Cent Rep (Hastings Center Report)
Ethnic Health (Ethnicity & Health)
J Med Ethics (Journal of Medical Ethics)
BMC Med Ethics (Biomed central Medical Ethics)
Bioethics
Neuroethics-Neth
J Empir Res Hum Res (Journal of Empirical Re-
search on Human Research Ethics)
Public Health Eth-UK (Public Health Ethics)
J Law Med Ethics (The Journal of Law, Medicine &
Ethics)
Account Res (Accountability in Research)
J Bioethic Inq (Journal of Bioethical Inquiry)
Med Law Rev. (Medical Law Review)
Rev. Rom Bioet (Revista Romana de Bioetica)
Genet Counsel (Journal of Genetic Counseling)
Ethik Med (Ethik in der Medizin)
Acta Bioeth (Acta bioethica)
Nursing Ethics
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
Nanoethics
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
The Journal of Clinical Ethics
HEC Forum
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
American Journal of Bioethics Primary Research
Indian Journal of Medical Ethics
Asian Bioethics Review








PhilIndex (linmited search to academic journals)
III. Scientific, psychology, and psychiatry databases
combined
Search until May 3, 2017
PubMed - 208 results
Scopus - 236 results
Embase (via Ovid) - 263 results
Web of Science - 157 results
PsycAarticles - 17 results
Psychology & Behavioral Sciences Collection
(PBSC) - 16 results
PsycInfo (via Ovid) - 122 results
Psychiatry Online - 139 results (excluded news
articles)
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a b s t r a c t
The serendipitous discovery of triggered autobiographical memories and eventual memory improvement
in an obese patient who received fornix deep brain stimulation in 2008 paved the way for several phase I
and phase II clinical trials focused on the safety and efficacy of this potential intervention for people with
Alzheimer’s disease. In this article, we summarize clinical trials and case reports on fornix deep brain
stimulation for Alzheimer’s disease and review experiments on animal models evaluating the physio-
logical or behavioral effects of this intervention. Based on information from these reports and studies,
we identify potential translational challenges of this approach and determine practical and ethical
considerations for clinical trials, focusing on issues regarding selection criteria, trial design, and outcome
evaluation. Based on initial results suggesting greater benefit for those with milder disease stage, we find
it essential that participant expectations are carefully managed to avoid treatment disenchantment and/
or frustration from participants and caregivers. Finally, we urge for collaboration between centers to
establish proper clinical standards and to promote better trial results comparison.
 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is the leading cause of dementia
worldwide (Plassman et al., 2007), with 5.3 million AD-affected
individuals in the USA alone (Alzheimer’s Association, 2015) and
more than 95% of whom are65 (Hebert et al., 2013). Characterized
by brain pathological hallmarks such as b-amyloid plaques and
neurofibrillary tangles, AD clinically manifests as slowly progres-
sive dementia and gross cerebral atrophy (Bird, 1998). Currently, AD
is divided into asymptomatic preclinical, predementia, and
dementia phases (Jack et al., 2011), with increasing cognitive defi-
cits associated as the disease progresses to later stages. In the
dementia phase of AD, affected individuals experience deficits in
memory, reasoning and executive function, visuospatial abilities,
language functions, and/or personality, which significantly
interfere with ability to function at work or at usual activities
(McKhann et al., 2011). Death usually results from general inanition,
malnutrition, and pneumonia (Bird, 1998).
Currently, only 6 drugs have been approved by the FDA for the
management of AD, but none of them prevents disease progression
(Alzheimer’s Association, 2015), treats the underlying pathology, or
provides long-lasting benefit (Broadstock et al., 2014). As such,
several novel drug (Kumar et al., 2015) and non-drug approaches
(Corbett and Ballard, 2012) are currently being tested, with several
non-drug approaches being invasive in nature (Nilsson et al., 2010;
Tuszynski et al., 2015). Among the invasive neurosurgical methods
that is being tested for AD is deep brain stimulation (DBS), which
involves implanting in a region of interest one or more quadripolar
leads that are then connected to an externally programmable
implanted pulse generator to deliver continuous electrical stimu-
lation (De Jesus et al., 2015; Gionfriddo et al., 2013; Okun, 2012). DBS
stimulation parameters are programmable, and clinicians deter-
mine the optimal settings and implantation location for each patient
to maximize relief from disease symptoms while minimizing
unwanted stimulation-induced side effects such as speech
* Corresponding author at: University of Tasmania, Private Bag 41, Hobart, Tas-
mania 7001, Australia. Tel.: þ61432741133; fax: þ61362267847.
E-mail address: John.viana@utas.edu.au (J.N.M. Viaña).
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disturbance (Patel et al., 2015), depression, and suicidality (Appleby
et al., 2007). DBS could exert its therapeutic action by inducing
orthodromic or antidromic effects that change patterns of neuronal
activation and inhibition and potentially disrupt abnormal firing
patterns at the synaptic level. These could then lead to changes in
neurotransmitter release, neuronal excitability, and in oscillatory
properties of connected neural networks (Deniau et al., 2010;
Hammond et al., 2008). DBS in certain brain regions has already
been approved for several indications such as essential and
Parkinsonian tremor, Parkinson’s disease, dystonia, obsessive
compulsive disorder, and epilepsy (Sarem-Aslani andMullett, 2011).
Most clinical trials of deep brain stimulation for people with
Alzheimer’s disease targeted the fornix, a white matter bundle that
serves as the major hippocampal output tract (Thomas et al., 2011),
connecting the hippocampus with the mammillary bodies in the
hypothalamus, septal nuclei (Mielke et al., 2012), and nucleus
accumbens (Oishi and Lyketsos, 2014). The fornix is located in the
medial diencephalon and is an integral part of the Papez circuit,
which is also referred to as the “temporal lobe memory system”
(Nowrangi and Rosenberg, 2015). Damage of the fornix in humans
and animals has been associated with anterograde amnesia, deficits
in spatial memory, and impairment in visuospatial memory acqui-
sition, indicating the fornix’s role in declarative memory formation
and consolidation (Thomas et al., 2011). InpeoplewithAD, the fornix
is atrophied anddisplaysmicrostructural impairments in the formof
dendritic and axonal damage and breakdown of myelin and tissue
cytoarchitecture, which correlate with worse performance on
memory tasks (Douet and Chang, 2014; Mielke et al., 2012).
Given the invasive nature of DBS compared with other existing
and proposed therapies for AD, it is important to examine current
clinical trials (Table 1) and animal studies (Table 2) of fornix DBS for
AD to evaluate and appraise the current level of evidence, deter-
mine relevant translational and ethical issues, and provide recom-
mendations for ongoing and future trials to prevent unnecessary
harm and ensure that trial participants are well-protected and
adequately informed.
2. Deep brain stimulation of the fornix in humans and
animals
2.1. Experimental trials in humans
The potential of fornix DBS for memory improvement was first
identified when autobiographical memories were evoked and
improvements in verbal and visuospatial memories were observed
in a patient who underwent DBS for obesity (Hamani et al., 2008).
Since the fornix is a major output pathway for the hippocampal
formation (Thomas et al., 2011), and hippocampal damage is an
early feature of AD (Moodley and Chan, 2014), this discovery led to a
phase I clinical trial in 6 people with early AD. During surgery,
2 subjects reported stimulation-induced autobiographical experi-
ential phenomena. Memory improvements were also reported in
some participants after 12 months of stimulation, especially in
those who experienced vivid experiential phenomena during
surgery and had less severe memory problems (Laxton et al., 2010).
Increased metabolism in certain brain networks (Smith et al., 2012)
and increased hippocampal volume in 2 participants (Sankar et al.,
2015) were also observed 12 months after the stimulation.
Taking into account the results of the phase I trial (Laxton et al.,
2010), a phase II clinical trial was then initiated (Holroyd et al.,
2015). The phase II “ADvance” trial is a randomized, double-blind,
placebo-controlled, delayed-start trial conducted in different sites
in North America. In this study, half of the subjects did not receive
any stimulation for 12 months, whereas the other half received
continuous DBS stimulation. All participants were then stimulated
after the 12-month period. An initial report assessing the surgery’s
safety indicated that accurate targeting of the fornix without direct
injury was successfully performed, and that 90 days postsurgery,
bilateral fornix DBS was well tolerated by the trial participants
(Ponce et al., 2016). The first-year results of the ADvance trial
showed an interesting trend in cognitive change only when results
were separately analyzed for participants younger and older than
65. After 1 year of DBS, participants <65 appeared to have signifi-
cantly worse cognitive scores than controls <65, whereas partici-
pants 65 exhibited slight improvement (Lozano et al., 2016).
In addition to the studies done in North America, another team
in France has performed bilateral fornix DBS. The subject’s cognitive
performance stabilized over 2 years of continuous stimulation, and
her anxiety and mood were slightly improved and were eventually
stabilized after 6months of stimulation (Fontaine et al., 2013, 2015).
2.2. DBS of the fornix in animal models
Several studies in animals (Table 2) have also been conducted to
elucidate the effect of fornix DBS on cognition and behavior (Hao
et al., 2015; Hescham et al., 2013, 2017; Zhang et al., 2015), brain
activity (Gondard et al., 2015; Hao et al., 2015; Hescham et al., 2016;
Ross et al., 2016; Talakoub et al., 2016), and brain structure (Hao
et al., 2015; Hescham et al., 2017). Results from these studies indi-
cate that fornix DBS improves spatial (Hao et al., 2015; Hescham
et al., 2013, 2017; Zhang et al., 2015), contextual (Hao et al., 2015),
and recognition (Zhang et al., 2015) memories with no effect on
locomotion, anxiety, pain threshold, and motor learning levels (Hao
et al., 2015; Hescham et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2015). These suggest
that fornix DBS could improve both hippocampus-dependent
spatial and hippocampus-independent recognition memories
(Zhang et al., 2015). In addition, fornix deep brain stimulation also
results in increased neuronal activity, determined by enhanced cFos
expression (Gondard et al., 2015; Hao et al., 2015; Hescham et al.,
2016); evoked hippocampal responses (Talakoub et al., 2016);
increase in hippocampal acetylcholine (Hescham et al., 2016);
induction of proteins involved in axonal growth, and guidance,
synaptic plasticity, synaptogenesis, and neuronal differentiation
and survival (Gondard et al., 2015); enhanced long-term potentia-
tion (Hao et al., 2015); dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens;
and induction of medial and corticolimbic hemodynamic responses
via glutamatergic and dopaminergic transmission (Ross et al.,
2016). DBS could also potentially enhance hippocampal neuro-
genesis; however, results from different studies are conflicting (Hao
et al., 2015; Hescham et al., 2017). Finally, Talakoub et al. (2016)
demonstrated that closed-loop low-frequency stimulation during
hippocampal sharp-wave ripples could result in the interruption of
these ripples and associated multi-unit activity.
3. Translational challenges of animal studies
Currently, there is no wild-type or transgenic model that repli-
cates the full suite of pathological changes in AD, nor the typical
spread of pathology from medial temporal regions to other cortical
areas. Consequently, evaluating the effects of stimulation of axons
in the fornix in models that are currently available may provide an
incomplete profile of potential benefits in human AD. However,
there have been some intriguing results from animal studies that
indicate that the benefits of DBS may be more widespread than
anticipated from stimulating simply this axonal tract given the
observed effects on neurogenesis (Hao et al., 2015; Hescham et al.,
2017), synaptic and neuroprotective protein expression (Gondard
et al., 2015), and synaptic properties (Hao et al., 2015), potentially
suggesting that DBS could have a broader neuroprotective function
in neural cell biology. It will be important to ensure the validity of
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current experimental results obtained since they could help inform
decisions on trial design and participant selection. For instance,
determining whether DBS of the fornix indeed induces neuro-
genesis or if it has a neuroprotective effect could help identify at
which stage of AD fornix DBS might bemost effective. In addition, it
is important to ensure that the frequency and timing of stimulation
provided is appropriate since it has been shown in a closed-loop
protocol that DBS could interrupt hippocampal sharp-wave rip-
ples, which play a role in memory consolidation and/or retrieval
(Talakoub et al., 2016). Certain stimulation parameters and
improperly timed stimulation should therefore be avoided as they
could lead to memory impairment instead of improvement.
Results to date from the limited number of fornix DBS animal
studies have been conflicting, as shown by differing results of
Table 2
Animal studies on deep brain stimulation of the fornix
Study Subjects Stimulation parameters Assessments Results
Hescham et al. (2013) Adult male SD rates injected
with scopolamine
10 fDBS, 11 sham
Bilateral, 10/100 Hz, 50/100/
200 mA, 100 ms; 2 min before and
until the end of each session
Behavior (OLT and OFT) [: OLT (memory performance)
NSD: OFT
Hescham et al. (2016) Male SD rats
15 fDBS, 11 sham
Bilateral, 100 Hz, 100 mA, 100 ms;
cFos and dialysis: 1 h
Brain activity and
neurotransmitters (Ach and Glu)
released
[: cFos expression in CA1 and
CA3 subregions; hippocampal
Ach in first 20min of stimulation
NSD: Glu levels
Gondard et al. (2015) Adult male Wistar rats
27 fDBS, 27 sham
Bilateral, 130 Hz, 2.5 V, 90 ms; 1 h Protein expression in the
hippocampus
[: Hippocampal cFos (dentate
gyrus granule cell layer), BDNF,
VEGF, synaptic proteins GAP43,
and synaptophysin
NSD: APP, tau, ptau, and
chaperone proteins
Zhang et al. (2015) 6-wk old SD rats injected with
Ab 1-42 peptides in the
hippocampus
8 fDBS, 8 sham
Bilateral, 130 Hz, 500 mA,
90 ms; 24 h
Behavior (MWM, NORM, OFT) [: MWM (reference memory of
platform, frequency of platform
crossings, time spent in platform
quadrant); NORM (time with
novel object and recognition
index)
NSD: OFT
Hao et al. (2015) 6 to 8-wk old female RTT
(Mecp2þ/) mice
111 fDBS; 106 shama
Unilateral, biphasic rectangular
pulses, 130 Hz, 60 ms, 80%
intensity needed for
hippocampal afterdischarge; 1 h
per d for 14 d
Behavior (MWM, FM, OFT, light-
dark box, wire hang, dowel
walk, accelerating rotarod, 3-
chamber interaction, pain
threshold), synaptic
transmission, brain activity, and
neurogenesis
[: MWM (memory in WT and
RTT mice, retrieval in RTT mice);
FM (contextual memory in WT
and RTT mice; hippocampal
infusion of atropine, an Ach
receptor antagonist, did not alter
fear memory in fDBS RTT or WT
mice); LTP in WT and RTT mice;
Fos expression in dentate
neurons; bilateral dentate
neurogenesis in WT and RTT
NSD: OFT, light-dark box, wire




Y: slightly in magnitude of
evoked responses in RTT animals
Hescham et al. (2017) SD rats
10 fDBS, 7 sham
Bilateral, 100 Hz, 100 mA,
100 ms; 4 h
Behavior (MWM) and
neurogenesis
[: MWM (number of crossings




Ross et al. (2016) Domestic swine
17 fDBS
Unilateral, biphasic, 3/5/7 V
pulses, 130 Hz, 150 ms; fMRI: 5
6-s epochs with 1-min intervals
and 10-min rest, FSCV: 1 6-s
stimulation, 5-min rest
Brain activity and dopamine
release
[: medial limbic and
corticolimbic circuits activity;
biphasic NAc dopamine release
in the NAc
Intracranial NAc infusion of
dopamine or glutamate receptor
antagonists attenuated DBS-
induced activity in the
hippocampus and amygdala
Talakoub et al. (2016) Adult female macaque
1 fDBS
Bilateral, biphasic, 100 ms;
hippocampal response: 1/4/8
pulses, 1/2/3 mA, 1.75 Hz, 3 min;
ripple interruption (closed-
loop): 4 pulses, 2 ms, 2 mAwhen
signal amplitude crosses
threshold, 95 daily sessions:







Y: hippocampal ripple duration
through interruption of the tail
of the ripple, multi-unit activity
of interrupted ripples to below
baseline levels, and ripple
amplitude (as a result of closed-
loop stimulation)
Stimulation (4/8 pulses, 2/3 mA)
evoked hippocampal response
Key: BDNF, brain-derived neurotrophic factor; BOLD, blood oxygen level-dependent; FM, fearmemory; FSCV, fast scan cyclic voltammetry; LTP, long-term potentiation; MWM,
Morris Water Maze; NAc, nucleus accumbens; NORM, Novel Object Recognition Memory Test; NSD, no significant difference GAP43, growth-associated protein 43; OFT, Open
Field Test; OLT, Object Location Task; RTT, Rett syndrome; SD, Sprague Dawley; VEGF, vascular endothelial growth factor; WT, wild-type.
a Considering separate mice were used in each test.
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potentially DBS-induced neurogenesis by the groups of Hao et al.
(2015) and Hescham et al. (2017). Potential reasons may include
differing stimulation parameters, investigation protocols, and animal
models. For instance, both studies employed different stimulation
frequencies, pulse widths, and stimulation durations (Table 2).
Moreover, BrdU labelingwas conducted by Hao et al. (2015) each day
after DBS for 14 days, and mice were examined after almost 4 weeks
in contrast to the study of Hescham et al. (2017) where rats were
injected with BrdU for 3 consecutive days 3 days after stimulation
and were sacrificed almost 6 weeks after. These differences simply
illustrate that different protocols and animal models were used,
which could account for potentially differing results.
Overall, these differences highlight the need to standardize
stimulation parameters, and perhaps also animal models, in future
animal experiments to better translate findings tomechanisms that
are also present in people with AD. It is also important to note that
most animal studies utilized pharmacological approaches (Hescham
et al., 2013; Zhanget al., 2015) toproducememory impairments, and
the effects of fornix DBS have not been examined in transgenic lines
bearing human genemutations linked to familial AD (Do Carmo and
Cuello, 2013). The length of stimulation in all animal studies per-
formed is also much shorter than those used in clinical trials, and
thus, results from current animal studies might not fully reflect
behavioral and physiologic changes associated with long-term DBS.
4. Ethical and practical considerations for clinical trials
4.1. Participant selection criteria
In the clinical trials (Holroyd et al., 2015; Laxton et al., 2010) and
case studies (Fontaine et al., 2013) for DBS on people with AD, there
was no uniformity of criteria employed in participant selection and
consent acquisition (Table 3). Although most experimental partici-
pants were 50e65, one study was recruiting people as young as
40 (Laxton et al., 2010), whereas another one considered those who
are up to 85 still eligible (Holroyd et al., 2015). Recruiting partici-
pants who are <65 and not reporting the conduct of any family
background check and/or genetic screening could potentially allow
the recruitment of people with a genetic mutation strongly predis-
posing them to AD that could have a more rapid disease progression
and more pronounced brain pathology (Ringman et al., 2014).
Moreover, early-onset dementia could also potentially include
frontotemporal dementia as well as AD, unless this was specifically
ruled out through the employment of neurologic and genetic tests
(Rossor et al., 2010). Recruiting such participants could put them at
risk and minimize potential benefits, especially in trials wherein
stimulation is withheld for 1 year and if the same protocols are
employed as for those with normal AD progression (Holroyd et al.,
2015; Panegyres and Chen, 2013; Viaña et al., 2017). Different
criteria for AD and different tests to evaluate baseline cognitionwere
also used in each study. Also, although 2 (Holroyd et al., 2015; Laxton
et al., 2010) out of 3 studies stated that participants should be on a
stable dose of cholinesterase-inhibiting drugs, the period overwhich
the drugs should have been taken differs between these studies.
Considering that DBS surgery and stimulation could lead to a
number of neurologic and psychiatric adverse side-effects (Appleby
et al., 2007; Patel et al., 2015; Pinsker et al., 2013), selecting the
appropriate trial participants is of utmost importance to prevent
unnecessary harms (Ovadia and Bottini, 2015). Almost all the
studies excluded subjects with neurologic, psychiatric, and/or other
medical abnormalities; however, only one (Holroyd et al., 2015)
specifically excluded participants with mental retardation and
suicidal ideation. Some exclusion criteria such as suicidal ideation
should be given importance since suicidality is a potential adverse
Table 3
Selection criteria for participant recruitment of human studies on deep brain stimulation of the fornix for Alzheimer’s disease (primarily based on clinicaltrials.gov entries)
Study Phase 1dCanada (Laxton et al., 2010) Phase 1dFrance (Fontaine et al., 2013) Phase 2dNorth America (Holroyd et al.,
2015; Lozano et al., 2016)
Inclusion criteria
Recruitment age 40e80 50e65 (extended to 70 after protocol
amendment)
45e85
AD stage Probable AD (1983 NINCDS-ADRDA) AD DSM IV Probable AD (2012 NIA-AA)
Cognitive score CDR of 0.5e1, MMSE of 20e28 Episodic memory impairment from
FCSRT/Grober and Buschke test; MMSE
of 20e24
CDR of 0.5e1; ADAS-Cog 11 of 12e24,
score 4 on item 1: immediate recall
Informed consent Participant or surrogate Participant Subject, caregiver, and surrogate
Exclusion criteria
Neurologic abnormalities Pre-existing structural brain
abnormalities (tumor, infarction,
intracranial hematoma)
Abnormality on pre-operative MRI Modified Hachinski ischemic score >4
at screening; history of brain tumor,
subdural hematoma, or other clinically
significant space-occupying lesions;
history of head trauma
Cognitive abnormalities - - Mental retardation
Psychiatric conditions Other psychiatric diagnosis Associated DSM IV axis I pathology NPI 33 total score 10 or score 4 in
any domain except apathy; YMRS 11;
current major psychiatric disorder
(such as schizophrenia, BD or MDD);
active psychiatric disorder; score >10
on CSDD; current alcohol or substance
use disorder as defined by DSM-IV-TR
Suicidality - - Suicide past 2 y; C-SSRS
Additional tests
Genetic screening or family check - - -
Biomarker - MRI and/or CSF and/or PET proposed to
participant
PET scans for characteristic metabolic
pattern associated with AD
Key: ADAS-Cog, Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scaleecognitive component; BD, bipolar disorder; CDR, Clinical Dementia Rating scale; CSDD, Cornell Scale for Depression in
Dementia; CSF, cerebrospinal fluid measurement; C-SSRS, Columbia Suicide Severity Rating Scale; DSM, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; DSM IV-TR,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Text Revision; FCSRT, Free and Cued Selective Reminding Test; MDD, major depressive disorder; MMSE,
MinieMental State Exam; MRI, magnetic resonance imaging; NIA-AA, National Institute on Aging-Alzheimer’s Association; NINDS-ADRDA, National Institute of Neurological
and Communicative Disorders and Stroke (NINCDS) and the Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Disorders Association (ADRDA); NPI, Neuropsychiatric Inventory; PET, positron
emission tomography; YMRS, Young Mania Rating Scale.
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event of DBS (Appleby et al., 2007), and people with AD are at an
increased risk of committing suicide (Barak and Aizenberg, 2002).
We recommend that the Neuropsychiatric Inventory should be
used in all subsequent DBS for AD trials to exclude patients with
depression and suicidal ideations (Cummings et al., 1994), and to
monitor patients during and after the trial for the appearance of any
depressive symptom or suicidal inclinations. Only one study has
explicitly stated the use of the Neuropsychiatric Inventory in
excluding patients with clinically significant psychiatric symptoms
and as a clinical outcome measure (Lozano et al., 2016).
Since it has been suggested that those at an earlier AD stage and
those who experienced in-surgery stimulation-induced autobio-
graphical memories are more likely to benefit from fornix DBS
(Laxton et al., 2010), determining which exact stage of AD are
patients most responsive to fornix DBS and verifying if triggered
autobiographical memories are indeed a good marker of eventual
therapeutic response to DBS are crucial. In addition, since fornix DBS
might have a potentially age-dependent effect (Lozano et al., 2016), it
is important to determine whether age is indeed a true effect-
modifying factor or if there is another underlying variable that
happens to just bemore prevalent inyounger individualswith AD. As
such, incorporating biomarker information such as hippocampal
brain volume, CSF levels of tau and amyloid beta, and brain activity
measured by EEG and fMRI (Lewczuk et al., 2015) in patient selection
might providemore information on AD stage during recruitment and
also on other variables that could influence a participant’s response
to DBS. Among the 3 trials, only one (Fontaine et al., 2013) provided
evidence of potential AD pathology from CSF amyloid and tau levels.
Finally, it is important to consider AD’s neurodegenerative nature
and that most affected individuals are65 (Hebert et al., 2013), and
as such, participants could already have impaired decision-making
capacity (Kim et al., 2001) that could compromise their ability to
provide fully informed consent. Future trials should assess the
ability of trial participants to consent using systematic or established
measures of capacity assessment (Grisso et al., 1995; Marson et al.,
1995), and from there, determine whether the participant’s con-
sent alone is enough or if additional consent from a caretaker or
surrogate is needed. However, eventual support of caregivers might
be necessary even for those who are fully competent at the start of
the trial, and thus, their opinionmight still have to be valued (Pierce,
2014). In addition, someparticipantsmight eventually lose adequate
decision-making capacities, and as such, advance researchdirectives
should be made and surrogate decision makers/legally authorized
representatives should be initially assigned to facilitate or guide
decisions in later trial stages (Siegel et al., 2017). Among the trials,
only one (Holroyd et al., 2015) required informed consent signed by
the subject, a family caregiver, and a surrogate.
4.2. Trial design
An essential component of a DBS study is the stimulation
parameters used given that they could impact the therapeutic effect
of DBS (Cooper et al., 2008; Reich et al., 2015). Both phase I studies
(Fontaine et al., 2013; Laxton et al., 2010) and the phase II trial
(Holroyd et al., 2015) used a stimulation frequency similar to the one
used in the studyof fornixDBSto treat anobesepatient (Hamani et al.,
2008; Table 1). However, the phase I and phase II trials in North
America (Holroyd et al., 2015; Laxton et al., 2010) both employed a
longer pulse width than what was originally provided in the obese
patient (Hamani et al., 2008). Given that the same research team
facilitated these 3 studies in North America (Hamani et al., 2008;
Laxton et al., 2010; Lozano et al., 2016), it would be important to
determine the rationale behind increasing the pulse width. Interest-
ingly, the phase I trial in France (Fontaine et al., 2013) employed an
even longer pulse width but a relatively smaller voltage but did not
really provide a rationalization for such deviation. Standardization is
crucial and should be implemented in future trials to allow better
compilation of results and to minimize potential variables that could
influence experimental outcomes. Standardization should not be
placed abovepatientwelfare though, andadjustments, as longas they
are accounted for andexplained, shouldbemade tominimize adverse
events if they arise in certain participants.
The phase II trial of fornix DBS (Lozano et al., 2016) employs a
designwith a no-stimulation group for the first 12 months and then
shifts to an open-label design where all participants will receive
stimulation for an additional 12 months (Holroyd et al., 2015). It is
interesting to compare this protocol with another trial of DBS tar-
geting the nucleus basalis of Meynert in people with AD (Kuhn et al.,
2015). This study consisted of an initial 1-month randomized
double-blind sham-controlled stimulation phase, where 2 weeks of
stimulation were followed by 2 weeks without stimulation or vice
versa, with the 2 phases separated by a 24-hour washout period, and
a succeeding 11-month phase of continued open stimulation on all
participants. In the nucleus basalis of Meynert study, mean MMSE
scores improved after 2 weeks of stimulation compared with the
score after 2 weeks without stimulation. On the other hand, results
from the phase II clinical trial (Lozano et al., 2016) showed no dif-
ference between the groups when analysis was performed just
based on treatment arm, but accounting for age suggested variable
effects of stimulation for different age groups (Table 1).
The differing set-ups of DBS for AD studies with controls (Kuhn
et al., 2015; Lozano et al., 2016) raise the questions of how long
should stimulation be withheld to be able to observe an adequate
effect while ensuring that thosewho do not receive stimulation for a
certain period are not dramatically disadvantaged, especially if DBS
has the potential to improve participants’ cognitive capacities only
at a certain stage or period of impairment. Given the initial results of
the phase I trial in Canada (Laxton et al., 2010), participants should
be in a very mild stage of dementia in such a way that after 1 year
without stimulation, they would not progress to a stage where they
are unlikely to benefit from DBS. The 1-year report of the phase II
trial (Lozano et al., 2016) did not analyze the influence of initial
cognitive scores on therapeutic benefit, data on which might shed
light on the participants with presurgery cognitive scores who are
most likely to benefit from DBS. However, the phase II trial reported
an effect of age, the results of which actually raise several concerns.
Primarily, there was cognitive worsening in those <65, which ap-
pears to be much greater than the cognitive improvement in those
65. In addition, results of stimulation effect on CDR-SB were only
significant for those <65. Such effect was in the negative direction
though, suggesting that DBS might actually worsen cognitive
decline in a certain subgroup of patients. This raises the issue of
whether it might be ethical to continue stimulating participants
<65 who are in the ON group and begin stimulation for those who
were not initially stimulated (Viaña et al., 2017). Nonetheless, im-
mediate conclusions that those <65 will be negatively affected by
DBS might be unwarranted given that selecting 65 as a cut-off point
has no biological significance and is mainly an indicative of social
divide in terms of employment and retirement age (Rossor et al.,
2010). Furthermore, no genetic tests or family background checks
were mentioned in the phase II trial (Lozano et al., 2016) to deter-
mine if any of the participants have mutations that might lead to a
more aggressive AD disease course (Ringman et al., 2014), which
could affect outcomes and potentially explain the results for the
younger patient subgroup (Viaña et al., 2017).
4.3. Outcome measures
All fornix DBS studies primarily aimed to determine the safety of
the procedure, but all of them also examined its efficacy. All 3 trials
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utilized ADAS-Cog, and each further utilized different additional
cognitive and global measures ranging from MMSE, CDR, and
FCSRT. All studies also performed cerebral functional examination
via PET, and 2 studies (Holroyd et al., 2015; Laxton et al., 2010)
measured hippocampal volume via MRI. As with stimulation
parameters, the standardization of cognitive and neurologic tests is
essential for better comparison of results from these studies.
Moreover, having standardized cognitive and neurologic tests
would help strengthen any evidence for the therapeutic effect of
DBS and also simplify regulatory approval application processes.
Although the phase I trial report (Laxton et al., 2010) suggested
potential memory improvements and increased temporal lobe
metabolism and hippocampal volume from fornix DBS, it is
important to note that half of the participants worsened after
3 months of stimulation, and after the 12-month period, 2 partici-
pants had worse performance than during the start of the therapy.
In addition, the phase II trial (Lozano et al., 2016) showed significant
cognitive worsening in stimulated participants <65 and only very
mild improvement in those 65. Although these studies generally
indicate that DBS of the fornix in people with AD is safe, its clinical
significance should also be taken into account in making decisions
on progressing to the next clinical trial phase where a larger
participant cohort will be enrolled.
The benefits of stimulation of the fornix would be expected to
have a particular time window that relates to the early involve-
ment of the medial temporal lobe and hippocampus in degener-
ative changes with neuronal degeneration and the loss of axons,
including those in the fornix. Although certain participants might
expect immediate improvement of cognition, results in some
subjects might only be witnessed after a longer period of stimu-
lation (Laxton et al., 2010), despite the background of early
degeneration of the hippocampal formation. This is in stark
contrast with DBS for essential tremor and Parkinson’s disease
where patients see improvements in motor function shortly after
the stimulation is started (Hristova et al., 2000). The possibility of
late response highlights the importance of proper communication
with people with AD about the possible time interval over which
improvement could occur and that DBS might just stabilize
cognitive status for a period of time rather than improve cognitive
function.
It is also important to emphasize that several aspects of cogni-
tion, daily functioning, and social interaction are not well captured
by common AD scales (Robert et al., 2010). In addition, although the
various formal assessments of neurological function may help
elucidate the mechanisms underlying potential memory improve-
ments, they may not have much impact on trial participants when
relayed to them. As such, cognitive and neurological changes should
be related to functional outcomes, such as in activities of daily living
and quality of life (QoL). In the Canadian phase I trial (Laxton et al.,
2010), 4 out of 6 participants had improved scores in an AD-specific
QoL scale. In the Clinician Interview-Based Impression of Change
scale however, only 1 participant was reported to show improve-
ment. Given that there are no controls for this trial, it would be
difficult to attribute whether such improvement was due to the
medication, surgical procedure, or the stimulation itself. Moreover,
the 1-year report of the phase II trial (Lozano et al., 2016) did not
really indicate what the results of the QoL-AD test are, although the
inclusion of such test was initially indicated in their initial study
description (Holroyd et al., 2015). In addition, scores of patients
who received and did not receive stimulation in the AD Cooperative
StudydActivities of Daily Living Inventory (ADCS-ADL) did not
differ; however, such was only the result when age is not accounted
for. Given that the participants’ age seemed to have an influence on
the outcome of stimulation, ADCS-ADL results should have also
been compared between the 2 age groups.
5. Conclusions
Results from animal studies could aid participant selection and
trial design, yet current animal studies greatly differ in stimulation
parameters and also use animalmodels that inadequately represent
the underlying pathology of AD. These considerations highlight the
need for collaboration among research centers and laboratories to
establish standards in the stimulation parameters used and
cognitive measures employed both in human and animal studies to
facilitate better comparison of results and minimize confounding
variables.
Preliminary results from small studies in humans indicate that
fornix DBS in people with AD may be feasible and safe, although
sufficiently powered larger studies are required. These and possible
future studies bring up salient issues on appropriate participant
selection criteria, framework for consent, and participant orienta-
tion procedure. There are also concerns relating to the design of
subsequent clinical trials, particularly regarding the optimal AD
stage for DBS intervention and the subgroups of people with AD
that are most likely to benefit. Appropriate outcomemeasures need
to be developed, particularly given outcomes may range from
improvement in cognition from current levels, stability of symp-
toms, or continued decline. Obtaining a sufficiently powered study
that addresses these issues of efficacy may prove challenging for
such a surgical procedure given its highly invasive nature. In
addition, the long-term safety of the surgery needs to be eval-
uateddvery few studies have examined the pathological effects of
placement of stimulating electrodes post mortem (Pilitsis et al.,
2008; Sun et al., 2008). In this regard, the placement and activa-
tion of electrodes in axonal tracts that are already degenerating,
such as the fornix in AD, may be an important consideration.
Economic, societal, and regulatory issues also have to be antic-
ipated. An economic evaluation of DBS for mild AD suggests that in
order for it to be more clinically and cost effective than standard
care, it has to achieve an 80% success rate (Mirsaeedi-Farahani et al.,
2015), a benchmark that results from past and ongoing fornix DBS
for AD clinical trials seem to be relatively distant from. Even though
DBS for AD would be close to or achieve such benchmark at some
point, its widespread application would still be immensely chal-
lenging. Certain racial groups already have limited access to AD
screening and standard treatment protocols (Dilworth-Anderson
et al., 2012), in addition to restricted DBS for Parkinson’s disease
access and health care coverage for neurosurgical procedures (Chan
et al., 2014). DBS also involves a complicated operation and requires
a multidisciplinary team for monitoring, necessitating specialized
psychiatric, neurological, and neurosurgical facilities and skillset,
making its application in urban areas and developing countries
with limited resources a big challenge. In addition, although certain
people might have access to and health care coverage for DBS, they
might be wary of and opt not to receive DBS treatment given that it
could be a ground for rejection to nursing homes due to the in-
crease in care needed (Farris and Gianola, 2009) and financial cost
in the event of device-related complications. Regulatory challenges
also have to be addressed, especially in attempting to use DBS in the
context of treatment for peoplewith AD (Schmitz-Luhn et al., 2012).
Lessons have to be learned from the irresponsible marketing and
use of “stem cells” for neurodegenerative conditions in connection
with the alarming popularity increase of stem cell tourism (Jawad
et al., 2012). Strict regulations and safeguards should be in place
in different countries to prevent unregulated promotion and use of
deep brain stimulation to “treat” people with Alzheimer’s disease.
The burden of Alzheimer’s disease is not just limited to the
patient but extends to the family, caregivers, and society as awhole.
In DBS for AD, this can be further complicated by the potential of
DBS to affect social and family dynamics, as demonstrated in people
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with Parkinson’s disease that despite being relieved of motor
symptoms through DBS, experienced self estrangement and/or
post-operative changes in personality, outlook in life, and behavior
that affected marital relations and professional activity (Agid et al.,
2006; Gilbert, 2012). Although there are currently no reports on the
effects of DBS on socio-familial dynamics for people with AD, these
issues might potentially arise and have to eventually be reconciled
with the effect of AD itself on familial relations, especially with
communication difficulties and loss of affectional expression
(Davies et al., 2010) and on how caregivers adapt and respond to it.
Given the burden of AD and potential adverse effects of DBS to
socio-familial dynamics, decisions on policies regarding access to
and protocols for DBS trials and therapeutic application should
involve and consider the needs and opinions of people with AD
eligible for DBS and their families and caregivers.
Since there is no disease-modifying treatment available for AD,
DBS might offer an additional mode of therapy. Nonetheless, sound
and ethical scientific and clinical groundwork have to be estab-
lished first before this highly invasive procedure that targets a
vulnerable group of individuals is approved and recommended for
wide use.
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Abstract. Several studies of deep brain stimulation (DBS) of the fornix or the nucleus basalis of Meynert have been recently
conducted in people with Alzheimer’s disease, with several recruiting participants <65 and thus have early-onset Alzheimer’s
disease (EOAD). Although EOAD accounts for less than 5.5% of AD cases, ethical considerations must still be made
when performing DBS trials including these participants since a portion of people with EOAD, especially those possessing
autosomal-dominant mutations, have an atypical and more aggressive disease progression. These considerations include
appropriate patient selection and signing of an informed consent for genetic testing; appropriate study design; potential
outcomes that people with EOAD could expect; and accurate interpretation and balanced discussion of trial results. Finally,
recommendations for future DBS for AD trials will be made to ensure that EOAD patients will not experience avoidable
harms should they be enrolled in these experimental studies.
Keywords: Clinical trials as topic, deep brain stimulation, early onset Alzheimer’s disease, ethical review, ethics, familial
Alzheimer’s disease, fornix (brain), nucleus basalis of Meynert
INTRODUCTION
There has been a recent surge in experimental tri-
als on deep brain stimulation (DBS) for Alzheimer’s
disease (AD) [1–5], with several studies recruiting
participants <65 [1, 3–5] and thus have early-onset
Alzheimer’s disease (EOAD). Although there have
already been previous discussions on the ethics of
DBS for neurodegenerative disorders [6–9], issues
arising from recruiting people with EOAD for DBS
∗Correspondence to: John Noel M. Vian˜a, MSc, University of
Tasmania, Private Bag 41, Hobart, Tasmania 7001, Australia. Tel.:
+61 432741133; E-mail: john.viana@utas.edu.au.
trials remain unexamined and unexplored in the lit-
erature. To address this gap, we discuss potential
ethical issues focusing on selection criteria, genetic
testing and informed consent, study design,measured
outcomes, and result interpretation and portrayal to




Dementia affects an estimated 46.8 million peo-
ple worldwide [10], with AD as its leading cause
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[11]. People with AD dementia suffer from cognitive
or behavioral impairment in two or more domains,
which include memory, reasoning and executive
function, visuospatial abilities, language functions,
and personality, that significantly interferes with abil-
ity to function at work or at usual activities [12].
Although the majority of people with AD are ≥65
[13], 5.5% of those affected have an onset of demen-
tia before 65 [14] and thus are classified as having
EOAD. The 65-year-old cut-off point has no bio-
logical significance and is mainly an indicative of
social divide in terms of employment and retirement
age [15]. Nonetheless, people with EOAD usually
have a more rapid disease progression and have more
pronounced brain pathology compared to those who
developAD symptoms after 65 [16]. In addition, they
have a much shorter survival time; much more preva-
lent language disturbance [17]; exhibit other atypical
symptoms such as visual agnosia, apraxia, dyscal-
culia, and executive dysfunction [18]; have a higher
prevalence of additional non-cognitive neurological
symptoms [19]; and exhibitmore severe temporopari-
etal junction atrophy [20].
At least 62% of patients with EOAD have a history
of AD in the family [21], implying potential genetic
underpinnings. Currently, three genes have been fully
established to cause highly penetrant and autoso-
mal dominant AD: amyloid precursor protein (APP)
and presenilin 1 and 2 (PSEN1 and PSEN2). PSEN1
makes up 30 to 70%of familial EOAD (EOFAD); fol-
lowed by APP that accounts for 10–15% of EOFAD
cases; and lastly, by PSEN2 that accounts for less than
5% of all EOFAD [22, 23]. Mutations in APP causes
its aberrant processing and increased A42 secretion,
whereas mutations in PSEN1 or PSEN2 lead to aber-
rant cleavage of APP by -secretase, resulting in an
overproduction of A42 [16]. Overall, this leads to
the biological cascade causing the observed cogni-
tive defects in AD. The age of AD onset in PSEN1
mutation carriers is between 30 and 50 years old, 40 to
70 years in PSEN2, and 45 to 60 years in APP muta-
tion carriers. Atypical presentations such as language
impairment and behavioral symptoms such as delu-
sion, hallucinations, and apathy have been observed
in those with PSEN1 or PSEN2 mutations [22]. Cer-
tain APP mutations have also been linked to cases
of congophilic angiopathy [23], which can lead to
leukoencephalopathy, stroke-like episodes, hemor-
rhage, and cortical calcification [19].
Even though APP, PSEN1, and PSEN2 muta-
tions are the only ones definitively proven to cause
autosomal-dominant EOAD, the presence of an
APOE 4 allele has also been associated as a risk fac-
tor for typical AD and potentially reduces its age of
onset by roughly 10 years. It is not a necessary com-
ponent though since patients who typically exhibit
an atypical and early-onset AD course, exhibiting
focal cortical, non-memory impairments, and a more
aggressive progression, can develop AD even in the
absence of an APOE 4 allele [18]. Nonetheless,
patients who have APP, PSEN1, or PSEN2mutations
could also have a much earlier age of onset if they
possess an APOE 4 allele [23, 24].
Currently, people diagnosed with EOAD are given
the same treatment as those who have late-onset
Alzheimer’s disease (LOAD), given similarities in
pathogenesis and clinical features [19]. Only six
drugs are FDA-approved for the management of AD
symptoms; however, none of them stops disease pro-
gression [25], treats the underlying pathology, or
provides long-termbenefit [26].As such, several clin-
ical trials on different modes of treatment are being
undertaken to either provide additional long-lasting
relief from symptoms or treat the underlyingADneu-
ropathology. Among the treatment modalities being
investigated is DBS, a procedure wherein leads are
inserted into the brain region of interest to deliver
continuous electrical stimulation [27], with the hope
of ameliorating cognitive dysfunction. Currently,
DBS has regulatory approval for essential tremor,
Parkinson’s disease, dystonia, obsessive-compulsive
disorder, and epilepsy [28].
CLINICAL STUDIES ON DEEP BRAIN
STIMULATION FOR AD
The first experimental trial on DBS for AD was
performed in 1984 where the nucleus basalis of
Meynert (NBM) was stimulated. Although there was
no improvement in memory or cognition, preserved
cortical glucose metabolic activity in the left parietal
and left temporal lobes and partial arrest of deteri-
oration in the left frontal area were observed [29].
The next clinical trial was performed 26 years later
[1], and it was driven by a serendipitous discovery
in 2008 when DBS of the fornix to treat obesity
resulted to “deja vu-like” sensations during surgery
and improvements in episodic verbal and associative
memory after three weeks of stimulation [30]. The
2010 Phase I trial investigated DBS of the fornix in
six patients with early AD. Similar to the 2008 study,
two patients experienced autobiographical experi-
ential phenomena during surgery. In addition, after139
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12 months of continuous DBS, some patients were
reported to have improved memory and reduced cog-
nitive decline, reversed glucose metabolism [1], and
increased hippocampal volume [31]. Given that the
Phase I trial was considered to have proven the
safety of DBS of the fornix and showed metabolic
changes associated with it, a Phase II randomized,
double-blind, placebo-controlled, delayed-start trial
is currently being conducted in 42 subjects with mild,
probable AD. In this trial, half of the subjects will
not receive any stimulation while the other half will
receive continuous DBS stimulation for 12 months;
after which, all participants will receive stimulation
for 12 months [32]. Results of the first year of this
trial have already been published and indicate no sig-
nificant difference in cognitive scores between those
who received and those who did not receive stimula-
tion. However, stratifying participants based on age
showed that those who are <65 actually significantly
worsened after DBS for one year, whereas those
≥65 had a slight improvement in cognitive function.
In terms of safety, there were 145 and 117 non-
serious adverse events in patients that received and
did not receive stimulation, respectively. In addition,
nine serious adverse events for each participant sub-
group were reported. Serious adverse events include
those that lead to prolonged hospital stay, new hospi-
tal admission, disability, or death, such as infection,
lead repositioning, post-op nausea, depression, suici-
dal ideation, and worsening confusion. Non-serious
adverse events are predominantly general medical in
nature, followed by psychiatric events. Taking into
account the nature and extent of reported adverse
events, an independent data and safety monitoring
board concluded that the observed safety profile was
as expected with deep brain stimulation [3].
Aside from the aforementioned Phase I [1] and
Phase II trials [3] of fornix DBS in North Amer-
ica, several other case studies and trials of DBS for
patients with AD have been reported. A team in
France performed fornix DBS in a patient with mild
cognitive decline. After 12months of stimulation, the
patient’s cognitive performance reportedly stabilized,
and the patient also had increased mesial temporal
lobe metabolism [2]. Aside from the study done in
1984 [29], another trial of DBS of the NBM was
also performed by Kuhn et al. [4] where six patients
with mild to moderate AD received bilateral DBS.
Their study consisted of an initial one-month ran-
domized sham-controlled stimulation phase, where
two weeks of stimulation was followed by two weeks
without stimulation or vice versa, and a succeeding
11-month phase of continued open stimulation on
all patients. During the first month, mean Mini-
Mental State Examination (MMSE) scores improved
after two-weeks of stimulation compared to the
score after two weeks without stimulation. After
almost a year of stimulation, cognitive assessments
revealed slower disease progression when compared
to patients undergoing medication. In addition, some
patients exhibited increased temporal and amygdalo-
hippocampal glucose metabolism after almost a year
of stimulation. In terms of safety, the surgical proce-
dures were well tolerated, and the patients had fast
recovery and did not have significant stimulation-
induced untoward effects [4]. Kuhn et al. [5] then fur-
ther extended their study and performed continuous
DBS of theNBM in two patients who have an average
age younger than the average of those in the Phase
I trial and who both have lower baseline ADAS-Cog
scores. One participant deteriorated after 26 months
based on ADAS-Cog andMMSE scores, whereas the
other participant had a stable ADAS-Cog and even
improved MMSE score after 28 months. Hardenacke
et al. [33] then collated the results of the Phase I trial
[4] and that of the two new patients [5] and suggested
that NBM-DBS performed at a younger age and at an
earlier disease stage may favorably impact cognitive
functions and disease progression.
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON DBS
STUDIES ON PEOPLE WITH EOAD
Majority of the trials [1, 2, 4, 32] performed or
currently ongoing recruited patients who are less
than 65 years old, and thus could potentially have
EOAD. Given that DBS is an invasive procedure that
could lead to a number of neurologic and psychiatric
unwanted side effects [34], it is important to consider
ethical issues that may arise when performing it to
different patient subgroups, especially to individuals
less than 65 who might have certain mutations that
could lead to a more aggressive disease course [16].
Considerations for patient selection
Four out of six reported studies [1, 2, 4, 32] posted
recruitment details on the clinicaltrials.gov database
and described them in their papers (Table 1). From
this information, it is evident that five out of six
DBS for AD studies recruited a total of 19 partici-
pants <65, all of which have at least mild cognitive
impairment. This indicates an overrepresentation of
EOAD in the study population (32.7%) given that140
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only around 5.5% of people with AD have an early
disease onset [14]. Such overrepresentation of EOAD
patients might not have been deliberately made by
the authors and could have just been a result of better
success in recruiting and enrolling younger patients
due to their greater capacity to tolerate surgery [35]
and provide consent [36]. Furthermore, these studies
did not mention performing any family background
checks or genetic tests for APP, PSEN1, and PSEN2,
which makes it possible that a participant enrolled
could also have familial (EOFAD) or autosomal-
dominant EOAD (AD-EOAD). If one considers that
the proportion of autosomal dominant EOADpatients
among all EOAD patients is 13% [21], then it seems
likely that at least two patients (13% of 18 = 2.34)
with AD-EOAD have already participated in these
trials. Interestingly, patient 3 in the Phase I trial
of Laxton et al. [1] was below 65, had an aggres-
sive disease course prior to surgery based on MMSE
scores, and had theworst outcomepost-DBSbased on
MMSE scores. As such, patient 3 might actually have
a form of EOFAD or AD-EOAD; however, this can-
not be ascertained given that no family background
checks or genetic tests were presented in the report.
Considering that people <65 are being recruited in
DBS for AD studies, we suggest considerations and
adjustments in certain inclusion and exclusion criteria
when patients with EOAD are potentially recruited
in studies, especially those who have autosomal-
dominant EOAD.
First, since certain AD-EOAD patients could
exhibit atypical behavioral symptoms andDBS could
have unwanted psychiatric effects [34], recruited
EOAD patients should not have any major psychi-
atric disorder, especially those that increase the risk
of suicide, such as depression, schizophrenia, and
substance use disorders [37, 38]. Participants with
a history of and/or who were experiencing suici-
dal ideations at the time of recruitment should be
excluded in trials considering that suicidality is a
potential adverse event ofDBS [39–41]; patientswith
ADhave an increased risk of committing suicide [42];
and people with certain autosomal AD mutations
have a high risk of depression and disinhibition [43].
Of all the studies of DBS for AD, only two studies
[4, 32] specifically excluded patients who had previ-
ous suicide attempts or who have suicidal ideations.
Moreover, should appropriate consent be given to
employ genetic testing in patients with a family his-
tory of AD, careful counselling should be provided
to minimize the risks of increased suicidal ideation
from an untoward result. Proper tests and monitoring
should then be made to ensure that individuals with
positive results do not exhibit any suicidal tendencies
or ideations prior to commencing DBS surgery.
Second, potential adjustments in the required cog-
nitive profile and disease stage of recruited EOAD
patients should be made to account for its shorter
disease duration and more aggressive course, espe-
cially in participants who have autosomal-dominant
mutations [22]. In past and ongoing studies of DBS
for AD, some trials [1, 2, 32] only recruited patients
with mild AD, whereas Kuhn et al. [4] also included
thosewithmoderateAD. In terms of cognitive profile,
two studies [1, 32] recruited patients with a Clinical
Dementia Rating (CDR) of up to 1, two studies [1, 4]
recruited patients with MMSE as low as 18, and one
study [32] recruited patients that have an ADAS-Cog
11 score as high as 26. The inclusion of patients with
CDR, MMSE, and ADS-Cog 11 scores that already
signify cognitive decline beyond the mild cognitive
impairment stage [44] and at the start of the dementia
phase warrants serious consideration when patients
with EOAD are included in a study, given EOAD’s
more aggressive disease course [16]. Considering the
initial results of Laxton et al. [1] andHardenacke et al.
[33] showing that patients in an earlier disease stage
aremore likely to benefit fromDBS, there is a need to
modify the cognitive status cut-offs for participants
<65 participating in DBS for EOAD studies. EOAD
patients that have a CDR score >0.5, MMSE score
<23, and ADAS-Cog 11 score >18 [45], and possess
mutations predisposing them tomore aggressive cog-
nitive deterioration [22, 23] should not be included in
DBS studies unless more evidence has been gathered
regarding the efficacy of DBS in later AD stages.
Although the use of most biomarker data as diag-
nostic tools has not yet been approved clinically,
hippocampal volume, tau, andA cerebrospinal fluid
levels, and brain activity [46] could also be used
in conjunction with cognitive tests to ensure that
enrolled EOAD patients are at an early disease stage.
Third, it is important to consider the effect of
excluding or only including certain patient subgroups
based on participants’ cognitive, genetic, and/or
biomarker profile on the study’s external and inter-
nal validity and also to determine whether it violates
the clinical responsibility to provide patients access to
certain treatments [47]. Excluding participants with
EOAD or including only EOAD participants might
increase a study’s internal validity due to increased
subject homogeneity; however, such could also con-
sequently diminish a study’s external validity [48,
49]. Although preliminary trials on drugs and certain142
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interventions are often done on more homogeneous
populations as a result of relatively narrow selec-
tion criteria [50], participant recruitment for invasive
neurosurgical procedures such as DBS could be
extremely challenging, especially when highly strin-
gent selection criteria are employed [2]. As such,
recruiting an immensely homogeneous sample might
not be possible in the context of preliminary DBS
trials. Furthermore, trials including different popu-
lations for invasive procedures could provide better
knowledge of different subpopulations that could be
more responsive to treatments, provided that no sub-
population is significantly disadvantaged or harmed
by the intervention in accordance with the ethics
principle of Nonmaleficence [7, 51]. However, since
initial results from the Phase II fornix DBS trials sug-
gest that participants <65 could worsen from DBS
[3], excluding them from subsequent fornix DBS tri-
als, especially those with moderate AD, might be
warranted until subsequent in-depth analyses have
been made to ascertain if age is indeed the sole
causative factor associated with the observed decline
or if other variables such as genetic and cognitive
status actually better explain the variable effects of
treatment between different patient subgroups. This
further emphasizes the importance of obtaining addi-
tional information on genetic status and biomarker
information in participants so that those who are
either likely to benefit or are likely to be harmed by
DBS would be better and more precisely identified.
Given that DBS for AD has not been approved yet
by an established regulatory body (e.g., FDA) as a
standard of care and its application is still in the con-
text of clinical trials, denying access to it for certain
patient subgroups could not be considered as denial
of treatment.
Genetic vulnerability and informed consent
Since the corresponding clinical progression
resulting from certain AD-associated mutations has
already been recorded [23], making the correct
adjustments such as allowable time period to with-
hold treatment and frequency of monitoring for
patients with certain EOAD genetic subtypes would
be much better facilitated if detailed genetic informa-
tion is available. However, requiring genetic testing
for autosomal dominantADmutations in all or certain
trial participants raises its own set of ethical issues,
requires adjustments to the informed consent pro-
cess, and entails additional procedures that have to
be included in the trial (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Decision tree for providing informed consent and for
genetic testing in DBS trials including people with early-onset
Alzheimer’s disease. Solid boxes, lines, and arrows indicate sug-
gestions that must be minimally fulfilled. Dashed boxes, lines, and
arrows indicate optimum suggestions. 143
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First and foremost, even before having participants
sign an informed consent form, it is important for all
studies to assess their ability to consent using sys-
tematic or established measures of capacity [52, 53].
Participants who do not fully understand the risks of
the invasive neurosurgical procedure or the associated
uncertainty to benefit from the trial, given the limited
data from preliminary studies, should be excluded.
Second, should genetic testing be required, it
should be specified in the informed consent form
that participants will consent to the DBS surgery and
stimulation and all other pre- and post-clinical test-
ing, including genotyping of APP, PSEN1, PSEN2,
and/or APOE. The genotyping that will be per-
formed should be clearly indicated. Both patients
and immediate family members should be given
options to decide whether they would like to have
the results of the genetic tests disclosed or not.
Since approved prevention methods [54] and treat-
ment options for AD do not exist yet, there is no
obligation for deliberate disclosure of genetic test
results to participants and immediate familymembers
[55]. Nonetheless, pre-disclosure genetic counselling
using established guidelines [56, 57] should be pro-
vided to both patients and immediate familymembers
to allow them to better understand the implications of
results disclosure [58, 59], particularly on reproduc-
tive [60], insurance [61], and geriatric care planning
and also on potentially being able to access certain
clinical trials for those with autosomal dominant AD
[62]. Should patients and/or immediate family mem-
bers prefer to know results, further support in the form
of post-disclosure genetic counselling sessions could
be provided [57]. It should be emphasized that the risk
of inheriting amutation from a parent with autosomal
dominant AD is 50%, and immediate family mem-
bers who wish to undergo predictive genetic testing
themselves should be referred to a genetic counsellor,
neurologist, and psychologist/psychiatrist for further
evaluation and support [56, 63]. Consequently, since
payment for further testing and counselling sessions
would raise financial concerns [64] for those conduct-
ing the trial and/or those participating in it, the extent
of genetic counselling and compensation that will be
provided should be clearly indicated in the informed
consent form [51] to better allow family members
to decide on whether they would still prefer to be
informed of the results and understand potential lim-
itations in the support that they would be receiving
in the event of an unfavorable result. Finally, patients
who do not consent to genetic testing should not be
directly excluded from trials and should be offered
alternative options such as family history assessment
[65] for autosomal dominant EOAD risk estimation
and DNA banking [56] for potential genetic testing
after the patient’s death [66], with his or her consent.
Those who do not consent to such alternatives might
be given lower priority to participate in a trial.
Third, since a significant number of studies of
DBS for AD [4, 32] required the consent of fam-
ily members or caregivers, requiring genetic testing
could raise potential issues when the patient but not
the family members would consent to participation
in the trial and consequentially, genetic testing [55].
Although at the start of the trial, participants with
EOAD at a very early disease stage might still have
adequate ability to consent, they might eventually
need a caregiver when the disease rapidly progresses,
and as such, caregivers’ opinions and support on a
patient’s participation in a DBS trial [8] would be of
increasing importance in later trial stages. This high-
lights a potential dilemma when there are conflicting
opinions. The final decision on whether a participant
should participate in a DBS trial and have a genetic
test should then be made only after having a care-
ful and collaborative discussion with the researchers,
clinicians, family members, and the participant. If
there are still conflicting opinions after the delibera-
tion, we recommend that the decision of participants
who have adequate decision-making capacity at the
start of the trial be honored. Should the participant
want to undergo DBS and genetic testing, legal repre-
sentatives and advance research directives [7] should
also be determined and set by the participant prior to
DBS implantation.Given that several states and coun-
tries only allow consent on the subject’s behalf when
the patient has a legal status of incompetence [67],
legal representatives might have to make eventual
decisions on whether to continue DBS stimulation;
however, there might be a point prior to complete
incompetence when the capacity to consent is uncer-
tain and solely obtaining consent from caregivers
would not be the best option from an ethical per-
spective [68]. In such instances, researchers could
also seek assent from participants and exclude those
expressing dissent [7], which may be indicated by
signs or actions of frustration, unhappiness, discom-
fort, or passivity [69].
Disease progression and study design
Only two trials [4, 32] of DBS for AD have a
case-control design, albeit with different durations
in which stimulation was withheld from the control144
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group.WithholdingDBS for a long time from partici-
pantswith EOADmight not be justifiable considering
that DBS is an invasive procedure with potential
unwanted side effects [34, 70, 71], and people with
EOAD might have a more aggressive disease course
and higher mortality than LOAD [72]. It should
also be taken into account that although the Phase
I trial showed that patients who had milder cognitive
symptoms at the time of DBS initiation have seem-
ingly bettermetabolic and cognitive outcomes [1], the
Phase II trial indicated in its subgroup analysis that
participants <65 actually had worse cognitive scores
after stimulation for one year, whereas the opposite
was observed for those ≥65 [3]. Since results for
each individual participant <65 were not presented,
it is not yet known whether all of them experienced
decline after DBS or if it is only a few with other
characteristics such as lower cognitive profile ormore
advanced disease stage. In addition, it would be inter-
esting to know if combining the results for the five
participants <65 in the Phase I fornix DBS trial [1]
with the results for those <65 in the Phase II trial
[3] would still lead to the same observed differential
effect of DBS for this subgroup. Given such uncer-
tainty, it might be possible that some participants <65
could have also benefitted from the stimulation given
that some participants <65 in the Phase I trial [1]
had stabilized or improved cognitive scores following
DBS. For those <65 who might benefit from stimu-
lation and for the rest of participants who were in
the control group, withholding stimulation for a year
could potentially result to a loss of a significant num-
ber of time and treatment opportunities where their
cognition could still be stabilized. Although patients
will continue receiving medications for memory dur-
ing the period without stimulation, limiting them
from attaining any eventual potential benefit from
the surgery and even potentially causing them harm
should any untoward incident result from surgery or
stimulation would be unfair. On the other hand, for
those <65 wherein stimulation could be disadvanta-
geous, having a shorter stimulation time instead of
one year could have potentially allowed initial detec-
tion of the stimulation’s potential adverse effect, and
appropriate actions could have been taken to prevent
further harm in these patients.
The initial results of the Phase II trial also bring
into question whether the study design has to be
modified given that those <65 might be disadvan-
taged. It is important for Lozano et al. [3] to look at
individual patients who deteriorated the most in the
<65 stimulation group and see whether stimulation
might need to be stopped for them instead of allow-
ing them to continue to the one year open stimulation
phase. In addition, those who are <65 who were orig-
inally assigned to the control group and have similar
cognitive profiles as those who were most severely
disadvantaged by DBS might not need to participate
in the trial’s next phase and not receive any stimu-
lation given that these participants might actually be
harmed by it. Although these adjustments to the study
design could have some effect on the study’s power
if ever implemented, it is more important to protect
participants’ welfare, especially if there is convincing
evidence that their further participation could lead to
avoidable harms.
In terms of patient monitoring, studies usually
monitored performance in various cognitive and
neuropsychiatric tasks a month, three months, six
months, and a year after surgery. However, when
participantswith a potentiallymore rapid disease pro-
gression are included [23], more frequent monitoring
(bimonthly or monthly) should be implemented.
Given that those <65 who received stimulation for
one year in the Phase II trial had worse outcomes
than those who did not [3], much more frequent
monitoring would have allowed the initial detection
of this potential worsening and would have allowed
more data to be obtained to determine the rate of
disease progression and compare it with that prior
to stimulation or with historical controls. Moreover,
given that some people with AD-EOAD experience
atypical symptoms [19] such as behavioral impair-
ment, apraxia, and aphasia, stringent examination
and careful neuropsychiatric monitoring before and
post-implantation should be made to ensure that
any neuropsychiatric or motor attributes would not
be affected in a way that is detrimental to the
patient.
Potential trial outcomes
All the trials that have been completed [1, 2, 4]
and the Phase II trial [32] that is ongoing assessed
the efficacy of DBS using a cognitive test (MMSE,
ADAS-Cog, CDR, FCSRT); however, several studies
have also employedmeasurements of metabolism via
PET [1, 2, 4, 29, 32], brain activity through EEG [4],
and changes in hippocampal volume through MRI
[1, 32]. Some studies also assessed the participant’s
quality of life [1, 4, 32]. For the Phase I studies [3, 5],
results on the quality of life have been inconsistent
with an increase in some participants and a decrease
in others. For the Phase II trial, Holroyd et al. [32]145
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mentioned that they will be including the Quality of
Life – Alzheimer Disease measure [73]; however,
Lozano et al. [3] did not mention the result of this
test in the report they have published [9]. All studies
have also reported improved or preserved neurologic
activity in certain brain areas; however, the translata-
bility of these improvements to the trial participants’
quality of life and daily functioning has yet to be
adequately proven.
Although in general, the final pathophysiology in
EOAD and LOAD may be greatly similar, the ini-
tial disease progression and onset of EOAD and
LOAD might have some differences that could lead
to potentially variable outcomes during early disease
stages. For instance, EOAD patients have more pro-
nounced atrophy in neocortical areas as opposed to
LOAD patients wherein atrophy is more severe in the
hippocampus [74]. Moreover, EOFAD patients also
present with apraxia, aphasia, or dysexecutive syn-
drome [19]. As such, additional modes of assessment
should be performed in studies involving patients
with EOAD to determine how DBS affects these
cognitive domains and motor symptoms. It might
also be possible that EOAD patients might have a
different initial clinical outcome given that degener-
ation usually is not as prominent in the hippocampus.
Depending on the target region for DBS, the extent
of changes or duration of stabilization in cogni-
tive scores could differ between EOAD and LOAD
patients. Although the results of the Phase II trial
might indicate that fornix DBS could potentially
be disadvantageous for those <65 [3], such might
not necessarily be the case for NBM stimulation.
Given these, it is important to properly convey these
potential sources of differential DBS response to
EOAD patients, especially those with family his-
tory and mutation in APP, PSEN1, or PSEN2, so
that they will be more informed when they consent
to the procedure and also to increase the likelihood
that they will monitor the effects of stimulation on
these atypical symptoms once the trial has been
initiated.
Interpretation and communication of study
results
Results of preliminary studies are used to plan
the next stages of clinical trials [75]; however, they
should not be used to justify efficacy and safety
[75, 76] in a clinical setting. It is important that
trials should convey this in their discussion and con-
clusion to prevent creating false hype. In addition,
they should also highlight limitations in their
methodology that could have affected study results.
For example, Kuhn et al. [4] mentioned that it proved
impossible for them to precisely insert the elec-
trode in their preselected target due to degenerative
or pathological vascular alterations. Although they
mentioned this as a limitation of their study, they
should have reflected more on whether this limita-
tion would then make precise targeting of a desired
region in the NBM totally not feasible instead of
just concluding that DBS of the NBM is “techni-
cally feasible”. In addition, they also mentioned that
NBMDBS “apparently lacks significant stimulation-
induced untoward effects”; however, they mentioned
that one patient required lorazepam during the stim-
ulation phase without fully describing why and at
which exact points during the open stimulation phase
was the drug prescribed. Finally, it is important to
emphasize that the conclusion that DBS is “well
tolerated” and that “four out of six patients were
responders” should only be considered in the con-
text of deciding whether to do a subsequent clinical
trial in a proper and well-regulated research setting
and not allowing for NBM DBS to be performed on
anyone with AD in a clinical setting given that the
study’s limited sample size is inadequate to capture
a wide range of potential adverse events and derive
any statistically valid conclusion on the efficacy
of DBS.
Another important aspect in reports of trials is
for authors to completely report the results of all
statistical tests that they perform. In the results of
the Phase II trial [3], the observed difference in
results between those who received stimulation and
those who did not is much more dramatic for those
<65, whereas only slight improvements in cogni-
tive function were observed for those who are ≥65.
Although the authors mentioned the result of the sta-
tistical tests for the <65 group, they did not provide
p values for the ≥65 group for readers to deter-
mine the significance of the observed decline between
those who received and those who did not receive
stimulation.
Finally, it is important to consider that the 65
years cut-off point has no biological significance and
is mainly based on employment and retirement age
[15]. As such, it is crucial that further analysis for
the Phase II trial [3] should be performed based on
other factors such as disease stage, cognitive scores
at the start of the trial, and/or extent of AD pathol-
ogy based on biomarkers such as brain volume and
levels of tau and/or A in the cerebrospinal fluid [9,146
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46]. In addition, relating genetic data to treatment
outcomes could potentially allow for better explana-
tion of results obtained for those <65. It is possible
that those who were made worse off by DBS have
genetic mutations that result to a more aggressive
disease course [16], and these individuals are also
at a later disease stage at the trial onset. Report-
ing effects for participants having known mutations
might require presentation of individual de-identified
data to facilitate comparison of the rates of progres-
sion for individuals possessing mutations in known
genes and accurately determine if DBS might have
affected the rate of disease progression for these par-
ticipants. Although introducing other variables in the
analysis would add another level of complexity, they
could facilitate improved understanding of the factors
that affect DBS response, allowing better selection of
suitable participants in future trials. Caution should
be exercised in drawing conclusions thoughgiven that
analysis based on subgroups usually lacks adequate
power andmay yield false-negative results, unless the
initial trial power calculation significantly accounted
for eventual subgroup analysis [77].
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE
CONSIDERATIONS
Studies that conducted DBS in patients with AD
have not screened patients less than 65 years old for a
family history of EOAD; mutations in APP, PSEN1,
or PSEN2; or have APOE alleles that could affect
age of disease onset and potentially, rate of progres-
sion [78]. As such, participants who have a familial
or genetic AD that have a more aggressive disease
course might have been disadvantaged by trials in
terms of the employed study design and frequency of
monitoring.
Although we believe that larger studies on DBS
for EOAD should only be conducted after an exten-
sive positive appraisal of the long-term results of
the ongoing Phase II trial taking into account pre-
vious trials and relevant animal studies, we would
like to propose certain precautionary recommenda-
tions for potential trials in the future that would
include participants <65 (Table 2). First, in terms
of patient selection, EOAD patients who have psy-
chiatric disorders, suicidal ideations, and who are
Table 2
Recommendations for DBS clinical trials, especially those involving participants with EOAD, based on gaps in current and previous trials
and case studies
Clinical Trial Aspect Recommendations
Participant Selection • Exclude participants who have a major psychiatric disorder, suicide history, and suicidal ideations.
• Exclude participants beyond the mild cognitive impairment/ very mild AD stage (CDR score >0.5, MMSE
score <23, and ADAS-Cog 11 score >18).
• Use potential biomarker information to better estimate disease stage.
Genetic Testing • Test for mutations in APP, PS1, and PS2, and if possible, determine APOE alleles possessed (for research
purposes).
• Provide pre-test and post-disclosure genetic counselling to participants and their immediate family.
Informed Consent • Assess ability to consent using established measures of capacity.
• Request consent both for DBS and genetic testing.
• Offer alternative options such as DNA banking for those who do not wish to undergo genetic testing.
• Clearly indicate what counselling and predictive genetic testing will be performed and which services are
covered by the trial organizers.
• Collaborative decision making should be made in case of conflicting opinions; however, a participant’s
decision should be honored if he or she has adequate capacity to consent.
• Assign legal representatives and advance directives for participants.
• Incorporate patient assent and dissent in decision-making in later trial stages.
Trial Design • Initially assign a shorter stimulation period (<1 year).
• Stimulation might have to be discontinued in the event of evident cognitive decline from DBS.
• Monitor participants more frequently (monthly or bimonthly) and include assessments for atypical symptoms
in people with EOAD and for neuropsychiatric changes.
Outcome Measures • Include quality of life measurements in trials and report their results in publications.
• Include additional modes of assessment for atypical symptoms in people with EOAD.
• Acknowledge potentially variable outcomes between EOAD and LOAD participants and possibly different
effects of fornix and NBM DBS on different patient subgroups.
Reporting of Results • Realistically convey whether certain methodological limitations affect feasibility of DBS for particular
regions.
• Provide more specific details of adverse events and how they were addressed.
• Completely report results of all statistical tests.
• Analyze other variables that could result to different responses to DBS such as disease stage and genetic
status.
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already at the dementia phase should be excluded in
studies until results suggest that DBS might also be
effective in later AD stages. Second, genetic screen-
ing of patients <65 years old should be included
in trials; however, disclosure of results has to be
discussed with patients and relatives. Third, appro-
priate adjustments on the length of exposure to
trial arms, assessments performed, and frequency of
monitoring should be made to accommodate dif-
ferences in EOAD and LOAD should people <65
be included. Fourth, study results should be real-
istically conveyed and should be reported equally
regardless of the direction of the effect. Researchers
and the media should be careful not to hype up
results of preliminary studies to ensure that EOAD
patients volunteering to enroll in an experimen-
tal trial are fully informed and not just misled by
overly positive depictions of DBS for AD [79].
Finally and most importantly, collaboration between
basic researchers, neurologists, psychiatrists, neuro-
surgeons, genetic counsellors, ethicists, and other
aged care personnel should be established to set
a proper framework ensuring that patients with
EOAD are appropriately prepared and informed,
well-protected, unharmed, and are not deprived of
potential therapeutic benefits in future clinical trials
of DBS for AD.
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Abstract
Memory dysfunction and cognitive impairments due to Alzheimer’s disease can affect the self-
hood and identity of afflicted individuals, causing distress to both people with Alzheimer’s
disease and their caregivers. Recently, a number of case studies and clinical trials have been
conducted to determine the potential of deep brain stimulation as a therapeutic modality for
people with Alzheimer’s disease. Some of these studies have shown that deep brain stimulation
could induce flashbacks and stabilize or even improve memory. However, deep brain stimula-
tion itself has also been attributed as a potential threat to identity and selfhood, especially
when procedure-related adverse events arise. We anticipate potential effects of deep brain
stimulation for people with Alzheimer’s disease on selfhood, reconciling information from
medical reports, psychological, and sociological investigations on the impacts of deep brain
stimulation or Alzheimer’s disease on selfhood. A tripartite model of the self that extends
the scope of Rom Harre´’s and Steve Sabat’s social constructionist framework was used. In this
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model, potential effects of deep brain stimulation for Alzheimer’s disease on Self 1 or singu-
larity through use of first-person indexicals, and gestures of self-reference, attribution, and
recognition; Self 2 or past and present attributes, knowledge of these characteristics, and
continuity of narrative identity; and Self 3 or the relational and social self are explored. The
ethical implications of potential effects of deep brain stimulation for Alzheimer’s disease on the
tripartite self are then highlighted, focusing on adapting informed consent procedures and care
provided throughout the trial to account for both positive and negative plausible effects on Self
1, Self 2, and Self 3.
Keywords
Alzheimer’s disease, deep brain stimulation, memory, cognition, selfhood, identity
Introduction
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) affects at least 28 million people worldwide (Alzheimer’s
Association, 2015), causing significant impairments in memory, reasoning and executive
function, visuospatial abilities, language functions, and/or personality (McKhann et al.,
2011), in addition to significant emotional and physical burden to caregivers (Wright,
Doherty, & Dumas, 2009). With these, AD could influence the identity and selfhood of
affected individuals, both from their perspective and that of their family or caregivers
(Caddell & Clare, 2010). Currently, there is a surge in using deep brain stimulation
(DBS), a procedure that implants leads in the brain and a pulse generator in the chest to
provide electrical stimulation to a brain region of interest (Okun, 2012), to target symptoms
of AD (Fontaine et al., 2013; Kuhn et al., 2015; Laxton et al., 2010; Lozano et al., 2016).
Initial trial results suggest that DBS is safe and might have some positive effect on cognition
and memory for certain people with AD (Fontaine et al., 2013; Kuhn et al., 2015; Laxton
et al., 2010; Lozano et al., 2016), which could potentially restore altered selves due to the
disease. However, DBS itself has been associated with postoperative personality and psy-
chiatric changes (Appleby, Duggan, Regenberg, & Rabins, 2007; Gilbert, 2012, 2013;
Gilbert, Goddard, Vian˜a, Carter, & Horne, 2017), which could also influence a recipient’s
selfhood and identity.
Although there are a number of papers that have already explored the ethics of the
use of DBS in people diagnosed with AD (Ovadia & Bottini, 2015; Pierce, 2014; Siegel,
Barrett, & Bhati, 2017; Vian˜a, Bittlinger, & Gilbert, 2017; Vian˜a, Vickers, Cook, &
Gilbert, 2017), none has extensively investigated issues arising from its potential effect
on selfhood and identity, relating it to how AD already affects these aspects. Given this
gap in the literature, we explore the potential effects of DBS on the selfhood of people
with AD and their associated ethical implications using an extended version of the social
constructionist model (Harre´, 1991; Sabat & Collins, 1999; Sabat & Harre´, 1992), which
incorporates non-verbal components of selfhood and identity. In this revised tripartite
self model, Self 1 encompasses self recognition, referencing, and attribution; Self 2
includes physical and mental attributes, self-knowledge, and consistency of self narra-





References included in this article were obtained through a search on PubMed, Scopus, and
Google Scholar until 11 September 2017 using the keywords “Alzheimer’s disease”,
“dementia”, “deep brain stimulation”, “selfhood”, “social constructionist”, and “identity”
and their corresponding permutations and combinations. The references of highly relevant
articles were also examined to expand the search coverage and identify other articles related
to the initial keywords used. Primary studies and case reports that explored the impact of
AD on the social constructionist framework’s three aspects of the self were identified and
highlighted in this review. There were no studies that investigated the impact of DBS on
selfhood using the social constructionist framework, so relevant studies that discussed its
effects on self recognition and perception, psychological and psychiatric profiles, identity,
and social adjustment were referenced instead. Results from clinical trials of DBS in people
with AD were also obtained using this search strategy, mainly through the keyword “DBS
Alzheimer’s disease”. No specific period was set during the searches, and only articles that
are fully in or with abstracts in English (for a cited case report in Dutch) were included in
this manuscript.
AD and the self
Studies on the effect of AD on selfhood have mostly used the social constructionist model
(Caddell & Clare, 2010; Harre´, 1991; Sabat & Collins, 1999; Sabat & Harre´, 1992;) in which
three aspects of the self can be derived through interactions of people with AD with other
individuals or the interviewer. Self 1 is the experience of singularity or psychological con-
tinuity over time and can be determined by a person’s use of personal pronouns such as “I”,
“me”, “my”, and “mine” and/or gestures such as pointing to one’s self that index a person’s
unique and singular position in time and space. Self 2 refers to past and present physical and
psychological attributes, beliefs, and judgment of these attributes. Self 3 consists of the
persona that an individual displays socially, along with the attributes associated with that
particular role, as a result of co-creation with one or more individuals (Harre´, 1991; Sabat &
Collins, 1999; Sabat & Harre´, 1992).
Some studies report preservation of Self 1 in people with AD (Hedman, Hansebo,
Ternestedt, Hellstrom, & Norberg, 2013; Sabat, 2002; Sabat & Collins, 1999; Sabat &
Gladstone, 2010; Sabat & Harre´, 1992; Tappen, Williams, Fishman, & Touhy, 1999), where-
as others point to a potential loss, at least when measured by personal pronoun use (Fazio &
Mitchell, 2009; Small, Geldart, Gutman, & Clarke Scott, 1998). However, those who report
decreased or absence of personal pronoun use highlighted that people with AD were still
able to defend their rights in conflicts and call staff by their names, which could be inter-
preted as demonstrations of the integrity of the self via non-verbal behaviors and manners of
addressing people (Small et al., 1998). In addition, decreased usage of personal pronouns
could mainly be a result of cognitive and linguistic production deficits rather than an inabil-
ity to refer to one’s self (Fazio & Mitchell, 2009). Reports on AD’s effect on Self 2 have also
been equivocal. Although the social constructionist framework states that Self 2 cannot be
completely lost given that it consists of a person’s actual physical and mental attributes
(including the diagnosis of having AD) (Sabat, 2002; Sabat, Fath, Moghaddam, & Harre´,
1999), it can still be affected by AD in a number of ways. Several studies reported the
preservation of Self 2’s self-reflection aspect as demonstrated by knowledge of past
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attributes and acknowledgement of AD-associated deficits in language, movement, and
memory and of challenges in taking care of several aspects of personal and family life
(Hedman et al., 2013; Hedman, Hansebo, Ternestedt, Hellstr€om, & Norberg, 2014; Sabat,
2005; Sabat & Collins, 1999; Sabat & Harre´, 1992; Sabat et al., 1999). On the other hand,
there were reports of a person with AD mixing past and present events, and several indi-
viduals who did not recognize or even markedly deny their memory deficits (Sevush & Leve,
1993; Skaalvik, Fjelltun, Normann, & Norberg, 2016). Finally, with regards to Self 3, some-
one with AD might prefer to be regarded according to his/her previous roles or professions
rather than as someone suffering from AD (Sabat & Collins, 1999; Sabat & Gladstone,
2010; Sabat & Harre´, 1992; Sabat et al., 1999). However, the expression of certain social
selves might be limited due to healthy others limiting the social persona of a person with AD
to that of a ‘burdensome, dysfunctional patient’ (Sabat, 2002, 2003) and to malignant
positioning of healthy behaviors as dysfunctional and certainly due to the diagnosis
(Sabat, 2005; Sabat & Gladstone, 2010; Sabat & Harre´, 1992; Sabat et al., 1999; Sabat,
Napolitano, & Fath, 2004).
Although the social constructionist framework has been the most employed model in
studying the effects of AD on the self, other perspectives have also been used both in
quantitative and qualitative studies. Among them is the interactionist perspective, indicating
that the self is based on social constructs rooted in interactions with other people through
conversations and non-verbal behavior (Caddell & Clare, 2010). Employing this perspective,
Fontana and Smith (1989) noted that in certain people, the self is deteriorated to a point
that only internalized social norms, basic emotional needs such as affection, and manifes-
tations of selfishness remain in the person. Other qualitative studies employed the concept of
embodied selfhood, which sees the self as reflected in bodily actions such as appearance,
social etiquette, response to music, caring, politeness, and culture- and class-specific gestural
communication and behavior (Kontos, 2004, 2005); and investigated the ability of partic-
ipants to share personal narratives. These studies suggested that people with AD still have
manifestations of selfhood through awareness of their surroundings, interaction with other
people, and construction of an autobiographical memory-based narrative, albeit to varying
degrees and with some individuals demonstrating chronological fragmentation or omission.
Quantitative studies have utilized scales to evaluate the strength of identity in people with
AD; role identities from the person’s and family members’ perspectives; self-recognition
using mirrors, photographs, and videotapes; and knowledge of one’s name, job, and per-
sonality traits, which are compared with ratings from family members. Overall, these studies
show people with AD have a vaguer and weaker sense of identity; forget or place less
significance in role identities, especially occupational roles; recognize themselves less likely
in the mirror, videotapes, and recent photographs; and potentially, rate present attributes
and personality traits less accurately (Caddell & Clare, 2010).
Overall, results from psychological and sociological studies on people with AD suggest
that although selfhood is not completely lost in people with AD, several aspects of it can be
affected by the disease at different stages. Given the number of overlaps in different frame-
works used in qualitative and quantitative studies, other models can supplement and com-
plete Harre´’s (1991) and Sabat’s (2003) three aspects of the self to understand further the
impact of AD on selfhood, acknowledging both verbal and non-verbal components and
perspectives from the person with AD and his or her family and caregivers.
This extended version of the tripartite model of the self incorporates non-verbal forms of
expression (Fontana & Smith, 1989), interactionist and embodied selfhood perspectives
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(Kontos, 2004), and frameworks employed by quantitative studies (Caddell & Clare, 2010).
Self 1 is now associated with personal pronoun use; subjective feelings, such as the feeling of
being one’s self; gestural actions that indicate singularity such as pointing to self, positioning
of the body properly in space, and personal grooming; and self-recognition in front of a
mirror (after acknowledgement of facing a mirror and in the absence of visual dysfunction).
Self 2 encompasses actual past and present physical and mental attributes; awareness of
these characteristics and their projection in day-to-day behavior outside social situations;
and the general consistency of these descriptions over time and similarity with descriptions
of family members and/or caregivers. We acknowledge that Self 2 cannot be completely lost
in dementia or due to any other condition or intervention because the physical and mental
changes they bring add to and become part of an individual’s Self 2 (Sabat, 2005; Sabat
et al., 1999). However, we aim to highlight other aspects of Self 2 that might be affected by
AD or DBS and have relevance to caregivers, such as consistency of descriptions of physical
and mental attributes and their portrayal in day-to-day life—aspects that can be measured
through interviews with the person and his/her caretakers for a period of time and can be
related to the severity of the disorder or parameters of the stimulation. Finally, Self 3
includes how a person acts socially or expresses values indicative of his/her past or present
social role/(s) and positioning, and also how others interact with the person over time and
whether or not that is consistent with the social role that he/she portrays. Although we
acknowledge that this social role is co-created with the way others treat the person with AD
(Sabat, 2003; Sabat et al., 1999) and that malignant social positioning can limit and nega-
tively affect social relations (Kitwood, 1990), we do not discount the effects of neuropath-
ological changes on cognition and behavior on how a person with AD acts in social
situations (Cosentino et al., 2014; Rafii et al., 2014).
DBS for AD
Currently, two brain regions have been targeted to investigate if DBS leads to cognitive
stabilization or improvement in people with AD. Some studies targeted the nucleus basalis
of Meynert (NBM) (Kuhn et al., 2015; Turnbull, McGeer, Beattie, Calne, & Pate, 1985), the
main cholinergic structure in the basal forebrain and is one of the structures severely
atrophied in AD (see Liu, Chang, Pearce, & Gentleman, 2015 for an extensive review;
Whitehouse, Price, Clark, Coyle, & DeLong, 1981; Whitehouse et al., 1982). The other
region being targeted is the fornix, a white matter bundle connecting the hippocampus to
the hypothalamus, nucleus accumbens, and septal nuclei (Oishi & Lyketsos, 2014). Phase I
and Phase II trials have been/are being conducted in North America and France and have
implanted 49 people with AD in total (Fontaine et al., 2013; Laxton et al., 2010; Lozano
et al., 2016). These trials have been mainly driven by a serendipitous discovery on induced
flashbacks and memory improvement in a person treated with hypothalamic/fornix DBS for
obesity (Hamani et al., 2008).
A number of these DBS studies reported participants experiencing flashbacks of actual
memories during in-surgery stimulation (Hamani et al., 2008; Laxton et al., 2010; Lozano
et al., 2016) and also improvement or stabilization of scores in cognitive tests evaluating
short-term memory, verbal fluency, object naming, and spatial and temporal awareness
(Fontaine et al., 2013; Hamani et al., 2008; Kuhn et al., 2015; Laxton et al., 2010;
Lozano et al., 2016). Interestingly, flashbacks have been observed in both people with
and without AD. For instance, in the study that led to the Phase I and Phase II clinical
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trials of fornix DBS for AD, Hamani et al. (2008) described that the person treated with
DBS for obesity,
Reported the sudden perception of being in a park with friends, a familiar scene to him. He felt
he was younger, around 20 years old. He recognized his epoch-appropriate girlfriend among the
people. He did not see himself in the scene, but instead was an observer. The scene was in color;
people were wearing identifiable clothes and were talking, but he could not decipher what they
were saying. As the stimulation intensity was increased from 3.0 to 5.0 volts, he reported that the
details in the scene became more vivid. (Hamani et al., 2008)
The Phase I trial report also indicated that during in-surgery stimulation,
Two of the 6 patients reported stimulation-induced experiential phenomena. Patient 2 reported
having the sensation of being in her garden, tending to the plants on a sunny day with stimu-
lation. In her case, this sensation outlasted the stimulation by several seconds. At certain con-
tacts and settings, there was a pleasurable, warm sexual sensation that was clearly time-locked
with the application of electrical stimulation. With stimulation, Patient 4 reported having the
memory of being fishing on a boat on a wavy blue colored lake with his sons and catching a large
green and white fish. On later questioning in both patients, these events were autobiographical,
had actually occurred in the past, and were accurately reported according to the patient’s
spouse. (Laxton et al., 2010)
Although some participants experienced memory improvement or stimulation-
induced flashbacks, a few of them also experienced adverse psychiatric events such as con-
fusion, depression, and suicidal ideations. In the Phase II trial, participants <65 who were
stimulated also experienced, on average, much faster cognitive decline than those who did
not receive stimulation for one year (Lozano et al., 2016; Ponce et al., 2016).
These observations mirror the work of Wilder Penfield, who reported experiential phe-
nomena induced by stimulation of certain regions in the temporal lobe in people undergoing
surgery for epilepsy (Penfield & Perot, 1963). For instance, they reported that:
As soon as the current was turned on, the patient exclaimed in great surprise, “Yes, Doctor, yes,
Doctor! Now I hear people laughing—my friends in South Africa.” He was asked if he could
recognize who these people were, and he replied, “Yes, they are two cousins, Bessie and Ann
Wheliaw.” . . . This was a real experience and he was very surprised that he seemed to be with his
friends back in South Africa which he had left about a month previously. (Case 38, 22-year-old
man; Penfield & Perot, 1963)
However, novel issues arise with DBS in people with AD considering the vulnerable pop-
ulation being targeted due to their cognitive dysfunction, which may affect their capacity to
consent; the progressive neuropathology and neurological damage caused by b-amyloid
plaques and neurofibrillary tangles; the long-term nature of the stimulation; the region
being stimulated; and the goal of the stimulation. Whereas Penfield and Perot (1963) per-
formed cortical stimulation to mainly locate the epileptic focus, the studies on DBS for
people with AD performed it on deeper structures (fornix or NBM) to determine if DBS
could address the cognitive dysfunctions experienced as a result of AD and if successful in




DBS has been attributed by a number of people with Parkinson’s disease (PD) to affect their
own self-concept and to even lead to estrangement. For instance, some people experienced
strangeness from the absence of motor symptoms; loss of vital force and aim in life; per-
sistence of anticipatory thoughts on potential eventual motor problems; and an impression
of a dehumanized and device-dependent body. Some people even perceived themselves post-
surgery as an electric doll, a Robocop, or someone under remote control (Agid et al., 2006;
Gilbert et al., 2017). Though these feelings could be a logical reaction to having a brain
implant and also to the sudden disappearance of motor symptoms, which have affected
people with PD for a long time, they could also be a result of the stimulation itself, the
surgery performed, and/or accompanying adjustments in medication (Gilbert et al., 2017).
Aside from feelings of self-estrangement, there have been reports on the psychological
and psychiatric effects of DBS for PD. For instance, amplification or decompensation of
previously existing psychiatric disorders was observed, in addition to aggravation of per-
sonality traits related to lack of motivation, irritability, poor judgment, apathy, and vul-
nerability to pressure. There have been accounts of emotional hyperreactivity (Houeto et al.,
2002), extroversion and a change in political affiliation (Mathews, Bok, & Rabins, 2009),
development of a permanent manic state (Leentjens, Visser-Vandewalle, Temel, & Verhey,
2004), hypersexuality (Herzog et al., 2003), and stimulation-induced dissociative response
(Goethals, Jacobs, Van der Linden, Caemaert, & Audenaert, 2008). As such, DBS for PD
and other psychiatric conditions in which it is being tested could lead to unanticipated and
negative psychological and psychiatric effects, which could not only threaten a person’s
identity but could also lead to diminution of agency.
DBS also has an impact on social relations of people with PD. General motor improve-
ment from DBS did not guarantee proper social adjustment, or even resulted to impairment
in certain individuals (Agid et al., 2006; Houeto et al., 2002; Schupbach et al., 2006). Some
people reported lack of energy and wanting their spouses to just stay at home and care for
them, whereas others exhibited sexually deviant and uncharacterized behaviors (Gilbert,
2017). On the other hand, dramatic motor improvements led to some individuals no
longer wanting to become a dependent husband or wife and becoming more outgoing
and independent, which resulted to some spouses having difficulties in giving up their
roles as a caregiver and behaving as an equal partner rather than as a nurse (Schupbach
& Agid, 2008). Other people developed novelty-seeking activities such as gambling and
leisure tourism (Houeto et al., 2002). There have also been reports of people giving second-
ary importance to work, either as a result of realizing overinvestment in work pre-DBS to
demonstrate competence in spite of PD or having less ability to concentrate in tasks (Agid
et al., 2006), which could lead to decreased productivity and professional conflicts.
DBS for AD: Effects on the tripartite self
Self 1: Self-recognition, attribution, and referencing
Studies on DBS for AD are very preliminary, mainly focusing on cognitive and safety
outcomes. None of them have performed in-depth interviews (Agid et al., 2006; Gilbert
et al., 2017; Houeto et al., 2002). As such, there is no empirical information available to
determine whether people with AD who received DBS also experience self-estrangement.
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Almost all of the people enrolled are in an early to moderate stage of dementia, and as such,
most of them potentially still have the capacity for self-recognition (Biringer & Anderson,
1992), although this was not measured in DBS for AD studies. Given that those at an earlier
stage of AD could potentially better benefit from DBS (Laxton et al., 2010), the effect of
DBS on diminished self-recognition will less likely be determined until this intervention has
been approved for use in a wider population and in later stages of AD. Fornix DBS has also
been shown to improve verbal memory (Hamani et al., 2008), which could potentially
increase language use and thus, the use of first-person pronouns. However, simple increase
in the use of first-person pronouns should not be treated as an increase in awareness of
Self 1. Instead, the proportion and rate of first-person pronoun use (Fazio & Mitchell, 2009)
should be employed to determine whether there is indeed an increase in self-ascription, in
addition to the context in which they are used. Mere increase in the utterance of “I” should
not easily be counted as a gain in the expression of Self 1 in the absence of its use to specify
location, time, and/or responsibility (Harre´, 1991). Moreover, the impact of improvement in
ability to self-ascribe using first-person pronouns should be related to a potential increase in
autonomy and independence and an improved ability to convey thoughts, emotions, pref-
erences, and desires.
There is also no available information on whether DBS in people with AD leads to
statements such as “I’m under remote control” (Agid et al., 2006), or “I wasn’t me”
(Gilbert et al., 2017). Given that some individuals with AD state “I have lost myself”
when unable to progress with certain tasks (Maurer, Volk, & Gerbaldo, 1997), it remains
to be determined whether DBS will aggravate this self-estrangement or if potential menory
and cognitive improvements would allow individuals to “regain” themselves. The extent to
which people with AD would be further estranged or would no longer feel estranged would
largely depend though on initial perception of the disease, the extent of cognitive improve-
ment, and on other unanticipated adverse psychological and psychiatric effects of the inter-
vention. For instance, those who have dramatic memory improvements due to DBS could
actually no longer feel estranged by their selves suffering from dementia, allowing them to
return to their selves prior to dementia. The same could not be said for people who just
experience minimal improvements or cognitive stabilization. These individuals, along with
those who experience cognitive decline instead (Lozano et al., 2016), would potentially feel
as or even more estranged by AD. In addition, those who develop adverse psychiatric
events, such as delirium, depression (Lozano et al., 2016), or mania, could also have feelings
of deteriorative estrangement, which can be manifested in lack of control over their emo-
tions (Gilbert et al., 2017).
Self 2: Self-knowledge and identity continuity
In the revised tripartite model of the self, a person’s physical and mental attributes are still
important parts of Self 2 (Sabat & Collins, 1999), signifying that regardless of the extent of
AD or cognitive dysfunction, a portion of Self 2 remains intact. Nonetheless, this does not
mean that a person’s Self 2 is immune to reduced richness (Seidl, Lueken, Thomann, Geider,
& Schroder, 2011), fragmentation and petrification (Mograbi, Brown, & Morris, 2009), and
negative perception by the person and others as a result of cognitive deficits, especially if
they limit a person’s daily activities of living and prevents him/her from properly navigating




Possible deficits in Self 2 due to AD could affect the narrative continuity of affected
individuals, especially in the late stages where they fail to retrieve or encode recent memories
(Seidl et al., 2011). Although philosophers such as Thomas Reid have argued that narrative
continuity and ability to retrieve past memories are not essential components of selfhood
(Copenhaver, 2014), other researchers in neuroethics have highlighted the importance of
continuous personal narratives and psychological attributes in identity formation and main-
tenance (Klaming & Haselager, 2013; Schechtman, 2010). We subscribe that gaps or frag-
mentation in personal narratives and self-knowledge do not necessarily result to a loss of
Self 2, considering its innateness to a person; however, we believe that discontinuities in
narratives, a reduction in their richness, and diminished ability of self-assessment and self-
knowledge could negatively affect Self 2. How much the loss of a particular memory threat-
ens the Self 2 would be contingent on the emotional valence of the memory and their
relationship to attributes that a person deems central to his or her identity. Although
some people with AD who received DBS demonstrated positive changes in ADAS-Cog
and MMSE scores (Kuhn et al., 2015; Laxton et al., 2010; Lozano et al., 2016), which
might indicate increased intact recall leading to more correct answers in questions probing
for memory, word recognition, language, orientation, and/or attention (Folstein, Folstein,
& McHugh, 1975; Rosen, Mohs, & Davis, 1984), they do not necessarily mean that these
people could already properly reflect on their present attributes or remember details of their
past that would allow them to form a continuous narrative identity and adjust his/her
personality and behavior. Improvements in MMSE and ADAS-Cog results due to DBS
do not directly determine if a person with AD would suddenly be able to properly integrate
ongoing experiences with his or her past experiences and could then properly make appro-
priate and voluntary behavior and personality adjustments. In addition, these tests would
not be able to measure what “forgotten” past memories someone with AD will remember. If
DBS only allows a person with AD to resume integrating and acknowledging present
experiences but not recall memories “weakened” by AD, this could then create a memory
gap, which could be seen as a disruption to a continuous narrative identity. Furthermore,
there will be no way to retrieve experiences that have not been stored in the first place due to
anterograde amnesia prior to treatment. It is also important to note that severe anosognosia
in AD is actually associated with less severe depression (Starkstein, 2014), which might be
due to decreasing awareness of cognitive deficits (Mograbi & Morris, 2013). As such,
increased awareness of deficits in people with AD as a result of DBS-induced cognitive
improvements might actually result in depression (Bianchetti & Trabucchi, 1999), especially
if these improvements are just minimal or if the rate of cognitive worsening is just stabilized
or slightly decreased. On the other hand, if they are dramatic enough such as in the case
reported by Aquilina and Hughes (2006), wherein a person who had gone mute and had
significant cognitive dysfunction was able to speak fluently again and even do crossword
puzzles after taking a cholinesterase inhibitor, then this could lead to independence and a
more positive evaluation of mental attributes and thus, an improved Self 2.
Potential DBS-induced adverse psychological effects (Agid et al., 2006; Gilbert et al.,
2017; Houeto et al., 2002; Mathews et al., 2009), which could be seen as additional threats to
the narrative continuity aspect of Self 2 (Klaming & Haselager, 2013; Schechtman, 2010),
could also affect an already damaged Self 2 due to AD, albeit in varying ways. For instance,
if a person who was initially depressed as a result of AD suddenly becomes manic as a result
of DBS, then this might result in further disruptions in his or her narrative identity.
However, this might depend on the person’s personality prior to the onset of dementia.
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Someone who is already energetic pre-AD would not really feel much discontinuity from
DBS-induced elevated mood as opposed to someone who has been a shy and reserved
person prior to AD. In fact, a pre-AD energetic person might even find these side effects
as allowing him or her to express his/her true authentic self (Nyholm & O’Neill, 2016),
which was “robbed off” by AD. Although someone who was previously shy even before AD
might feel a sense of discontinuity, the extent of discontinuity would depend on how positive
or negative does that individual sees being energetic as. If it is highly valued and seen as
positive, the person might easily reconcile with this discontinuity, see it as empowering, and
even feel elated, easily accommodating the newly acquired trait. It has to be emphasized
though that a manic state post-DBS experienced by an individual might be authentic,
acceptable, and preferable for him/her (Kraemer, 2013), but it does not necessarily suggest
that his/her family and friends would also find that state desirable and authentic (Thomson
& Segrave, 2017). These are hypothetical situations as no qualitative study investigating
these phenomenon has been done in people with AD who underwent DBS; however,
highlighting different scenarios is important in helping manage the expectations of trial
participants on the potential consequences of participating in a DBS trial.
Fornix DBS has also evoked autobiographical memories in certain individuals (Hamani
et al., 2008; Laxton et al., 2010; Lozano et al., 2016); however, it is unclear if these memories
are those that someone can still fully recall and relive even in the absence of stimulation, or if
they are forgotten memories, potentially due to AD, allowed to be accessed again and
brought back to reminiscence by DBS. If these are memories that the person could still
recall, replaying them might not really have profound consequences. However, if the evoked
experiential phenomena are memories no longer accessible to the person with AD, DBS
might actually positively impact Self 2 by allowing people to regain pieces of lost narratives
and thus achieve better narrative continuity. This would also have a positive impact to
caregivers and family members (Haahr, Kirkevold, Hall, & Østergaard, 2013). The content
and emotional salience of the evoked memories should be greatly considered though. For
instance, remembering the birth of a grandchild would have more significance rather than an
evoked memory of just eating alone in an aged care facility. However, being reminded of a
repressed traumatic memory such as an incident of abuse during childhood could potentially
have negative effects on an individual. Although studies on the use of DBS in people with
AD (Fontaine et al., 2013; Kuhn et al., 2015; Laxton et al., 2010; Lozano et al., 2016) have
not mentioned any stimulation-induced traumatic or negative experiential phenomenon, one
of Penfield’s patients had a negative or threatening experiential hallucination during in-
surgery stimulation (Patient 3). That patient suddenly saw robbers with guns coming at
him; however, this was not an actual past experience but rather a fantasy drawn from
reading a comic book (Penfield & Perot, 1963). The difference in the region stimulated
and the parameters might have an influence; however, the possibility of a negative and
distressing experiential phenomenon should not be disregarded.
Self 3: Relational identity and social positioning
The actual impact of DBS for AD on participants’ social adjustment remains to be deter-
mined since none of the performed studies on DBS for AD have utilized a Social
Adjustment Scale measure similar to what studies on PD have employed (Agid et al.,
2006; Houeto et al., 2002; Paykel, Weissman, Prusoff, & Tonks, 1971). However, it is pos-
sible to anticipate the potential impact of DBS in the Self 3 of people with AD based on
10 Dementia 0(0)
160
differences in people with AD and PD. First, most DBS for AD trial participants are in the
mild to moderate stages of dementia, and as such, still retain functional capacity and ability
to engage in certain social roles as opposed to those with PD who might be severely disabled
by their motor symptoms. Certain functional capacities and an ability to engage in certain
social roles might even be retained in severe disease stages in AD (Kontos, 2004; Sabat et al.,
1999), albeit to varying degrees depending on the extent of brain pathology and the existence
of malignant positioning by others (Kitwood, 1990; Sabat & Gladstone, 2010; Sabat et al.,
1999). Since DBS has not been tested in people with severe AD, it is not yet known how
dramatic and enduring will the cognitive improvements be. Regardless of disease stage, it is
vital to highlight that an important aspect of Self 3 is the way others treat the person with
AD, which fundamentally creates the social identity that he/she projects, underscoring the
influence of caregiver expectations post-DBS on the ability of a person with AD to express
certain social selves. Second, the average age of DBS for AD recipients is also much older
than those who usually receive DBS for PD (Agid et al., 2006; Lozano et al., 2016). Majority
of people with AD who underwent DBS surgery are greater than 65, and as such, might have
already retired from work and no longer have professional commitments (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016). For those who no longer have active
professional commitments and have already retired, potential adverse effects in professional
relations due to people giving secondary importance to work after DBS in people with PD
(Agid et al., 2006) might not be encountered.
Considering the aforementioned differences, the effects of DBS on the familial and pro-
fessional Self 3 of someone in early-stage AD might not be as dramatic as in those who are
in PD, especially for people with mild to moderate AD. Cognitive improvements from DBS,
especially if they are not dramatic, in people with mild AD might not result to regaining of
functionality that is as pronounced as in PD. If DBS just reduces the rate of cognitive
decline, people with AD might not even feel the effects of the treatment and might even
continue to experience cognitive decline, albeit at a slower rate. However, the extra time that
DBS affords these individuals could actually allow them to be more confident in living up to
their present roles and function optimally for a longer period of time. For instance, a
grandmother would still be able to read story books for her grandchildren and answer
questions from them, or an academic would be able to teach and write papers for a
longer period of time. For people in late stages of AD, it can only be hypothesized that
the effect of DBS on someone’s social confidence would largely be contingent on how
dramatic cognitive improvements it could cause are. If they are large enough for someone
to regain communication, executive, and navigation skills, then it would also be possible for
these individuals to pursue novel things and resume past activities, similar to the case of
Mrs. G who was mute but started to talk again and verbally interact with other people as a
result of dramatic cognitive improvements from a cholinesterase inhibitor (Aquilina &
Hughes, 2006). These might result to a similar situation for those with PD wherein a gain
of independence has affected someone’s dependence on his/her spouse or children, conse-
quently affecting marital and familial relations.
Although some social issues relate to people feeling overly empowered post-DBS, other
individuals feel the inability to properly resume normal activities due to the negative con-
sequences of PD on the person’s life and the burden/pressure attached to being “normal”
once again (Agid et al., 2006; Gilbert, 2012). The initial damage done by AD on an indi-
vidual’s life, especially on his social relations, could also lead to problems in social adjust-
ment. Cognitive deficits in people with AD could make them feel unable to socially
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demonstrate attributes they had in their careers (Sabat, 2002) and when coupled by stigma-
tizing and discriminating attitudes of people towards them (Baylis, 2013; Werner, 2008),
could inevitably result in them less likely to engage in social situations. These feelings might
persist even after DBS, especially when the stimulation does not really result to improve-
ments but rather just stabilizes cognition or decreases the rate of cognitive decline. In
addition, even if there are significant improvements, some people with AD might still find
it difficult to discard the pathology from their self-image (Gilbert, 2012) and still feel inse-
cure when in social situations. Expectations by family members would also play a great role
in the social selves that people with AD portray. If after DBS, other people would treat the
DBS recipient as someone who is more “capable”, though AD might not have necessarily
incapacitated him or her and these perceptions of incapacity are just due to malignant
positioning, the person would be given more opportunities to express his/her Self 3 and
better enrich his/her social life. The possibility of too high expectations is also possible and
could lead to social adjustment issues, especially when spouses of people with AD would
potentially reject them following DBS, thinking that DBS would allow the person with AD
to return to a life prior to disease onset (Agid et al., 2006). Although spouses might expect
restoration of independence in people with AD, cognitive improvements might not be dra-
matic enough to regain normal function. This could lead to undue pressures to the person
with AD and could even make them feel a diminished Self 3 due to their inability to fulfill
the expectations of their wives, children, and/or caregivers. Furthermore, this might result to
reduced care and monitoring due to a misled sense of belief that DBS in people with AD is
an actual therapy that leads to improvements in cognition rather than an experimental
intervention.
Ethical implications for consent and care
Several international recommendations and standards such as The Helsinki Declaration, the
Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) International Ethical
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subject, the Oviedo Convention on
Human Rights and Biomedicine, and the 2001/20/European Commission Clinical Trials
Directive emphasize the need for protection of vulnerable subjects, especially those with
limited capacities to consent (Duguet & Boyer-Beviere, 2011). Significantly greater protec-
tions should be provided for vulnerable research participants in studies where the possible
harm is greater than those encountered in their everyday life, in addition to ensuring that the
study has potential direct benefit to the participants (Beattie, 2007). Considering the cog-
nitive deficits in people with AD that could limit their ability to provide fully informed
consent (Cahill & Wichman, 2000) and the risks associated with DBS (Patel et al., 2015), the
informed consent process for DBS in people with AD has to be adapted to ensure maximal
understanding of involved parties while acknowledging potential limitations in the ability of
people with AD to fully comprehend the trial procedure. Furthermore, the potential iatro-
genic harms on the use of DBS in people with AD raise serious ethical concerns, beyond
bodily harms associated with safety concerns and potential impacts on a recipient’s psycho-
logical life and existence. This highlights the relevance of the tripartite model of selfhood in
ensuring that the physical, mental, and social well-being of participants are well-protected
and that their selfhood is acknowledged and honored before, during, and even after the trial,
in line with the bioethical principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, and respect for auton-
omy (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013).
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Given that Self 1 can be intact in people with AD, as demonstrated by the use of first-
person indexicals (Hedman et al., 2013; Sabat, 2002; Sabat & Collins, 1999; Sabat &
Gladstone, 2010; Sabat & Harre´, 1992; Tappen et al., 1999) and gestures that refer to
one’s self (Kontos, 2004), the opinions of people with AD regarding trial participation
should always be considered. Even if they have been assessed to have limited capacity to
consent using standardized measures of capacity assessment (Grisso, Appelbaum, Mulvey,
& Fletcher, 1995; Marson, Ingram, Cody, & Harre´ll, 1995), their assent should still be
obtained and any consistent manifestations of dissent should be honored (Siegel et al.,
2017). There should be no way that only a legally assigned representative (LAR) or a
surrogate’s decision be adequate in trial participation; however, their consent also has to
be obtained for a person with AD to be enrolled in a DBS trial. Double informed consent
(Beck & Shue, 2003) would ensure that there will be someone to eventually make fully
informed decisions once the participant’s capacity to make well-informed judgments has
been compromised, especially with DBS trials that can run for up to four years (Lozano
et al., 2016). It is however important that the person providing the second consent also has
adequate decision-making capacity. Finally, we recommend that people with AD who do
not have adequate capacity to consent or do not have another person to provide additional
consent should not be included in clinical trials on DBS for AD (Vian˜a, Bittlinger, et al.,
2017). This would ensure that should someone with AD who is undergoing DBS reaches a
stage where his/her abilities to consistently and properly use first-person indexicals, indic-
ative of acknowledgement of his/her social position as an autonomous decision-maker, have
been diminished (Fazio & Mitchell, 2009; Small et al., 1998), a close family member, care-
taker, or LAR is available to appropriately indicate the person’s preferences (based on what
they know of the person’s past autonomous choices) and act as an extension of the person’s
Self 1.
Although Self 2 may not be lost due to AD, it can be negatively affected should DBS
induce adverse psychiatric events that might disrupt a person’s psychological continuity—in
a deteriorative and distortive way (Gilbert et al., 2017). Furthermore, cognitive deficits due
to AD might further impair the capacity of a person with AD to make fully informed and
carefully evaluated decisions in later stages of the trial. Both possibilities highlight the need
for the issuance of advance directives upon enrollment in the trial and also the assignment
by the patient of an LAR or a surrogate-decision maker, who knows the participant’s
preferences and could make decisions that would uphold them. Given that the intervention
itself might result to unwanted changes in the Self 2, these should be relayed to the partic-
ipant during the informed consent procedure, in addition to the outcomes that the trial aims
to evaluate. However, most informed consent procedures under-emphasize potential adverse
effects of the intervention on social function and selfhood and just present immediate and
long-term medical risks. Informed consent procedures could be augmented in a way that
presents both known medical risks, risks of unknown prevalence, unknown risks (Lipsman,
Giacobbe, Bernstein, & Lozano, 2012; Maslen et al., 2018), and hypothetical risks. These
hypothetical risks, such as the recollection of traumatic childhood memories during in-
surgery stimulation (Penfield & Perot, 1963) or deteriorative feelings of powerlessness
that have been correlated with self-harms (Gilbert, 2013; Gilbert et al., 2017), can be deter-
mined from interventions that have a great degree of similarity to the one being evaluated
(DBS for PD, cortical stimulation). It is also advised that the informed consent procedure be
performed by an external party to minimize the influence of the study doctors on the deci-
sion of the person with AD and his or her family to participate in the trial, in addition to
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involving people such as social workers to help evaluate and relay potential impacts of DBS
to the research participant and his/her family members (Glannon, 2010). Finally, consider-
ing that certain adverse events, such as recollection of traumatic memories or threatening
situations (Penfield & Perot, 1963), emergence of psychiatric symptoms and feelings of loss
of control or powerlessness (Gilbert, 2013, 2015; Gilbert & Vian˜a, 2018, in press; Gilbert
et al., 2017), and accelerated cognitive decline (Lozano et al., 2016), could arise and could
negatively affect a person’s Self 2, proper counseling strategies, frequent monitoring, and
adequate support and care should be provided all throughout the trail and for a certain
period after the trial.
Finally, trials should ensure that participants are not just delegated as mere participants
or patients but rather be allowed to express themselves as research collaborators, facilitating
the respect and enrichment of their Self 3 (Sabat, 2003). Participants should be involved in
discussions regarding trial participation, consulted regarding potential changes in the pro-
tocol, and informed of the results once the trial is finished. Furthermore, qualitative and
quantitative measures of social function should be incorporated as outcomes (Agid et al.,
2006; Houeto et al., 2002; Kitwood, 1990; Paykel et al., 1971; Sabat & Gladstone, 2010),
given their importance in a participant’s everyday functioning. Caregivers should also be
briefed and provided adequate information regarding certain psychosocial effects as a result
of DBS to allow proper adjustment, prevent malignant psychology, and also minimize
therapeutic misconceptions (Siegel et al., 2017) that might lead to hyper-inflated expect-
ations. These information should not only be brought up during the informed consent
procedure, but they should also be consistently relayed all throughout the trial. In the
event that stimulation results to drastic effects that trample with the person’s dignity and
cause significant distress and confusion, adequate care and support should be provided at all
times to acknowledge the person’s pre-existing social role and allow him/her to still project
and create preferred Selves 3. Honoring the person’s intact capacities and personhood
(Kitwood, 1990) could help promote a degree of independence and help maintain compe-
tence to make autonomous decisions that are in his/her best interests.
Conclusions
Overall, we used an extended tripartite model of the self grounded on Harre´’s (1991) and
Sabat’s (2002) social constructionist framework to hypothesize the potential impacts of DBS
on the selfhood of people with AD using information from clinical trials and case reports.
We acknowledge that the three “selves” we proposed are not mutually exclusive and actually
have several overlaps. For instance, an intact Self 1 is needed in order to be able to reflect on
one’s personal attributes (Self 2) and exhibit them in appropriate social situations (Self 3). In
addition, we also do not intend to speculate on whether the overall selfhood, Self 1, Self 2, or
Self 3 is lost in people with AD who receive DBS as we see each aspect of the self as further
divided into distinct components that actually exist as a continuum rather than as a binary
entity, with the effects of DBS and AD highly contingent on the disease stage, extent of
improvement, potential treatment-associated adverse effects, and social positioning by
others.
By highlighting three aspects of the self and multiple dimensions of each aspect, we hope
to have provided a critical overview and examination of the possible impacts of both AD
and DBS on individuals and have emphasized the need for a multi-perspective and multi-
disciplinary approach towards understanding the concept of selfhood. Furthermore, the
14 Dementia 0(0)
164
ethical recommendations we have provided would be applicable not only to existing and
future trials employing DBS in people with AD, but also to other forms of invasive and non-
invasive interventions. Examining ethical issues for an intervention through its potential
effects on Self 1, 2, and 3 of a person with AD acknowledges that AD is not only a disease of
the brain and cognition, but is a disorder that has a rich social dimension that needs to be
taken into account when designing and conducting a clinical trial.
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Chapter Seven. Extending the Neuroethical Discussion and Moving Forward 
 
I. A Multi-Level and Interdisciplinary Approach Towards Elucidating Ethical Issues 
 
 Interdisciplinarity is one of the key features and driving forces of neuroscience, from 
the formalization of the first neuroscience institutes and establishment of dedicated 
organizations such as the Society for Neuroscience (SfN) and the International Brain Research 
Organization (IBRO) (Sabbatini & Cardoso 2002) to the present endeavours in broadening and 
deepening the understanding of brain processes and the way they result to consciousness, 
cognition, and behaviour. By bringing together the expertise of people in biology, chemistry, 
physics, mathematics, computer science, engineering, and psychology, knowledge on how 
the brain works has vastly improved. Not only has there been interdisciplinarity in the 
disciplines that converged to develop the tools and contribute to the baseline knowledge for 
neuroscientific inquiry to flourish, but also in the levels of organization in which mental 
processes are being investigated. As highlighted by Sabbatini and Cardoso (2002), 
neuroscience has leveraged research focus from just a single organisational level to a more 
integrated and multi-directional approach, acknowledging molecular, cellular, network, 
psychological, and socio-environmental contributors to cognition and action. 
 
 Given the interdisciplinary nature of neuroscience, it is just befitting for a field that 
investigates and explores the ethical dimensions of this discipline to acknowledge the benefits 
of looking at different levels of biopsychosocial organization and through different disciplinary 
lenses. Furthermore, from a pragmatic standpoint (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 
2008b), understanding the ethical and societal implications of neuroscientific development 
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necessitates the use of empirical knowledge and methods from both the natural and social 
sciences, taking into account scientific facts and social norms. As such, this project 
investigates neuroethical issues on clinical trials of deep brain stimulation for Alzheimer’s 
disease from the perspectives of medicine, psychology, sociology, and philosophy. This 
project incorporates knowledge from neuroscientific research on the genetic, molecular, 
cellular, and structural underpinnings of AD, along with psychological and sociological 
investigations on how it affects the cognition and shapes the lived experience of those 
diagnosed with it, to determine and dissect ethical issues associated with the potential use of 
DBS as another mode of therapy for people with AD.  
 
By grounding the claims made throughout this thesis on actual results of the case 
studies and trials on DBS for people with AD (Turnbull et al. 1985; Laxton et al. 2010; Fontaine 
et al. 2013; Kuhn et al. 2015; Lozano et al. 2016) and on studies reporting its effects for other 
conditions such as that of Gilbert et al. (2017) and Gilbert and Viaña (2018) in Chapter 3, this 
dissertation aims to provide recommendations that would be relevant and relatable to people 
with AD, their family and caregivers, their attending medical team, and the doctors and 
scientists conducting the clinical trials. Pragmatically-oriented (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; 
Racine 2008b) conceptual work on this topic could serve as the basis of future actual empirical 
work involving deliberation and engagement with various key stakeholders, allowing better 
understanding of the perspectives of people with AD on participating in a risky and invasive 
clinical trial and the intentions and motivations of researchers in extending the application of 
DBS to AD. This study also acknowledges the richness that philosophical inquiry brings to the 
understanding of the effects of DBS for AD on selfhood, as illustrated by the descriptive 
enumeration of several philosophical viewpoints in Chapter 3 and their use in the publications 
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incorporated in the same chapter and in Chapter 6. Viewing empirical data through the 
philosophical propositions made on how DBS could affect identity and selfhood would further 
enrich the ethical issues raised and recommendations made, as long as the claims are not 
overhyped and are still well grounded on empirical realities, a point emphasized in the paper 
of Gilbert, Viaña and Ineichen (2018) in Chapter 3. 
 
 Keeping in mind the different levels of biological organization, the reviews on clinical 
trials of DBS for AD in Chapters 4 (Viaña et al. 2017) and 5 (Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017) 
present whether these trials performed genetic tests or incorporated biomarkers in recruiting 
participants; what cognitive, neurologic, and psychiatric characteristics were used to 
determine the people with AD eligible to participate in the trials; the stimulation parameters 
used; and the medical, cognitive, neurologic, psychiatric, and functional outcomes utilised to 
assess the safety and efficacy of the procedure. Constructing tables in these publications 
allowed easier comparison of protocols among different trials and identification of 
differences, which could hint to salient ethical issues that need to be raised. 
 
By looking at Table 3 in Chapter 4 (Viaña et al. 2017), it is evident that other fornix DBS 
for AD trials (Laxton et al. 2010; Fontaine et al. 2013) did not have suicidal tendencies or 
history of suicide as an exclusion criterion, although it is a potential risk associated with DBS 
(Appleby et al. 2007). It is also apparent in Table 1 in Chapter 4 (Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 
2017) that only few studies (Fontaine et al. 2013; Kuhn et al. 2015) used biomarkers such as 
CSF tau and Aβ42 to ascertain that their participants really have Alzheimer’s pathology. 
Considering that the trials propose the use of DBS for people with Alzheimer’s disease, 
additional tests, especially if they are already available and have even been used by other DBS 
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for AD studies, to ascertain the diagnosis should be utilised to increase the scientific validity 
of the findings and to exclude people who might have dementia that is not due to Alzheimer’s 
pathology from participating in a risky and highly invasive trial. Also, since a lot of studies 
included people who are <65, these individuals could have frontotemporal dementia (FTD) 
due to the early onset of dementia symptoms, which could affect the study’s internal validity 
and also the outcome for these participants given the variability in affected brain networks 
between people with AD and FTD (Hafkemeijer et al. 2016). 
 
 In addition to showing the different levels of biological organisation used for 
recruitment and assessment in DBS for AD trials in humans, scrutinizing the effects of fornix 
DBS stimulation in different animal models on molecular, cellular, structural, 
electrophysiological, and behavioural parameters also help identify significant translational 
issues and possible risks of harm from DBS, which can then be used to propose refinements 
for in-human trial protocols (Viaña et al. 2017).  
 
In Table 2 in Chapter 4 (Viaña et al. 2017), it can be seen that only very few studies 
utilised animal models in which AD-associated cognitive deficits (Hescham et al. 2017) or 
pathophysiological processes (Zhang et al. 2015) were deliberately induced. This could affect 
the translatability of findings on the effects of fornix DBS not just on memory, but potentially, 
also on molecular, cellular, and network properties given the absence of AD-associated 
deficits in the animals used in most of the studies. Another important translational issue, 
which also has serious ethical repercussions, was derived from results of the study of 
Talakoub et al. (2016), which suggested that improperly timed stimulation could actually 
disrupt brain activity critical in memory consolidation or retrieval. Although this study did not 
175
perform any behavioural tests to determine whether such disruption really affected the 
memory of the macaque monkey being tested, it highlights the need for close monitoring of 
participants given the possibility of memory impairment as a result of inappropriate 
stimulation parameters or timing. It would be ironic and harmful to participants with AD that 
an intervention being tested to address memory deficits would in itself be detrimental to 
proper memory function. 
 
In Chapters 4 and 5, the ethical issues raised were divided according to when in the 
development of the technology or in what stage of the trial they will arise. The purpose of 
this is to encourage critical reflection of scientists and doctors facilitating these pre-clinical 
studies and/or in-human trials on what considerations should they make in designing, 
executing, and concluding an animal study or a clinical trial in humans. This mode of division 
is also in line with framework for determining ethical issues in clinical trials forwarded by 
Emmanuel, Wendler, and Grady (2000) and by Li et al. (2016). Publishing the papers making 
up Chapters 4 (Viaña et al. 2017) and 5 (Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017) in medical and 
neuroscientific journals would hopefully increase readership of these articles by medical and 
scientific professionals conducting DBS for AD studies and facilitate the integration of the 
recommendations provided in studies that they are or will be conducting. 
 
Starting with translational challenges, the discussion on this issue in Chapter 4 
highlights the need for a close collaboration between scientists testing the technologies in 
animal models and to people doing the clinical trials to maximise the translatability of findings, 
especially with regards to the stimulation parameters and timing during the disease course 
and the relevance of observed outcomes in animals to physiological and functional measures 
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in humans (Viaña et al. 2017).  The “Participant selection criteria” section in Chapter 4 (Viaña 
et al. 2017) and the “Considerations for patient selection” section in Chapter 5 (Viaña, 
Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017) both discuss ways in which the selection criteria can be improved 
to ensure that participants are not subjected to undue and avoidable harms and also 
potentially benefit from the procedure, in line with the ethical principles of beneficence and 
non-maleficence (Beauchamp & Childress 2013) and with pragmatism’s (Fins, Bacchetta & 
Miller 1997; Fins 2008b) goal of providing practical goals and realizable plans of action. This 
is evident in the suggestions on excluding people with suicidal tendencies and/or depression, 
including only people with mild AD if they are <65 and have EOAD-associated genetic 
mutations, and incorporating biomarkers for AD pathology in the selection criteria. The “Trial 
design” section in Chapter 4 (Viaña et al. 2017) and the “Disease progression and study design” 
section in Chapter 5 (Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017) evaluate the study designs of different 
clinical trials to see whether participants assigned to a certain study group could be 
disadvantaged, especially if they do not get access to the intervention for a particular time 
period and if by the time they would, the potential “therapeutic window” has already been 
missed considering the degenerative nature of Alzheimer’s disease. The “Outcome measures” 
section in Chapter 4 (Viaña et al. 2017) and the “Potential trial outcomes” section in Chapter 
5 (Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017) examine the measures used to evaluate the safety and 
efficacy of the intervention and also the time points in which these evaluations were made. 
These sections also highlight the need for determining the relevance of these measures to the 
quality of life and lived experience of people with AD and how expectations regarding 
potential benefits from trial participation are managed. Finally, Chapter 4 (Viaña et al. 2017) 
touches on institutional (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997), economic and societal issues, 
particularly on challenges to access of DBS for AD should it be eventually approved and also 
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on the potential misuse of safety and efficacy data from clinical trials to offer DBS in people 
with AD as an off-label therapeutic option outside the context of a clinical trial. 
 
 As evident in the discussion in the preceding paragraph, the format in which the 
ethical issues were raised in Chapters 4 and 5 are pretty similar. Nonetheless, the paper in 
Chapter 5 (Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017) brings additional scientific information and further 
ethical reflection by highlighting that although general ethical considerations can be made for 
a particular neurotechnology such as DBS and on its application for a novel condition such as 
AD, ethical analysis can even be extended and made more specific to account for issues that 
would arise from variable results of an intervention between sub-populations (Lozano et al. 
2016), in line with pragmatism’s (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b) emphasis on 
the role context in ethical deliberation.  
 
The differing results between participants who are <65 and participants who are ≥65 
(Lozano et al. 2016) suggest that factors such as age or the presence of autosomal dominant 
AD-associated mutations, which could result to earlier onset of dementia (Cacace, Sleegers & 
Van Broeckhoven 2016), might play a role and should be accounted for in determining the 
populations to recruit and the way that the trial will be designed and executed. Incorporating 
genetic information into the trial also necessitates additional ethical considerations, which 
are elaborated in the “Genetic vulnerability and informed consent” section in Chapter 4 
(Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017). By drawing from literature in genethics and genetic 
counselling, this section discusses issues relevant to disclosure of genetic results and the need 
for pre- and post-test counselling, and potential problems that could arise when the 
participant and his/her family have differing opinions on the conduct of a genetic test for AD-
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associated mutations. Although concerns on the risks of genetic information to an individual 
with AD could be lessened if there is already a clear diagnosis of AD, some other risks to that 
person and to his or her family members remain. For instance, information on having 
autosomal-dominant mutations linked to early-onset AD could lead to prognostic pessimism 
(Kong, Dunn & Parker 2017) on some individuals regarding their rate of decline and possible 
eventual appearance of behavioural (Cacace, Sleegers & Van Broeckhoven 2016) and motor 
symptoms (Wu et al. 2012) associated with autosomal dominant AD, especially in the absence 
of proper post-test genetic counselling (Viaña, Bueno & Gilbert 2017). Genetic information 
could also have repercussions on family members, primarily on children and immediate 
relatives. A positive genetic test result for possession of autosomal dominant AD associated 
alleles means that children and siblings could also have the mutation, which would have 
implications on insurance (Roberts, Christensen & Green 2011), reproductive (Goldman 2012), 
and geriatric care planning, in addition to decisions on participating in a clinical trial for those 
with autosomal dominant AD (Van Cauwenberghe, Van Broeckhoven & Sleegers 2015) and 
getting a genetic test themselves. Chapter 5 also includes a section on “Interpretation and 
communication of study results”, which emphasizes the need for transparency in disclosing 
challenges encountered during the trial, adverse events experienced by the participants and 
the way they were managed, and results for all the statistical tests performed. This section 
also proposes additional analyses that can be performed, such as accounting for genetic data 
or cognitive scores at the start of the trial, to ascertain if age has a direct effect on a 
participant’s response to the intervention and also to better refine the recruitment criteria in 
future trials, ensuring that only those with the greatest prospect of benefit and least risk of 
harm are recruited.  
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Although a few of the recommendations on patient selection, trial design, and 
measured outcomes presented in Chapter 4 (Viaña et al. 2017) were re-iterated and 
emphasized further in Chapter 5 (Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017), new ones were also 
proposed to account for differences between EOAD and late-onset AD. These include 
recruitment of people <65 who only have a milder form of cognitive dysfunction, especially 
when they have autosomal dominant genetic mutations predisposing them to EOAD; 
shortening the time when stimulation would be withheld from the <65 group; having a more 
frequent outcome assessment; and including additional measures that determine the effects 
of DBS on dysfunctions such as apraxia, aphasia, and dysexecutive syndrome, which are more 
prevalent in people with early-onset familial AD (Wu et al. 2012).  
 
Overall, the paper of Viaña, Bittlinger and Gilbert (2017) demonstrates the value of 
looking more closely at peculiarities in clinical trial results and understanding what ethical 
issues and concerns could emerge from them, particularly from the perspective of those that 
could be harmed to a greater degree as a result of assignment to a certain trial arm. This paper 
also highlights how bringing together discussions from different ethical disciplines such as 
neuroethics and genethics could result to a better understanding of important ethical issues 
and to the proposal of practical (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b) 
recommendations that account for multiple dimensions of the disorder and its effects on 
afflicted individuals and their family. 
 
 As mentioned at the start of this section, neuroscientific knowledge has benefitted 
greatly from interdisciplinarity, both in the levels of organisation investigated and the 
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disciplinary tools employed (Sabbatini & Cardoso 2002). The same applies for knowledge on 
specific disorders such as AD and the effect of an intervention such as DBS.  
 
Whereas the papers in Chapters 4 (Viaña et al. 2017) and 5 (Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 
2017) focus more on the medical and scientific aspects of DBS and AD, Chapter 6 (Viaña & 
Gilbert 2018) widens the investigative lens and incorporates reflections from psychology, 
sociology, and philosophy to anticipate the effects of DBS for AD on selfhood and identity and 
uses these as springboards in determining salient ethical concerns. Although the model of 
selfhood used is primarily based on the one proposed in the publications of Sabat and Harré 
(1992) and Sabat and Collins (1999), Viaña and Gilbert (2018) acknowledge that the original 
social constructionist-grounded tripartite model of selfhood only focuses on verbal 
components of Selves 1, 2, and 3. As such, the original tripartite model was extended, 
incorporating other frameworks used in the investigation on the effects of AD on selfhood 
and identity that were mentioned in Chapter 2, to provide a more comprehensive theoretical 
framework that will be employed to hypothesize the effects of DBS on the selfhood and 
identity of people with AD. 
 
By combining results from DBS for AD trials, with a focus on the experiential 
phenomena experienced by some participants during in-surgery stimulation, with qualitative 
studies or philosophical reflections on the effects of AD or DBS on selfhood and identity, which 
were reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3, we attempt to provide reflections that are philosophically 
encompassing yet empirically grounded, in line with the pragmatic framing and practical 
inclination (Fins, Bacchetta & Miler 1997; Racine 2008b) of this dissertation. This way, the 
hypothesised effects of DBS for AD on Self 1 or self reference and attribution; Self 2 or one’s 
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characteristics and life story, and knowledge of them; and Self 3 or social and relational 
projection of the self would still resonate with and be relatable to people with AD and their 
caregivers (Viaña and Gilbert 2018).  
 
Using the revised tripartite model of selfhood as a lens to examine ethical concerns 
arising from DBS for AD studies reinforces some of the recommendations made in Chapters 4 
(Viaña et al. 2017) and 5 (Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017), especially with regards to 
acknowledging the remaining capacity of a participant in the informed consent process, 
creating an advance directive, and assigning a legal representative and/or a co-decision maker. 
In addition, fleshing out the ethical issues based on DBS for AD’s possible effects on the 
tripartite self facilitate the suggestions of additional recommendations on the presented 
information during the informed consent procedure, preparation for adverse events such as 
recollection of traumatic memories, treatment of the participant as a research partner in the 
trial, incorporation of social adjustment measures in the assessment of DBS-associated 
sequelae, and proper communication with the participant and his/her caregivers on the 
possible extent of benefit from the treatment to prevent misconceptions and unrealistic 
expectations (Viaña & Gilbert 2018). 
 
 In conclusion, the three papers presented in Chapters 4 (Viaña et al. 2017), 5 (Viaña, 
Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017), and 6 (Viaña & Gilbert 2018) provide a multi-level interdisciplinary 
analysis of clinical trials on DBS for AD and the ethical issues that arise from them. Hopefully, 
such approach has illustrated the richness, diversity, and complexity of issues associated with 
DBS for AD; and has provided a discourse that people with AD, their family and caregivers, 
doctors, neuroscientists, social scientists, and philosophers could understand, relate to, and 
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participate in. It is important to acknowledge that while majority of the statements and claims 
in these publications are empirically grounded and based on observations from other DBS 
studies or research involving people with AD, this project remains a conceptual and 
theoretical one. As such, some of the claims such as recollection of traumatic memories or 
increased risk of suicide might not be observed in people with AD who receive DBS.  
Nonetheless, acknowledging the possibility of these events would lead to measures, such as 
exclusion of people with depression, that would prevent them from occurring in the first place 
and properly address them should they arise. In order to adopt a full pragmatic approach (Fins, 
Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b), recommendations in the three main publications 
should be tested and deliberated upon in future empirical bioethical studies involving people 
with AD who have received or will receive DBS, and on future conceptual and empirical 
neuroethical research on new findings from the clinical trials examined (Leoutsakos et al. 
2018), or on DBS of other brain regions (Scharre et al. 2018) or DBS with a closed-loop set-up 
(Senova, Chaillet & Lozano 2018) in people with AD. 
 
II. DBS and Beyond: Extending the Ethics to Other Invasive Neurotechnologies 
 
 The pragmatic (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b) analytical framework 
used (examination of issues during different translational and clinical trial stages; 
identification of novel considerations as a result of variable results in different sub-
populations; and using a philosophically, psychologically, and sociologically-grounded 
tripartite model of selfhood) and ethical recommendations made in this dissertation can be 
applied not only to future DBS for AD studies but also to other invasive neurotechnologies 
that are being tested for people with Alzheimer’s disease. 
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 In addition to DBS, other invasive neurotechnologies such as stem cell implantation 
and gene therapy have been or are being tested in people with AD. The commentary of Viaña, 
Carter, and Gilbert (2018), which can be found in pages 193 to 198, presents graphs 
demonstrating that in recent years, there has been an increase in the number of studies and 
in the number of people with dementia recruited for trials involving DBS, stem cell therapy, 
or gene therapy. Considering the rapid pace of biotechnological innovation, these numbers 
are expected to continuously increase.  
 
 Gene therapy trials involve delivery of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) into the central 
nervous system, either ex vivo by implanting genetically modified cells containing the 
therapeutic gene or in vivo by directly introducing a therapeutic gene into the desired region 
using viral vectors (Choong, Baba & Mochizuki 2016). An example of a gene therapy study 
being conducted in people with AD is that of Rafii et al. (2014)  wherein adeno-associated 
virus (AAV) particles containing the nerve growth factor (NGF) gene are delivered 
stereotactically to the nucleus basalis of Meynert (NBM), a brain region with densely packed 
cholinergic neurons, which provides majority of the cholinergic input to the entire neocortex 
(Rafii et al. 2014).  
 
In the trial of Rafii et al. (2014), ten people with mild to moderate AD (MMSE of 16 to 
28) received bilateral AAV2-NGF injections into the NBM. The participants were divided into 
three groups, with each group receiving a different dose of AAV2-NGF (1.2 x 1010 viral 
genomes (vg), 5.8 x 1010 vg, or 1.2 x 1011 vg). They were assessed at several time points, with 
the earliest one a day after the surgery and the latest one, two years post-surgery.  
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In terms of safety, there were no unusual surgical complications except for a 
postsurgical hygroma, which was successfully drained. There were very few adverse events, 
all of which were deemed by the investigators to be not or unlikely related to the intervention. 
Only one participant died during the 24-month observation period, with the cause being 
failure to thrive (Rafii et al. 2014), which is a syndrome of weight loss, decreased appetite and 
poor nutrition, decline in physical and cognitive function, and inactivity (Sarkisian & Lachs 
1996). It was not specified though if this has been the result of the Alzheimer’s pathology or 
if the intervention had any role in it.  
 
For secondary clinical outcomes, Rafii et al. (2014) reported the absence of any 
evidence suggesting a rate of clinical deterioration greater than that of people with mild to 
moderate AD who were enrolled in previous studies. They also mentioned that participants 
who received the highest dose of AAV2-NGF deteriorated the least based on Alzheimer’s 
Disease Assessment Scale – Cognitive (ADAS-Cog) and Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) 
scores. Furthermore, there was only mild to sub-moderate deterioration in the Alzheimer’s 
Disease Cooperative Study Clinical Global Impression of Change (ADCSCGIC) test for all three 
groups, and there were also no significant differences noted on other neuropsychological 
measures.  
 
Post-mortem pathological assessments were performed on the brains of five 
participants, which confirmed AD diagnosis based on amyloid-beta and neurofibrillary tangle 
pathology. Three brains have been successfully fixed to visualize NGF, and they showed NGF 
expression in a relatively limited area close to the needle tract. Numerous cholinergic neurons 
were also positive for acetylcholinesterase, choline acetyltransferase (ChAT), neurotrophin 
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receptor p75, and NGF. Finally, neurons exposed to AAV2-NGF were larger than those distal 
to the NGF expression field, and those exposed neurons from injected participants were also 
larger than those from a comparable NBM region in control participants (Rafii et al. 2014). 
 
In contrast to in vivo gene therapy where virus particles are delivered directly to the 
brain, cell-based therapies introduce reprogrammed cell lines or stem cells into the brain, 
either stereotactically or through a certain device. The International Neuroethics Society (INS) 
conference proceeding of Viaña, Illes, and Gilbert (2018) and the poster presented during 
such conference, both of which are incorporated in this chapter and can be found in pages 
199 to 207, review and illustrate a number of cell implantation strategies being tested in 
people with AD. 
 
One of the studies reviewed in the poster is that of Kim et al. (2015) where human 
umbilical cord blood mesenchymal stem cells (hUCB-MSCs) were stereotactically 
transplanted into the hippocampus and precuneus of people with AD, given that these are 
the regions where amyloid or neurofibrillary tangles start to accumulate. In this study, nine 
people with AD (MMSE of 10 to 23) received injections of MSCs on both sides of the 
hippocampus and in the right precuneus. Three of the nine participants received a dose of 3.0 
x 106 cells, with 1.0 x 106 cells injected in each region, whereas the other six received double 
the dose (6.0 x 106 cells in total). Safety, clinical, and laboratory assessments were performed 
at baseline, in several time periods during and after the month following the surgery, and the 
latest, 24 months after injection of the hUCB-MSCs. 
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With regards to safety and feasibility, Kim et al. (2015) reported that the procedure 
was feasible, well-tolerated, and safe for the population they enrolled. None of the 
participants experienced fever or haemorrhage 24 hours post-injection. There were no severe 
adverse events experienced; however, a number of participants had gastrointestinal 
disorders (nausea, colonic polyp, and/or vomiting), procedural complications (wound pain 
and/or ligament sprain), nervous system disorders (headache and/or dizziness), mild delirium, 
back pain, and/or asthenia (weakness or lack of energy) within three months after surgery. 
The authors deemed these events as surgery-related rather than stem cell-related events. No 
adverse events were observed during the 24-month extended follow-up study. Neurological 
assessment through MRI at 3 and 24 months revealed no tumour or subdural haemorrhages. 
All trial participants were immunologically stable at 12 weeks and 12 months post-injection. 
 
Clinical, psychiatric, and functional measures used to assess the effect of hUCB-MSCs 
effect on cognition included the Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale – Cognitive subscale 
(ADAS-Cog), Seoul Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (S-IADL), the Mini-Mental State 
Examination (MMSE), and caregiver-administered neuropsychiatric inventory. The low-dose 
group had a much larger degree of mean worsening in cognition based on ADAS-Cog and 
MMSE scores from baseline to 2 years post-injection; however, considering the small sample 
size and large standard deviation that resulted to a degree of overlap in the range of observed 
changes, it would be difficult to conclude that participants who received a much higher dose 
had slower cognitive decline. In addition, Kim et al. (2015) pointed out that the rate of 
observed decline in MMSE in their study was much faster than in typical AD, and they 
attributed it to the recruitment of people with early-onset AD. In terms of the S-IADL, the low 
187
dose group had a worse mean decrease in functional outcome than the high-dose group 24 
months post-injection. 
 
Kim et al. (2015) also reported that their neurological assessments on amyloid burden 
via 11C-labeled Pittsburgh compound B (PiB) positron emission tomography (PET) (PiB-PET) 
did not reveal differences in amyloid burden between the left and right precuneus. Kim et al. 
(2015) mentioned that this observation did not replicate results from animal studies that 
show a reduction of Aβ42 plaques in the hippocampus and other brain regions following 
injection of hUCB-MSCs (Kim et al. 2011). 
 
The purpose of this section is not to review cell implantation and gene therapy studies 
on people with AD. This section also does not aim to provide a comprehensive reflection on 
the ethical issues raised by the methodologies and results of these trials, similar to what was 
performed in Chapters 4 to 6. Rather, it just shows that there are other studies involving other 
invasive neurotechnologies on people with AD and that the ethical framework used to identify 
salient considerations can be used to analyse these other trials. In addition, some of the 
recommendations for improved participant protection and harm minimisation proposed in 
Chapters 4 to 6 can be translated to these trials. 
 
As demonstrated in the abstract and shown in its accompanying poster that was  
presented at the 2017 INS meeting (pages 199 to 207), the selection criteria, informed 
consent procedure, trial design, and measured outcomes of cell implantation studies can be 
evaluated and compared, similar to what was performed in Chapters 4 and 5. From these 
comparisons, salient ethical concerns can be identified, especially with regards to the most 
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suitable population for this kind of intervention and the appropriate trial design (number of 
injection sites, dosage of injection) to minimise harms and to have a more equitable prospect 
of benefit for all participants involved. Although a portion of the ethical frameworks can be 
easily adapted to evaluate these studies, novel properties of the trials might also necessitate 
the examination of additional parameters for a more comprehensive ethical evaluation. For 
instance, given issues associated with ownership of biological material (Petrini 2012) and 
sourcing of stem cells (King & Perrin 2014), it is important to evaluate how the cells were 
obtained and the associated informed consent procedure. In addition, given that some trials 
did not directly introduce the cells into the brain, but rather introduced them via a reservoir 
that separates them from the brain environment and allows them to be explanted later on 
(Wahlberg et al. 2012), opens up discussions on the importance of reversibility of a procedure 
and its relation to informed consent and risks of harm.  
The commentary of Viaña, Carter, and Gilbert (2018), presented in pages 193 to 198, 
also illustrates how a number of the recommendations made in Chapters 4 to 6 can be 
generalized to several invasive neurotechnological trials, including that of Rafii et al. (2014) 
and Kim et al. (2015). This paper highlights properties that are common to three types of 
invasive neurotechnological trials (DBS, cell implantation, and gene therapy) for AD, which 
include their partial or complete irreversibility, greater risks compared to observational 
studies or pharmacologic interventions, necessity of having another decision maker, and 
effects on relational adjustment and social positioning. Given these similar properties, 
recommendations relating to the informed consent process, translation from animal studies, 
assessment of capacity and role of the co-decision maker, and proper communication of the 
experimental nature of the trial and the extent of possible improvement from the 
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intervention can be applied to all three forms of invasive neurotechnologies being tested in 
people with AD.  
 
As mentioned in the paragraphs discussing the conference abstract of Viaña, Illes, and 
Gilbert (2018) and in earlier discussions in this thesis, it is also important to acknowledge 
differences among the three technologies and incorporate knowledge on them in the 
refinement of existing ethical guidelines and in the formulation of additional ones. For 
example, whereas DBS is partially reversible and the device can be explanted (Gilbert 2015), 
stem cells and virus particles carrying a particular gene cannot be removed from the brain 
once they have been stereotactically injected, at least given the current state of technology. 
Once someone decides to participate in a cell implantation or in vivo gene therapy trial, their 
decision is binding for life. In contrast, for DBS, the trial participant and/or medical team can 
have the stimulation stopped or even have the device fully explanted. Although this could 
help reduce unwanted side effects and/or put a DBS recipient in a state where he or she could 
make competent decisions as in the case reported by Leentjens et al. (2004), this does not 
provide absolute guarantee of undoing all DBS-associated changes considering the initial 
lesioning process, stimulation-induced plasticity, and social attitudes towards DBS and/or 
neurological and psychiatric disorders that are beyond the medical team’s control (Gilbert et 
al. 2017; Gilbert & Viaña 2018; Viaña & Gilbert 2018). In addition, the possibility of stopping 
the stimulation and/or explantation raises additional issues regarding decisional competence 
in later stages of dementia, considering the degenerative nature of AD, and on how much 




Considering the funding being put by governments into AD research and the 
increasing number of people with AD in both developed and developing countries, along with 
the advancements in biotechnology and neuroscience, it is anticipated that more trials that 
necessitate stereotactic surgery and are potentially irreversible would be tested in people 
with AD. This emphasizes the need for bioethics to actively and continuously monitor existing 
studies and evaluate new ones. This section illustrates how the ethical frameworks used in 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 and how a number of the ethical recommendations forwarded in these 
chapters can be used to assess and refine new invasive neurotechnological trials. It is crucial 
though to acknowledge differences among neurotechnologies and take these into account 
when translating ethical considerations and making certain recommendations. 
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III. Broadening the Neuroethical Oversight: Insights from Other Bioethics Publications
Considering the interdisciplinarity of neuroethics and the multiple levels of 
organisation in which ethical issues can be examined, the reflections in the papers presented 
in Chapters 3 to 7 can be seen as only few of the many ways to approach the ethical discourse 
on the topic of invasive neurotechnologies for Alzheimer’s disease. There are definitely 
additional angles and more methodologies and frameworks from which the ethical 
considerations can be dissected and discussed.  
Throughout my doctoral research, ethical issues on other biotechnological and 
neuroscientific products and projects have been explored. These include societal implications 
of findings from genomic research (Viaña, Bueno & Gilbert 2017); media portrayals of 3D 
bioprinting (Gilbert et al. 2018); public communication of the goals of the Human Brain Project 
(Viaña & Gilbert 2016); effect of a brain tumor on moral responsibility (Gilbert, Vranic & Viaña 
2016); and eligibility, applicability and reliability issues on the use of decoded neurofeedback 
for psychiatric disorders (Viaña et al. 2016). Although the main discussion on these 
publications might not be directly related to the use of invasive neurotechnologies in people 
with AD, a few of the insights and angles from which the ethical concerns were identified can 
be translated to future studies on the ethics of invasive neurotechnologies for AD. Given that 
I have led or partook in the writing of these publications, they will be incorporated in this 
thesis. In this section, a brief discussion on each of these publications will be made, focusing 
on what aspects, methods, or frameworks can be translated to further explorations on ethical, 
legal, and societal issues on the use of DBS and other emerging invasive neurotechnologies in 
the management and treatment of people with AD and/or other forms of dementia. 
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In the commentary on the translation of outcomes from genomic research into clinical 
and public health contexts, which can be accessed in pages 219 to 222, Viaña, Bueno, and 
Gilbert (2017) responded to some of the claims made by Kong, Dunn, and Parker (2017) on 
how genomic research might lead to a sense of prognostic pessimism and on how it might 
draw the focus towards pharmacologic interventions and away from behavioural and 
environmental treatments. Using results from genome-wide association studies (GWAS) and 
functional genomics studies on bipolar disorder (BD), Viaña, Bueno, and Gilbert (2017) 
illustrated additional ways in which knowledge from GWAS can be used to better model and 
understand diseases. In order to demonstrate how genomic research might not necessarily 
lead to prognostic pessimism, we emphasized that results from GWAS on BD reveal that 
intrinsic biogenetic factors play a small role on BD progression, and that knowledge from 
genomic studies can actually help provide more personalized treatments, which can improve 
disease management. We also provided examples on how genomic research can reveal the 
influence of having particular genotypes on response to behavioural interventions and the 
effects of developmental stressors, both of which could help optimize behavioural therapies 
and encourage funding towards social interventions. Finally, we emphasized the importance 
of genetic counselling in order to minimize prognostic pessimism and provide advice to 
people on the management of their disease, especially on which interventions might be more 
effective given their genetic profile. 
 
Some of the points raised in the paper of Viaña, Bueno, and Gilbert (2017) resonate 
with the ones forwarded in Chapter 5 (Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017), especially on the 
importance of pre- and post-test genetic counselling for trials in which genetic data will be 
obtained from participants. Viaña, Bittlinger, and Gilbert (2017) also recommended several 
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modifications on the protocols and recruitment criteria of DBS for AD trials to account for 
differences between autosomal dominant early-onset AD and normal late-onset AD on 
disease progression, similar to the way the commentary (Viaña, Bueno & Gilbert 2017) 
provided examples on how genetic data can be used to refine pharmacologic and/or 
behavioural interventions. With new data coming from genetic and genomic studies on 
people with AD (Lambert et al. 2013; Chauhan et al. 2015; Escott-Price et al. 2015; Cuyvers & 
Sleegers 2016), it is important to consider how knowledge from these could help inform the 
possible response of different sub-groups of people with AD to invasive neurotechnological 
interventions. Although there might not be a direct genetically attributable influence on 
response to an invasive neurotechnological intervention, the effect of particular 
polymorphisms, copy number variations, or gene variants (Hooli et al. 2014; Zheng et al. 2015; 
Cuyvers & Sleegers 2016) on disease progression or on the symptoms that people with AD 
could experience could help tailor clinical trial protocols to ensure adequate monitoring and 
to minimise adverse events that could reduce the quality of life and cause distress to people 
who will also be subjected to an invasive neurological procedure. 
 
The communication of scientific results to the public via mass media plays a pivotal 
role not only in keeping the public updated on the latest scientific discoveries and innovation, 
but also in helping people with certain disorders or diseases find clinical trials to improve their 
condition and/or address symptoms not remedied by approved therapy. Gilbert et al. (2018), 
whose paper is in pages 223 to 231, explores portrayals of 3D bioprinting in mass media that 
are indexed in the Factiva database. Articles were analysed to determine whether they 
include a patient story, mention risks and associated ethical issues, describe 3D bioprinting as 
a revolutionary technology, alludes to the printing of organs, and/or has an overall positive 
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portrayal of the technology. The analysis showed that most media articles positively portray 
3D bioprinting and only very few mention risks and ethical issues. Almost a third of the articles 
also allude to the possibility of printing organs in the near future. In this manuscript, we 
emphasize the importance of balanced communication of the technology, ensuring that risks 
and ethical concerns are also disseminated. Hopefully, a more balanced and not positively 
overhyped representation of 3D-bioprinted materials and other technologies would avert 
incidences like the Macchiarini scandal where a number of people implanted with a 
biofabricated trachea died (Gilbert et al. 2018).  
 
Balanced and accurate media reports are advocated for in the communication of the 
results of invasive neurotechnological trials for AD. Considering that there has already been 
positive media coverage on DBS for AD and its potential implications on boosting memory 
since 2011 (Gilbert & Dodds 2013; Gilbert & Ovadia 2011), it would be interesting and 
important to have an up-to-date evaluation of media portrayals of invasive neuroethologies 
for AD using the framework and methodologies by Gilbert et al. (2018). With the growing 
influence of social media, it would also be an important direction for future research to 
evaluate the portrayal of invasive neurotechnologies and discussions surrounding them on 
Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms (Purcell-Davis 2013; Kamenova, Reshef 
& Caulfield 2014; Robillard et al. 2015). These investigations would help determine whether 
there are unrealistic reports on the benefits and risks of these interventions, and also appraise 
current public perceptions and opinions on media reports of invasive neurotechnological 
trials for AD. Knowledge from these media studies could then be used by clinicians, clinical 
trial teams, and patient advocacy groups to devise strategies for more accurate depiction of 
these invasive neurotechnologies in medical consultations or in informed consent procedures, 
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with the ultimate goal of better informing people interested in participating in clinical trials 
and for those who will eventually enrol, prevent therapeutic misconception that can lead to 
unrealistic expectations (Lidz & Appelbaum 2002). 
 
Aside from mass media outlets, it is also important for researchers, the institutions 
they are affiliated with, and funding bodies to properly and realistically communicate the 
objectives of their research and its deliverables upon completion. This would ensure that the 
public would not have overhyped expectations, which could undermine trust in science when 
they are not met. The commentary of Viaña and Gilbert (2016), which is in pages 232 to 235, 
evaluates the way that the Human Brain Project (HBP) is presented to the public by comparing 
it to the Human Genome Project (HGP), another large-scale biology project, and to the Blue 
Brain Project (BBP), which is the HBP’s precursor. This paper emphasizes that although the 
HGP has been successful in its scientific goal of generating the sequence of the human 
genome, it has not lived up to predictions on it revolutionizing personalized medicine or 
ending diseases such as cancer and AD. Similarly, the BBP has also achieved its main scientific 
goal of digitally reconstructing a rat’s somatosensory cortex (Markram et al. 2015); however, 
it has not really shown how this reconstruction can lead to therapies and treatments for 
neurological disorders, as promoted in its initial description (Markram 2006). Looking at the 
proposals made and final outputs of the BBP and HGP, this commentary underscores the need 
for the HBP to be more modest on its claims and more transparent on its limitations. The 
same recommendation applies to the centres, scientists, and doctors performing studies on 
invasive neurotechnologies for dementia. It is important for them to be realistic in their 
declarations and projections so as not to create false hope onto people with AD. A possible 
bioethical research project concerning this topic would be to examine review papers by 
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people involved in clinical trials of invasive neurotechnologies for AD, along with university 
press releases and interviews, to determine how they conveyed the goals of these trials to 
the public and whether these have been met upon the conclusion of the trial. 
 
As mentioned in earlier chapters, it has been suggested that DBS has a putative effect 
on personality and may even result to disinhibition, hypersexuality (Akakin et al. 2014; Gilbert 
& Viana 2018), agitation (Rose et al. 2011), and aggressive behaviour (Papuc et al. 2015) in 
some individuals. People with dementia, especially those with frontotemporal dementia, may 
also exhibit socially undesirable, violent, and sexually disinhibited behaviours (Mychack et al. 
2001; Kim et al. 2011; Cipriani et al. 2016). These DBS and/or AD-induced dramatic changes 
in mental states, personality, disposition, beliefs, and behaviour could lead to changes in 
personhood and identity, which would have implications on the responsibility of individuals 
with AD and/or receiving DBS over the conduct of their actions (Glannon 1998). Thus, it would 
be an interesting direction for future studies on the legal and societal issues raised by DBS 
and other invasive neurotechnologies for people with dementia to determine whether 
recipients of these technologies who also have AD would be morally responsible and culpable 
for crimes that they may commit. 
 
The commentary of Gilbert, Vranic and Viaña (2016), presented in pages 236 to 239, 
reflects on the case of a person with a brain tumour who was sentenced to prison for sexual 
harassment and sexual assault of his pubescent stepdaughter. This paper questions the 
degree to which the man is accountable for his actions as a result of the tumour and the 
extent to which the man should be punished, along with issues on whether it would be 
ethically acceptable or required to use brain surgery to restore his capacities to allow him to 
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serve his sentence. Although there are differences in the pathology of a brain tumour with 
that of AD or other causes of dementia, the philosophical reflection in this commentary could 
be used in future inquiries on the sentencing of people with dementia (Doron et al. 2017). 
Having a brain implant, which could also lead to aggressive, violent, hypersexual, and socially 
deviant behaviours (Müller, Walter & Christen 2014), further complicates the issue, especially 
if the person no longer has adequate capacity to decide on the adjustment of parameters or 
on the implant’s explantation. This implies that certain psychological screening procedures 
might have to be employed during participant selection to exclude people with a high risk of 
pedophilia or sexual deviancy from receiving an intervention that could increase the risk of 
conducting a harmful sexual act (Müller, Walter & Christen 2014). The need to reflect on these 
issues from philosophical, medical, legal, and sociological perspectives would be more 
pressing in the years to come given the increasing number of people with dementia who have 
received or will be receiving an invasive neurotechnology (Viaña, Carter & Gilbert 2018). 
 
The last manuscript that is included in this section is that of Viaña et al. (2016), 
presented in pages 240 to 243, which discusses eligibility, applicability, and reliability issues 
on the use of decoded neurofeedback (dNF) in people who have schizophrenia or major 
depressive disorder (MDD). This commentary reviews studies involving people with MDD or 
schizophrenia who participated in sessions of real-time fMRI neurofeedback (rtfMRI-NF) 
wherein representations of real time-reported brain activity patterns are used by patients to 
learn self-regulation in order to change behaviour (Stoeckel et al. 2014). From the results of 
the studies reviewed, Viaña et al. (2016) pointed out salient ethical issues that might arise 
from clinical applications of decoded neurofeedback, a more computationally advanced 
version of rtfMRI-NF. Salient ethical concerns include accurately determining the people who 
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would benefit from dNF given the variability in MDD and schizophrenia symptomatology and 
inability of certain patients to focus on the learning task, and ensuring that people with MDD 
or schizophrenia would be able to translate self-regulation strategies they learned in the lab 
to real-life scenarios such as when hallucinations or suicidal tendencies arise. 
 
Although there are key differences between dNF and invasive neurotechnologies such 
as DBS, gene therapy, and stem cells, especially with regards to safety and reversibility, the 
framework used in this commentary would still be translatable. As highlighted in the selection 
criteria sections of Chapters 4 (Viaña et al. 2017) and 5 (Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017), it is 
important to evaluate whether a technology is applicable for certain sub-populations, 
considering symptomatic variabilities. Careful identification of relevant eligibility criteria is of 
utmost importance, especially in procedures wherein participants will be subjected to 
stereotactic surgery and general anaesthesia (Viaña, Carter & Gilbert 2018). Although the 
reliability parameter might not be fully applicable to invasive neurotechnologies covered in 
this thesis given that they generally function independently of the recipient’s effort (due to 
the invasive neurotechnology being physically part of and continuously exerting its effects on 
the recipient), issues of reliability could arise in newer versions of invasive neurotechnologies 
such as closed-loop DBS systems (Senova, Chaillet & Lozano 2018). With closed-loop DBS 
systems, it is important for the mathematical models and software to be reliable enough to 
stimulate only when necessary and ensure that the stimulation provided would not lead to 
disruption of network activity crucial to memory formation and retrieval. Examining the ethics 
of closed loop stimulation systems is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, it would 
definitely be an important subject for future bioethical explorations, particularly on concerns 
regarding eligibility, applicability, and reliability. 
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From genomic research (Viaña, Bueno & Gilbert 2017) to 3D bioprinting (Gilbert et al. 
2018) to decoded neurofeedback (Viaña et al. 2016), this section covers a wide range of 
neuro- and biotechnological products and/or endeavours that necessitate ethical scrutiny. By 
showing how the ethical issues raised and methodologies used in the different publications 
included relate to invasive neurotechnologies for dementia, this dissertation shows how 
integrated and interdisciplinary neuroethics is as a discipline. It also illustrates how 
frameworks from other studies can be adapted and refined to identify ethical concerns in a 
different technology. Finally, this section suggests directions and topics for future conceptual 
and empirical research that need to be undertaken to ensure that ethical reflection on 
invasive neurotechnologies for dementia keeps up with technological innovation. As 
neuroscience continues to progress and new technologies are being tested in humans, 
viewing issues in more levels of organisation or through additional disciplinary lenses, in line 
with pragmatism’s advocacy for interdisciplinarity (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 
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Chapter Eight. Concluding Remarks 
 
 From genes, molecules, and cells that make up the brain and maintain its proper 
function to synapses and networks the give rise to consciousness, cognition, and behaviour, 
the study of neuroscience encompasses multiple levels of biological organisation. As 
illustrated throughout this dissertation, both Alzheimer’s disease and deep brain stimulation 
exert their effect on several levels, ultimately leading to what can be observed in a person 
with AD or in someone receiving DBS therapy. However, simply reducing the lived experience 
of a person with AD and/or undergoing DBS to pathological hallmarks and to alterations in 
neural firing limits understanding of the true scope of the disease and of this intervention. 
People are not isolated entities solely defined by their neurological make up; on the other 
hand, they are embodied beings living in a particular society and have relationships with other 
members of it. As such, DBS for AD may aggravate existing or even introduce new 
vulnerabilities, manifested both through the effects of the intervention on the pathology and 
the person; on his or her relationships with family, caregivers, and society members; and on 
his or her social position and care arrangements or context (Dodds 2005, 2007, 2013). 
Understanding the extent to which a disease affects an individual and how novel therapies 
being tested might improve or worsen his or her lived experience requires examination that 
does not only utilise concepts and tools from neuropathology, neurology, and psychiatry, but 




 By seeing people with AD who participate in DBS trials as having brains affected by the 
pathology, surgery, and stimulation, the totality of which reflected in their cognition and 
mental states; and as persons who are embodied, relational, and social beings, this thesis 
highlights the ethical challenges that arise from clinical trials of DBS on people with AD. This 
thesis mainly employs a pragmatic ethical approach (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 
2008b), indirectly drawing from the principles of respect for persons, beneficence, non-
maleficence, and justice (Beauchamp & Childress 2013) and from frameworks in research 
ethics (Emanuel, Wendler & Grady 2000; Li et al. 2016), to examine clinical trial protocols of 
DBS and other invasive neurotechnological trials for AD and determine aspects that could be 
further improved to promote participant welfare. Extensive philosophical grounding of these 
principles and of other approaches to ethical reasoning are already widely presented in the 
theoretical bioethics literature, and as such, this thesis aims to focus the discussion on the 
ethical issues directly related to the medical and research domains. Considering the increasing 
burden of AD and the technological innovations that facilitate several new interventions to 
be better developed and even tested in humans, there is an ever pressing need to raise and 
deliberate on ethical issues in a manner directly relevant to the clinical trials; using a language 
that doctors, scientists, and participants can relate to; and sharing concerns in journals that 
medical and health practitioners mainly subscribe to. 
 
 The three main publications comprising this thesis employ a pragmatic approach (Fins, 
Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b) to determine ethical issues from the perspective of 
the effects of DBS for AD on the brain and person and its possible repercussions to 
relationships and society. These publications aim to provide an overview on clinical trials and 
animal studies on DBS for AD; determine ethical issues that arise from the protocols of the 
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studies that were reviewed; and propose recommendations to address them. These 
publications also aim to demonstrate how examining issues through different levels and 
lenses can lead to recommendations that have a direct influence on the way that current 
and/or future trials are conducted – from pointing out issues in the translation of DBS for AD 
from animal models to the first participants to different sub-populations (Viaña et al. 2017); 
to underscoring how genetic risk factors might affect DBS outcome and how should clinical 
trials account for this (Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017); and finally, to utilising information 
and interpretations from studies on the effects of AD on selfhood and DBS on outlook, 
behaviour, personality, and relationality (Gilbert et al. 2017; Gilbert & Viaña 2018; Gilbert, 
Viaña & Ineichen 2018) in anticipating and mitigating possible adverse immediate, short-term, 
and long-term effects of DBS for AD (Viaña & Gilbert 2018). 
 
 In addition to DBS, other neurotechnologies such as cell implantation and gene 
therapy are also being investigated for AD. The trial-focused and application-oriented 
grounding of ethical recommendations on DBS for AD in this thesis can be used to evaluate 
trials on other invasive neurotechnologies and propose recommendations on trial protocols 
that directly address associated ethical concerns (Viaña, Carter & Gilbert 2018; Viaña, Illes & 
Gilbert 2018). Further down the track, the ethical examination of DBS for AD can be extended 
to not only analyse and propose recommendations for pre-clinical studies and in-human trials, 
but also assess media depictions of this topic, promotion of this line of research, and its 
implications on legal culpability and moral responsibility (Gilbert et al. 2018; Gilbert, Vranic & 
Viaña 2016; Viaña & Gilbert 2016). Ethical examination should also keep track with 
innovations on neurotechnologies and discoveries on the biology of AD, refining 
recommendations when necessary to account for additional complexities (Viaña, Bueno & 
246
Gilbert 2017; Viaña et al. 2016) and to ensure that the recommendations made are properly 
grounded in medical and scientific realities. 
 
 This dissertation draws insights from pragmatism (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; 
Racine 2008b) in order to propose recommendations that aim to improve the ethical conduct 
of clinical trials of DBS and other invasive neurotechnologies in people with AD. Although 
ethical reflection in this dissertation is based on empirical information from the results of DBS 
for AD clinical trials, animal studies evaluating the effects of fornix stimulation, studies on the 
impact of AD on selfhood, and information from research involving people who have received 
DBS for other conditions, the major limitation of this work is that there was no direct 
engagement with people with AD who have received DBS, their caregivers and/or family 
members, and researchers and health care personnel conducting the trials. As such, this thesis 
can only claim partial application of a pragmatic approach (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; 
Racine 2008b), considering the absence of engagement, deliberation, and negotiation with 
key stakeholders involved in this clinical research endeavour.  
 
To gauge the full spectrum of ethical concerns arising from clinical trials of DBS for AD, 
qualitative and quantitative studies must be performed on people with AD who have received 
or will receive DBS and their family members, caregivers, study partners, and/or surrogate 
decision makers, inquiring about their motivations and apprehensions for participating in a 
clinical trial; lived experience before, during, and after a DBS trial; and ethical and moral 
concerns faced during different trial stages. Interviews and surveys with researchers, 
scientists, doctors, and other medical professionals who are conducting DBS for AD trials 
and/or are involved in laboratory research relevant to this topic should also be performed. 
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This will be crucial in acquiring a fuller understanding of the state of knowledge and research 
in this field; preliminary evidence on the potential safety and efficacy of DBS for AD beyond 
what is available in academic publications; motivations for pursuing this line of work in a 
vulnerable population, despite limited evidence; factors and considerations undertaken in 
participant recruitment, trial design, and selection of outcome measures; and personal 
reflection on possible ethical issues arising from the conduct of these clinical trials. To 
incorporate negotiation and deliberation (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b), focus 
groups involving various stakeholders can be facilitated, allowing joint discussion on ethical 
issues from multiple perspectives and collaborative decision-making on possible ways in 
which they can be addressed. In these studies, a hypothesis-based approach could also be 
employed to determine how certain factors such as decision-making capacity of people with 
AD and their family members and possible conflicts of interest of researchers could influence 
their perceptions of ethical dilemmas and moral concerns arising from DBS for AD trials. 
Empirical studies are of crucial importance in this line of research, building upon the 
conceptual work presented in this dissertation. They would also provide an excellent 
opportunity to gauge whether the concerns and recommendations forwarded in the 
incorporated publications are similar to the ones voiced out by various parties, and on how 
can the recommendations be further improved to acknowledge contextual variations and the 
perspectives of multiple stakeholders.  
 
 Although most publications presented in this dissertation performed a systematic 
search using specific keywords on various databases to survey empirical studies relevant to 
understanding ethical concerns in clinical trials of invasive neurotechnologies in people with 
AD, a more systematic review methodology following the PRISMA-P statement (Shamseer et 
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al. 2015) could have been employed. This would facilitate increased transparency on the 
selection of animal studies, clinical trials on DBS for AD, and other empirical studies on people 
with AD or DBS recipients that are included in the publications and used to derive ethical 
recommendations. Furthermore, future ethics research on this topic could formulate and 
utilise a more concrete protocol in determining which occurrences during a clinical trial 
warrant serious consideration and an actual ethical recommendation. For the three main 
publications (Viaña et al. 2017; Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017; Viaña & Gilbert 2018) in this 
dissertation, the requirements for ethical research trial forwarded by Emmanuel, Wendler, 
and Grady (2000) and elements essential in an ethics section of a clinical trial protocol, 
identified by Li et al. (2016), were used to direct the focus of the ethical analysis to participant 
selection, study design, and outcome measurement and reporting. In line with a pragmatic 
approach to bioethical analysis (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b), deliberation 
with people with AD, family members, and healthcare personnel should be employed to 
determine what aspects in a DBS for AD clinical trial do they deem highly important and what 
results from previous studies would warrant more serious ethical reflection.  
 
 Overall, this dissertation focuses on the “ethics of neuroscience” while ensuring that 
the “neuroscience in ethics” is not put to the sideline by grounding ethical reflection on 
empirical data from animal studies, clinical trials, and other quantitative and qualitative 
research on people with AD and/or undergoing DBS, and by proposing recommendations 
directly addressing clinical trial procedures. Ethics can help direct neuroscience towards a 
more humane future, emphasizing the shared importance and relevance of the brain, mind, 
and society in defining a person and his/her actions. On a similar light, neuroscience can also 
help produce a more relatable ethics, ensuring that recommendations made are practical and 
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could actually benefit and protect the people that it primarily advocates for. As with different 
disciplines going hand-in-hand to better understand AD and DBS and to frame the discourse 
in this manuscript, neuroethicists, neuroscientists, and most importantly, neuro-recipients 
should engage in dialogue and collaboration to create a balanced future for neurotechnology 
development, one that realizes how neurotechnologies can dramatically improve lives of 
people but also acknowledges that in the absence of proper scrutiny and reflection, how they 
can impair individuals and make them lose trust in the enterprise of neuroscience and the 
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Review of “Ethical Considerations for Deep Brain Stimulation and Other Invasive Neurotechnological Trials in 
People with Alzheimer’s Disease” 
Overall, this doctoral dissertation submitted by John Noel M. Viaña for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy at 
the University of Tasmania has many merits and strengths such as: 
? Very clear writing with clean prose and well-structured papers and dissertation sections; 
? An impressive amount of peer-reviewed publications already accepted and published in a short time 
span; 
? Effective engagement in interdisciplinary scholarship; 
? Solid contributions to the literature on different fronts, already recognized by peers; 
? Extensive and productive scientific collaborations and networking; 
? Exquisitely well-researched papers with careful rendition of subtle aspects of clinical trials and of 
technology. 
The main weaknesses are: 
? A partially spelled out pragmatic approach (page 19) which, if expanded a bit more upon, would furnish 
much of the theoretical backbone required for a dissertation. I here invite the author to describe in a 
page or two the pragmatic approach at the basis of his dissertation.  By doing so the candidate would 
realize how different aspects of the dissertation are held together by this approach but also why there 
are shortcomings in following this approach which would merit further attention in future work. (It is 
completely fine to not follow strictly of fully the insights of a given theoretical approach because of 
practical reasons or other reasons, but it is important to state this explicitly.) I will simply enlist here a 
few features worth keeping in mind in the progressive deployment of a sophisticated and multifaceted 
pragmatic approach: 
o The value of understanding the lived experience of those concerned (as stated on page 27, page 
86, and pages 175 and 241) but most papers in the dissertation (e.g., page 127, page 136 are 
good examples), start with a technoscientific point of view and not from the point of view of 
lived experience and descriptions of problems as encountered by those concerned. For example, 
one page 41 the all-importance of finding treatments is stated but the pragmatic claimed on 
page 42 would also require more attention to lived experiences and the needs of patients and 
families. 
o The importance of context (as described at the top of page 26) as well as the need to adjust 
ethical responses to changing situations. 
o The importance of empirical research (page 171) in spite of the focus on conceptual research in 
the thesis (page 179). 
o The desire to produce recommendations and to speak to real-world situations (e.g., page 179, 
page 180) but more attention to deliberation would be needed in the future given the emphasis 
placed on deliberation in pragmatism. What is the value of deliberation as a method in 
opposition to more top-down approaches like principlism which in all fairness is a sort of middle 
ground between top-down and bottom-up approaches? What is the connection between 
common principle-based approaches (page 19, page 174) and the pragmatic approach? 




What would this insight mean in the context of the work reported in the dissertation? In terms 
of eventually testing out the recommendations formulated? 
o Fallibilism as stressed in pragmatic theory: What is the author’s role (and his collaborators) in 
generating the PIAAAS bubble (page 108)? If an increasing critical perspective was developed 
during the process of research and publication (e.g., growing self-awareness), this should be 
explained to avoid the impression of blaming only others. It would contribute to the 
epistemological humility and fallibilism promoted by pragmatism. There is also a need to 
actually enact ethical concepts and theories at some point to assess their value (all of the work 
published is upstream with little indication of how it will or could be tested. 
o The role of empirical research in bioethics scholarship and the constraints on speculation 
imposed by a pragmatic approach (pages 114 and 115) as well as the interdisciplinary nature of 
ethics/neuroethics (page 171) but what is the candidate’s stance on the role of speculation? 
Pragmatic approaches stress the value of scenario-based ethical deliberation. Is there a role for 
speculation (or something akin) therein? 
o Working in collaboration with moral agents (few of the papers take the perspective of 
researchers, their intents, their motivations) such that limited internal understanding of the 
rationale of researchers is reflected. Resolving ethical problems is facilitated by the 
understanding of the motivations of people as agents. However, researcher voices are quite 
absent from the thesis and the development of recommendations (page 171). There is no 
engagement process supporting the development of recommendations. 
? The concerns about the risks of genetic information (pages 136-148) could be lessened if the patient is 
already diagnosed with AD? 
? The use of the concept of “transdisciplinary research” (page 18), “transdisciplinary approach” (page 19), 
“transdisciplinary pragmatic approach” (page 26), transdisciplinary analysis (page 179), transdisciplinary 
nature of neuroethics (page 205) and so on...  merits elucidation, notably where many hesitate to claim 
such a high level of integration for neuroethics. Most authors describe neuroethics as an 
interdisciplinary field and nevertheless there are some who still challenge this view. I am not sure the 
candidate can claim the thesis to be an exemplar of transdisciplinary research. It would be advisable to 
redescribe the work. Also, the explanation of the transdisciplinary nature of neuroethics as being 
premised on the interdisciplinary nature of neuroscience (pages 170-171) is not the most convincing. Yes, 
in a sense the complexity of neuroscience as a field merits a complex response but are there not 
stronger arguments justifying the interdisciplinary nature of neuroethics (from a pragmatic 
perspective)?  
? Some tensions between the criticisms about speculation in and the actual engagement in scholarship 
which seems to rely itself on an economy of promises because it is not grounded in actual lived 
experience of stakeholders. Indeed, many if not all of the contributions are premised on a rather narrow 
description of the problem addressed, often starting with technological development and clinical 
research with little integration of social context and relational aspects of situations experienced by 
patients and their relatives. In the future, adopting a pragmatic approach should infuse theoretical and 
methodological orientations such that situations are not solely defined by their techno-scientific 
dimensions but also their personal, interpersonal aspects dimensions too.  Page 119: Why is speculative 
ethics wrong? You should spell out what is your own ideal of ethics scholarship, otherwise you fall into 




Throughout the thesis, there is no contextual analysis for the reasons/causes of speculation in ethics 
scholarship. 
? There is no general imitations section, no acknowledgment of what was fulfilled and not fulfilled by the 
doctoral research project 
Minor comments (typos, formulations) 
? Missing “on-going” in “on practices and research involving” (page 18)? 
? “has written” and not “has wrote” (page 24) 
? “these papers are” and not “these papers will” (page 24) 
? “this chapter includes” and not “this chapter will include articles” (page 24) 
? “also illustrates” instead of “will also illustrate” (page 25) 
? Nuance the lack of advocacy for PET scan for diagnostic purposes given its (potentially hasty) admission 
in the USA (to differentiate between different forms of dementia? (page 33) 
? Missing “not” in “was able to” on page 46 
? Change “would be useful” for “will be useful” (page 51) 
? Insert “the” in “for the informed consent procedure and the design of DBS...” (page 51) 
? Why is the therapeutic use of electric stimulation not dated back to the Ancient civilizations (page 52) 
and actually to 1936-7 
? Does “leisure tourism” (page 61) stand for sex tourism? If that’s the case it should be spelled out very 
transparently without any euphemism 
? “to cross an international boarder” instead of “cross the border” (page 65) 
? Check syntax in “various qualitatively different kinds...” (page 66) 
? I wondered if the repeated statements “are included in this manuscript” (e.g., page 69, page 107, page 
214 and so on) should not be changed to something like “are included in this thesis” or “are included in 
this doctoral dissertation”  
? page 77, not clear what the “#” stands for in the table 
? Typo in “[7]., etc.” (page 109) 
? How do know that the “prevalence of evidence” was not biased by conflicts of interest” (page 117). Why 
are you so confident in the prevalence rates reported? (page 117) 
? Why “Nonetheless” in “Nonetheless, this study”? A pragmatic model of philosophy does not antagonize 
conceptual and empirical research (page 171). 
? Change “more closely on peculiarities” to “more closely at peculiarities” (page 177)  
? Change “Throughout the PhD” for “Throughout my doctoral research” (page 205) 
? Insert “project” after “A possible bioethical research” (page 209) 
? Provide a reference for the “applied and pragmatic ethical approach” (page 242) 
? Confusion between practical and pragmatic (page 242 and 244) 
I encourage the candidate to continue his work, enrich his understanding of pragmatism and pursue a research 
program where layers of meaning and of methodologies will be explored. This doctoral dissertation is a highly 




????????????? ???????????? ???? ???????????????












































???????????????????????????????? ???? ??????????? ???????????????????????????

















? ???????????????????? ???? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
????
















Response to examiners’ feedback – John Noel M. Viaña; Page 1 of 29 
 
January 29, 2019 
 
Dirk Baltzly, Ph.D. 
Chair of Examiners 
Philosophy and Gender Studies Program 
School of Humanities 
College of Arts, Law, and Education 
University of Tasmania 
 
Re: Response to the examiners’ comments on the PhD thesis entitled “Ethical Considerations for Deep Brain 
Stimulation and Other Invasive Neurotechnological Trials in People with Alzheimer's Disease” 
 
Dear Prof. Baltzly: 
 
Good day! Thank you very much for considering my PhD thesis on “Ethical Considerations for Deep 
Brain Stimulation and Other Invasive Neurotechnological Trials in People with Alzheimer's Disease” and for 
providing me with the opportunity to revise it. I greatly appreciate the time, attention, and effort that the two 
examiners took to review my PhD thesis and suggest points for improvement. I would also like to thank both 
examiners for pointing out the merits and strengths of my doctoral dissertation, recommending that my degree 
be awarded after minor revisions, and suggesting some textual changes. I have carefully reviewed the feedback 
provided by each examiner and have revised my dissertation accordingly. In general, I have expanded my 
discussion on pragmatic ethics and on the limitations of this dissertation, as suggested by Examiner 1, and I 
have also elaborated on the method I employed to come up with the recommendations made in the three main 
publications in this thesis, as suggested by Examiner 2. Kindly find below a tabulation of the suggestions made 
by each examiner and my responses to these comments, highlighting the textual changes I have made in the 
manuscript to account for the feedback provided. 
 




A partially spelled out pragmatic approach 
(page 19) which, if expanded a bit more 
upon, would furnish much of the theoretical 
backbone required for a dissertation. I here 
invite the author to describe in a page or 
two the pragmatic approach at the basis of 
his dissertation. By doing so the candidate 
would realize how different aspects of the 
dissertation are held together by this 
approach but also why there are 
shortcomings in following this approach 
which would merit further attention in 
future work. (It is completely fine to not 
follow strictly of fully the insights of a given 
I would like to thank Examiner 1 for inviting me to spell out the 
pragmatic approach at the basis of my dissertation. I have 
added the following paragraphs, which can be found on pages 
3 to 7 of Chapter 1, to describe the pragmatic approach I used: 
 
“In addition to taking an interdisciplinary lens, this thesis also 
utilises an empirical, applied, and pragmatic bioethical 
approach (Fins, Miller & Bacchetta 1997, 1998; Racine 2008a, 
2008b). Pragmatism, a philosophical tradition that originated 
from the USA around 1870 and initially forwarded by Charles 
Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, emphasises 
the clarification of the contents of hypotheses by tracing their 
practical consequences or implications for what we will or 
should do (Hookway 2013). The version of pragmatism in 
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theoretical approach because of practical 
reasons or other reasons, but it is important 
to state this explicitly.) 
bioethics that is applied in this work draws upon from the 
moderate natural pragmatism forwarded by Eric Racine 
(2008b, 2013) and the clinical pragmatism method proposed by 
Joseph Fins, Matthew D. Bacchetta, and Franklin G. Miller 
(1997, 1998), both of which were mainly or partly inspired by 
John Dewey’s formulation of pragmatism, which emphasises 
that moral problem solving should be based on the 
experimental method of inquiry (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 
1997). Dewey’s naturalistic metaethics of value judgements, 
grounded in developmental and social psychology, argues the 
use of reflective intelligence in revising our judgements in light 
of the consequences brought about by acting on them, allowing 
redirection of conduct when habits fail. Through an 
experimental method of inquiry, value judgements are tested 
by putting them into practice and assessing whether the results 
are satisfactory in the way they solve problems while limiting 
side effects to an acceptable level, enable successful outcomes 
to new problems, and provide satisfactory results when 
compared to alternative value judgements. Dewey’s ethics 
distinguishes itself by focusing on human conduct as warrant 
for value judgements, rather than on a fixed reference point 
such as Platonic Forms, God’s command, nature, or pure 
reason (Anderson 2018). 
 
Racine’s (2013) reading of Dewey’s (1922) pragmatism 
highlights his view of pragmatism as an approach that stresses 
how ethical behaviour and thinking are contextual.  Racine 
compares it with Beauchamp’s and Childress’s principlism 
(2009), and emphasises how pragmatism reflects more on 
aspects of social justice, empirical research’s transformative 
role, and institutional and macro-level changes on health policy 
due to the influence of democracy and deliberation in the 
construction of shared common goods (Racine 2013). 
Furthermore, his perspective on pragmatism emphasises the 
positive contribution of science to debates on ethics and policy 
but also challenges various forms of foundationalism in 
philosophy and science. In addition to Dewey’s (1922) 
pragmatism, Racine (2008b) has also drawn upon the work of 
various philosophers such as Van Rensselaer Potter on 
bioethics being the bridge between science and the 
humanities;  Anne Fagot-Largeault on the auto-regulation 
process that is based on social adaptation in bioethics; and 
Jonathan Moreno on pragmatism’s rejection of fundamental 
ethical principles that rely on a priory inquiry. By using ideas 
from various pragmatists, Racine (2008b) then proposes that a 
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moderate pragmatic naturalism best describes the state 
bioethics has taken in order to respond to new healthcare 
situations and scientific advances. The theoretical 
commitments of Racine’s (2008b) moderate pragmatic 
naturalism are: 
“1) Distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ granted with 
qualifications; 2) Ethical predicates are properties that 
cannot be reduced to natural properties but are best 
understood within a fact-value continuum; 3) Empirical 
knowledge does not bring ethical justification of ethical 
norms but ethical knowledge must take into account 
human capacities. ‘Is’ does not imply ‘ought’ but ‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’; 4) Ethical norms are not natural laws but 
norms and rules proper to human social life. There are no 
natural moral laws but moral rules can be better 
understood from a factual point of view that takes into 
consideration constraints to moral agency; 5) Ethical 
norms do not simply follow from reason or experience but 
from their interaction, e.g. reflexive equilibrium; 6) 
Bioethics is neither autonomous nor heteronomous but 
best described as an interdisciplinary field with practical 
goals such as creating new forms of wisdom in the delivery 
of healthcare and the pursuit of health; 7) Normative 
ethics is normative. Metaethics is both empirical and 
conceptual.” (p. 98, Racine 2008b) 
Racine (2008b) forwards that moderate natural pragmatism 
“expresses some of the commitments required for the 
flourishing of new forms of wisdom for the delivery of 
healthcare and the pursuit of health” (p. 100, Racine 2008b). 
Through the lens of pragmatist bioethics, Racine has advocated 
for the acknowledgement of pluralism in neuroethics and for 
more active involvement of physicians, allied healthcare 
personnel, and stakeholders in improving healthcare (Racine 
2008a). He has also used this framework to investigate the 
effect of media depictions of disorders of consciousness on 
public perceptions on disorder prognosis; the differing opinions 
of physicians, and the contextual and personal factors 
influencing such, on the prognosis of people with disorders of 
consciousness (Racine 2008b); and the reason for ongoing 
controversies on death determination and why lay and 
foundational expert views need to co-evolve in order to 
reconstruct the meaning of death considering its practical 
importance (Racine 2015). 
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Another perspective greatly inspired by Dewey’s (1922) 
pragmatism is that of Fins, Bacchetta, and Miller (1997, 1998), 
who proposed clinical pragmatism as a method of problem 
solving. The goal of clinical pragmatism is to reach consensus 
on good outcomes in real clinical cases posing moral problems. 
This is achieved by a thorough process of inquiry, discussion, 
negotiation, and reflective evaluation, treating moral rules and 
principles as hypothetical guides for conduct rather than as 
fixed and absolute moral laws (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997). 
In clinical pragmatism, health practitioners engage in a 
collaborative process of problem solving when they 
 “(1) assess the patient’s medical condition; (2) 
determine and clarify the clinical diagnosis; (3) assess the 
patient’s decision-making capacity, beliefs, values, 
preferences, and needs; (4) consider family dynamics and 
the impact of care on family members and others 
intimately concerned with the patient’s well-being; (5) 
consider institutional arrangements and broader social 
norms that may influence patient care; (6) identify the 
range of moral considerations relevant to the case in a 
manner analogous to the clinical process of differential 
diagnosis; (7) suggest provisional goals of care and offer a  
plan of action including plausible treatment and care 
options; (8) negotiate an ethically acceptable plan of 
action; (9) implement the agreed upon plan; (10) evaluate 
the results of the intervention; and (11) undertake 
periodic review and modify the course of action as the 
case evolves” (p. 131, Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997) 
Ultimately, clinical pragmatism focuses on the interpersonal 
process of moral problem solving, and as such, it requires being 
able to take others’ perspectives, engage in deliberative 
dialogue, and negotiate questions of meaning and the goals of 
care to reach an informed and inclusive consensus (Fins, 
Bacchetta & Miller 1997, 1998). Using the case of a person with 
Parkinson’s disease who became non-arousable due to a yeast 
infection, has poor prognosis, and who has a wife who wanted 
him to receive all aggressive measures including 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, Fins, Bacchetta, and Miller 
(1997) illustrated how clinical pragmatism can be used by the 
physician to undertake authentic communication with the wife 
and achieve consensual decision on the appropriate 
therapeutic course at the end of life, taking into account 
situational, relational, institutional, social, religious, and 
cultural factors influencing decision making (Fins, Bacchetta & 
Miller 1997). Clinical pragmatism has also been used by Fins 
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(2005) to identify challenges in the care of patients with severe 
brain injury and on ways in which a proper plan of palliative 
care can be negotiated with surrogates, considering medical 
facts and the values of the patient and surrogates while 
ensuring balance between burdens and benefits.” 
 
In the first half of the paragraph on page 9 of Chapter 1, I have 
also described challenges and possible shortcomings of 
pragmatism. 
 
“It is important to acknowledge that the experimental method 
championed by pragmatism also has its challenges, particularly 
in determining whether the tested principles provide the 
necessary guidance to a situation and lead to desired 
consequences. Although, consensus can be viewed as a 
potential way of determining the success of a tested principle, 
the influence of inequalities in power, wealth, and information 
should not be disregarded (Arras 2002) as this could easily 
degenerate pragmatism into clinical manipulation and become 
a way for the physician to reassert paternalism (Tong 1997). 
Nonetheless, considering pragmatism’s (Fins, Bacchetta & 
Miller 1997; Racine 2008b) dynamism, self-reflexivity, and 
fluidity and its commitment to modest fallibilism (Arras 2002), 
this approach provides adequate opportunity for self-
correction (Brown 2008) should initial consensus prove to 
exacerbate rather than ameliorate paternalistic attitudes and 
undermine patient autonomy. Furthermore, even though 
consensus cannot be achieved, an open and honest discussion 
and deliberation could still result to the goods of mutual 
respect and trust between participants and health 
professionals (Tong 1997).” 
The value of understanding the lived 
experience of those concerned (as stated 
on page 27, page 86, and pages 175 and 
241) but most papers in the dissertation 
(e.g., page 127, page 136 are good 
examples), start with a technoscientific 
point of view and not from the point of view 
of lived experience and descriptions of 
problems as encountered by those 
concerned. For example, one page 41 the 
all-importance of finding treatments is 
stated but the pragmatic claimed on page 
42 would also require more attention to 
I greatly appreciate Examiner 1’s suggestion of giving more 
attention to the lived experiences and needs of families and 
patients in the pragmatic claimed on page 36. I have already 
expanded the section on interventions for people with 
Alzheimer’s disease, adding this paragraph on pages 36 to 37 
of Chapter 2: 
 
“Although the focus of this thesis is on invasive treatment 
modalities that primarily aim to improve the cognition of 
people with AD, it is important not to discount the importance 
of social and environmental interventions that provide 
additional support and help improve the quality of life and well-
being of people with AD and their caregivers (Quinn et al. 2016; 
Vandepitte et al. 2016; Whitlatch & Orsulic-Jeras 2018). In 
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lived experiences and the needs of patients 
and families. 
addition, evaluating the value of interventions, regardless of 
their nature and invasiveness, should always take into account 
effects that extend beyond the biology of the person with AD, 
acknowledging how they could also influence daily function 
and living, relationality, and sociocultural integration. “ 
The importance of context (as described at 
the top of page 26) as well as the need to 
adjust ethical responses to changing 
situations. 
I would like to thank Examiner 1 for recommending further 
emphasis in this dissertation on the importance of context and 
the need to adjust ethical responses to changing situations. I 
have added the phrase “in medical details and social context” 
in this sentence on page 19 of Chapter 1 to underscore this 
point: 
 
“Although this thesis acknowledges the usefulness of existing 
ethical publications (Pierce 2014; Ovadia & Bottini 2015; Siegel, 
Barrett & Bhati 2017; Bittlinger & Müller 2018) and even 
recommends extending the ethical frameworks and ideas 
raised in them to other technologies for dementia, it also aims 
to underscore the importance of accounting for nuances in 
medical details and social context, and adapting, reconciling, 
and/or reframing ethical discussions and recommendations to 
accommodate these specificities and differences, as in the case 
of DBS for people with early-onset AD.” 
The importance of empirical research (page 
171) in spite of the focus on conceptual 
research in the thesis (page 179). 
I appreciate Examiner 1’s suggestion that the importance of 
empirical research on the ethics of DBS for AD be elaborated 
further, in spite of the focus of this thesis on conceptual 
research. I have added or expanded the following sentences in 




“Pragmatically-oriented (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 
2008b) conceptual work on this topic could serve as the basis 
of future actual empirical work involving deliberation and 
engagement with various key stakeholders, allowing better 
understanding of the perspectives of people with AD on 
participating in a risky and invasive clinical trial and the 
intentions and motivations of researchers in extending the 




“In order to adopt a full pragmatic approach (Fins, Bacchetta & 
Miller 1997; Racine 2008b), recommendations in the three 
main publications should be tested and deliberated upon in 
future empirical bioethical studies involving people with AD 
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who have received or will receive DBS, and on future 
conceptual and empirical neuroethical research on new 
findings from the clinical trials examined (Leoutsakos et al. 
2018), or on DBS of other brain regions (Scharre et al. 2018) or 
DBS with a closed-loop set-up (Senova, Chaillet & Lozano 2018) 
in people with AD.” 
The desire to produce recommendations 
and to speak to real-world situations (e.g., 
page 179, page 180) but more attention to 
deliberation would be needed in the future 
given the emphasis placed on deliberation 
in pragmatism. What is the value of 
deliberation as a method in opposition to 
more top-down approaches like principlism 
which in all fairness is a sort of middle 
ground between top-down and bottom-up 
approaches? What is the connection 
between common principle-based 
approaches (page 19, page 174) and the 
pragmatic approach? Pragmatism admits 
the use of principles but most often 
considers them as hypotheses to test. What 
would this insight mean in the context of 
the work reported in the dissertation? In 
terms of eventually testing out the 
recommendations formulated? 
I greatly appreciate Examiner 1’s recommendation of including 
a more detailed discussion on the importance of deliberation 
in pragmatism and its relation and comparison to principlism, 
particularly in the context of this body of work. I have added or 
expanded the following statements to address these 
suggestions: 
 
Chapter 1, pages 7 to 8: 
 
“Although pragmatism in bioethics focuses more on a 
deliberative and dynamic approach to decision-making rather 
than on the direct top-down application of bioethical principles 
and moral laws (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b), 
certain moral rules, principles, and guidelines can still be used 
as hypotheses or as available frameworks for analysing moral 
situations (Arras 2002) and determining the most appropriate 
ethical course of action in a particular context. In this thesis, 
principles from various guidelines such as the Nuremberg Code, 
Declaration of Helsinki, Belmont Report, and the International 
Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human 
Subjects are used to evaluate clinical trials on their social or 
scientific value, scientific validity, subject selection, risk-benefit 
ratio, study design, informed consent procedure, 
communication of research results, and treatment of 
participants (Emanuel, Wendler & Grady 2000; Li et al. 2016). 
Although not explicitly stated all the time, the ethical 
considerations forwarded throughout this dissertation are also 
guided by the four key principles in medical ethics, which are 
respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and 
justice (Beauchamp & Childress 2013). The application of a 
pragmatic approach (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 
2008b) means that no principle takes precedence or priority 
over the others; rather, these principles are just used as guides 
to determine the most appropriate course of action to protect 
and promote the welfare of research participants and other 
stakeholders, taking into account scientific and medical 
knowledge, relational and social dimensions of living with AD 
and/or receiving an invasive intervention such as DBS, and the 
context in which the trial is performed and where decisions are 
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made. By utilising a pragmatic approach (Fins, Bacchetta & 
Miller 1997; Racine 2008b) guided by cornerstone ethical 
guidelines and medical ethics principles to evaluate different 
aspects of a clinical trial (Emanuel, Wendler & Grady 2000; Li et 
al. 2016), this dissertation and the publications in it emulate the 
clinical and research ethics-grounded analysis performed by 
Issa and Keyserlingk (2000), Karlawish and Casarett (2001), 
Karlawish and Clark (2002), Beattie (2007), and Fisk (2007) to 
dissect ethical issues in research involving people with 
dementia and by Cabrera, Evans, and Hamilton (2014), Clausen 
(2010), and Racine, Bell, and Zizzo (2014) to determine ethical 
considerations on the expanding use of DBS.” 
 
Chapter 7, page 177: 
 
“The “Participant selection criteria” section in Chapter 4 (Viaña 
et al. 2017) and the “Considerations for patient selection” 
section in Chapter 5 (Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017) both 
discuss ways in which the selection criteria can be improved to 
ensure that participants are not subjected to undue and 
avoidable harms and also potentially benefit from the 
procedure, in line with the ethical principles of beneficence and 
non-maleficence  (Beauchamp & Childress 2013) and with 
pragmatism’s (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Fins 2008b) goal 
of providing practical goals and realizable plans of action.” 
 
Chapter 7, page 183: 
 
“In order to adopt a full pragmatic approach (Fins, Bacchetta & 
Miller 1997; Racine 2008b), recommendations in the three 
main publications should be tested and deliberated upon in 
future empirical bioethical studies involving people with AD 
who have received or will receive DBS, and on future 
conceptual and empirical neuroethical research on new 
findings from the clinical trials examined (Leoutsakos et al. 
2018), or on DBS of other brain regions (Scharre et al. 2018) or 
DBS with a closed-loop set-up (Senova, Chaillet & Lozano 2018) 
in people with AD.” 
Fallibilism as stressed in pragmatic theory: 
What is the author’s role (and his 
collaborators) in generating the PIAAAS 
bubble (page 108)? If an increasing critical 
perspective was developed during the 
process of research and publication (e.g., 
growing self-awareness), this should be 
explained to avoid the impression of 
I would like to thank Examiner 1 for asking further clarification 
on the role of the author and his collaborators in generating the 
PIAAAS (personality, identity, agency, authenticity, autonomy, 
and self) bubble and for emphasizing the need to actually enact 
ethical concepts and theories at some point to assess their 
value. I have added following paragraph on pages 104 to 106 of 
Chapter 3 to respond to and integrate this feedback in my 
dissertation: 
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blaming only others. It would contribute to 
the epistemological humility and fallibilism 
promoted by pragmatism. There is also a 
need to actually enact ethical concepts and 
theories at some point to assess their value 
(all of the work published is upstream with 
little indication of how it will or could be 
tested. 
“Our article on the potential ethics bubble on the effects of DBS 
on PIAAAS (Gilbert, Viaña & Ineichen 2018) has encouraged 
deeper reflection on how my and my collaborators’ previous 
conceptual and empirical works could have likewise 
contributed to an ethics bubble, and on how future work 
conducting empirical research or drawing from results of 
qualitative studies could be improved so as not to create an 
impenetrable bubble that distorts accurate perception of 
actual risks and potential benefits of a certain technology or 
intervention. One evidence of such reflection is the citation of 
Frederic Gilbert’s (2013, 2015) previous works on how DBS in 
people with treatment-resistant depression could lead to self-
estrangement. In the article of Gilbert, Viaña and Ineichen 
(2018), the papers of Gilbert (2013, 2015) were included in 
Table 2 as examples of philosophical explanations about the 
putative impact of DBS on PIAAAS. Including Gilbert’s (2013, 
2015) papers as possible contributors to the PIAAAS bubble is 
evidence of growing self-awareness and an increase in critical 
perspective during research and publication, in line with 
pragmatism’s (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997) emphasis on 
periodic review and in modifying previously proposed courses 
of action as research evolves. The critical appraisal of one’s 
previous work is also a demonstration of commitment to 
moderate fallibilism and epistemological humility advocated by 
pragmatism (Arras 2002), acknowledging how one’s previous 
views could have contributed to an ethics bubble and how this 
could be corrected. The use of the term “we neuroethicists” or 
“we, the neuroethicists” in the paper also exemplifies that the 
goal of the article of Gilbert, Viaña and Ineichen (2018) is not to 
simply delegate blame to other ethicists for generating hype on 
the extended effects of DBS, but also to critically appraise one’s 
previous work and the way it has also contributed to the 
generation of a speculative bubble. Finally, in order to achieve 
a full pragmatic approach (Fins, Bacchetta & Miler 1997; Racine 
2008b) in addressing the issue of ethics hype on the effects of 
DBS on PIAAAS, it is important to facilitate deliberation with 
patients, physicians, and ethicists on how they perceive 
philosophical reflections on DBS’s effects on PIAAAS could 
affect patient willingness to undergo DBS and physician 
decision to offer it as a potential therapy. This deliberation 
would allow testing of the practical usefulness and applicability 
of the recommendations forwarded by Gilbert, Viaña, and 
Ineichen (2018) and also espouse mutual trust and respect 
among various stakeholders (Tong 1997) in the applications of 
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DBS to movement disorders and in its expanding therapeutic 
applications.” 
The role of empirical research in bioethics 
scholarship and the constraints on 
speculation imposed by a pragmatic 
approach (pages 114 and 115) as well as the 
interdisciplinary nature of 
ethics/neuroethics (page 171) but what is 
the candidate’s stance on the role of 
speculation? Pragmatic approaches stress 
the value of scenario-based ethical 
deliberation. Is there a role for speculation 
(or something akin) therein? 
I am grateful for Examiner 1’s questions on my stance on 
speculation and on whether I believe that there is role for 
speculation in a pragmatic ethical approach. I have added the 
following paragraph on pages 106 to 108 of Chapter 3 to 
address the examiner’s queries: 
 
“Although Gilbert, Viaña, and Ineichen (2018) caution against 
unwarranted and unsubstantiated speculation on the effects of 
DBS on PIAAAS, we do not aim to disregard the role and 
importance of speculation. Speculation in bioethics involves an 
attempt to predict scenarios and draw conclusions on their 
possible outcomes based on assumptions that cannot be 
verified by present empirical or scientific claims. We 
acknowledge that through this effort, major ethical challenges 
can be foreseen before a novel technology or a new application 
of an existing technology is introduced and disseminated 
(Racine et al. 2014), allowing adequate steps to be taken to 
avert or deal with these challenges (Roache 2008). 
Furthermore, we agree with Roache (2008) that properly 
grounded and knowledge-based speculation (Racine et al. 
2014) encourages ethical evaluation at the start or early stages 
of a project, helping avoid unethical or ethically misguided 
scientific endeavours before a significant amount of money, 
time, and careers has been invested in them. Speculation, even 
of future scenarios with low probabilities of occurring, could 
also be instrumental in motivating the conduct of crucial ethical 
projects (Roache 2008) that address present issues.  
 
Pragmatism’s commitment to fallibilism (Arras 2002), 
acknowledging that knowledge is not absolute (Brown 2008), 
also signifies room for making speculations, as long as they 
follow a thorough review of empirical information (Fins, 
Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Fins 2005) and discuss the limitations 
of various methods in obtaining such information, as indicated 
in the paper of Gilbert, Viaña, and Ineichen (2018) and in one 
of the preceding paragraphs. With pragmatism’s emphasis on 
scenario and context-based ethical deliberation (Fins, 
Bacchetta & Miler 1997; Racine 2008b), it is important to 
critically appraise previous speculations and conclusions made 
to see how well they still fit within a particular context and the 
extent of the applicability of any claims made. For instance, the 
article of Gilbert, Viaña, and Ineichen (2018) highlighted that 
“the prevalence and incidence of effects on PIAAAS might not 
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be exclusively correlated with a specific DBS target and/or 
stimulation parameter. It should rather be seen as a result of 
the interaction between electrical stimulation, adjustments in 
medication, and natural progression of the disease” (p. 10, 
Gilbert, Viaña & Ineichen 2018).  This claim underscores the 
significance of context in translating ethical claims. In addition 
to taking into account biological details of a case, it is essential 
to factor in family dynamics, institutional arrangements, social 
norms (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997), cultural practices, and 
broader environmental factors that could affect the extent in 
which a person receiving DBS adjusts and adapts to DBS 
therapy. The applicability, importance, and relevance of any 
speculations made should be viewed from both techno-
scientific and psycho-socio-environmental vantage points, 
considering not just the perspectives of people receiving DBS 
but also of the attending medical professionals and of family 
and caregivers. Finally, fallibilism should be applied to both 
qualitative and quantitative claims. Potential biases due to 
conflicts of interest (Bebbington 2003) and/or limitations and 
challenges in gathering comprehensive quantitative 
information (Fairchild et al. 2018) should be acknowledged 
when presenting and drawing claims from quantitative data. 
For instance, the applicability to ethical claims of prevalence 
rates of various psychiatric symptoms in people with 
Parkinson’s disease indicated in the paper of Gilbert, Viaña, and 
Ineichen (2018) might be affected by location, time period, 
specific patient population, institutional capacities, and other 
socio-environmental factors that influence the reporting and 
diagnosis of psychiatric symptoms (Woodall et al. 2010; Kohrt 
et al. 2014).” 
Working in collaboration with moral agents 
(few of the papers take the perspective of 
researchers, their intents, their 
motivations) such that limited internal 
understanding of the rationale of 
researchers is reflected. Resolving ethical 
problems is facilitated by the understanding 
of the motivations of people as agents. 
However, researcher voices are quite 
absent from the thesis and the 
development of recommendations (page 
171). There is no engagement process 
supporting the development of 
recommendations. 
I would like to thank Examiner 1 for pointing out that 
researcher voices are quite absent from this thesis and in the 
development of recommendations and that there is no 
engagement process in the development of recommendations. 
I have added the following statements in this thesis to 
acknowledge these points and underscore the importance of 
involving researchers, clinicians, and other allied healthcare 
personnel in future ethical investigations on clinical trials of 
deep brain stimulation for Alzheimer’s disease: 
 
Chapter 1, pages 12 to 13: 
 
“At this point, it is also important to stress what this 
dissertation does not try to achieve. First, although pragmatic 
ethics focuses on the role of deliberation and negotiation (Fins, 
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Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b), research for this 
dissertation does not include direct engagement with people 
participating in DBS for AD clinical trials, their family members 
and/or caregivers, and researchers and clinicians having an 
active role in the conduct of these trials, given that none of the 
trials are performed in Australia. As such, this dissertation 
employs a relatively limited pragmatic approach.” 
 
Chapter 7, page 173: 
 
“Pragmatically-oriented (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 
2008b) conceptual work on this topic could serve as the basis 
of future actual empirical work involving deliberation and 
engagement with various key stakeholders, allowing better 
understanding of the perspectives of people with AD on 
participating in a risky and invasive clinical trial and the 
intentions and motivations of researchers in extending the 
application of DBS to AD.” 
 
Chapter 8, pages 247 to 248: 
 
“Interviews and surveys with researchers, scientists, doctors, 
and other medical professionals who are conducting DBS for 
AD trials and/or are involved in laboratory research relevant to 
this topic should also be performed. This will be crucial in 
acquiring a fuller understanding of the state of knowledge and 
research in this field; preliminary evidence on the potential 
safety and efficacy of DBS for AD beyond what is available in 
academic publications; motivations for pursuing this line of 
work in a vulnerable population, despite limited evidence; 
factors and considerations undertaken in participant 
recruitment, trial design, and selection of outcome measures; 
and personal reflection on possible ethical issues arising from 
the conduct of these clinical trials. To incorporate negotiation 
and deliberation (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b), 
focus groups involving various stakeholders can be facilitated, 
allowing joint discussion on ethical issues from multiple 
perspectives and collaborative decision-making on possible 
ways in which they can be addressed. In these studies, a 
hypothesis-based approach could also be employed to 
determine how certain factors such as decision-making 
capacity of people with AD and their family members and 
possible conflicts of interest of researchers could influence 
their perceptions of ethical dilemmas and moral concerns 
arising from DBS for AD trials.” 
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The concerns about the risks of genetic 
information (pages 136-148) could be 
lessened if the patient is already diagnosed 
with AD? 
I would like to thank Examiner 1 for asking whether the risks of 
genetic information could be lessened if a person with AD has 
already received clinical diagnosis. I have added a few 
sentences on page 179 of Chapter 7 to address this query: 
 
“Although concerns on the risks of genetic information to an 
individual with AD could be lessened if there is already a clear 
diagnosis of AD, some other risks to that person and to his or 
her family members remain. For instance, information on 
having autosomal-dominant mutations linked to early-onset 
AD could lead to prognostic pessimism (Kong, Dunn & Parker 
2017) on some individuals regarding their rate of decline and 
possible eventual appearance of behavioural (Cacace, Sleegers 
& Van Broeckhoven 2016) and motor symptoms (Wu et al. 
2012) associated with autosomal dominant AD, especially in 
the absence of proper post-test genetic counselling (Viaña, 
Bueno & Gilbert 2017). Genetic information could also have 
repercussions on family members, primarily on children and 
immediate relatives. A positive genetic test result for 
possession of autosomal dominant AD associated alleles means 
that children and siblings could also have the mutation, which 
would have implications on insurance (Roberts, Christensen & 
Green 2011), reproductive (Goldman 2012), and geriatric care 
planning, in addition to decisions on participating in a clinical 
trial for those with autosomal dominant AD (Van 
Cauwenberghe, Van Broeckhoven & Sleegers 2015) and getting 
a genetic test themselves.” 
The use of the concept of “transdisciplinary 
research” (page 18), “transdisciplinary 
approach” (page 19), “transdisciplinary 
pragmatic approach” (page 26), 
transdisciplinary analysis (page 179), 
transdisciplinary nature of neuroethics 
(page 205) and so on... merits elucidation, 
notably where many hesitate to claim such 
a high level of integration for neuroethics. 
Most authors describe neuroethics as an 
interdisciplinary field and nevertheless 
there are some who still challenge this view. 
I am not sure the candidate can claim the 
thesis to be an exemplar of transdisciplinary 
research. It would be advisable to 
redescribe the work. Also, the explanation 
of the transdisciplinary nature of 
neuroethics as being premised on the 
Upon careful reflection, I agree with Examiner 1 that the level 
of integration in neuroethics is mostly at the interdisciplinary, 
rather than at the transdisciplinary, level. The application and 
synthesis of multiple disciplinary vantage points have allowed 
the proposition of practical recommendations, but indeed, not 
the creation of a totally novel field and methodology that 
transcend individual disciplinary perspectives (Choi & Pak 
2006). Contributions from distinct disciplines can still be 
identified and pointed out in neuroethical discourses. As such, 
I have already redescribed this concept in this work and have 
change all mentions of “transdisciplinary” to 
“interdisciplinary”, including variations of these terms. 
 
To address Examiner 1’s request for a stronger argument on the 
interdisciplinary nature of neuroethics (from a pragmatic 
perspective), I have extended the following statement on pages 
172 to 173 of Chapter 7: 
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interdisciplinary nature of neuroscience 
(pages 170-171) is not the most convincing. 
Yes, in a sense the complexity of 
neuroscience as a field merits a complex 
response but are there not stronger 
arguments justifying the interdisciplinary 
nature of neuroethics (from a pragmatic 
perspective)? 
“Given the interdisciplinary nature of neuroscience, it is just 
befitting for a field that investigates and explores the ethical 
dimensions of this discipline to acknowledge the benefits of 
looking at different levels of biopsychosocial organization and 
through different disciplinary lenses. Furthermore, from a 
pragmatic standpoint (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 
2008b), understanding the ethical and societal implications of 
neuroscientific development necessitates the use of empirical 
knowledge and methods from both the natural and social 
sciences, taking into account scientific facts and social norms.” 
Some tensions between the criticisms 
about speculation in and the actual 
engagement in scholarship which seems to 
rely itself on an economy of promises 
because it is not grounded in actual lived 
experience of stakeholders. Indeed, many if 
not all of the contributions are premised on 
a rather narrow description of the problem 
addressed, often starting with technological 
development and clinical research with 
little integration of social context and 
relational aspects of situations experienced 
by patients and their relatives. In the future, 
adopting a pragmatic approach should 
infuse theoretical and methodological 
orientations such that situations are not 
solely defined by their techno-scientific 
dimensions but also their personal, 
interpersonal aspects dimensions too. Page 
119: Why is speculative ethics wrong? You 
should spell out what is your own ideal of 
ethics scholarship, otherwise you fall into 
crypto-normativism: you suggest implicitly 
a normative vision without spelling it out 
yourself. 
Throughout the thesis, there is no 
contextual analysis for the reasons/causes 
of speculation in ethics scholarship. 
I appreciate Examiner 1’s feedback on the depiction of 
speculation in this dissertation. I have added the following 
paragraphs on pages 106 to 108 of Chapter 3 to provide a richer 
description of speculative ethics, reasons and causes for 
speculation in ethics, and my perspective on how it fits into my 
own ideal of ethics scholarship: 
 
“Although Gilbert, Viaña, and Ineichen (2018) caution against 
unwarranted and unsubstantiated speculation on the effects of 
DBS on PIAAAS, we do not aim to disregard the role and 
importance of speculation. Speculation in bioethics involves an 
attempt to predict scenarios and draw conclusions on their 
possible outcomes based on assumptions that cannot be 
verified by present empirical or scientific claims. We 
acknowledge that through this effort, major ethical challenges 
can be foreseen before a novel technology or a new application 
of an existing technology is introduced and disseminated 
(Racine et al. 2014), allowing adequate steps to be taken to 
avert or deal with these challenges (Roache 2008). 
Furthermore, we agree with Roache (2008) that properly 
grounded and knowledge-based speculation (Racine et al. 
2014) encourages ethical evaluation at the start or early stages 
of a project, helping avoid unethical or ethically misguided 
scientific endeavours before a significant amount of money, 
time, and careers has been invested in them. Speculation, even 
of future scenarios with low probabilities of occurring, could 
also be instrumental in motivating the conduct of crucial ethical 
projects (Roache 2008) that address present issues.  
 
Pragmatism’s commitment to fallibilism (Arras 2002), 
acknowledging that knowledge is not absolute (Brown 2008), 
also signifies room for making speculations, as long as they 
follow a thorough review of empirical information (Fins, 
Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Fins 2005) and discuss the limitations 
of various methods in obtaining such information, as indicated 
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in the paper of Gilbert, Viaña, and Ineichen (2018) and in one 
of the preceding paragraphs. With pragmatism’s emphasis on 
scenario and context-based ethical deliberation (Fins, 
Bacchetta & Miler 1997; Racine 2008b), it is important to 
critically appraise previous speculations and conclusions made 
to see how well they still fit within a particular context and the 
extent of the applicability of any claims made. For instance, the 
article of Gilbert, Viaña, and Ineichen (2018) highlighted that 
“the prevalence and incidence of effects on PIAAAS might not 
be exclusively correlated with a specific DBS target and/or 
stimulation parameter. It should rather be seen as a result of 
the interaction between electrical stimulation, adjustments in 
medication, and natural progression of the disease” (p. 10, 
Gilbert, Viaña & Ineichen 2018).  This claim underscores the 
significance of context in translating ethical claims. In addition 
to taking into account biological details of a case, it is essential 
to factor in family dynamics, institutional arrangements, social 
norms (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997), cultural practices, and 
broader environmental factors that could affect the extent in 
which a person receiving DBS adjusts and adapts to DBS 
therapy. The applicability, importance, and relevance of any 
speculations made should be viewed from both techno-
scientific and psycho-socio-environmental vantage points, 
considering not just the perspectives of people receiving DBS 
but also of the attending medical professionals and of family 
and caregivers. Finally, fallibilism should be applied to both 
qualitative and quantitative claims. Potential biases due to 
conflicts of interest (Bebbington 2003) and/or limitations and 
challenges in gathering comprehensive quantitative 
information (Fairchild et al. 2018) should be acknowledged 
when presenting and drawing claims from quantitative data. 
For instance, the applicability to ethical claims of prevalence 
rates of various psychiatric symptoms in people with 
Parkinson’s disease indicated in the paper of Gilbert, Viaña, and 
Ineichen (2018) might be affected by location, time period, 
specific patient population, institutional capacities, and other 
socio-environmental factors that influence the reporting and 
diagnosis of psychiatric symptoms (Woodall et al. 2010; Kohrt 
et al. 2014).” 
 
With regards to Examiner 1’s point on this dissertation being 
“premised on a rather narrow description of the problem 
addressed, often starting with technological development and 
clinical research with little integration of social context and 
relational aspects of situations experienced by patients and 
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their relatives”, I agree that the two publications in Chapters 4 
(Viaña et al. 2017) and 5 (Viaña, Bittlinger, and Gilbert 2017) on 
ethical considerations on clinical trials of DBS for people with 
AD mainly gravitate towards techno-scientific details of the 
clinical trials. However, the publication in Chapter 6 (Viaña and 
Gilbert 2018) places great emphasis on the importance of 
personal and interpersonal aspects, with its use of the tripartite 
model of selfhood to hypothesise or speculate on the possible 
effects of DBS on self referencing, self-description, and 
relationality of people with Alzheimer’s disease. 
 
I have also added the following sentences in this dissertation to 
further underscore the importance of getting the perspectives 
of multiple stakeholders and investigating ethical issues from 
both techno-scientific and psycho-social vantage pints: 
 
Chapter 3, page 107: 
 
“In addition to taking into account biological details of a case, 
it is essential to factor in family dynamics, institutional 
arrangements, social norms (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997), 
cultural practices, and broader environmental factors that 
could affect the extent in which a person receiving DBS adjusts 
and adapts to DBS therapy. The applicability, importance, and 
relevance of any speculations made should be viewed from 
both techno-scientific and psycho-socio-environmental 
vantage points, considering not just the perspectives of people 
receiving DBS but also of the attending medical professionals 
and of family and caregivers.” 
 
Chapter 3, page 108: 
 
“Furthermore, in order to apply a complete pragmatic 
approach (Fins, Bacchetta & Miler 1997; Racine 2008b) to 
investigating and understanding the ethical concerns 
associated with DBS for AD, deliberation with patients, family 
members and caregivers, researchers, and medical staff should 
be made using recommendations in this paper’s three main 
publications (Viaña et al. 2017; Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017; 
Viaña & Gilbert 2018) as guiding frameworks. This would 
ensure that ethical recommendations are actually enacted and 
evaluated, in addition to determining additional techno-
scientific and psycho-socio-environmental factors, especially 
participant and caregiver actual lived experiences, that are 
crucial in developing more sound and adaptive 
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recommendations for ongoing and future DBS for AD clinical 
trials.”  
There is no general imitations section, no 
acknowledgment of what was fulfilled and 
not fulfilled by the doctoral research project 
I would like thank Examiner 1 for pointing this out. I have added 
the following paragraphs to provide a more concrete 
description of the goals and limitations of this dissertation: 
 
Chapter 1, pages 12 to 13: 
 
“At this point, it is also important to stress what this 
dissertation does not try to achieve. First, although pragmatic 
ethics focuses on the role of deliberation and negotiation (Fins, 
Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b), research for this 
dissertation does not include direct engagement with people 
participating in DBS for AD clinical trials, their family members 
and/or caregivers, and researchers and clinicians having an 
active role in the conduct of these trials, given that none of the 
trials are performed in Australia. As such, this dissertation 
employs a relatively limited pragmatic approach. Nevertheless, 
by drawing directly from information on how the trials are set-
up and recruited, in addition to previous studies on clinical 
trials of DBS for other indications and on how Alzheimer’s 
disease could affect selfhood and decision-making, this thesis 
embraces the pragmatic framework, at least to the extent in 
which it uses an interdisciplinary approach that acknowledges 
the contributions of medicine, social science, and philosophy to 
providing practical recommendations that would help guide 
the ethical conduct of ongoing and prospective DBS for AD 
trials. The three main publications in this thesis (Viaña et al. 
2017; Viaña, Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017; Viaña & Gilbert 2018) 
could also serve as groundwork for future ethics research that 
employ a fuller pragmatic approach (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 
1997; Racine 2008b) – directly engaging with participants and 
researchers in DBS for AD trials, determining how the 
recommendations forwarded in the publications help improve 
the conduct of these trials, and gauging additional concerns of 
multiple stakeholders that warrant further moral reflection.” 
 
Chapter 8, pages 247 to 249: 
 
“This dissertation draws insights from pragmatism (Fins, 
Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b) in order to propose 
recommendations that aim to improve the ethical conduct of 
clinical trials of DBS and other invasive neurotechnologies in 
people with AD. Although ethical reflection in this dissertation 
is based on empirical information from the results of DBS for 
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AD clinical trials, animal studies evaluating the effects of fornix 
stimulation, studies on the impact of AD on selfhood, and 
information from research involving people who have received 
DBS for other conditions, the major limitation of this work is 
that there was no direct engagement with people with AD who 
have received DBS, their caregivers and/or family members, 
and researchers and health care personnel conducting the 
trials. As such, this thesis can only claim partial application of a 
pragmatic approach (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 
2008b), considering the absence of engagement, deliberation, 
and negotiation with key stakeholders involved in this clinical 
research endeavour.  
 
To gauge the full spectrum of ethical concerns arising from 
clinical trials of DBS for AD, qualitative and quantitative studies 
must be performed on people with AD who have received or 
will receive DBS and their family members, caregivers, study 
partners, and/or surrogate decision makers, inquiring about 
their motivations and apprehensions for participating in a 
clinical trial; lived experience before, during, and after a DBS 
trial; and ethical and moral concerns faced during different trial 
stages. Interviews and surveys with researchers, scientists, 
doctors, and other medical professionals who are conducting 
DBS for AD trials and/or are involved in laboratory research 
relevant to this topic should also be performed. This will be 
crucial in acquiring a fuller understanding of the state of 
knowledge and research in this field; preliminary evidence on 
the potential safety and efficacy of DBS for AD beyond what is 
available in academic publications; motivations for pursuing 
this line of work in a vulnerable population, despite limited 
evidence; factors and considerations undertaken in participant 
recruitment, trial design, and selection of outcome measures; 
and personal reflection on possible ethical issues arising from 
the conduct of these clinical trials. To incorporate negotiation 
and deliberation (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b), 
focus groups involving various stakeholders can be facilitated, 
allowing joint discussion on ethical issues from multiple 
perspectives and collaborative decision-making on possible 
ways in which they can be addressed. In these studies, a 
hypothesis-based approach could also be employed to 
determine how certain factors such as decision-making 
capacity of people with AD and their family members and 
possible conflicts of interest of researchers could influence 
their perceptions of ethical dilemmas and moral concerns 
arising from DBS for AD trials. Empirical studies are of crucial 
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importance in this line of research, building upon the 
conceptual work presented in this dissertation. They would 
also provide an excellent opportunity to gauge whether the 
concerns and recommendations forwarded in the incorporated 
publications are similar to the ones voiced out by various 
parties, and on how can the recommendations be further 
improved to acknowledge contextual variations and the 
perspectives of multiple stakeholders.  
 
Although most publications presented in this dissertation 
performed a systematic search using specific keywords on 
various databases to survey empirical studies relevant to 
understanding ethical concerns in clinical trials of invasive 
neurotechnologies in people with AD, a more systematic 
review methodology following the PRISMA-P statement 
(Shamseer et al. 2015) could have been employed. This would 
facilitate increased transparency on the selection of animal 
studies, clinical trials on DBS for AD, and other empirical studies 
on people with AD or DBS recipients that are included in the 
publications and used to derive ethical recommendations. 
Furthermore, future ethics research on this topic could 
formulate and utilise a more concrete protocol in determining 
which occurrences during a clinical trial warrant serious 
consideration and an actual ethical recommendation. For the 
three main publications (Viaña et al. 2017; Viaña, Bittlinger & 
Gilbert 2017; Viaña & Gilbert 2018) in this dissertation, the 
requirements for ethical research trial forwarded by 
Emmanuel, Wendler, and Grady (2000) and elements essential 
in an ethics section of a clinical trial protocol, identified by Li et 
al. (2016), were used to direct the focus of the ethical analysis 
to participant selection, study design, and outcome 
measurement and reporting. In line with a pragmatic approach 
to bioethical analysis (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 
2008b), deliberation with people with AD, family members, and 
healthcare personnel should be employed to determine what 
aspects in a DBS for AD clinical trial do they deem highly 
important and what results from previous studies would 
warrant more serious ethical reflection.” 
Minor comments (typos, formulations) 
Suggestion/Feedback Response 
Missing “on-going” in “on practices and 
research involving” (page 18)? 
I have already changed “on practices and research involving” 
on page 2 of Chapter 1 to “on on-going practices and research 
involving”. 
“has written” and not “has wrote” (page 24) I have already changed “has wrote” on page 18 of Chapter 1 to 
“have written”. 
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“these papers are” and not “these papers 
will” (page 24) 
On page 18 of Chapter 1, I have already replaced “these papers 
will” with “these papers are”. 
“this chapter includes” and not “this 
chapter will include articles” (page 24) 
I have already replaced “this chapter will include articles” with 
“this chapter includes articles” on page 18 of Chapter 1. 
“also illustrates” instead of “will also 
illustrate” (page 25) 
I have already changed “will also illustrate” on page 18 of 
Chapter 1 to “also illustrates”. 
Nuance the lack of advocacy for PET scan for 
diagnostic purposes given its (potentially 
hasty) admission in the USA (to differentiate 
between different forms of dementia? 
(page 33) 
I greatly appreciate Examiner 1’s recommendation of nuancing 
the lack of advocacy for PET scan in diagnosing AD and in 
differentiating it from other types of dementia. I have added 
the following points on page 27 of Chapter 2 in response to this 
suggestion: 
 
“Although FDG-PET ([18F] fluorodeoxyglucose positron 
emission tomography) is already used in clinical practice to 
differentiate AD from other types of dementia, preventing the 
prescription of inappropriate medications for those with 
frontotemporal dementia or dementia with Lewy Bodies, the 
hasty and inappropriate use of amyloid imaging for AD 
diagnosis is cautioned against. A negative result on an amyloid 
PET scan indicates reduced likelihood of AD as the underlying 
cause of cognitive impairment; however, a positive result does 
not establish differential diagnosis between AD and other 
amyloid-beta disorders such as dementia with Lewy bodies or 
cerebral amyloid angiopathy (Marcus, Mena & Subramaniam 
2014).  Furthermore, a positive result may be incidental since 
cognitively-normal adults could also exhibit age-related 
increase in cerebral amyloid (Atri 2016). As such, when using 
amyloid PET imaging to aid in AD diagnosis, it is important that 
other clinical information are considered, standardized 
protocols are followed, and the procedure and scan 
interpretation are performed by staff and clinicians with 
expertise in neurodegenerative disorders (Marcus, Mena & 
Subramaniam 2014).” 
Missing “not” in “was able to” on page 46 Upon double checking the paper of Sabat (2002), the woman 
referred to in this study was indeed still able to “refer to her 
previous ability to find the exact words for her thoughts, being 
a former academic, and shared her frustrations from not being 
able to use the most appropriate words as a result of AD (Self 
2).” As such, there is no missing “not” in the phrase referred to. 
Change “would be useful” for “will be 
useful” (page 51) 
I have already replaced “would be useful” with “will be useful” 
on page 46 of Chapter 3. 
Insert “the” in “for the informed consent 
procedure and the design of DBS...” (page 
51) 
I have already changed “for the informed consent procedure 
and design of DBS” on page 46 of Chapter 3 to “for the 
informed consent procedure and the design of DBS”. 
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Why is the therapeutic use of electric 
stimulation not dated back to the Ancient 
civilizations (page 52) and actually to 1936-
7 
In this statement, I am referring to the modern way of using 
electrical stimulation for therapy. I have added “instrument-
induced” in this sentence on page 47 of Chapter 3 to further 
clarify what I am referring to: 
 
“The first therapeutic application of instrument-induced 
electrical stimulation of the brain was reported in 1936 and in 
1937 when it was used to localize the firing point for epilepsy 
(Penfield 1936) and in mapping cortical somatic motor and 
sensory representation (Penfield, Wilder & Boldrey 1937), 
respectively.” 
Does “leisure tourism” (page 61) stand for 
sex tourism? If that’s the case it should be 
spelled out very transparently without any 
euphemism 
Houeto et al. (2002) did not specify whether “leisure tourism” 
meant “sex tourism”. As such, I would prefer not to elaborate 
further on this so as not to put my own words or interpretation 
on the researchers’ own definition and conceptualization of 
“leisure tourism”. 
“to cross an international boarder” instead 
of “cross the border” (page 65) 
I have already replaced “to cross the border” with “to cross an 
international border” on page 61 of Chapter 3. 
Check syntax in “various qualitatively 
different kinds...” (page 66) 
I have already changed “In this study, we demonstrated that 
there are various qualitatively different kinds” on page 62 of 
Chapter 3 to “In this qualitative study, we demonstrated that 
there are different kinds”. 
I wondered if the repeated statements “are 
included in this manuscript” (e.g., page 69, 
page 107, page 214 and so on) should not 
be changed to something like “are included 
in this thesis” or “are included in this 
doctoral dissertation” 
I have already replaced all instances of “are included in this 
manuscript” with “are included in this doctoral dissertation”. 
page 77, not clear what the “#” stands for in 
the table 
I have added the following statement on page 66 of Chapter 3 
to state what the “#” in the paper of Gilbert et al. (2017) stands 
for: 
 
“Note: In the table on page 75, the “#” for the Model of Self 
employed in the studies of Gilbert (2013a, 2015, 2017) 
indicates that no particular model of the self was advocated for, 
given that these studies focus more on the concept of self-
estrangement from a phenomenological point of view. I would 
like to thank one of the examiners for clarifying what was 
meant by this symbol in the table.” 
Typo in “[7]., etc.” (page 109) I have included the following sentences on page 109 of Chapter 
3 to acknowledge the typographical error in the paper of 
Gilbert, Viaña, and Ineichen (2018): 
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“Note: On page 111, there is a period after “has the potential 
to alter essential features of a patient’s personhood, including 
mood, personality, and cognitive abilities [7]”. This was a 
typographical error, and the period should not have been 
there. “[7]., etc.” should be replaced with “[7], etc.” I would like 
to thank one of the examiners for pointing out this mistake.” 
How do know that the “prevalence of 
evidence” was not biased by conflicts of 
interest” (page 117). Why are you so 
confident in the prevalence rates reported? 
(page 117) 
Indeed, there is no way to directly know that the “prevalence 
of evidence” reported in the paper of Gilbert, Viaña, and 
Ineichen (2008) is not biased by conflicts of interest. As such, I 
am not completely confident with the prevalence rates 
reported. I have added the following sentences on pages 107 
to 108 of Chapter 3 to reflect this stance: 
 
“Finally, fallibilism should be applied to both qualitative and 
quantitative claims. Potential biases due to conflicts of interest 
(Bebbington 2003) and/or limitations and challenges in 
gathering comprehensive quantitative information (Fairchild et 
al. 2018) should be acknowledged when presenting and 
drawing claims from quantitative data. For instance, the 
applicability to ethical claims of prevalence rates of various 
psychiatric symptoms in people with Parkinson’s disease 
indicated in the paper of Gilbert, Viaña, and Ineichen (2018) 
might be affected by location, time period, specific patient 
population, institutional capacities, and other socio-
environmental factors that influence the reporting and 
diagnosis of psychiatric symptoms (Woodall et al. 2010; Kohrt 
et al. 2014).” 
Why “Nonetheless” in “Nonetheless, this 
study”? A pragmatic model of philosophy 
does not antagonize conceptual and 
empirical research (page 171). 
I have already deleted the “Nonetheless” before “this study 
also acknowledges the richness” on page 173 of Chapter 7. 
Change “more closely on peculiarities” to 
“more closely at peculiarities” (page 177) 
I have already replaced “more closely on peculiarities” with 
“more closely at peculiarities” on page 180 of Chapter 7. 
Change “Throughout the PhD” for 
“Throughout my doctoral research” (page 
205) 
I have already changed “Throughout the PhD” on page 208 of 
Chapter 7 to “Throughout my doctoral research”. 
Insert “project” after “A possible bioethical 
research” (page 209) 
I have already replaced “A possible bioethical research 
concerning” with “A possible bioethical research project 
concerning” on page 212 of Chapter 7. 
Provide a reference for the “applied and 
pragmatic ethical approach” (page 242) 
I have added “(Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b)” 
after “a pragmatic ethical approach” on page 245 of Chapter 8. 
Confusion between practical and pragmatic 
(page 242 and 244) 
In Chapter 8, I have replaced “an applied and pragmatic ethical 
approach” with “a pragmatic ethical approach” on page 245. I 
have also replaced “pragmatic” with “practical” on page 249. 
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Responses to Examiner 2’s comments and recommendations 
 
Key areas for improvement 
Suggestion/Feedback Response 
It would be useful to include a brief section, 
or even simply a paragraph, that consists in 
a narrative about the methodology 
employed, in particular for the first two 
main publications. The justification for the 
choice of methodology (for example, versus 
a scoping or systematic review) as well as 
additional details about how and which 
publications were selected as part of the 
review would be critical to provide context 
for the body of work. 
I would like to thank Examiner 2 for suggesting the inclusion of 
a paragraph on the search methodology I employed for the first 
two main publications. I have included the following paragraph 
on pages 10 to 11 of Chapter 1 to address this point: 
 
“Through the principle-guided pragmatic approach (Fins, 
Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Emanuel, Wendler & Grady 2000; 
Racine 2008b; Li et al. 2016) described in the preceding 
paragraphs, this dissertation critically examines the protocols 
of animal research and in-human trials of DBS for AD, 
determines aspects of these studies that necessitate ethical 
reflection, and provides recommendations that directly 
address ethical concerns arising from the recruitment, design, 
and conduct of these studies. Considering the emphasis placed 
by pragmatism on the contribution of scientific and clinical 
knowledge derived from empirical investigations to ethical 
debates (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b), ethical 
reflection was based on the set-up and results of clinical trials 
and/or animal studies testing the effect of DBS on animal 
models or on people with AD. For the three publications that 
are the main focus of this dissertation (Viaña et al. 2017; Viaña, 
Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017; Viaña & Gilbert 2018), past and 
ongoing trials of DBS in people with AD were determined using 
a PubMed and clinicaltrials.gov search of the keywords “DBS 
Alzheimer’s disease” while completed animal studies that 
employed DBS of the fornix were identified using the keywords 
“DBS fornix” on PubMed. For the paper examining potential 
effects of DBS on the selfhood of people with AD (Viaña & 
Gilbert 2018), references were obtained through a search on 
PubMed, Scopus, and Google Scholar using the keywords 
“Alzheimer’s disease”, “dementia”, “deep brain stimulation”, 
“selfhood”, “social constructionist”, and “identity” and their 
corresponding permutations and combinations. Primary 
studies and case reports that explored the impact of AD on the 
social constructionist framework’s three aspects of the self 
were identified and highlighted in this review. There were no 
studies that investigated the impact of DBS on selfhood using 
the social constructionist framework, so relevant studies that 
discussed its effects on self recognition and perception, 
psychological and psychiatric profiles, identity, and social 
adjustment were referenced instead. For the research involved 
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in all three publications (Viaña et al. 2017; Viaña, Bittlinger & 
Gilbert 2017; Viaña & Gilbert 2018), the references of highly 
relevant articles were also examined to expand the search 
coverage and identify other articles related to the initial 
keywords used. No specific period was set during the searches, 
and only articles that are fully in or with abstracts in English 
were included as references for the three publications.” 
 
I have also described the limitations of the search method and 
review strategy I employed in the main publications included in 
this dissertation on pages 248 to 249 of Chapter 8: 
 
“Although most publications presented in this dissertation 
performed a systematic search using specific keywords on 
various databases to survey empirical studies relevant to 
understanding ethical concerns in clinical trials of invasive 
neurotechnologies in people with AD, a more systematic 
review methodology following the PRISMA-P statement 
(Shamseer et al. 2015) could have been employed. This would 
facilitate increased transparency on the selection of animal 
studies, clinical trials on DBS for AD, and other empirical studies 
on people with AD or DBS recipients that are included in the 
publications and used to derive ethical recommendations.” 
Within the section about methodology, I 
would invite the candidate to provide an 
indepth description of how the analytical 
framework was applied and how the 
recommendations were formed. As one 
example, for the recommendations about 
verifying if fornix stimulation triggers 
autobiographical memory as a marker of 
eventual therapeutic response – what 
methodology was employed to derive these 
recommendations from the literature? 
Which metrics were used to determine if an 
occurrence described in the literature 
warranted a recommendation? 
I would like to thank Examiner 2 for inviting me to provide an 
in-depth description of the analytical framework I used. I have 
included a paragraph in pages 11 to 12 of Chapter 1 to describe 
in detail how I applied a pragmatic framework for the 
recommendations forwarded in the three main publications in 
this dissertation: 
 
“For the three main publications (Viaña et al. 2017; Viaña, 
Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017; Viaña & Gilbert 2018), the pragmatic 
analytical framework (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 
2008b) was employed to provide recommendations that 
acknowledge and address ethical concerns specifically arising 
from evaluating the safety and efficacy of DBS in people with 
AD. After obtaining relevant literature through methods 
detailed in the preceding paragraph, scientific papers 
describing the clinical trials of DBS for people with AD were 
carefully and critically read and details on different aspects of 
the trial such as inclusion and exclusion criteria, consent 
procedure, characteristics of the population enrolled, study 
design, and measured outcomes and results were placed in a 
Microsoft Excel matrix to facilitate better comparison among 
different trials. By using information on the pathophysiology, 
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diagnosis, and prognosis (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997) of AD 
and the mechanisms of action and possible risks of DBS, better 
assessment of the suitability of the enrolled participants and 
the design of the clinical trials could be made.  With the focus 
of clinical pragmatism on patient’s decision-making capacity 
and family dynamics (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997), the way 
the informed consent was obtained for the trials and how the 
opinions of family members and caregivers were taken into 
account in the consent procedure, in addition to how AD could 
affect decision-making capacity, were also examined. In the 
identification of ethical considerations in the three major 
publications, institutional arrangements and broader social 
norms (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997) were considered in 
identifying DBS access issues and in determining how social 
factors such as malignant positioning of people with dementia 
(Sabat & Collins 1999) and therapeutic misconception of 
invasive neurotechnological trial participation (Fisher et al. 
2012) could affect the lived experience of a person with 
dementia who is receiving DBS. Furthermore, relevant moral 
considerations are also identified (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 
1997), highlighting potential tensions between the need to 
properly and systematically investigate an intervention that 
might be beneficial to people with AD and the obligation to 
ensure that vulnerable people with impaired-decision making 
are not taken advantage of and are not subjected to risky 
interventions with minimal possibility of benefit.  With the 
focus of pragmatic ethics on suggesting goals of care (Fins, 
Bacchetta & Miller 1997)  and on drawing from various 
disciplines to create new forms of wisdom in the pursuit of 
health (Racine 2008b), the ultimate aim of the three main 
publications in this dissertation (Viaña et al. 2017; Viaña, 
Bittlinger & Gilbert 2017; Viaña & Gilbert 2018) is to suggest 
plans of action that would minimise harm and ensure the 
welfare of clinical trial participants, ensuring that adequate 
care and respect are provided in the context of a clinical trial. 
Finally, clinical pragmatism advocates for periodic review and 
modification of course of action as the case evolves (Fins, 
Bacchetta & Miller 1997). As such, results from previous clinical 
trials of DBS for AD are also assessed to see how they can 
inform the design of ongoing and planned trials, ensuring that 
the participants enrolled and that the set-up of the clinical trials 
would lead to the greatest prospect of benefit and the least 
possibility of undue medical and social harms.”  
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On page 249 of Chapter 8, I have also mentioned limitations of 
the methodology I employed in deriving the recommendations 
forwarded: 
 
“Furthermore, future ethics research on this topic could 
formulate and utilise a more concrete protocol in determining 
which occurrences during a clinical trial warrant serious 
consideration and an actual ethical recommendation. For the 
three main publications (Viaña et al. 2017; Viaña, Bittlinger & 
Gilbert 2017; Viaña & Gilbert 2018) in this dissertation, the 
requirements for ethical research trial forwarded by 
Emmanuel, Wendler, and Grady (2000) and elements essential 
in an ethics section of a clinical trial protocol, identified by Li et 
al. (2016), were used to direct the focus of the ethical analysis 
to participant selection, study design, and outcome 
measurement and reporting. In line with a pragmatic approach 
to bioethical analysis (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 
2008b), deliberation with people with AD, family members, and 
healthcare personnel should be employed to determine what 
aspects in a DBS for AD clinical trial do they deem highly 
important and what results from previous studies would 
warrant more serious ethical reflection.” 
 
No specific established methodology was used to derive the 
recommendation on verifying if fornix stimulation triggers 
autobiographical memory is a marker of eventual therapeutic 
response (Viaña et al. 2017). This recommendation was made 
after reading the results of the Phase 1 trial (Laxton et al. 2010) 
showing that those who had experiential phenomenon during 
in-surgery stimulation had better cognitive outcomes from the 
trial. As such, I believe that verifying if this relationship indeed 
exists would help better tailor participant and brain target 
selection in future trials of DBS for AD. 
During his thesis defense, I would 
recommend that the candidate explore 
how the same research questions could be 
addressed using a hypothesis-based 
approach. 
I appreciate Examiner 2’s suggestion of exploring how the 
research questions on the ethical issues raised by DBS for AD in 
this dissertation could be addressed using a hypothesis-based 
approach. There is no formal thesis defense at the University of 
Tasmania, so I have just included the following paragraphs on 
pages 247 to 248 of Chapter 8 of this dissertation to address 
this point and elaborate further how an empirical study 
involving stakeholders could be performed to determine 
ethical issues associated with invasive neurotechnological trials 
involving people with AD: 
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“To gauge the full spectrum of ethical concerns arising from 
clinical trials of DBS for AD, qualitative and quantitative studies 
must be performed on people with AD who have received or 
will receive DBS and their family members, caregivers, study 
partners, and/or surrogate decision makers, inquiring about 
their motivations and apprehensions for participating in a 
clinical trial; lived experience before, during, and after a DBS 
trial; and ethical and moral concerns faced during different trial 
stages. Interviews and surveys with researchers, scientists, 
doctors, and other medical professionals who are conducting 
DBS for AD trials and/or are involved in laboratory research 
relevant to this topic should also be performed. This will be 
crucial in acquiring a fuller understanding of the state of 
knowledge and research in this field; preliminary evidence on 
the potential safety and efficacy of DBS for AD beyond what is 
available in academic publications; motivations for pursuing 
this line of work in a vulnerable population, despite limited 
evidence; factors and considerations undertaken in participant 
recruitment, trial design, and selection of outcome measures; 
and personal reflection on possible ethical issues arising from 
the conduct of these clinical trials. To incorporate negotiation 
and deliberation (Fins, Bacchetta & Miller 1997; Racine 2008b), 
focus groups involving various stakeholders can be facilitated, 
allowing joint discussion on ethical issues from multiple 
perspectives and collaborative decision-making on possible 
ways in which they can be addressed. In these studies, a 
hypothesis-based approach could also be employed to 
determine how certain factors such as decision-making 
capacity of people with AD and their family members and 
possible conflicts of interest of researchers could influence 
their perceptions of ethical dilemmas and moral concerns 
arising from DBS for AD trials. Empirical studies are of crucial 
importance in this line of research, building upon the 
conceptual work presented in this dissertation. They would 
also provide an excellent opportunity to gauge whether the 
concerns and recommendations forwarded in the incorporated 
publications are similar to the ones voiced out by various 
parties, and on how can the recommendations be further 
improved to acknowledge contextual variations and the 
perspectives of multiple stakeholders.” 
Minor comments  
Suggestion/Feedback Response 
The thesis would benefit from figures, in 
particular one on the potential mechanisms 
of action of deep brain stimulation and one 
I have added a figure on page 25 of Chapter 2 and another 
figure on page 52 of Chapter 3 to illustrate the clinical 
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on the clinical features of Alzheimer disease 
progression, to aid in setting the context. 
progression of AD and the mechanisms of action of DBS, 
respectively. 
Studies of identity and selfhood in deep 
brain stimulation are often qualitative in 
nature as dictated by the research question, 
which can limit their representativeness as 
the candidate aptly points out in a 
statement on page 105. The candidate may 
wish to comment on the various biases 
researchers may encounter when 
conducting qualitative work (e.g., interview 
studies). 
I have added a paragraph on page 104 of Chapter 3 to point out 
various biases researchers may encounter when they conduct 
qualitative work: 
 
“Considering that exaggerated claims can result from the 
overinterpretation and non-systematic analysis of cited 
empirical studies, it is important to acknowledge the limitations 
of qualitative empirical studies themselves that could also 
contribute to hyperinflated pronouncements. One of which is 
the possibility of bias in terms of the segment of the interview 
included in the paper, manifested as “cherry picking” of data 
presented in order to conform with a particular pre-established 
conceptual stance, hypothesis, or agenda of the researchers 
(Morse 2015; Galdas 2017). In addition, there could also be bias 
in the selection of the interviewees and in the formulation of 
questions, especially in the comparison of different 
interventions in samples that are likewise inherently non-
equivalent. Though certain steps such as member checks and 
triangulation can be taken to lessen bias (Morse 2015), it is 
always important for qualitive researchers and those who cite 
their work to acknowledge inherent limitations of qualitative 
research in order to moderate the extent of any claims and 
conclusions.” 
The candidate should revise the 
introduction and discussion sections and 
eliminate the use of imprecise language 
(e.g., “has taken off”, page 18).  
I have revised the first sentence of Chapter 1, which can be 
found on page 2, to eliminate imprecise language and provide 
evidence for the claim made. 
 
“Neuroethics, a discipline encompassing both the ethics of 
neuroscience and neuroscience of ethics (Roskies 2002), has 
gained prominence in the past decade and a half, as evidenced 
by an increase in publications and research efforts and by the 
establishment of dedicated journals and academic societies 
(Racine et al. 2017; The Lancet Neurology 2018).“ 
In the current state of uncertainty in the 
quality of peer-reviewed journals, the 
candidate may want to define Q1 journals 
(page 20). 
I have revised the clause on pages 13 to 14 of Chapter 1 to make 
what I meant by Q1 clearer: 
 
“which were also published in journals ranked by Scimago Lab 
to be in the first quartile of their respective subjects (Scimago 
Lab 2017)” 
As some individuals with Mild Cognitive 
Impairment (MCI) do not convert to 
Alzheimer disease, I would suggest avoiding 
likening MCI to “pre-dementia” (page 32). 
I have deleted “or MCI” before “phase of AD” on page 25 of 
Chapter 2 to address Examiner 2’s suggestion. 
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Response to examiners’ feedback – John Noel M. Viaña; Page 29 of 29 
 
I have also added a sentence in the caption of Figure 1 on page 
25 of Chapter 2 to further emphasise this point: 
 
“It is important to note that not all people with MCI (mild 
cognitive impairment) will progress to clinically-defined AD 
dementia (Frolich et al. 2017).” 
In the introduction chapters, I would 
suggest moving the pathophysiology 
section ahead of the other topics, as there 
are discussions of A-beta and tau 
embedded into other sections (e.g., 
genetics) and it may be helpful for the flow 
of the thesis to describe and define these 
hallmarks first. 
I have already moved the “Pathophysiology of Alzheimer’s 
Disease” section ahead of the “Genetics of Alzheimer’s 
Disease” section in Chapter 2. 
I would encourage the candidate to 
reference the sentence that describes the 
benefits of Alzheimer disease drugs (page 
41) as these are somewhat debated in the 
dementia research community. 
I have added “(Anand, Gill & Mahdi 2014)” after “Monotherapy 
with these drugs has been shown to improve cognitive 
function, slow the pace of cognitive decline, and reduce 
behavioural symptoms” on page 35 of Chapter 2 to provide a 
reference for the statement made. I have also added “in people 
with mild to moderate AD (Tsoi et al. 2019)” after this sentence 
to highlight the limited benefit of monotherapy. 
 
Once again, I would like to thank the two examiners for their feedback and suggestions for 
improvement of my doctoral thesis. I would also like to thank you in advance for the time that you will dedicate 
in ensuring that I have responded to the examiners’ comments and have made corresponding changes to my 
PhD thesis. I hope that this manuscript would shed light on both recurring and novel ethical issues brought 
about by clinical trials of deep brain stimulation and other invasive neurotechnologies for people with 
Alzheimer’s disease. Should you have further inquiries or clarifications, feel free to contact me, and I will try to 




John Noel M. Viaña, M.Sc. 
PhD candidate, University of Tasmania, Australia 
Affiliate member, Ethics, Policy, and Public Engagement Program 
Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Electromaterials Science 
 
E-mail address: john.viana@utas.edu.au 
Cellphone Number: +61432741133 
 
 
References (not in the dissertation but in this response to examiners’ feedback): 
 
Choi, BC & Pak, AW 2006, 'Multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity in health research, services, 
education and policy: 1. Definitions, objectives, and evidence of effectiveness', Clin Invest Med, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 
351-364. 
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Conference: 11th Annual International Electromaterials Science Symposium 
Venue: Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia 
Date: February 10 to 12, 2016 
Presentation type: Poster presentation 
Enthusiastic Portrayal of 3D Bioprinting in the Media 
John N Viana1, Frederic Gilbert1,2* & Susan Dodds1,2 
1University of Tasmania  
2ARC Centre of Excellence for Electromaterials Science  
*fredericgilbertt@gmail.com
There has been a surge in media reports extolling the potential clinical potential for using 3D 
bioprinting to treat a wide range of conditions, with several clinical trials being undertaken. 
Implantable 3D-printed biomaterials are not free of ethical challenges as they can present 
severe risks of irrevocable harm to patients. Our study surveys key English-speaking media 
and determines whether there is a bias in favour of 3D Bioprinting in the media coverage. 
Medial dissemination of selective positive 3D bioprinting findings may mean that potential 
risk of harms are not appropriately brought to the attention of prospective experimental 
participants and increase the risk that researchers’ may neglect significant ethical issues. 
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Conference: 10th FENS (Federation of European Neuroscience Societies) Forum of 
Neuroscience 2016 
Venue: Bella Center, Copenhagen, Denmark 
Date: July 2 to 6, 2016 
Presentation type: Poster presentation 
Ethical considerations for clinical trials of DBS for patients with Alzheimer’s disease 
Viaña JNM, Gilbert F 
Alzheimer’s disease is the most common form of dementia affecting more than 5.3 
million people in the USA alone. FDA-approved drugs only provide temporary relief to 
memory problems, and no disease-modifying therapies are currently available. Recently, case 
reports and initial clinical trials on the potential use of DBS for memory improvement in 
people with Alzheimer’s Disease or other neurologic conditions have been reported. In this 
poster, we examine ethical issues associated with performing experimental trials on DBS for 
people with Alzheimer’s Disease in light of recent clinical and neuroscientific findings. In 
particular, we look at recently-published experimental trials of DBS of the fornix or of the 
nucleus basalis of Meynert in patients with mild probable to moderate Alzheimer’s Disease. 
Exploring such trials allows us to identify and comprehend current ethical concerns, and 
anticipate potential issues for future trials of similar nature. We also suggest ideal clinical trial 
set-ups of DBS at different stages of AD that would ensure maximal protection of patients 
without compromising the scientific validity of experimental findings. 
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Conference: Neurizons 2016 
Venue: Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany 
Date: May 31 to June 3, 2016 
Presentation type: Poster presentation 
Ethical considerations for DBS in patients with early-onset autosomal dominant 
Alzheimer’s disease 
Viaña JNM, Gilbert F 
Alzheimer’s disease is the most common form of dementia affecting more than 5.3 
million people in the USA alone. FDA-approved drugs only provide temporary relief to 
memory problems, and no disease-modifying therapies are currently available. Although the 
cause of Alzheimer’s Disease for most patients is multifactorial in nature, around 1% of people 
have early onset AD (EOAD) due to a rare autosomal dominant mutation in APP, PSEN1, or 
PSEN2. Recently, case reports and initial clinical trials on the potential use of DBS for memory 
improvement in people with Alzheimer’s Disease or other neurologic conditions have been 
reported; however, none of them tested DBS on people with autosomal dominant EOAD. In 
this poster, we explore ethical considerations that must be undertaken when performing 
experimental DBS on people with autosomal dominant EOAD. While focusing on the best way 
to protect potential patients, we also examine the most appropriate kind of FDA approval that 
should guide such experimental trials and on how ethical guidelines would possibly differ 
from those in people where the onset of AD is at a later age.  
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Conference: University of Tasmania 2016 Graduate Research Conference 
Venue: University of Tasmania, Hobart, Australia 
Date: September 1 to 2, 2016 
Presentation type: Poster presentation 
 
Ethical Implications of Novel Neurotechnologies for Alzheimer’s disease 
John Noel M. Viaña1,2 and Frederic Gilbert1,2 
1Ethics, Policy and Public Engagement Program, Australian Research Council Center of 
Excellence for Electromaterials Science 
2Philosophy and Gender Studies Program, School of Humanities, University of Tasmania 
 
Alzheimer’s disease is the most common form of dementia affecting more than 5.3 
million people in the USA alone. FDA-approved drugs only provide temporary relief to 
memory problems, and no disease-modifying therapies are currently available. Recently, a 
number of neuroscience discoveries and inventions have shown potential to address 
Alzheimer’s disease. These include deep brain stimulation, stem cell implantation, gene 
therapy, and optogenetics. Although these technologies could potentially provide improved 
management or even treatment of Alzheimer’s disease, they are invasive in nature and thus, 
pose a number of medical risks to patients. Moreover, given that a majority of people affected 
by Alzheimer’s Disease are old and demented, ethical concerns arise when novel treatments 
are tested and used in a vulnerable population with potentially limited ability to consent. This 
poster provides a brief overview of these four neurotechnologies and introduces the 
framework that will be used to examine associated ethical concerns for first in-human studies 
and clinical trials involving them. Although DBS, stem cells, gene therapy, and optogenetics 
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might offer additional therapeutic modules for AD, the ethical, scientific and clinical 
groundwork that need to be established have to be first elaborated before any of these highly 
invasive procedures that target a vulnerable group of patients are approved and 
recommended for wide use. 
395
Conference: 2017 Sherwin B. Nuland Summer Institute in Bioethics (organized by the Yale 
Interdisciplinary Center for Bioethics) Student Poster Presentation 
Venue: Medical Historical Library, Yale School of Medicine, New Haven, Connecticut, USA 
Date: July 21, 2017 
Presentation type: Poster presentation 
Ethical considerations in patient selection and informed consent for Alzheimer’s 
disease in vivo gene therapy trials 
John Noel M. Viaña 
Ethics, Policy and Public Engagement Program, Australian Research Council Center of 
Excellence for Electromaterials Science; Philosophy and Gender Studies Program, School of 
Humanities, Faculty of Arts and Law, University of Tasmania 
E-mail addresses: john.viana@utas.edu.au
Abstract 
Alzheimer’s disease is the most common form of dementia affecting more than 5.3 
million people in the USA alone. FDA-approved drugs provide only temporary relief to 
memory problems, and no disease-modifying therapies are currently available. Recently, 
results of the first in-human experimental trial involving in vivo gene therapy in people with 
Alzheimer’s disease have been published. In this paper, I examine ethical issues associated 
with the experimental trial involving virus-mediated delivery of the nerve growth factor (NGF) 
gene to the nucleus basalis of Meynert of people with Alzheimer’s disease. Specifically, I 
examine ethical concerns related to patient selection and recruitment, assessing if trial 
participants are indeed those who would potentially benefit the most and would have the 
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least amount of risks and harms. I also evaluate the informed consent procedure 
implemented. In general, I believe that the study should have recruited participants only of a 
very mild disease stage and should have also expanded their exclusion criteria to those with 
psychiatric abnormalities. Furthermore, the description of the informed consent process 
should have explicitly stated the involvement of the participant’s caregiver and/or family, in 
addition to requiring that all participants have adequate capacity to understand the trial 
procedure and provide an informed, rationalized, and stable consent. These 
recommendations have to be taken into account in subsequent trials to ensure maximal 















Conference: International Neuroethics Society – 2017 Annual Meeting 
Venue: American Association for the Advancement of Science Building, Washington, DC, USA 
Date: November 9 to 10, 2017 
Presentation type: Poster presentation 
 
Ethical Considerations for Cell Implantation in Alzheimer’s Disease 
John Noel M. Viaña (J.N.M. Viaña)1,2, Judy Illes (J. Illes)2,3, Frederic Gilbert (F. Gilbert)1,2,3 
1 Ethics, Policy and Public Engagement Program, Australian Research Council Center of 
Excellence for Electromaterials Science; Philosophy and Gender Studies Program, School of 
Humanities, Faculty of Arts and Law, University of Tasmania; E-mail addresses: 
john.viana@utas.edu.au 
2 National Core for Neuroethics, Faculty of Medicine, University of British Columbia, 
Vancouver, Canada 
3 Center for Sensorimotor Neural Engineering, Department of Philosophy, University of 
Washington, Seattle, USA; Tel: 1 203-616-5763 
 
Alzheimer’s disease is the most common form of dementia affecting more than 30 
million people worldwide. FDA-approved drugs only provide temporary relief to memory 
problems, and no disease-modifying therapies are currently available. A number of studies 
testing different cell implantation strategies in Alzheimer’s disease animal models have 
already been conducted (Tong, Fong, and Huang 2015, Emerich et al. 2014). A clinical trial has 
also investigated encapsulated cells delivering nerve growth factor to the basal forebrain in 
people with Alzheimer’s disease (Eriksdotter-Jonhagen et al. 2012, Wahlberg et al. 2012). 
Currently, there are several clinicaltrials.gov-indexed in-human trials that evaluated or are 
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evaluating stereotactic brain injection of stem cells. In this study, we examine ethical issues 
associated with these invasive neurological studies in light of recent clinical and neuroscience 
findings in both humans and animal models, focusing on trial methodology and translational 
aspects (Viaña et al. 2017). In particular, we compare and contrast different cell implantation 
strategies used in past and ongoing trials, and identify ethical concerns related to translation 
justification, patient selection and recruitment, trial design, and treatment outcomes. We 
conclude with recommendations for ongoing and future trials to ensure maximal protection 
of patients without compromising the scientific validity of experimental findings. 
Disclosure of Conflict/(s) of Interest: The authors have no conflict of interest to disclose. 
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Conference: Neuroscience 2017 (Society for Neuroscience 2017 Annual Meeting) 
Venue: Walter E. Washington Convention Center, Washington, DC, USA 
Date: November 11 to 15, 2017 
Presentation type: Poster presentation 
Theme J: History and Education (J.04.a. Ethical and policy issues in neuroscience) 
Ethical considerations for gene therapy in people with Alzheimer’s disease 
John Noel M. Viaña1 and Frederic Gilbert2 
1 Ethics, Policy and Public Engagement Program, Australian Research Council Center of 
Excellence for Electromaterials Science; Philosophy and Gender Studies Program, School of 
Humanities, Faculty of Arts and Law, University of Tasmania; E-mail addresses: 
john.viana@utas.edu.au 
2 Center for Sensorimotor Neural Engineering, Department of Philosophy, University of 
Washington, Seattle, USA; Tel: 1 203-616-5763 
Alzheimer’s disease is the most common form of dementia affecting more than 5.3 
million people in the USA alone. FDA-approved drugs only provide temporary relief to 
memory problems, and no disease-modifying therapies are currently available. Recently, 
results of the first in-human experimental trials involving in vivo gene therapy in people with 
Alzheimer’s disease have been published. In this poster, we examine ethical issues associated 
with these trials in light of recent clinical and neuroscientific findings. In particular, we look at 
experimental trials involving stereotactic adeno-associated virus-mediated delivery of the 
nerve growth factor (NGF) gene in people with Alzheimer’s disease. We identify ethical 
concerns related to translation justification, patient selection and recruitment, trial design, 
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and treatment outcomes. Examining these issues allows us to understand pressing ethical and 
regulatory obstacles, and provide recommendations for ongoing and future trials of similar 
nature to ensure maximal protection of patients without compromising the scientific validity 


















Conference: Asia-Pacific Centre for Neuromodulation 2017 Deep Brain Stimulation 
Symposium 
Venue: Queensland Brain Institute, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia 
Date: November 24 to 25, 2017 
Presentation type: Oral presentation 
Currents of memory: the ethics of deep brain stimulation for Alzheimer’s disease 
John Noel Viañaa and Frederic Gilberta,b,c 
aEthics, Policy, and Public Engagement Program, Australian Centre for Electromaterials 
Science, University of Tasmania, Hobart, Australia 
bDepartment of Philosophy and Center for Sensorimotor Neural Engineering, University of 
Washington, Seattle, USA 
cNational Core for Neuroethics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada 
Currently, several clinical trials of fornix or nucleus basalis of Meynert (NBM) 
stimulation have been performed to treat memory and cognitive impairments associated with 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD). These studies have tested the safety and the efficacy of deep brain 
stimulation (DBS), with results showing potential memory improvements depending on the 
age of the patient. This talk aims to provide a brief overview of the progress of DBS trials for 
AD and raise salient ethical concerns regarding patient selection, informed consent, study 
design, outcome evaluation, and result presentation and interpretation. It will also highlight 
several issues in recruiting people with early-onset Alzheimer’s disease (EOAD), given the 
Phase II trial results showing that this group of patients could actually have worse cognitive 
outcomes post-DBS. This could be further complicated by the high prevalence of highly 
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penetrant autosomal-dominant mutations in this sub-group, which could affect prognosis and 
the rate of cognitive decline. This talk will then emphasize the need for adaptive strategies to 
minimize harms when recruiting people with EOAD and address issues arising from patient 
privacy and disclosure of genetic test results. Overall, recommendations will be provided to 
ensure that both people with early-onset and late-onset AD participating in DBS trials are 

















Conference: Herrenhausen Conference: Lost in the Maze? Navigating Evidence and Ethics in 
Translational Neuroscience 
Venue: Herrenhausen Palace, Hanover, Germany 
Date: February 14 to 16, 2018 
Presentation type: 1 poster presentation and 1 oral presentation 
How does your approach specifically tackle the questions and challenges emerging from 
the field? Why should we select your project? (600 characters) 
We use an empirical bioethics approach to identify ethical issues on invasive brain 
surgery for Alzheimer’s (AD) trials, reviewing reports in academic journals and clinical trial 
databases. We examine issues on patient selection, informed consent, study design, and 
outcome measures. We also examine relevant animal studies to determine what valuable 
information can be derived from them and how applicable they are to human trials. 
Addressing these ethical issues, focusing on the justifiability of initiating in-human trials, 
directly benefits translational research protocols for AD treatment. 
Men before mice: invasive brain stimulation trials for Alzheimer’s disease 
Authors: John Noel M. Viaña and Frederic Gilbert 
There is concerning evidence showing that invasive brain surgeries to tackle 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) symptoms are increasingly being tested in humans despite being 
highly experimental, supported by little pre-clinical studies, and potentially bearing 
irreversible consequences to vulnerable patients. For instance, the serendipitous discovery of 
stimulation-induced autobiographical recollection and eventual verbal and spatial memory 
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improvements in a single patient treated with fornix deep brain stimulation (DBS) for obesity 
has precipitously led to several Phase I and Phase II trials for AD. Although DBS has been 
proven to be relatively safe in other trials, it is ethically intriguing how experimental AD trials 
were launched despite absence of pre-clinical data from animal models, which is the common 
practice for drug-based interventions. Does the approval and widespread use of subthalamic 
DBS for Parkinson’s disease enough to justify testing of fornix DBS for AD? Are there special 
considerations when testing this kind of invasive brain intervention in a population with an 
impaired ability to consent? Finally, what role do animal studies play, and how applicable is 
the information obtained from them to trials in humans?   
This presentation explores and addresses these questions by first reviewing the 
timeline of in-human and animal studies on fornix DBS for AD. Then, potential arguments for 
and against directly conducting a Phase I trial in humans from an outcome in a single case 
study for a different condition will be enumerated. The need for studies in animals before 
conducting a Phase I trial will be determined using perspectives based on the principles of 
beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. The concept of 3R’s (Replace, Reduce, Refine) will 
also be used to examine whether it is justifiable to directly conduct a Phase I trial and not 
investigate this intervention first in appropriate rodent and primate models of AD. Through 
these, we could better determine whether it is justifiable and ethical to have tried fornix DBS 
for AD on men first before conducting an extensive investigation of the safety and efficacy of 





Conference: European Forum Alpbach 2018 
Venue: Congress Centrum Alpbach, Alpbach, Austria 
Date: August 15 to 31, 2018 
Presentation type: Dance and verse choir presentation 
 
Proposal for the International Evening Presentation at the 2018 European Forum Alpbach 
John Noel M. Viaña, PhD student at the University of Tasmania 
Performed by: John Noel M. Viaña, Dorel Butaciu, Mert Ceylan, Dorotea Neuberg, Theresa 
Ratheiser, Barbara Röhrer, Alieu Sowe, Rares Tracicaru, Phong Vu Dinh 
 
Proposed pair of topics: Science and ethics 
Title: Delving deeper into brain stimulation narratives: communicating ethical discourse 
through dance and verse choir 
 
 Scientific and technological developments have led to the improvement of the lives of 
countless individuals. However, some of the final products of science have actually caused 
distress to people and a reduction in their quality of life. Even for scientific fruits that have 
been approved for general use and have benefitted many people, some sub-populations did 
not benefit or were even harmed either by the final product itself or during the process of its 
testing, evaluation, and refinement. 
 
 Due to atrocities committed in the past such as mistreatment of vulnerable populations 
(African-Americans, children, etc.) in clinical studies and drug trials and crimes committed 
during World War 2 in the name of science and discovery, bioethics has been developed and 
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formalized as a discipline. Today, it continues its role in analysing issues that arise from 
developments in biology and medicine and helping ensure that no populations are exploited 
or unduly harmed by scientific innovations. 
 
 My PhD thesis focuses on issues arising from deep brain stimulation (DBS), a procedure 
wherein leads are inserted deep into a person’s brain to transmit electrical currents and 
provide relief from motor or psychiatric symptoms that he or she is experiencing. DBS is 
approved in the USA, Europe, and in many other countries for use in people with Parkinson’s 
disease and other motor disorders such as essential tremor and dystonia.  
 
 Although many people with Parkinson’s have been able to better function as a result of 
DBS, with a number even being able to pursue professional activities or continue hobbies, a 
portion of individuals have developed unintended psychiatric symptoms or even felt self 
estrangement after DBS. Some people developed mania and/or hypersexuality, felt much 
stronger and attempted to do things beyond their physical capacity, and experienced marital 
conflicts and difficulties in social re-integration.1-3 
 
 This presentation would focus on results from empirical studies3,4 where I was involved 
in and also from my ethical reflections5 on clinical trials on new DBS indications. The empirical 
studies present narratives of people with Parkinson’s disease who received deep brain 
stimulation. Some of the interviewees developed psychiatric symptoms and experienced 
problems coping with them. The studies detail how they dealt with these symptoms, coped 
with them, and even used them to create art. 3,4 The ethical reflections would focus on the 
possible effects of DBS on people with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and on how it could affect 
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different aspects of their selfhood, basing on the results of clinical trials of DBS for Alzheimer’s 
and other indications, and on the impacts of memory loss and cognitive deficits in people with 
AD on their selfhood. These reflections reflect on how DBS could potentially allow people with 
AD to better appraise themselves and recall salient life events, but it also raises the possibility 
of people remembering repressed traumatic memories and being expected to fulfil tasks that 
they still would not be able to due to the small degree of memory improvement.5  
  
 The ideas raised and narratives shared in manuscripts in which I have contributed to 
will be presented in the form of dance and of interpretative and loud reading of passages 
from these texts.3-5 I have tried choreographing some dance before to portray changes 
experienced by some people with Parkinson’s as a result of DBS, and I would like to 
incorporate some ideas from that previous performance to the presentation during the 
international evening. Having other people join in the dance performance and reading of the 
texts would also result to a more elaborate and artistic presentation. The presentation would 
probably start with part of the group reading an introduction on DBS, Alzheimer’s, and 
Parkinson’s, and another part interpreting those passages through action and dance. Then, 
we will move on to demonstrate through body movement the possible unintended side 
effects of DBS for Parkinson’s and how someone copes with them. Finally, some of the ethical 
reflections on the effects of DBS for Alzheimer’s will be read aloud and with emotion, and 
potentially, also interpreted through dance and action. 
 
 Overall, this performance aims to communicate pressing ethical issues that accompany 
medical advancements, focusing on the lived experience of the technology’s end users. Only 
by opening the ethical discussions and emphasizing that certain individuals might not fully 
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benefit from or even be harmed by an intervention can we fine tune technologies and develop 
strategies to make sure that people are well informed of the risks of a trial and treatment and 
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Conference: 19th Asian Bioethics Conference 
Venue: Open University of Kaohsiung and Kaohsiung Municipal Kai-Syuan Psychiatric 
Hospital, Kaohsiung, Taiwan 
Date: November 13 to 16, 2018 (abstract for oral presentation accepted; forthcoming) 
Presentation type: Oral presentation 
 
Clinical trials of invasive neurotechnologies for dementia: an Asian perspective 
John Noel M. Viaña 
Philosophy and Gender Studies Program, School of Humanities, College of Arts, Law, and 
Education; Wicking Dementia Research and Education Centre, College of Health and 
Medicine; and Ethics, Policy, and Pubic Engagement Program, Australian Research Council 
Centre of Excellence for Electromaterials Science, University of Tasmania 
 
 The increase in the world’s aging population implies that more and more people will 
be at risk for dementia, especially due to Alzheimer’s disease. In the Asia Pacific region alone, 
at least 23 million people have dementia. Considering the lack of a cure and the health and 
economic burden to individuals and society brought by dementia, there is an ethical 
requirement and imperative to explore novel therapeutic modalities. A number of the 
modalities being tested in humans include deep brain stimulation and cell implantation. These 
neurotechnologies are highly invasive and pose a risk of harm greater than most conventional 
pharmacologic agents. As such, clinical trials involving these technologies raise salient ethical 
concerns. This talk would first present the current state of stem cell and deep brain 
stimulation clinical trials for dementia in Asia. It will then compare the trial design and 
enrolment criteria of trials conducted in Asian countries to those conducted in Europe and 
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North America. Second, it will enumerate possible ethical gaps in the clinical trials being 
conducted in Asian countries and provide recommendations for future trials to better protect 
trial participants and adequately inform them of possible risks and benefits. Finally, it will 
explore how clinical trials can be made more just, especially for the first participants, where 
there is less information on prospective benefits and trial-associated harms. By then 
broadening the lens to social justice, this talk will reflect on challenges that invasive 
neurotechnologies could face with regards to widespread application, should they get 
approved. Since a significant number of Asians with dementia are already being enrolled in 
clinical trials for invasive neurotechnologies, it is becoming increasingly important to address 
associated ethical issues using Asian perspectives on elderly care responsibility and 















Conference: Australasian Society for Philosophy and Psychology 2018 Meeting 
Venue: Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia 
Date: December 5 to 7, 2018 (abstract for oral presentation accepted; forthcoming) 
Presentation type: Oral presentation 
 
Stimulating the brain or altering the self? The effects of neurostimulation for Alzheimer’s 
disease 
John Noel M. Viaña1,2,3 and Frederic Gilbert2,3,4 
1Wicking Dementia Research and Education Centre, College of Health and Medicine, 
University of Tasmania; 2Philosophy and Gender Studies Program, School of Humanities, 
College of Arts, Law, and Education, University of Tasmania; 3Ethics, Policy and Public 
Engagement Program, Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Electromaterials 
Science; 4Center for Sensorimotor Neural Engineering and Department of Philosophy, 
University of Washington 
E-mail address of corresponding author: john.viana@utas.edu.au 
 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) leads to memory dysfunction and cognitive impairments, 
which have been shown to drastically affect the selfhood of afflicted individuals. Novel 
neurostimulation technologies tested to treat AD, such as deep brain stimulation, have also 
been associated with influencing the selfhood in different cohorts of patients (Parkinson’s 
disease, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, etc.), both due to their beneficial and potential 
adverse side effects. Considering the risks and irreversibility of these neurostimulative 
modalities, it is critical to anticipate how new neurostimulative interventions may affect self-
related concepts in a population whose selfhood is already threatened by the cognitive, 
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psychological, and social implications of an AD diagnosis. Using DBS for AD as a case, we 
anticipate these potential effects through the lens of an extended social constructionist 
grounded tripartite model of selfhood, originally proposed by Harre and Sabat. By reconciling 
information from medical reports, psychological, philosophical, and sociological 
investigations on the impacts of DBS or AD on selfhood, we examine potential effects of DBS 
for AD on Self 1 or singularity through use of first-person indexicals, and gestures of self-
reference, attribution, and recognition; Self 2 or past and present attributes, knowledge of 
these characteristics, and continuity of narrative identity; and Self 3 or the relational and 
social self. Anticipating these effects is crucial in ensuring adequate ethical oversight on 
informed consent procedures and care provision for people with AD enrolled or interested in 
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John Noel M. Viaña 
Address: Unit.No.1724, Tower 1, Breeze Residences, Roxas Blvd., Brgy. San Rafael, Pasay, 1302 Philippines 
E-mail addresses: jnmviana@yahoo.com; john.viana@utas.edu.au
Mobile number: +614........
Applying for: Completion of a PhD in Neuroethics (Society and Culture) at UTAS 
Career Overview 
I am a PhD student in Society and Culture (Neuroethics) at the University of Tasmania and have just submitted my 
PhD thesis on the ethics of clinical trials on invasive neurotechnologies for Alzheimer’s disease. I have a NEURASMUS 
Erasmus Mundus master’s degree in Neurosciences from the Université de Bordeaux and Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam and a bachelor’s degree in Molecular Biology and Biotechnology from the University of the Philippines 
Diliman where I graduated cum laude. In addition, I was a visiting researcher at the Brocher Foundation and a visiting 
student in neuroethics at Monash University, University of British Columbia, University of Washington, and Charité 
- Universitätsmedizin Berlin. I have also completed the 2017 Sherwin B. Nuland Summer Institute in Bioethics at Yale
University. I have teaching and mentoring experiences through my roles as a career peer; tutor for Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander students and tutor in Nursing Ethics and Good Thinking units at the University of Tasmania;
intern at Yale University; and research associate at the University of the Philippines Diliman.
Education and Training 
? Visiting researcher: Fondation Brocher, Geneva, Switzerland (September to October 2018) 
Project title: Invasive brain technologies for Alzheimer’s disease: common concerns and novel considerations 
? Participant and scholar: European Forum Alpbach 2018, Alpbach, Austria (August 2018) 
Courses/Seminars taken: Artificial Intelligence and Ethics; Our Work in Our Future; Technische Universitäten 
Austria Innovation Marathon; Health, Technology, Political, Legal, Economic, and Financial Market symposia  
? Visiting researcher/ PhD student: Neuroscience and Society Group, Brain and Mental Health Laboratory, School 
of Psychological Sciences, Monash University, Australia (November 2017 to January 2018) 
? Visiting International Research Student: Neuroethics Canada, Department of Medicine, University of British 
Columbia, Canada (September to October 2017) 
Courses/Seminars taken: Gene Therapy; Science Communication: The Crash Course
? Short-term visiting PhD student: Department of Philosophy and Center for Sensorimotor Neural Engineering, 
University of Washington, USA (August 2017) 
? 2017 Sherwin B. Nuland Summer Institute in Bioethics student: Yale Interdisciplinary Center for Bioethics, Yale 
University, USA; awarded with a full tuition waiver (June to July 2017) 
Courses/Seminars taken: Foundations in Bioethics; Bioethics and the Law; Bias in Bioethics; Personhood and 
Personal Identity in Bioethics; Environmental Ethics; Biotech Law and Patent Issues: The Global Biotech Business; 
Bioethics and the Media; LGBT Bioethics; Neuroethics; Ethical Issues in Psychiatry and Child Psychiatry; Bioethics 
Morning Lectures; Field trips to the Yale Medical History Library, Hastings Center, and the Connecticut Hospice;  
Final writing output and poster presentation: Ethical considerations in patient selection and informed consent 
for Alzheimer’s disease in vivo gene therapy trials 
? Visiting PhD student: Neurophilosophy, Medical Ethics, and Neuroethics Group, Division of Mind and Brain 
Research, Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Germany (June 2016) 
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? PhD in Society and Culture (Neuroethics) and Graduate Certificate in Research: University of Tasmania, 
Australia; Course GPA: 7.0/7.0; Tasmania Graduate Research Scholarship (September 2015 to Present) 
Expected graduation date: March 2019 (thesis submitted on October 12, 2018) 
Courses/Seminars taken: Introduction to Higher Degree by Research; Communicating Research; Introduction to 
Epidemiology; Health Economics; Certificate in Science Communication (ACES); Understanding Dementia; 
Preventing Dementia; Neuroscience and Society reading group (through Monash University); Unsettling the 
Humanities reading group; Queering Health reading group 
PhD thesis:  Ethical considerations for deep brain stimulation and other invasive neurotechnological trials in 
people with Alzheimer’s disease 
Dissertation description: This thesis examines studies on deep brain stimulation in people with Alzheimer’s 
disease, reviewing clinical trials and relevant animal studies to highlight pressing ethical concerns that ongoing 
and forthcoming trials need to address. By having three major publications during the course of the PhD as the 
main chapters, this thesis aims to enumerate ethical issues that encompass the neurobiological and genetic, 
cognitive, individual, and societal dimensions of deep brain stimulation for Alzheimer’s disease. These ethical 
considerations can then be extended into other forms of novel neurosurgical trials such as cell implantation and 
gene therapy.  
? NEURASMUS Erasmus Mundus Master’s in Neuroscience (Neurobiology and Neurogenetics track): VU 
University Amsterdam, Netherlands (1st year): Research Master’s in Neurosciences; University of Bordeaux, 
France (2nd year): Master’s in Biology, specialty in Neurosciences and Neuropsychopharmacology, mention assez 
bien; Erasmus Mundus Category A Scholarship (August 2013 to August 2015) 
Courses/Seminars taken: From Molecule to Mind (overview of cellular and molecular neuroscience, 
neuroanatomy, statistics; readings in neurophysiology; and lectures on the four major research themes – 
Attention and Cognition, Addictive Behavior, Anxiety and Depression, and Neurodegeneration at the 
Neuroscience Campus Amsterdam); Clinical Neurosciences; Behavioral Genetics; Neurogenomics; Scientific 
Writing in English; Cellular and Molecular Neurobiology; Techniques in Behavioral Experiments; Principles of 
Microscopy; Dynamic Imaging; Nonlinear Optics; Industrial Research 
First year research internship: Adeno-associated virus 2 and 5-mediated structural and GCaMP6-facilitated 
functional elucidation of cholinergic projections from the basal forebrain to the medial prefrontal cortex 
Master’s thesis: Role of the ventral tegmental area (VTA) to medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) dopaminergic 
projections during the acquisition of fear behavior 
? Bachelor of Science in Molecular Biology and Biotechnology: University of the Philippines Diliman, Philippines; 
graduated cum laude (June 2008 to April 2012) 
Courses/Seminars taken: Algebra and Trigonometry; Calculus; Statistics; Biology (with laboratory); General, 
Analytical, Organic, and Biological Chemistry (with laboratory); Physics (with laboratory); Ethics in Scientific 
Research, Undergraduate Seminar in Molecular Biology and Bioenterprise; Molecular Biology and Biotechnology 
(Molecular Microbiology, Animal and Plant Cell and Tissue Culture, Molecular Physiology of Eukaryotic Systems, 
Molecular Genetics, Molecular Biophysics,  Principles of Gene Manipulation, Genes and Development, Cellular 
and Molecular Immunology, and Industrial Biotechnology); General Psychology 
Undergraduate thesis: Evaluation of sodium alginate as a three-dimensional scaffold for neural cultures 
Relevant Employment History 
? Tutor for the Foundations for Professional Practice 2 unit (CNA1503):  Philosophy and Gender Studies Program, 
School of Humanities, University of Tasmania, Australia (July to August 2018) 
- Conducted two-hour tutorial sessions per week for four weeks for three groups of nursing students. Topics
discussed include an introduction to ethics, acknowledging personhood and exercising person-centred
approaches to negotiating care, and an introduction to the Australian medico-legal system
- Marked and provided feedback to student presentations
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? Tutor for the Good Thinking: Reasoning Skills for Life unit (XBR105): Philosophy and Gender Studies Program, 
School of Humanities, University of Tasmania, Australia (March to June 2018) 
 
- Moderated an online discussion group for 61 students, providing feedback on student posts and directing 
them to the correct answer to weekly questions regarding the topics discussed (clarifying reasoning, including 
mapping and standardisation of arguments; communicating reasoning; and evaluating reasoning, including 
discussions on general fallacies, deductive reasoning, and inductive reasoning) 
- Marked and provided feedback to student submissions (portfolios, essays, final exam) 
 
? Graduate Academic Tutor: Riawunna Centre for Aboriginal Education, University of Tasmania, Australia (March 
to May 2018) 
 
- Provided academic support to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander students, helping them with the units 
(such as HGA101: Sociology A) they are taking and ensuring successful outcomes 
 
? Summer Intern: 2017 Sherwin B. Nuland Summer Institute in Bioethics, Yale Interdisciplinary Center for Bioethics, 
Yale University, USA (May to July 2017) 
 
- Welcomed students to the program and provided assistance in setting up online accounts, obtaining an ID 
card, and getting around the Yale campus 
- Facilitated three introductory bioethics discussion sessions to help international students be more 
comfortable with communicating in English 
 
? Research Assistant/ Researcher: Philosophy and Gender Studies Program, School of Humanities, University of 
Tasmania, Australia (July 2015 to Present) 
 
- Conduct literature survey on explantation of brain implants, questionnaires to assess brain-computer 
interface outcomes, and representations of “cyborgs” in the philosophical literature  
-  Assist in formatting references for article submissions to journals 
- Perform media research on 3D bioprinting using Factiva and present media trends using tables and graphs 
- Summarise important findings in primary and review papers on 3D bioprinting, with special emphasis on the 
safety and other ethical considerations for clinical trials involving 3D-printed biomaterials and biological units 
- Summarise and graph the status of PubMed-indexed publications and WIPO-indexed patents involving 3D 
bioprinting 
 
? University Research Associate I: Laboratory of Molecular and Cell Biology, National Institute of Molecular Biology 
and Biotechnology, University of the Philippines Diliman, Philippines (January to June 2013) 
 
- Oversaw research projects being conducted at the laboratory and assisted in supervising undergraduate 
students and apprentices, teaching them laboratory techniques and helping them revise their thesis 
- Organised a three-week workshop on molecular and cell biology techniques to incoming students  
- Managed laboratory equipment, reagents, finances, and rodent strains 
- Assisted the project investigator in writing project reports and grant proposals and in presenting the 
laboratory’s research to a wide range of audience 
 
? Secretary: Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee, University of the Philippines Diliman, Philippines 
(January to May 2013) 
 
- Organised regular committee meetings and prepared necessary documents prior to and after each meeting 
- Coordinated with committee members from different institutes and departments at the university regarding 
animal housing and experimentation permit applications, regulatory approvals, and quality assurance of 
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Additional Work and Research Experience 
 
? Concierge: Student Services and Information Centre, University of Tasmania, Australia (February to July 2018) 
? Career Peer: Student Leadership, Career Development, and Employment team, University of Tasmania, Australia 
(February 2016 to May 2017) 
? Graduate Researcher: Neuronal Circuits of Associative Learning team, INSERM U862, Neurocentre Magendie, 
France (September 2014 to June 2015) 
? Research Intern: Department of Integrative Neurophysiology, Center for Neurogenomics and Cognitive Research, 
Neuroscience Campus Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands (February to August 2014) 
? Research Intern/Volunteer: Marine Science Institute, University of the Philippines Diliman, Philippines 
(September to November 2012) 
? Academic Tutor: Ahead Learning Systems, Inc., Quezon City, Philippines (June to November 2012) 
? Undergraduate Researcher/ Research Apprentice: Laboratory of Molecular and Cell Biology, National Institute 
of Molecular Biology and Biotechnology, National Science Complex, University of the Philippines Diliman, 
Philippines (December 2010 to April 2012) 
 
Peer- and/or Editor-Reviewed Journal Articles 
 
1. Viaña JNM, Gilbert F (2018) 32 shades of neuroethics – a review of the Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics 
edited by L. Syd M Johnson and Karen S. Rommelfanger. The American Journal of Bioethics 18(10): W1-W3.   
 
2. Viaña JNM, Carter A, Gilbert F (2018) Of meatballs and invasive neurotechnological trials: additional 
considerations for complex clinical decisions. AJOB Neuroscience 9(2): 100-104. 
 
3. Viaña JNM, Gilbert F (2018) Deep brain stimulation for people with Alzheimer’s disease: anticipating potential 
effects on the tripartite self. Dementia. Article first published online: March 11, 2018; 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1471301218761147 
 
4. Viaña JNM, Illes J, Gilbert F (2018) Ethical considerations for cell implantation in Alzheimer’s disease - selected 
abstracts from the 2017 International Neuroethics Society Annual Meeting. AJOB Neuroscience 9(1): W9-W10. 
 
5. Gilbert F, Viaña JNM, Ineichen C (2018) Deflating the “DBS causes personality changes” bubble. Neuroethics. 
Article first published online: June 19, 2018; https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-018-9373-8 
 
6. Gilbert F, Viaña JNM (2018) A personal narrative on living and dealing with psychiatric symptoms after DBS 
surgery. Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics 8(1): 67-77. 
 
7. Gilbert F, Viaña JNM, O’Connell CD, Dodds S (2018) Enthusiastic portrayal of 3D bioprinting in the media: ethical 
side effects. Bioethics 32(2): 94-102. 
 
8. Viaña JNM, Bittlinger M, Gilbert F (2017) Ethical considerations for deep brain stimulation trials in patients with 
early-onset Alzheimer’s disease. Journal of Alzheimer's Disease 58(2): 289-301. 
 
9. Viaña JNM, Vickers JC, Cook MJ, Gilbert F (2017) Currents of memory: recent progress, translational challenges, 
and ethical considerations in fornix deep brain stimulation trials for Alzheimer's disease. Neurobiology of Aging 
56: 202-210. 
 
10. Viaña JNM, Bueno RJ, Gilbert F (2017) Beyond genomic association: ethical implications of elucidating disease 
mechanisms and genotype-influenced treatment response. The American Journal of Bioethics 17(4): 24-26. 
 
11. Gilbert F, Goddard E, Viaña JNM, Carter A, Horne M (2017) I miss being me: phenomenological effects of deep 
brain stimulation. AJOB Neuroscience 8(2): 96-109. 
 
12. Viaña JNM, Freitas L, Severo MC, Gilbert F (2016) Decoded neurofeedback: eligibility, applicability, and reliability 
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13. Viaña JNM, Gilbert F (2016) Big explanations for big expectations: deriving lessons from the Human Genome and 
Blue Brain Projects. AJOB Neuroscience 7(1): 18-20. 
 
14. Gilbert F, Vranic A, Viaña JNM (2016) Acquired paedophilia and moral responsibility. AJOB Neuroscience 7(4): 
209-11. 
 
15. Luchicchi A, Bloem B, Viaña JNM, Mansvelder H, Role LW (2014) Illuminating the role of cholinergic signaling in 
circuits of attention and emotionally salient behaviors. Frontiers in Synaptic Neuroscience 6(24) doi: 
10.3389/fnsyn.2014.00024. 
 
Oral Presentations and Public Engagement 
 
 
1. Viaña JNM, Gilbert F (2018) Stimulating the brain or altering the self? The effects of neurostimulation for 
Alzheimer’s disease. Australasian Society for Philosophy and Psychology 2018 Meeting. Macquarie University, 
Sydney, Australia. 5-7 Dec. 
 
2. Viaña JNM (2018) Ethics of research on novel medical technologies: from bench to bedside and beyond. National 
Institute of Molecular Biology and Biotechnology, College of Science, University of the Philippines Diliman, 
Quezon City, Philippines. 19 Nov. 
 
3. Viaña JNM (2018) Clinical trials of invasive neurotechnologies for dementia: an Asian perspective. 19th Asian 
Bioethics Conference. Open University of Kaohsiung and Kaohsiung Municipal Kai-Syuan Psychiatric Hospital, 
Kaohsiung, Taiwan. 13-16 Nov. 
 
4. Viaña JNM (2018) Genes, cells, and electrodes: ethical considerations for clinical trials on people with dementia. 
Health Ethics and Policy Laboratory Meeting. Department of Health Sciences & Technology (D-HEST), Swiss 
Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich), Zurich, Switzerland. 23 Oct. 
 
5. Viaña JNM (2018) Brain, cognition, person, and society: neuroethics of invasive interventions for Alzheimer’s 
disease. Visiting Researchers’ Presentation. Brocher Foundation, Hermance, Switzerland. 4 Oct. 
 
6. Viaña JNM (2018) Alzheimer’s disease: what do invasive neurotechnologies bring to the table? Visiting 
Researchers’ Presentation. Brocher Foundation, Hermance, Switzerland. 4 Sept. 
 
7. Viaña JNM (2018) Dementia, diversity, and resilience. European Forum Alpbach 2018. Congress Centrum 
Alpbach, Alpbach, Austria. 15-31 Aug. 
 
8. Viaña JNM, Butaciu D, Ceylan M, Neuberg D, Ratheiser T, Röhrer B, Sowe A, Tracicaru R, Vu Dinh P (2018) Delving 
deeper into brain stimulation narratives: communicating ethical discourse through dance and verse choir. 
European Forum Alpbach 2018. Congress Centrum Alpbach, Alpbach, Austria. 15-31 Aug. 
 
9. Viaña JNM (2018) Participation in invasive neurotechnological trials: considerations for a complex clinical 
decision. ARC (Australian Research Council Australian Centre) Centre of Excellence for Electromaterials Science 
Meeting, Hobart, Australia, 23 May. 
 
10. Viaña JNM (2018) Participation in invasive neurotechnological trials: considerations for a complex clinical 
decision. ARC (Australian Research Council Australian Centre) Centre of Excellence for Electromaterials Science 
Ethics, Policy, and Public Engagement Team Meeting, Hobart, Australia, 7 May. 
 
11. Viaña JNM, Gilbert F (2018) Men before mice: invasive brain stimulation trials for Alzheimer’s disease. 
Herrenhausen Conference: Lost in the Maze? Navigating Evidence and Ethics in Translational Neuroscience. 
Herrenhausen Palace, Hanover, Germany, 14-16 Feb. 
 
12. Viaña JNM (2018) Brain, mind, and society: neuroethical challenges in the 21st Century. Why? Symposium. 
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13. Viaña JNM (2018) Deep brain stimulation for people with Alzheimer’s disease: Anticipating potential effects on
the tripartite self. Neuroethics and Society Group Meeting. Monash Biomedical Imaging Auditorium, Monash
University, Melbourne, Australia. 24 Jan.
14. Viaña JNM (2017) Invasive neurotechnologies for Alzheimer’s disease: mapping the ethical landscape.
Neuroscience and Society Group Meeting. Brain and Mental Health Laboratory, Monash University, Melbourne,
Australia. 11 Dec.
15. Viaña JNM (2017) Currents of memory: the ethics of deep brain stimulation for Alzheimer’s disease. Asia-Pacific
Centre for Neuromodulation 2017 Deep Brain Stimulation Symposium. Queensland Brain Institute, University of
Queensland, Brisbane, Australia. 24-25 Nov.
16. Viaña JNM (2017) Ethical issues in cell and gene therapy for Alzheimer’s disease. Neuroethics Canada Meeting.
Djavad Mowafaghian Centre for Brain Health, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. 30 Oct.
17. Viaña JNM (2017) The ethics of accessibility: why should we care? (Panel Discussion). UN Voices. TCoTA,
Dechaineux Lecture Theatre, Hobart, Australia. 19 Apr.
18. Viaña JNM (2017) Neurobiological investigations: from molecules to society. Philippine Science High School –
Western Visayas Campus, Iloilo City, Philippines, 4 Jan.
19. Viaña JNM (2016) Ethical considerations on the use of fornix deep brain stimulation for Alzheimer's disease. ARC
(Australian Research Council Australian Centre) Centre of Excellence for Electromaterials Science Meeting,
Hobart, Australia, 31 Aug.
20. Viaña JNM (2016) Ethical considerations on the use of deep brain stimulation and other invasive
neurotechnologies for Alzheimer's disease. ARC (Australian Research Council Australian Centre) Centre of
Excellence for Electromaterials Science Ethics, Policy, and Public Engagement Team Meeting, Hobart, Australia,
17 Aug.
21. Viaña JNM (2016) Neuroethics. Neurasmus 5th Annual Workshop, Budapest, Hungary, 11-14 Jul.
22. Gilbert F, Viaña JNM (2016) Enthusiastic portrayal of 3D bioprinting in the media: ethical side effects. 2016
Brocher Workshop, 3D Bioprinting: A New Medical and ethical Frontier? Geneva, Switzerland, 24-26 May.
23. Viaña JNM (2015) Role of dopaminergic projections from the ventral tegmental area to the medial prefrontal
cortex during fear behaviour. Neurasmus 4th Annual Workshop. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam,
Netherlands. 7-10 Jul.
24. Saloma CP, Viaña JNM (2013) Science, technology, and society - how biotechnology is touching our lives. College




1. Viaña JNM, Gilbert F (2018) Men before mice: invasive brain stimulation trials for Alzheimer’s disease.
Herrenhausen Conference: Lost in the Maze? Navigating Evidence and Ethics in Translational Neuroscience.
Herrenhausen Palace, Hanover, Germany. 14-16 Feb.
2. Viaña JNM, Illes J, Gilbert F (2017) Ethical considerations for gene therapy in people with Alzheimer’s disease.
Neuroscience 2017 (Society for Neuroscience 2017 Annual Meeting). Walter E. Washington Convention Center,
Washington, DC, USA. 11-15 Nov.
3. Viaña JNM, Illes J, Gilbert F (2017) Ethical considerations for cell implantation in Alzheimer’s disease.
International Neuroethics Society – 2017 Annual Meeting. American Association for the Advancement of Science 
Building, Washington, DC, USA. 9-10 Nov.
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4. Viaña JNM (2017) Ethical considerations in patient selection and informed consent for Alzheimer’s disease in vivo 
gene therapy trials. 2017 Sherwin B. Nuland Summer Institute in Bioethics (organized by the Yale Interdisciplinary 
Center for Bioethics) Student Poster Presentation. Medical Historical Library, Yale School of Medicine, New 
Haven, Connecticut, USA. 21 July. 
 
5. Viaña JNM, Gilbert F (2016) Ethical implications of novel neurotechnologies for Alzheimer’s disease. University 
of Tasmania 2016 Graduate Research Conference. University of Tasmania, Hobart, Australia. 1-2 Sep. 
 
6. Viaña JNM, Vickers J, Gilbert F (2016) Ethical considerations for clinical trials of fornix DBS for patients with 
Alzheimer’s disease. 10th FENS Forum of Neuroscience 2016. Copenhagen, Denmark. 2-6 Jul. 
 
7. Viaña JNM, Gilbert F (2016) Ethical considerations for DBS in patients with early-onset autosomal dominant 
Alzheimer’s disease. Neurizons 2016. Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany. 31 May - 3 June. 
 
8. Viaña JNM, Gilbert F, Blum A, Dodds S (2016) Enthusiastic portrayal of 3D bioprinting in the media. 11th Annual 
International Electromaterials Science Symposium. Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia. 10-12 Feb. 
 
 
9. Luchicchi A, Viaña JNM, Mnie-Filali O, Pattij T, Mansvelder HD (2015) Labeling of afferent cholinergic projections 
to the rat medial prefrontal cortex using viral mediators. 9th International Brain Research Organization World 
Congress of Neuroscience. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 7-11 July. 
 
10. Viaña JNM, Saloma CP (2012) Evaluation of sodium alginate as a 3D scaffold for neural precursor cell culture. 4th 
Outstanding Young Scientists Inc. (OYSI) Regional Symposium: Optimizing Coastal Resources for Equitable and 
Sustainable Development. Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, Iloilo, Philippines. 13-14 April. 
 
11. Viaña JNM, Saloma CP (2012) Evaluation of sodium alginate as a 3D scaffold for neural precursor cell culture. 3rd 
National Convention of the Philippine Society for Cell Biology, Inc. (PSCB): Cell Biology at the Crossroads of 
Different Biological Disciplines. College of Science Auditorium, National Science Complex, University of the 
Philippines Diliman, Philippines. 18-19 Oct.  
 
Awards, Grants, and Honours 
 
Year Event and Sponsor or Award-Giving 
Body 
Award/(s) Total Amount 
(AUD) 
2018 Asian Bioethics Conference (Taiwan) - 
Asian Bioethics Association  
Registration waiver (2,400 NTD); 
Awarded best oral presentation 
110 
2018 Fondation Brocher Residency 
(Switzerland) – Brocher Foundation 
Scholarship for junior researchers: airfare 
(1,473 CHF), accommodation, and daily 
allowance (870 CHF) 
3,327 
2018 European Forum Alpbach (Austria) – 
European Alpbach Foundation 
Registration waiver (1,400 EUR), 
accommodation (476 EUR), and meal 
allowance (289 EUR) 
3,529 
2018 Herrenhausen Conference (Germany) 
– Volkswagen Foundation 
Return airfare from Hobart, Australia (~2,000 
AUD), accommodation (387 EUR), travel 
insurance (13.20 EUR); Poster and oral 
presentations were selected among the top 
three 
2,652 
2017 International Neuroethics Society 
Meeting (USA) 
Poster was selected by AJOB Neuroscience 




8 of 11 CV (last updated January 28, 2019) – John Noel M. Viaña; jnmviana@yahoo.com
 
2017 Sherwin B. Nuland Summer Institute in 
Bioethics, Yale University (USA) – Yale 
Interdisciplinary Center for Bioethics 
Full tuition waiver (2,200 USD) from the 
Center and travel allowance (5,000 AUD) 
from the University of Tasmania 
8,080 
2016 Neurizons 2016 (Germany) and 
Federation of European Neuroscience 
Societies 2016 (Denmark) Conferences 
Funding from the University of Tasmania to 
cover registration costs (499 AUD) 
499 
2015 PhD in Society and Culture at the 
University of Tasmania (Australia) 
Full tuition waiver (98,000 AUD), Tasmanian 
Graduate Research Scholarship for 3 years 
(~78,000 AUD), and Overseas Student Health 
Cover (2,730 AUD) 
178,730 
2013 NEURASMUS Erasmus Mundus 
Master’s Program in Neuroscience 
(France, Netherlands) 
Category A scholarship: tuition waiver 
(16,000 EUR), living allowance (24,000 EUR), 
and mobility allowance (8,000 EUR); 
Graduated mention assez bien 
78,240 
2013 University of the Philippines Diliman 
(Philippines) 
Certificate of Distinction (Parangal sa Mag-
aaral) for achievement in a conference 
poster competition 
 
2012 3rd National Convention of the 
Philippine Society for Cell Biology, Inc. 
(Philippines) 
Awarded best poster  
2012 Bachelor of Science in Molecular 
Biology and Biotechnology, University 
of the Philippines Diliman (Philippines) 
Graduated cum laude  
2008 Secondary education at the Philippine 
Science High School, Western Visayas 
Campus (Philippines) 
Research grant from Pfizer Inc. for a research 
project on bacterial bioremediation (20,000 
PHP); Living allowance for 4 years (60,000 
PHP); Graduated with high honours; 
awarded “Best in Filipino” and for 
“Outstanding Alumni Achievement 
2,080 
  TOTAL AMOUNT (AUD) 277,247 
 
  
Additional Training: Seminars, Workshops, and Conferences 
 
? Australasian Society for Philosophy and Psychology 2018 Meeting. Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. 2018 
Dec 5-7. 
? 2018 International Mental Health Training Center Taiwan Conference: Experience of Mental Health Collaboration 
between Southeast Asia and Taiwan. Kaohsiung Municipal Kai-Syuan Psychiatric Hospital, Kaohsiung, Taiwan. 
2018 Nov 14. 
? 19th Asian Bioethics Conference. Open University of Kaohsiung and Kaohsiung Municipal Kai-Syuan Psychiatric 
Hospital, Kaohsiung, Taiwan. 2018 Nov 13-16. 
? Herrenhausen Conference: Lost in the Maze? Navigating Evidence and Ethics in Translational Neuroscience. 
Herrenhausen Palace, Hanover, Germany. 2018 Feb 14-16. 
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? Monash Dementia and Neurodegeneration Symposium. Monash Biomedical Imaging, Clayton, Australia. 2017 
Nov 28. 
? Asia-Pacific Centre for Neuromodulation 2017 Deep Brain Stimulation Symposium. Queensland Brain Institute, 
University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia. 2017 Nov 24-25. 
? Neuroscience 2017 (Society for Neuroscience 2017 Annual Meeting). Walter E. Washington Convention Center, 
Washington, DC, USA. 207 Nov 11-15. 
? International Neuroethics Society – 2017 Annual Meeting. American Association for the Advancement of Science 
Building, Washington, DC, USA. 2017 Nov 9-10. 
? Science Communication: The Crash Course. Organized by the Vancouver Coastal Health Research Institute. 
Blusson Spinal Cord Centre, Vancouver, Canada. 2018 Oct 18. 
? University of Tasmania 2016 Graduate Research Conference. Hobart, Tasmania, Australia. 2016 Sep 1- 2. 
? Neurasmus 5th Annual Workshop. Boscolo hotel, Budapest, Hungary; 2016 July 11-14. 
? Federation of European Neuroscience Societies. 10th FENS Forum of Neuroscience. Bella Center, Copenhagen, 
Denmark; 2016 Jul 2 – 6. 
? Federation of European Neuroscience Societies. Technical Workshop: Light that cures: therapies based on 
optogenetic manipulations and light-regulated drugs. Bella Center, Copenhagen, Denmark; 2016 Jul 2. 
? Kick-off Meeting of the International Project "Psychiatric Neurosurgery - Ethical, Legal, and Societal Issues". 
Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Berlin, Germany; 2016 Jun 27-28. 
? Neurizons 2016. Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Göttingen, Germany. 2016 May 31 – June 3. 
? Lake Geneva Graduate Conference (LG2C) 2016. University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland; 2016 May 27. 
? 2016 Brocher Workshop. 3D Bioprinting: A New Medical and Ethical Frontier? Geneva, Switzerland; 2016 May 
24-26. 
? 11th Annual International Electromaterials Science Symposium. Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia; 2016 
Feb 10-12. 
? Dementia Intervention Symposium. Wicking Dementia Research and Education Centre. University of Tasmania 
Medical Sciences Building, Hobart, Tasmania, Australia; 2015 Dec 3. 
? University of Tasmania 2015 Graduate Research Conference. Hobart, Tasmania, Australia. 2015 Sep 3 - 4. 
? Neurasmus 4th Annual Workshop. VU University, Amsterdam, Netherlands; 2015 Jul 7 – 10. 
? Bordeaux Neurocampus/ LabEx BRAIN symposium. University of Bordeaux, Talence, France; 2015 May 6. 
? Federation of European Neuroscience Societies. 9th FENS Forum of Neuroscience. MiCo Congress Centre, Milan, 
Italy; 2014 Jul 5 – 9. 
? Federation of European Neuroscience Societies. Technical Workshop: Epigenomic landscapes of the adult brain: 
implications in neuroplasticity and brain disorders. MiCo Congress Centre, Milan, Italy; 2014 Jul 5. 
? Neurasmus 3rd Annual Workshop. Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Germany; 2014 Jul 10 - 15. 
? Vrije Universiteit Medical Center. Brain Trees 2014 – a symposium on neural networks in cognition and disease. 
De Amstelzaal, VU University Medical Center, Amsterdam, Netherlands; 2014 Jun 23. 
? Vrije Universiteit and Vrije Universiteit Medical Center Electron Microscopy Facility. Mini-symposium on 
correlative light electron and cryo-electron microscopy. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan, Amsterdam, 
Netherlands; 2014 Jun 16. 
? Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour. Synapsium 2014: Donders Cognitive Neuroscience Master 
Symposium. Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands; 2014 May 22. 
? Neuroscience Campus Amsterdam. Annual Meeting 2014. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan, 
Amsterdam, Netherlands; 2014 Apr 10. 
? Amsterdam Animal Research Center. Advanced Rat Handling training course. Amsterdam Animal Research 








? Neuroscience Campus Amsterdam. Symposium Valorisatie – a symposium on the valorization of science. Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan, Amsterdam, Netherlands; 2014 Jan 24.  
? Philippine Genome Center. Bioinformatics Seminar for Health and Population Genomics Research – Conducting 
Genomic Research in the Era of Next-Generation Genotyping and Sequencing. National Institute of Molecular 
Biology and Biotechnology, National Science Complex, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, 
Philippines; 2013 Mar 20. 
? GE Healthcare and University of the Philippines Diliman Multidimensional Imaging Center. Recent Advances in 
Cellular Technologies – a series of talks on stem cells and super-resolution cellular imaging and demonstration 
of fluorescence and time-lapse microscopy using the Delta Vision system. National Institute of Molecular Biology 
and Biotechnology and National Institute of Physics, College of Science Complex, University of the Philippines 
Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines; 2013 Mar 12. 
? Laboratory Safety and Waste Management Seminar-Workshop. Institute of Chemistry, National Science 
Complex, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines. 2013 Feb 18. 
? National Institute of Molecular Biology and Biotechnology 25th Anniversary Distinguished Lecture, Conference 
and Trade Fair. National Institute of Molecular Biology and Biotechnology, College of Science Complex, University 
of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines; 2012 Dec 11. 
? 3rd National Convention of the Philippine Society for Cell Biology, Inc. (PSCB) National Convention: Cell Biology 
at the Crossroads of Different Biological Disciplines. College of Science Auditorium, National Science Complex, 
University of the Philippines Diliman, Philippines; 2012 Oct 18-19. 
? Novartis Healthcare Philippines, Inc. Biocamp 2012: Novartis Biotechnology Leadership Camp. Theme: Staying 
Competitive in the Knowledge Economy. Asian Institute of Management Conference Center, Asian Institute of 
Management, Philippines; 2012 Jul 30.  
? 4th Outstanding Young Scientists Inc. (OYSI) Regional Symposium: Optimizing Coastal Resources for Equitable 





As a University Research Associate at the University of the Philippines Diliman, I assisted the Project Investigator in 
supervising the following undergraduate students in their experiments and helped these students in defending their 
research projects and writing their thesis manuscripts: 
? Alfonso HPH (2013) GspIx23 Turritoxin Recombinant Protein Production and Functional Assay in Mice 
? Facun MAM (2013) Fabrication and Characterization of Alginate Scaffolds: Effect of Various Cross-linking Agents 
on 3D Neural Precursor Cell Culture 
? Subosa JF (2013) Development of In Vitro and In Vivo Mouse Models for SWCNT-Immunoliposome-Mediated 




? Obtained an overall Academic IELTS band of 8.0 (Very Good User) and an overall TOEFL iBT score of 114/120 
 
Honoraries, Societies, and Peer Review 
 
Australasian Society for Philosophy and Psychology; Asian Bioethics Association; Society for Neuroscience; 
International Neuroethics Society; Neuroscience Bordeaux Association; Federation of European Neuroscience 
Societies; Dutch Neurofederation; Phi Kappa Phi International Honor Society; Phi Sigma Biological Sciences Honor 
Society; University of the Philippines Molecular Biology and Biotechnology Society; Scientia (official publication of 
the College of Science of the University of the Philippines Diliman; writer from 2008 to 2009) 
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Associate Editor, Journal of Alzheimer’s Disease; Reviewer for Frontiers in Neuroscience, Journal of Parkinsonism 
and Restless Legs Syndrome, Clinical Interventions in Aging, and Frontiers in Clinical Drug Research - Alzheimer 
Disorders 
Software 
Windows, EndNote, Mendeley, SPSS, GraphPad Prism, Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, OneNote, 
Publisher), Adobe (Acrobat, Illustrator, InDesign, PhotoShop), Cyberlink PowerDirector 
Extra-curricular Activities 
? Online technological entrepreneurship class by Prof. Chuck Eesley from Stanford University (April to August 2012): 
Together with teammates from Sweden, Russia, and the USA and under the mentorship of Prof. Reynaldo Garcia, 
conceptualized and developed a business plan for SciTree (http://scitree.org), an online networking platform 
that aims to connect scientists and potential investors or partners from companies/ industries 
? “Startup Boards: Advanced Entrepreneurship”, an online class offered by Professor Clint Korver from Stanford 
University (October to December 2012): Continued development and conceptualization of key features, such as 
complex systems analysis and technology landscaping, for SciTree (http://scitree.org) 
? Extramural language courses (Japanese 1, French 1, and French 2): offered by the Department of Linguistics and 
Department of European Languages at the University of the Philippines Diliman (January 2011 to December 2012) 
Referees 
Lori Bruce, MA: Associate Director, Interdisciplinary Center for Bioethics; Director, Sherwin B. Nuland Summer 
Institute in Bioethics, Yale University, USA; Lori.Bruce@Yale.edu 
Adrian Carter, PhD: Associate Professor (Research), School of Psychological Sciences and Monash Institute of 
Cognitive and Clinical Neurosciences, Monash University, Australia; Adrian.Carter@monash.edu 
Susan Dodds, PhD: Dean and Professor of Philosophy, School of Humanities & Languages, Faculty of Arts & Social 
Sciences, University of New South Wales, Australia; susan.dodds@unsw.edu.au 
Frédéric Gilbert, PhD: ARC DECRA Fellow, Philosophy and Gender Studies Program, School of Humanities, University 
of Tasmania, Australia; fgilbert@utas.edu.au, fredericgilbertt@gmail.com 
Judy Illes, PhD, FRSC, FCAHS: Professor of Neurology and Canada Research Chair in Neuroethics, Division of 
Neurology, Department of Medicine, University of British Columbia, Canada; jilles@mail.ubc.ca 
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